

Rev. Piotr Mazurkiewicz

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland

ORCID: 0000-0003-1079-9904

Cultural diversity versus multiculturalism

Abstract: The text analyzes the differences between cultural diversity (a state meaning coexistence in one area of different cultures) and multiculturalism (ideology). The latter often tries to impose various forms of mixing cultures from above, proclaiming the positive fruits of such activities. For this reason, it omits the nature of man (objective, universal and common to all people), often turns against the national identity in which he sees an obstacle to the emergence of one global universal culture imposed from above. The creators of this ideology have their own system of values, which they often try to implement without the natural law.

Keywords: cultural diversity, multiculturalism, national identity

Abstrakt: Tekst analizuje różnice między wielokulturowością (stanem oznaczającym współistnienie na jednym terenie różnych kultur) a multikulturalizmem (ideologią). Ta druga często odgórnie próbuje narzucić różne formy mieszania się kultur głosząc pozytywne owoce takich działań. Z tego też powodu pomija ona naturę człowieka (obiektywną, uniwersalną i wspólną dla wszystkich ludzi), zwraca się często przeciwko tożsamości narodowej, w której upatruje przeszkodę na rzecz powstania jednej globalnej kultury ogólnoludzkiej narzuconej odgórnie. Twórcy ideologii tej posiadają własny system wartości, który nierzadko próbują realizować z pominięciem prawa naturalnego.

Słowa kluczowe: multikulturalizm, tożsamość narodowa, wielokulturowość

The increased mobility of people means that cultural diversity is a fact that we encounter in all the cities of the western world. This is not a completely new reality. It seems that some kind of diversity has always accompanied the lives of human communities. The idea that at some point in European history there were completely homogeneous communities is rather mythical. The degree of differentiation depended on the time and place. In recent decades, the possibilities

for interaction between different cultures have increased immeasurably [Benedict XVI 2009: 26]. However, if we mention nineteenth-century Polish cities such as Lviv, Vilnius, Warsaw and Łódź, meetings between people belonging to different cultures or religions were part of everyday life [Altermatt 2004: 75]. This was due to the geographical location on the borderline of civilization and the legally established centuries-old practice of tolerance¹. In Western Europe, cultural diversity is mainly a consequence of the decolonization process, the search for hands to work in the post-war period (guest workers), and the process of European integration guaranteeing freedom of movement for EU citizens.

In social sciences, cultural pluralism as a social fact, i.e. the phenomenon of coexistence in one territory of people belonging to different cultures, is distinguished from multiculturalism as an ideology that promotes one specific model of relations between these people and communities, colloquially called *multiculti*. Multicultural society as a fact depends to a small extent on the will of an individual, but political decisions have a significant impact on the shape of this phenomenon (demographic and migration policy, greater or less openness of the state to migrants, choice of migration directions, adopted criteria: cultural proximity, language skills, professed religion, education etc.).

Different interpretations of pluralism

A document entitled “Educating for intercultural dialogue at a Catholic school” was published by the Congregation to Catholic Education [2013] (hereinafter: DI). Living together creating a civilization of love briefly presents three possible attitudes towards the phenomenon of cultural diversity. The first is related to the relativization of the values of individual cultures. According to proponents of this view, there is no objective criterion for evaluating cultures, which indicates that they are equivalent. The consequence is cultural eclecticism. Cultures, treated as essentially equivalent and interchangeable, exist side by side, but are separated from each other [Benedict XVI 2009: 26]. The lack of metacultural criterion – referring to a measure that, as rooted in human nature, transcends

¹ It found confirmation in the act of the Warsaw Confederation, adopted on 28 January 1573, which granted the entire nobility the right to freely choose their faith, at the same time forbidding the state authorities to use any denominational discrimination when distributing offices, land estates or the lease of property belonging to the ruling (*The Confederation of Warsaw of 28th of January 1573: Religious tolerance guaranteed*, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/flagship-project-activities/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-heritage/registered-heritage-page-8/the-confederation-of-warsaw-of-28th-of-january-1573-religious-tolerance-guaranteed/> [Biskupski, Pula 1990].

all cultures [ibid.]² – makes any evaluation of cultures, and thus also authentic intercultural dialogue impossible. “Relativistic «neutrality»”, we read in the note of the Congregation, “in fact, endorses the absolute nature of every culture within its own sphere, and impedes the use of metacultural critical judgement, which would otherwise allow for universal interpretations” (DI 22). In the practice of social life, this leads to “ghettoization”, i.e. the existence of small, closed cultural communities side by side. This phenomenon is visible in many modern Western metropolises. People who from individual ethnic communities find no compelling reason to interact with the dominant culture. Often there is not even a need to learn the local language, since there is no reason to leave one’s district at all. This is part of a wider phenomenon called glocalization. People choose to live in a small local community, largely closed to others, but this community – thanks to electronic media enabling almost unlimited communication with the country of origin – can be located anywhere in the world. A special example that illustrates the lack of the need for cultural rooting in a new place and integration with the majority community is the world of Uber’s services. We get into the car in any city in the world. At the outset, the driver with Arabic, Georgian or Chinese features informs us in English that he does not speak any language that could be the basis of communication. Nor does he know the city where he transports his customers, which is no longer necessary anyway, thanks to GPS navigation. In the future a driver may not even be necessary at all. For now, Uber offers a job that only requires some minimal technical skills.

The second form of response to cultural diversity is the policy of assimilation. Many Western nations are aware that they are being affected – perhaps irreversibly – by the demographic crisis, which will also have very negative economic consequences

² Cf. ibid. “It must certainly be admitted that man always exists in a particular culture, but it must also be admitted that man is not exhaustively defined by that same culture. Moreover, the very progress of cultures demonstrates that there is something in man which transcends those cultures. This “something” is precisely human nature: this nature is itself the measure of culture and the condition ensuring that man does not become the prisoner of any of his cultures, but asserts his personal dignity by living in accordance with the profound truth of his being. To call into question the permanent structural elements of man which are connected with his own bodily dimension would not only conflict with common experience, but would render meaningless Jesus’ reference to the “beginning”, precisely where the social and cultural context of the time had distorted the primordial meaning and the role of certain moral norms (cf. Mt 19:1-9). This is the reason why “the Church affirms that underlying so many changes there are some things which do not change and are ultimately founded upon Christ, who is the same yesterday and today and for ever”. Christ is the “Beginning” who, having taken on human nature, definitively illumines it in its constitutive elements and in its dynamism of charity towards God and neighbour.” [John Paul II 1993: 53].

over time. The severity of this crisis was emphasized by Pope Francis in a speech in the European Parliament, pointing to “a general impression of weariness and aging, of a Europe which is now a «grandmother», no longer fertile and vibrant” [Francis 2014]. The European Großmutter is slowly reaching her end of life. In this context – according to the slogan populate or perish – governments of many countries decide to accept foreigners, but on the condition that they give up their own cultural identity and “blend in” with the dominant community. The cultural difference under this approach is seen as a threat no less than depopulation. This attitude “Rather than indifference towards the other culture, this approach is characterized by the demand for the other person to adapt. An example would be when, in a country with mass immigration, the presence of the foreigner is accepted only on the condition that he renounce his identity and cultural roots so as to embrace those of the receiving country”. (DI 24). In the case of educational models based on assimilation – we read in the note of the Congregation – the *other* must “abandon his cultural references, to take on those of another group or of the receiving country. Exchange is reduced to the mere insertion of minority cultures in the majority one, with little or no attention to the other person’s culture of origin”. (DI 24). The whole game is about whether the indigenous community manages to force assimilation to newcomers before they completely dominate it culturally making room for what is called *le grand remplacement* in the parlance of the right-wing parties [Camus 2011]. However, if the indigenous community does not take the risk of this game, one day it will disappear from history. Cultural diversity is only tolerated as a transitory state. As part of the assimilation process, “minority languages and cultures” are dismantled “like unnecessary scaffolding, once it is recognized that dominant values have been sufficiently mastered by” [Smolicz 2005: 377]. In the case of the assimilation policy – notes Benedict XVI – there is a risk of cultural flattening, harmonizing behavior and lifestyles. In this way, the deep significance of the culture of different nations, the traditions of different peoples, in which a person confronts fundamental existential questions, is lost. [Benedict XVI 2009: 26]. Let us emphasise that the error of both eclecticism and cultural flattening lies in separating culture from human nature and ultimately reducing man to merely cultural fact. “When this happens, humanity runs new risks of enslavement and manipulation“ [ibid.].

The third position proposed in this document is an intercultural approach. It assumes that cultural diversity is a value in itself. Various cultures present different answers to the question about the mystery of God and the mystery of man. A peaceful confrontation of these various answers offers a chance for a more

conscious and in-depth choice of one's own interpretation of the meaning of existence. The authors of the document cite the theological, anthropological and pedagogical reasons behind this approach. Firstly, from a theological perspective, people are called to shape social relationships in the image of the communion of the People of God ["that they may be one, as we are one" (Jn 17:22)]. *"In the light of the revealed mystery of the Trinity, we understand that true openness does not mean loss of individual identity but profound interpenetration"* (DI 37). Secondly, from an anthropological perspective, man is a dialogical being. He is called to live in community, go beyond himself and enter into relationships with other people. Going beyond one's own self can serve to strengthen one's identity. Without it, however, it is not possible to meet one of the deepest needs of man – the desire for love. Thirdly, from the pedagogy of communion, contact is always made between people, not between cultures. Meeting another person who is "different" helps to discover the dignity of every human person and the unity of mankind. It teaches how to transcend oneself and one's own limits, respect a person who is looking for the truth about his existence, deepen relationships with other people³. Cultural differences – according to this model – should be lived in the perspective of the unity of humankind. This approach, as we read in the document of the Congregation, is based on a dynamic concept of culture that avoids both closing and manifesting differences and presenting them in a stereotypical or folkloristic way. Intercultural strategies are effective when they avoid dividing individuals into autonomous and impenetrable cultural worlds, while promoting confrontation, dialogue, and mutual change to enable coexistence and face potential conflicts. Ultimately, the point is to develop a new intercultural approach aimed at integrating cultures in mutual recognition of one's existence (DI 28). Benedict XVI emphasizes that for intercultural dialogue to be fruitful, "has to set out from a deep-seated knowledge of the specific identity of the various dialogue partners" [Benedict XVI 2009: 26]. Therefore, the condition for such a dialogue is not cultural relativism, but having a strong cultural identity.

Man is always in a culture. The child's learning of speech is a great illustration of this fact. We talk about a mother tongue, but the mother does not invent the language in which she communicates with her child. She uses the language with which she has been equipped by a specific community, words whose meaning has

³ As an example of the possibility of learning life-important things from non-Christian cultures, I quote an Indian story: "Grandfather Indian explains to his grandson: 'In life you will always be accompanied by two wolves: black and white. They will constantly fight with each other.' 'And who will win?' asks the grandson. 'The one whom you feed.'"

developed over the centuries. However, this culture and language are not given once and for all as static realities. The dynamic concept of culture dominates Catholic teaching. Culture is not a reality closed once and for all. It still interacts with other cultures and gives his own answers in this confrontation. We do not know what fate is written for each of the currently existing cultures (DI 4). There is no certainty that it will survive the confrontation – hence it takes courage to enter into dialogue – but first the closed cultures will die, which – avoiding the confrontation – will marginalise themselves, and thus in some sense are already dead.

The fact that there is no single culture pattern, pure culture (DI 3) – let us be reminded – does not mean that any evaluation of cultures is not possible. However, the criterion for assessing individual elements of culture is anthropological. In the light of the Christian vision of man, we ask, therefore, what in a given culture serves the true good of the person and his integral development, and what does this development hinder or prevent. At the same time, there is the task of cleansing cultures of “all inhuman elements” (DI 20). Relativity of cultures does not mean relativism (DI 42).

Readiness for intercultural dialogue implies the existence of a strong cultural identity. Therefore, in the process of upbringing, people need to instill awareness of their own roots, and provide opportunities to learn about one’s own religion and certain aspects of other religions (DI 18). In dialogue, it is not just about respecting each other: this process implies questioning preconceived judgment so that everyone can understand and discuss the other person’s point of view (DI 43). This is especially evident when confronted with various forms of atheism and non-religious concepts of humanism (DI 12; 72). In the face of secularization processes that marginalize religious experience and deeper anthropological reflection, “dialogue of life” is not a compromise, but a place of fidelity to one’s Christian identity. Inter-religious dialogue should also be seen as a space for mutual testimony of believers belonging to different religions in order to get to know each other’s religion and ethical attitudes better and better. Mutual respect and understanding, trust and friendship increase due to direct and objective meeting of other people as well as religious and ethical requirements that characterize his credo and practice. To be true, this dialogue must be clear, avoid relativism and syncretism, and be guided by sincere respect for others and a spirit of reconciliation and brotherhood (DI 15). Therefore, we have highlighted certain aspects of moral and intellectual attitudes, but above all the need to be faithful to our own Christian belief.

The ideology of multiculturalism

In the document of the Congregation for Catholic Education to describe attitudes towards cultural diversity, two terms are used: cultural diversity (*multiculturalita*) and multiculturalism (*multiculturalismo*). The former refers to cultural diversity as a social fact. The second involves an ideology according to which this fact should be debated, because a multicultural society is “culturally richer” and presents “greater value” than a monocultural society. The word multiculturalism in the text itself falls only in the context of the second relativistic approach. The above distinction, present in many modern languages, does not actually exist in English, unless we consider cultural pluralism the equivalent of cultural diversity. The distinction between the relations within cultural communities already existing in a given territory and the political program that stipulates that such pluralism is to be supported or is yet to occur is of fundamental importance when it comes to any meaningful discourse on this topic. The word is used to describe a dispute of the communal type (e.g. between the Francophone and English-speaking community in Canada), a postcolonial dispute (e.g. between the Arab and Francophone community in France), and the dispute about the identity of the so-called new minorities do not help in understanding the nature of each of these phenomena.

We would like to recall that Will Kymlicka, one of the main propagators of multiculturalism, distinguishes three contexts in which liberalism requires supplementation with group-specific rights. This involves *self-government rights*, *polyethnic rights* and *to special representation rights* [Kymlicka 1997: 367]. The first of the highlighted situations does not apply to multiculturalism, because it is about traditional indigenous minorities in a given area and the possibility of applying for autonomy or federation of the state. The second situation is about new arrivals from different cultural or civilization circles and their right to be non-discriminated in the “new homeland”, i.e. to preserve their own culture with the right to exclude certain obligations imposed by law on all citizens. Most often this happens in a postcolonial context. Kymlicka speaks of the need to separate politics from nationality, similar to the separation of politics and religion previously made. The third case is about some form of so-called positive discrimination and affirmative policy towards the various minority groups that make up a given society. This applies to both ethnic minorities and the so-called new minorities. Therefore, the last two political demands are strictly in the context of multiculturalism [ibid.” 367-370]. At the root of this way of thinking, we have the assumption that democracy, as the rule of a mathematical majority, inherently discriminates against minority groups, and therefore, in the name of justice, demands correction

in the form of overrepresentation of minority groups. So democracy is no longer enough. Democratization of democracy is still needed [Giddens 1998: 70-78]. If discrimination here means a violation of the principles of justice, it is not clear which concept of justice has been adopted. Alain Touraine sees the historical guilt of democracy in its connection with the idea of a nation-state. By establishing the same legal norms as binding for everyone, the national-democratic model is responsible for the stigmatization and marginalization of all minority groups recognized as less valuable (*inferior*). In this way, cultural diversity is destroyed and authoritarian rationalization is introduced, which is a prerequisite for the victory of political universalism. According to Touraine, this model of liberal democracy, which unifies within the nation-state before our eyes is exhausted [Touraine 2000: 158-162].

At the opposite pole, Roger Scruton defines multiculturalism as follows: "Multiculturalism signifies the approach which tries to give as much representation as possible, within legal, political and educational institutions, to minority cultures" [Scruton 2007: 455]. Summing up Kymlicka's views, Monika Bartoszewicz states that it goes much further: "Multiculturalism is based (...) on the belief that emigrants should not be forced to abandon their traditional cultures, but on the contrary – they should be encouraged to cultivate them, and this should be borne by the indigenous inhabitants of the country that receives the emigrants. The inherent consequence of this is that the law in force in the country will have to be adapted to the needs of new arrivals." [Bartoszewicz 2018: 58]. So it is not just about representation, but about freeing minority groups from having to adapt to the dominant culture associated with cultural colonization [Touraine 2000: 168].

According to Monika Bartoszewicz, all problems related to multiculturalism result from the "founder's error", i.e. the universal opposition of the supporters of it to attempts to clearly define what "culture" really is. So, what are the advocates of multiculturalism demanding? Is it only about allowing in the public space a variety of costumes, kitchens, dances or recognized as characteristic for a given group of sports disciplines? Or is it the right for Hare Krishna, LGBT and anti-fascists to walk around Oxford Circus from time to time? Perhaps, however, the term culture means something completely different? When a priest from South America, who had been working in Warsaw for many years, decided to apply for Polish citizenship, he was asked at the migration office whether he ate hunter's stew and sour cucumbers. Visitors from distant cultures associate both traditional Polish dishes with rotting food. When he answer affirmatively, without unnecessary questions

about knowledge of Polish history or the constitution, he received citizenship. Does every applicant for citizenship have to pass the “sour cucumber” test? Rick Muir [2007: 10] rebels against such criteria. He writes: *There should be no cricket test.* After all, in every traditional community we have people who do not dance, are not interested in sport or are on a diet. Does “failing” the “cricket test” exclude them from belonging to the community? Is the fact that during a Germany vs Turkey football match some of the inhabitants of the block hang a German flag on the balcony and for others a Turkish flag is enough to say that they belong to different cultures? During the 2012 European Football Championship, a poster appeared showing the figure of the somewhat confused Emperor Franz Josef. Under the photo was the inscription: “Austria – Hungary, but against whom?” National borders are changing, which does not mean that people who, due to the war, have changed their citizenship not changing their place of residence should also change regional costumes and culinary habits.

However, what if cultural differences do not boil down to culinary or sports preferences? As far as the “sour cucumber” test is concerned, but the killing of “the exceeded number” of daughters, forced circumcision of women, child marriages, polygamy, honor killings, the death penalty for homosexual relations, slavery or cannibalism? Put simply, when it comes to adherence to the basic moral norms that the West has adopted under the influence of Christianity, should we encourage people to live alongside us to cultivate their traditional patterns of behavior? There is no doubt that the attitude to fundamental ethical norms and ethical evaluation of the above conduct are not common to all cultures. There is an opinion that the ethical minimum common to all civilizations includes only four universal principles: condemnation of theft in one’s own community, condemnation of adultery and incest, condemnation of betrayal of one’s own community, as well as respect for parents and the elderly. However, even with this minimum of rules, their content is interpreted differently⁴. It seems that a defined common cultural minimum is not enough to build a multicultural society on its basis.

Austria – Hungary, but against whom?

Contrary to appearances, this is a very serious question. If the ideology of multiculturalism aims to build a “new society”, then the question arises: at whose cost? At the starting point of the policy of multiculturalism, we find the theoretical

⁴ A set of these principles after Feliks Koneczny [1997] is provided by Monika Bartoszewicz [2018: 54-55].

thesis that humanity has entered a post-identity era. Therefore, cultural differences have become socially insignificant. The place of Christian universalism, which takes the existence of a common human nature as the foundation of a universal community, is occupied by globalism with its desire to establish *global governance* and a global *melting pot*. We are dealing here with a dispute between two different visions of man and the world, which Matthieu Bock-Côté [2019: 318] defines as a dispute between the social contract camp and the heritage and rooting camp. The first camp strives to globalize political ties while the second mainly goes back to its own history. The first wants to make “man be the same everywhere”, but not because of any common nature and the resulting norms of natural law, but because of the equal right to self-creation, i.e. to unrestricted change of the content of their own being (e.g. thanks to development bio-technology and neuroscience) [Zybertowicz et al. 2015] and the sense of their own existence. In extreme form: to become a post-human being (transhumanism). For nobility may demand that we finish man once and for all and replace him with a more perfect post-human being. Since it was Western civilization that invented the natural, impassable limits of human action that impede this process, it should be overthrown. The second camp refers to memory and continuity, but not to “live in a museum, but to find the best part of the heritage that protects us against demiurgical temptation, which lies the pursuit of progress, ordering forget about man’s limitations” [Bock-Côté 2019: 320].

According to Bock-Côté, multiculturalism, i.e. the idea of equality of cultures, was promoted after 1968 by the new left aware of the inevitable defeat of Marxism⁵. It was to be a tool for the “democratic” takeover of power over the majority by the minority. This thought closely refers to the program developed by Antonio Gramsci “to introduce communist policy not from below, in the form of a revolutionary movement, but by consistently eliminating the prevailing hegemony (...), for a long march from institution to institution” [Scruton 2019: 204]. Therefore, the goal is a kind of coup d’état carried out by communist intellectuals, which means giving up violence and moving the revolution from the streets and factories to the world of high culture: to universities, schools and theatres [ibid.: 208]. This revolution is taking place “gently” and “from above”. Hence, at some stage of the “acquisition of institutions”, there is also a phenomenon which Douglas Murray calls “State-sponsored multiculturalism” [Murray 2017: 98]. The mastery of state

⁵ “At a time when the historic edifice of Marxism collapses, it is necessary to save what determines the greatness of Marx’s thought, the search for dramas and fights through which people create their history,” wrote Alain Touraine [1979: 96].

institutions and cultural institutions means that proponents of multiculturalism take control of the means and resources that they can now use to create their vision of society from above. Criticism of Western civilization, deconstruction of Western traditions, slogan of anti-racism, anti-fascism, redefinition of human rights, non-discrimination policy based on a “new anthropology” or the domination of law over politics are elements of a political project [Bock-Côté 2019: 303-309]. The goal is not just to make some “civilizational correction”, but to finally free man from Western civilization as such. A civilization that imposes socially constructed roles, distances man from himself, which is a synonym of deep alienation [cf. *ibid.*: 94].

According to Samuel Huntington, the hostility of multiculturalism to Western civilization is not accidental. In his opinion, multiculturalism is the quintessence of anti-European civilization. It is, in fact, a movement aimed at overthrowing the hegemony of the European value system. Practiced on European soil, it is directed primarily against the monopoly of the Christian faith and the Christian way of organizing social life. The monoculture that is being fought here means nothing but Christian culture⁶. In no other sense has Europe been monocultural. “Western civilization freed [thanks to multiculturalism] finally from itself,” writes Bock-Côté, “will now be able to blend with humanity” [*ibid.*: 123]. In this sense, multiculturalism, which has been revealed even in the form of opposition to the inclusion in the preamble of the EU Constitutional Treaty of a reference to Christianity as a historical and social fact – says Philippe Nemo – is in fact negationism. The word referring, firstly, to the denial of another historical event – the Holocaust – was recalled here by Nemo with full awareness [Nemo 2010: 62]⁷.

⁶ “Multiculturalism is in its essence anti-European civilization. It is, as one scholar said, a «movement opposed to the monocultural hegemony of Eurocentric values, which has generally resulted in the marginalization of other cultural values... [It is opposed to] narrow Eurocentric concepts of American democratic principles, culture, and identity». It is basically an anti-Western ideology” [Huntington, 2005: 173]. A different approach, it seems, is represented by Cardinal Josef de Kesel: “Perhaps the biggest challenge for the Church in Europe, and it’s also an opportunity, because it helps us to rediscover our roots and our mission, is to wholeheartedly accept secularised society. It must be understood that Christianity was, for a long time, the cultural religion in Europe. Today this is no longer the case. And it would be dangerous to go back because it is always dangerous to have one religious tradition that obtains a monopoly. This is true for Christianity, for Islam...for any religion” [Kesel 2019].

⁷ During a lecture in Warsaw as part of the “John Paul II: Foundations of Democracy” conference on 31.05.2019, Joseph Weiler mentioned his conversation with Valéry Giscard d’Estaing on the subject of reference to Christianity in the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty. D’Estaing hid the fact that he wanted to introduce Christianity to the treaty, but

Bock-Côté also emphasizes that the attack on Western world values, historical identity or national sovereignty is – as mentioned – a kind of more or less conscious sabotage against the foundations of a democratic libertarian political order. “People [especially in Central Europe] did not fight totalitarianism only to defend their rights, but also to defend their country, their culture and civilization” [Nemo 2010: 312]. Forgetting this inseparable link, European policy is made unrealistic. A universalist Europe based on a multi-cult ideology detached from reality will not last long in a post-universal world.

Pedagogy of shame

Writing about the changes that are taking place in the functioning of the global democracy Chantal Delsol stated that one of the main tools used today to solve the problems related to the validity and analysis of indicators and ideological opponents is sneering and mockery. Delsol compares them to a “dirty atomic bomb” [Delsol 2019: 51]. Mockery – writes Delsol – I understand here in the original meaning of the French word *derision* referring to the Latin *deridere*, which means “to ridicule” but also “to deprive of sense”. To mock is not necessarily ridicule to destroy, but above all, and sometimes even exclusively, for nothing. It should be clarified that mockery or laughter helps a lot in invalidating. To taunt is a desecration of sense [2019: 51-52]. Mockery and mockery as tools of ideological struggle can be more deadly than naked violence. “Using sarcasm and destroying someone’s reputation, self-esteem, and therefore a sense of soul, can be more severe and cruel than the use of naked violence. Body scars are often shallower than soul scars.” [ibid.: 54].

To make this point clear, Delsol cites contemporary criticism of religion as an example. It starts with a quote from the Marquis de Sade [Sade 1909: 212-213.], who dreamed that people spending their free time in the temple, would see devotion like a visit to the theatre, where everyone can laugh at themselves and make fun of everyone. “Enough gods, if you do not want their dark kingdom to overwhelm you soon in all the atrocities of despotism; but you will destroy them only when you mock them. All the dangers that they carry will drop you like a pack of wolves if you care about them and pay attention to them. Do not overthrow these idols in anger; destroy them in play, and fame will leave them alone.”. Undoubtedly, Max

there was no consensus. Weiler was to say, “So you should have written it into the project you wrote yourself, and then there would have been no consensus to remove it.” The former French president was supposed to have said, “Monsieur, vous êtes méchant.”

Stirner, one of the creators of nihilism, is a continuator of this thought⁸. Leszek Kołakowski notes that Stirner does not invent a new, perfect society, but merely aims to overthrow the existing one, in the name of the value he himself promotes [1999: 26-27]. Kołakowski [2014: 536] also describes the same phenomenon at the stage of its contemporary implementation. “Jesus is ridiculed, but we know he’s right, and we don’t even openly question it. How is it possible? Furthermore, there are people who really practice Christian virtues but would never dare to preach them. Those who dare – priests or lay people – to proclaim the Gospel commandments on greed and riches, compassion and love on their own behalf, expose themselves to ridicule – it is not said: ‘it is not true’, but rather: ‘it is frivolous, it is ridiculous’. (...) In short, in the educated or semi-educated classes of our societies, to be a Christian is a shame – not even because Christianity does not enjoy intellectual respect, but because it is morally ridiculous.”⁹

Delsol points out that the sneering practice is selective. There are things that can be laughed at and things that fall under the umbrella of political correctness. Hence the question about the accepted sneering admissibility key. “Why can’t you make fun of Christ and not make fun of Auschwitz?” [Delsol 2016: 63]. Why is it possible to croak at the sight of a large family and not to be surprised at the sight

⁸ “Whether what I think and do” he writes, “is Christian, what do I care? Whether it is human, liberal, humane, whether unhuman, illiberal, what do I ask about that? If only it accomplishes what I want, if only I satisfy myself in it, then overlay it with predicates as you will; it is all alike to me. [...] I shall shudder no more before a thought, let it appear as presumptuous and ‘devilish’ [...] neither shall I recoil from any deed because there dwells in it a spirit of godlessness, immorality, wrongfulness [...]”. And he adds, “Perhaps I too, in the very next moment, defend myself against my former thoughts; I too am likely to change suddenly my mode of action; but not on account of its not corresponding to Christianity, not on account of its running counter to the eternal rights of man, not on account of its affronting the idea of mankind, humanity, and humanitarianism, but – because I am no longer all in it, because it no longer furnishes me any full enjoyment, because I doubt the earlier thought or no longer please myself in the mode of action just now practiced” [Stirner 2014: 459-460].

⁹ Similar attention was noted by Archbishop Fulton Sheen: “The Church has felt this moral decline. She notes the complete absence of rational objections against her. Never before has she been so impoverished for good strong intellectual opposition as at the present time. There are no foemen worthy of her steel. The opposition today is not intellectual, but moral. Men are no longer objecting to the Church because of the way they think, but because of the way they live. They no longer have difficulty with her Creed, but with her commandments. They remain outside her saving waters, not because they cannot accept the doctrine of Three Persons in one God but because they cannot accept the moral of two persons in one flesh; not because Infallibility is too complex, but because avoidance of Birth Control is too hard; not because the Eucharist is too sublime, but because Penance is too exacting. Briefly, the heresy of our day is not the heresy of thought – it is the heresy of action.” [Sheen 2003: VII].

of a half-naked man in a bra? Why does liberal censorship allow Charlie Hebdo to function and block any suspected homophobia on Facebook? Delsol says: “there is a hidden ideology behind mockery that turns out to be somewhat hollow; it only manifests itself in what escapes mockery, avoiding unequivocally advocating for any values.” [ibid.: 63-64]. In other words: it is not about destroying everything, but about deconstructing European tradition to make room for other values.

The ideological nature of the dispute contributes to its radicalization. On the one hand, there are people in the conflict who are proud of the achievements of Western civilization, while on the other there are those who recognize it as the source of all misery for humanity. On the one hand, some believe that the continuity of tradition should be maintained, while others work on its deconstruction, trying to replace it with some “new”, more egalitarian version. So we have a “camp of pride” and “camp of shame and remorse” in belonging to the West. Ivan Krastev [2017: 76-77, 89-96] in the work “After Europe” states that the essence of today’s political dispute in the West is the issue of the loyalty of the political elites. The old distinction between left and right has been replaced – in his opinion – by a conflict between internationalists and nativists. So we have bureaucratic and meritocratic elites striving to build a world without borders, which the people consider unbelievable in the event of any deeper crisis. We have “people from Anywhere” who are in constant motion and in a moment of serious turbulence simply move to another region of the world, and “people from Here”, rooted in the local community, who can be counted on, because they will not go anywhere. So we have the “no loyalty” and “no exit” elites, a party of people who care only about themselves and a party of people on whom others can count, because they are willing to make sacrifices in the name of social bonds similar to family ties.

At the heart of the dispute lies the question: what society and what policy does the global economy need? However, it is also of a moral nature, and one of the ways of fighting is to assert moral superiority. “Progressivism,” according to Bock-Côté Côté [2019: 313], “conceals the temptation of fanaticism and paves the way for the practice of dealing with ‘reactionaries’ of public enemies, enemies of humanity, whose hostility towards progress shows a reluctance to emancipate man”. The conviction that they have some knowledge of a perfect society and of their own moral superiority means that political opponents are not treated as partners in a rational debate, but various educational measures are applied to them. In the event of failure of pedagogical activities, it is always possible to prevent the expression of “backward” political opinions, e.g. through censorship [ibid.]. The “pedagogy of shame” is based on the belief that the past is nothing but pathology. Its defenders

are not partners for discussion since they are backward, not very intelligent, and above all responsible for centuries of discrimination against various minorities. Rather, they deserve re-education. History becomes a battlefield and an object of moral blackmail. “If you do not want to accept our vision of history, then you belong to the party of executioners oppressing victims of which we are the obvious representatives” – as Paul-Francois Paoli summarizes this position [2006: 45]. Remorse serves as a tool to disarm society and break it into hostile competing groups. The attitude towards the Holocaust here becomes a pedagogical model that should be applied to other historical and alleged crimes.

Bock-Côté Côté [2019: 128] analyses the phenomenon of ridicule and embarrassment from the point of view of its importance for defending societies against the ideology of multiculturalism. He reminds that “every society needs a narrative that structures its imaginary and concretizes the human need to belong to a community.” It is impossible to ensure the durability of a community without even a minimal guarantee of the stability of the sense of dignity resulting from belonging to that community. From this point of view, the lack of narrative continuity is a serious threat [Bartoszewicz 2018: 39]. Meanwhile, Western societies have learned to be ashamed of their own history, treating it as deeply burdened with indelible guilt. This leads to weakening the immune system of Western societies and leading them to agree to their complete transformation.” [Bock-Côté 2019: 131-132]. It is not about the necessary ability to distinguish between good and evil in its historical forms, the ability to recognize unethical activities in the history of one’s own community, and then to rationally and emotionally distance oneself to them in order to be able to establish new relations based on historical truth with other communities. In the case of the “pedagogy of shame”, which is used by the ideology of multiculturalism, it is about undermining the sense and value of the entire history of a given community. “Only the negation of everything that is Western, everything that the West has ever produced can satisfy the people of that West today,” writes Jacques Ellul.¹⁰ This is expressed in the suicidal “desire

¹⁰ “We are witnessing a mysterious phenomenon throughout Europe and America. We are caught in a gigantic procession of whips tearing apart themselves and each other with the worst lashes. We have dressed up so that no one can recognize the virtues of the people of our world, we have smeared with paint and blood to show our contempt for everything that has created our greatness. And we scourge hysterically for crimes we have not committed. We participate with joy and enthusiasm only in what denies, destroys, degenerates what was the work of the West. We walk around his body and spit in his face. If the nineteenth century has betrayed because of a good conscience (which has never been true of the West), we betray it because of a bad conscience that is on the verge of pure delirium.” [Ellul 2016].

to lead to its own fall at all costs, providing with its own hands the ruin of its fortresses and the irrationality of its own reason.” [Ellul 2016]. The authors of the Paris Statement emphasize the “utopian detachment from reality” of the project of multiculturalism, which “trades on the Christian ideal of universal charity in an exaggerated and unsustainable form.” For example, “to demand or even promote the assimilation of Muslim newcomers to our manners and mores, much less to our religion, has been thought a gross injustice. A commitment to equality, we have been told, demands that we abjure any hint that we believe our culture superior. [...] It requires from the European peoples a saintly degree of self-abnegation. We are to affirm the very colonization of our homelands and the demise of our culture as Europe’s great twenty-first century glory—a collective act of self-sacrifice for the sake of some new global community of peace and prosperity that is being born” [The Paris Statement 2017: 17]. The proposed community is in fact – according to the authors of the Declaration – neither universal nor a community. It is rather followed by a prejudice to real, historical communities – in this case to their own European past – and recognition that “to be an orphan—to be homeless—is a noble achievement”. [ibid.: 2] Quasi-religious belief in the inevitable progress means that the propagators of multiculturalism are “unable to acknowledge the defects in the post-national, post-cultural world they are constructing” [ibid.: 3]. They believe uncritically that new is always better than traditional.

The suicidal tendency in European culture – according to Ellul – consists of three elements. The first is the fascination with pure negation. It’s about some kind of “intellectual sadism,” which derives delirious pleasure from self-denial and destruction, to the deconstruction of the language. The effect is to prevent communication not only within one’s own community, but communication in general. The second element is the fascination with movement/change devoid of any direction. The world is gaining speed, which is so impressive that the passengers inside the speeding vehicle do not ask at all about the purpose of the ride¹¹. The third element is ever-accelerating persistent repetition (*le ressassement dans l’accélération*). Wherever a new idea (a new thought) appears it is immediately repeated by pseudoscientists in thousands of books published in the most scientific publications, which makes the West – in Ellul’s [2016] opinion – completely thoughtless. For people think that in the humanities or social sciences

¹¹ “We know the risks associated with pesticides and artificial fertilizers, and yet we are spreading them in ever increasing doses ... we know that we added some arsenic to each bowl of broth, and yet – like masochists – we drink a bowl of broth day after day, pushed to this superior force over our will. We accelerate forever and no matter where we are going.” [ibid.]

– as in the field of exact sciences or technology – you do not need to think for yourself, but just “keep up to date” and copy in your books ill-considered ideas. The authors of the Paris Statement [2017] emphasize that while universities have always been the pride of European civilisation, today – as a consequence of the extraordinary success of the strategy developed by Gramsci – are active subjects of ongoing cultural deconstruction. They “produce cohorts of indoctrinated political activists with little or no knowledge of the foundational texts of our political tradition, the greatest works of Western literature, or the most enduring political debates that have shaped the Western democratic tradition” [Michta 2019]. Rather than serve to convey a shared cultural heritage, universities and colleges have become a place of betrayal of European cultural heritage and indoctrination of young people with a culture of rejection; they “equate critical thinking with a simpleminded repudiation of the past” [The Paris Statement 2017: 21].

Multiculturalism and the category of the nation

One area of special activity for ideologists of multiculturalism is the category of nation and national identity. In a sense, multiculturalism aims to break up the monocultural nation into a series of small communities, some of which have already functioned as ethnic or religious minorities¹², other were just constructed through identity policy and affirmative action (e.g., communities built around sexual identity issues) leading to the proliferation of claiming groups and divisions within those groups [Wallerstein 1999: 115]. We must not forget about the migration policy that constantly creates newcomers communities poorly integrated with each other (unintegrated suspended communities). Therefore, the cultural and identity margins of Western civilisation are stretched in search of new classes of the oppressed, in order to mobilise them “in the service of the revolution” [Bock- Côté 2019: 103]. According to Michta, the effect of these activities is the fragmentation of societies (ghettoisation) and the accompanying weakening of the idea of citizenship, seen almost exclusively in terms of the rights of individual groups, without any reference to their obligations to the wider community [Michta 2019]. Citizenship – writes Jane Matlary – has been “deconstructed” and replaced by a sense of belonging to “tribal” communities claiming their own rights (tribalism) [Matlary 2019].

¹² This area, for example, includes Charles Taylor’s work on Canadian multiculturalism [Taylor et al. 1994].

Historical memory is a special battlefield for multiculturalists. Monocultural nations, which they oblige to deconstruct, are historical creations, and their moral delegitimation requires undermining the legitimacy of their origin. This work begins with the deconstruction of official legends supporting political legitimacy. The emergence of nations – according to this narrative – is not associated with any noble acts (religious conversion of the ruler, bravery in a winning battle, etc.), but with relations of domination, exclusion and discrimination [Bock- Côté 2019: 133]. The lack of universal awareness of this fact results only from the fact that the official history is written from the position of the winners. Therefore, history should be rewritten, and since it is intended to mobilise groups hitherto marginalised to “revolutionary service”, this must be done from the position of victims. Hence the historical remorse, penitential ideology, celebration of the memory of victims, etc. The inhabitants of Central Europe experience the fact that – due to the existence of the “iron curtain” separating them from the debates after World War II in the free world – the official history of Europe is written from the position of the West, completely ignoring their point of view. Hence the sudden popularity in Central Europe of historical policy and new “historical” disputes, e.g. about responsibility for the Holocaust. How much truth is in the statement that Poles created extermination camps and that “this unique military operation [in Normandy] eventually brought [Germans] liberation from the Nazis” [Merkel 2019]? Central Europeans are aware that history is sometimes written from the winners’ position, and reaching out with historical narrative based on facts is an important task for scientists. In the deconstruction of the historical narrative and the conversion of “historical consciousness into a great construction site” [Bock- Côté 2019: 134] “but it’s about something other than reaching the historical truth. It’s about writing the story of victims, but these historical victims must first be invented.” The existence of discriminated groups often depends on their administrative and statistical recognition, notes Bock-Côté, “and discrimination becomes sociologically visible only when it is politically constructed by a state that has decided to reprogram socialization mechanisms to adapt it to the ideal of pure egalitarian transparency between individuals and, moreover, between groups whose political promotion is supported.” [ibid.: 206-207]. On the one hand, this support consists in introducing their name to empirical research and law, on the other, it is about providing them access to public finances.

The first element of the identity engineering process is the denationalisation of historical consciousness [Bock-Cote 2008]. An important moral argument

is invoked here: national identity – as Etienne Balibar¹³ claims, for example – always has a racist character. Therefore, the concept of national identity should be remodelled in a multicultural way. Immanuel Wallerstein states that the logic of affirmative action leading to the proliferation of claim groups resulted in the accusation of “reverse racism”, i.e. the legal privilege of previously marginalised groups. Therefore, it was proposed that instead of “integrating” marginalised groups, equality of groups should be sought. “Whereas affirmative action found legitimation in the liberal concept of the perfect equality of all citizens, the concept of group equality found legitimacy in the liberal concept of the self-determination of nations” [Balibar 1999: 115]. “The path of group identity,” writes Wallerstein, “has involved the rejection of the concept of integration entirely. Why, said its proponents, should marginalized groups want to integrate into dominant groups? The very concept of integration involves, they argued, the assumption of biological or at least biocultural hierarchy. It assumes that the group into which one is being called to integrate is, in some way, superior to the group that has been marginalized” [ibid.]. Meanwhile, the only reason for gaining a dominant position in history was the size of these groups. The so-called national culture should therefore no longer abuse its demographic privileges, especially since it is no longer a majority culture [Bock-Côté 2019: 171]. The demand for recognition of equality of groups ultimately leads to the breakup of the notion of a cultural nation. Managing society by necessity requires the creation of a “rainbow” coalition of all those marginalised. A side effect is the division of groups into further subgroups. According to Wallerstein, the difficulty is related to the very concept of citizenship, which is always both inclusive and exclusive. “The concept of citizen makes no sense unless some are excluded from it” [1999: 117]. Therefore, in order to find a solution, one should go beyond the very concept of citizenship, get rid of the citizen and replace him with someone else. Perhaps this trend includes the pursuit of global citizenship, which frees the individual from the obligation to integrate with anyone.

Let us recall once again of the need to distinguish cultural diversity as a social fact from the ideology of multiculturalism. In the first sense, it is about finding a

¹³ “What would clearly be true for other societies, such as that of the US for example, is in fact also true for our own: racism is anchored in material structures (including psychical and sociopolitical structures) of very long standing, which are an integral part of what is called national identity” [Balibar 2011: 218]. Balibar and Wallerstein adopt a very broad definition of racism here.

common form of life in a community that is culturally diverse. The second is about an ideology that seeks to break up culturally homogeneous communities¹⁴. This ideology is being tried to be applied both to the European civilisation community and to national communities. In the first case, the enemy is Christian culture, which guarantees the religious and axiological homogeneity of Europe, in the second – traditional, homogeneous national cultures. It is worth emphasising once again that multiculturalism calls into question the achievements of liberal democracy so far, proposing either its reconstruction or its replacement by illiberal democracy¹⁵.

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¹⁴ “On n’est pas là pour décorer, on détruira votre société” (“We are not here to please. We are here to destroy society”) – such a slogan appeared on the LGBT march, which took place in the French capital in Saturday, 29 June 2019 P.-A. Depauw, *Le lobby LGBT assume vouloir détruire la société* [<https://medias-catholique.info/le-lobby-lgbt-assume-vouloir-detruire-la-societe/30213>].

¹⁵ Alain Touraine, rejecting both the republican, communitarian and liberal projects, proposes constructing national unity around the issue of defending the individual’s right to have an individual life project and a specific way (it is not known exactly) the reconciliation of identity and instrumentality [Touraine 2000: 229-230].

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