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Secular religions
and the religious/secular divide

Abstrakt: Od czasu kiedy Karl Schmitt po raz pierwszy opisał pewne współczesne ideologie jako świeckie analogie systemów religijnych, dalsze poszukiwanie takich teologii politycznych, lub – w szerszym sensie – politycznych lub świeckich religii, stało się czymś w rodaju mody. Wszystkie te podejścia równocześnie utrzymują, że polityczne i świeckie teologie i religie nie są „prawdziwymi” teologiami i religiami, a tylko „z tego świata”, „zapożyczonymi”, „pseudo”, „quasi” czy „ersatz” wersjami oryginału. Niemniej jednak, szybki przegląd literatury przedmiotu może rodzić pewne wątpliwości co do samej możliwości dokonania wyraźnego rozróżnienia: ludzie/społeczeństwo w myśli demokratycznej, proletariat w komunizmie, państwo w religii świeckiej, rynek albo pieniądze w poszczególnych szkołach ekonomicznych, czy Matka Natura w głębokiej ekologii (żeby tylko wymienić kilka przykładów) wydają się nie bardziej empirycznymi jednostkami niż transcendentalny Absolut w kilku „prawdziwych” religiach. Dlatego też mówienie o „świeckości” – przynajmniej w powyższych przypadkach – bardziej zaciemnia niż rozjaśnia – szczególnie fakt, że te ideologie mogą rywalizować z tradycyjnymi religiami właśnie dlatego, że należą one do tej samej kategorii. Nazywanie ich świeckimi będzie tylko pomagało im aby odróżniać się jako bardziej „obiektywne”, „realistyczne” czy „naukowe” niż tradycyjne systemy religijne, co najprawdopodobniej nie jest prawdą.

Słowa kluczowe: religie polityczne, religie świeckie, sekularyzm

Abstract: Since Carl Schmitt first described some modern political ideologies as the secular analogues of religious belief systems, it has become something of a fashion to find further examples of such political theologies, or – in a broader sense – political or secular religions. All these attempts simultaneously maintain that political and secular theologies and religions are not “real” theologies and religions, only “this-worldly”, “immanent”, “pseudo”, “quasi”, or “ersatz” versions of the latter. However, a brief overview of the topic’s literature may nevertheless
raise doubts about the very possibility of making a clear distinction: the People in democratic thought, the Proletariat in communism, the State in civil religion, the Market or Money in certain schools of economics, or Mother Nature in deep ecology (just to mention a few) seem no more empirical entities than the transcendent Absolute of several “genuine” religions. Speaking of “secular” – at least in these cases – therefore obscures more than it reveals – especially the fact that such ideologies can be rivals to traditional religions precisely because they belong to the same category. To call them secular will only help them to distinguish themselves as more “objective”, “realistic”, or “scientific” than traditional belief systems, which is most likely not the case.

Keywords: political religions, civil religions, secularization

Introduction
Treating certain – self-professedly secular – belief systems, political ideologies, socio-economic theories, or phenomena as diverse as entertainment or science as covertly or unconsciously religious has a long history. “Long” in this case means starting with the first modern attempts to separate the secular from the religious, and the most remarkable fact is that with such attempts, almost immediately appeared the suspicion that this separation was, in most cases, more apparent than real.

To find a sufficiently broad term that would cover all the phenomena involved has always been notoriously difficult. “Secular religion” is just one option among others; in a more specific context, “civil religion”, “political religion”, and “political theology” have also been used; just as “pseudo”, “quasi”, or “ersatz” religion; or, to cite more author-specific examples, “inner-worldly religion”, “immanent faith”, “lay spirituality”, or “laicized mysticism;” not to mention those which simply spoke of “new” religions without any further distinction.

All this already points to a profound uncertainty about the whole enterprise, but before arriving at the roots of this uncertainty, let us first take a brief look at the history of such comparisons. Afterwards we may turn to the terminological problems of speaking about “secular”, “civil”, “political”, “pseudo”, “quasi”, “ersatz”, etc. entities on the one hand, and maintaining that they remain a religion, a faith, a spirituality, or a mysticism on the other. The fundamental problem is obviously that of definitions, most importantly the definition of “religion”, which the present paper will not solve, either. To the contrary, my purpose is to raise further doubts of the very possibility of giving such a definition.
A brief history
The term “civil religion” was coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Du contrat social* in 1762, while “political religion” was arguably first used in its modern sense by Condorcet’s *Cinq mémoires sur l’instruction publique* in 1791. For the present discussion, Rousseau is of lesser importance, for his civil religion was in fact a genuine – albeit very simple – religion with dogmas about God, the afterlife, heavenly reward and punishment (Rousseau 2002: 253). Even though its ultimate task was to support social and political aims, its religious nature did not have to be “uncovered” by anyone (and the same goes to later examples of civil religion, most famously in Robert Bellah’s *Civil Religion in America*, which likewise noted that the latter was a “genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent religious reality,” even if “revealed through the experience of the American people”, see Bellah 1991 [1967]: 179).

In Condorcet’s *Mémoires*, in contrast, the term “political religion” already had the same negative meaning that would later most frequently be associated with it: unconditional belief (in the new, revolutionary Constitution as something absolute, a product of “universal reason”) indoctrinated by systematic propaganda to create a “blind enthusiasm” among citizens (Condorcet 2005 [1791]: 42). Whether or not Condorcet was right in suggesting that revolutionary ideas were covertly religious is, of course, highly dubious. Already in 1791, the French Revolution promoted many other, explicitly religious ideas and practices (the cult of Reason, the altars of the Fatherland, religious feasts and oaths, see e.g. Ozouf 1976) that would soon culminate in the worship of the Supreme Being, so Condorcet’s somewhat naïve attempt to “unveil” one of those may have been mistaken at the very outset.

What did become a more adequate target of such unveilings during the nineteenth century was the newly emerging ideology of democracy. The criticism of democratic principles, the ideas of popular sovereignty and majority rule may not have used the exact terms of “civil” or “political” religion, but other religious references were more than sporadic. In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* spoke of the “dogma” of the sovereignty of the people, the people ruling the political world as “God rules the universe”, or the “omnipotence” of the majority (Tocqueville 2010 [1835]: 97, 108, and 411). In 1861, John Stuart Mill’s *On Representative Government* mentioned the “false creed” of democratic egalitarianism (Mill 1977 [1861]: 478). In 1884, Herbert Spencer’s *The Man versus the State* called belief in representative democracy (the “divine right of parliaments”) a modern “superstition” (Spencer 1960 [1884]: 174). In 1896, Gaetano Mosca’s *Elementi di scienza politica* (published
in English as *The Ruling Class*) not only repeated Spencer’s verdict but compared Rousseau and Marx to religious founders (Mosca 1939 [1896]: 71 and 170). Later on, in the twentieth century, Vilfredo Pareto’s 1916 *Trattato di sociologia generale* (or *Mind and Society* in English) used even more religious analogies to describe the modern belief in democracy and equality, stating that the rise of democratic religion in the modern era was comparable to the rise of Christianity in the early centuries (Pareto 1935 [1916]: 1294).

In 1918, Luigi Sturzo may have been the first to use “secular religion” in connection with the worship of the absolute state (Gentile 2006: 93), while in 1922, Carl Schmitt introduced his own interpretation of “political theology”, meaning that all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state were “secularized theological concepts” (Schmitt 1984 [1922]: 36). After Schmitt, such analogies became even more widespread, with one remarkable difference: whereas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was democracy which was most often suspected of being covertly religious, from the 1920’s its place was taken by dictatorships in the works of the Russian Nikolai Berdyaev or such authors as Guy Stanton Ford, who first applied the analogy to contemporary dictatorships as having “a secular religion of their own creation” (Ford 1935: 6). In 1936, Adolf Keller called Leninism a “camouflaged secular religion” (Keller 1936: 69), while in 1938, Frederick A. Voigt discussed both Marxism and national socialism as “secular religions” (Voigt 1938: 3 and 57).

Eric Voegelin also wrote his own *Die politischen Religionen* in 1938, calling fascism and national-socialism “inner-worldly” religions, and this line of anti-totalitarian current culminated in Raymond Aron’s *L’avenir des religions séculières* in 1944. The latter term in fact became so popular that in the 1950s, when Hans Kelsen started to write a book-length refutation of all such comparisons, he named it *Secular Religion* (or, as the subtitle goes, *A Polemic against the Misinterpretation of Modern Social Philosophy, Science, and Politics as “New Religions”*, which once again shows the ambiguity of terminology; it is also no accident that he found all such concepts so problematic that he finally withdrew the manuscript, which would only appear in print in 2012).

In addition to – or sometimes as part of – the ideologies of democracy and dictatorship, the cult of the state and the nation also came under suspicion. To give a full list here would be utterly impossible, but it’s worth noting that Sturzło’s first mention of “secular” religion already referred to the “absolute sovereign state” as
an “irrepressible power and sole synthesis of the collective will”, and almost all other Catholic authors writing on modern political regimes connected these to the worship of the state, a so-called “statolatry” and the cult of the nation (see Gentile 2006: 89-97). The German legal scholar Hermann Heller, the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich, the anarcho-syndicalist writer Rudolf Rocker, and many others made a similar connection between statism and nationalism in the 1930s, until the seminal work of Carlton Hayes explicitly called nationalism “a religion” (Hayes 1960).

Although such politico-religious comparisons have remained with us ever since (on democratic religion see Boia 2002, Deneen 2005, Wydra 2015; on totalitarianism Maier 2004-2007; on the nation-states Bossy 1987, Cavanaugh 2011, Luomahono 2012, and many others), it has also become more frequent to describe other, not strictly speaking political belief systems as secular religions. Paul Vitz wrote of Psychology as Religion as early as 1977, Robert Nelson on Economics as Religion in 2001, Philip Goodchild on the Theology of Money in 2009, Harvey Cox on The Market as God in 2016, or John Rapley on Economic Religion in 2017. In the meantime, Robert Nelson also opposed economic religion to “environmental religion” in 2010, until in 2018, John Gray explicitly stated that some of the most prevalent forms of atheism were in fact religious; and the list is still far for complete.

The meaning of it all
The abundance of examples, however, is more vexing than convincing, and raises further questions. What is the exact meaning of a “secular”, “political”, “inner-worldly” (and so on) religion, faith, or belief? Are all these (with their corresponding practices, symbols, and institutions) in fact “religious”, or do we use such terms only in the sense of “almost like” a religion? In either case, what are the exact criteria that would define a religion? Have the authors writing on secular religions ever provided such criteria with any degree of precision? If so, did they coherently apply their own criteria to the phenomena investigated? If not, do we still have any grounds to speak of “secular religions”, or – what is an even more vexing issue – should we give up not only the term secular religion and its relatives, but also the terms “secular” and “religious” altogether?

To give a definitive answer to any such question is extremely difficult. To return to some of the examples cited before, Condorcet was rather vague on the subject: speaking of “a kind” [une espèce] or “a sort” [une sorte] of political religion already betrayed his reluctance to identify a “real” religion here, presumably because he found that political creeds were similar to religious ones only in the sense of
being dogmatic and intolerant, but this was hardly a full definition of religion (see Condorcet 2005 [1791]: 42 and 44).

Tocqueville, on the other hand, who detected many more analogies between religious and political ideas, never explicitly called democracy a “religion.” Even if the people ruled the American political world as God ruled the universe; even if the idea of popular sovereignty was treated as a dogma; and even if the majority was vested with such divine attributes as omnipotence, he carefully avoided any identification between political creeds and genuinely religious ones (which, for him, usually meant “Christian”, one might add).

In Mill’s account, “false creed” may indeed be nothing more than a metaphor, and it also remains doubtful whether Spencer’s frequent references to “divine right”, “oil of anointing”, “political superstitions”, or “political fetish” should be taken at face value, or just as rhetorical tools. There are some passages, however, that point to a more profound analogy: “It is curious” he says, “how commonly men continue to hold in fact doctrines which they have rejected in name – retaining the substance after they have abandoned the form” (Spencer 1960 [1884]: 174-175). This substance, at the same time, is not “religious” in general, but once again something known from monotheistic traditions, mostly from Christianity (see his references to “omnipotence”, or the scholastic concept of omnipotence “bounded only by physical impossibilities”, 173 and 175).

Mosca’s remarks on the religious character of “politico-social schools” are no less ambiguous: they are “in a sense” religious, but also “shorn of strictly theological elements” (Mosca 1939 [1896]: 166). In the same vein, Pareto’s “significant analogy” between democratic religion and Christianity – so, once again, Christianity, and not religion in general – leaves open the question whether they belong to the same category, or are just compared for the purpose of explaining one from the other.

Schmitt, who uses a similar analogical reasoning (a “systematic analogy”, Schmitt 1984 [1922]: 42], nevertheless speaks of “secularized” theological concepts, and although he never precisely explains how “secularized” should be understood, so much seems clear that “secularized” is something different from “non-secularized,” i.e. genuinely religious. In the case of socialism, however, the religious idea (that of “atheism”) seems to be perfectly identical with the political; otherwise we should say that socialism is a “secularized atheism”, which would be – to say the least – somewhat paradoxical (cf. Schmitt 1984 [1922]: 51 and 59).
Berdyaev is just as ambiguous on the subject: at times he declares that “communism persecutes all religions because it is itself a religion,” but other times he returns to the more traditional vocabulary of “secularized” and “pseudo” religions (Berdyaev 1966 [1931]: 70, 84 and 85). Eric Voegelin also carefully separates “trans-worldly” or “spiritual” religions (überweltlich or geistlich) from “inner-worldly” (innerweltlich) religions, thereby denying the full status of “religion” of the latter (Voegelin 2000 [1938]: 32-33); yet the whole distinction seems to evaporate when the object of political worship proves to be the spirit of the people (Volksgeist), which has no objective reality (Voegelin 2000 [1938]: 66). Raymond Aron shows the same ambiguity when talking about “secular” religions and their “quasi-sacred” objects in his The Future of Secular Religions (Aron 2002 [1944]: 178), while maintaining in his The Opium of the Intellectuals that communism is based on “hyper-realities” totally resistant to empirical facts, and thereby barely distinguishable from a “real” religion (Aron 1962 [1955]: 122-123). Authors like Erik Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddihn also carefully separate substitutes for religion (“Religionsersatz”) from real religions (again, mainly Christianity); even though the analogies of Christian and secular religions are more numerous than their differences (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974: 54).

“Ersatz,” “pseudo,” “quasi,” and other words are still part of the vocabulary of secular religion literature today (see e.g. Smith 1994 or Cox 2016: 8). Although some authors do attempt to distinguish between “religionsersatz” and “ersatzreligion” (a substitute for religion and an actual religion replacing others), or “pseudo” and “quasi” religions (those which show an “intended but deceptive similarity” to real religions, and those which have a “genuine”, albeit unintended similarity to them, see Tillich 1988 [1963]: 293), it remains true that in most cases the terms remain ambiguous. Even words like “secular” or “secularized” are difficult to view as something “non-religious” in the proper sense. As William Cavanaugh once ironically put it, “Carl Schmitt was right to say that all modern concepts of the state are secularized theological concepts if by secularized one means covert” (Cavanaugh 2011: 3).

The definition of “religion”
The reason why it seems almost impossible to say whether the adjective “secular” denotes a real, albeit non-traditional religion or something fundamentally different from religion is that no author gives a precise definition of religion itself. Most texts seem to imply that religion is such an obvious concept that it needs no further explication, while the case is the exact opposite: it is notoriously difficult to give
an exact definition. Traditional definitions that rely on such formulas like “belief in a god or several gods or other supernatural beings,” are clearly insufficient, for a number of so-called religions either have no gods (like Buddhism), or these gods are not personal (like in pantheism), or even if they have entities that with some laxity may be called gods, these gods are more natural than supernatural beings (as in most non-monotheistic traditions). Words like “supernatural” or “transcendent” are simply meaningless in such traditions, so all extensions which would like to replace gods or spirits with other supernatural or transcendent “principles” or “processes” will also fail to pass the test (cf. Asad 1987, Smith 1998, Fitzgerald 2000, Crane 2017).

A brief answer to the question whether a reasonably clear definition of religion was given by any of the authors writing on secular religions is also negative. It is only from the randomly listed features of secular religions that we might infer what a given author thinks to be the “essence” of religion. Dogmatism and indoctrination in Condorcet; dogmas about a non-empirical reality with God-like attributes in Tocqueville; again a set of empirically non-testable claims in Mill and Spencer; the former plus a church-like institution in Mosca and Pareto; concepts like God, law, and exception in Schmitt; dogmas, catechisms, an overarching moral teaching, a church-like institution, a professional priesthood, and a high level of enthusiasm in Berdyaev; dogmas, rituals, and enthusiasm in Aron (later also belief in a “hyper-reality”); dogmas and a church-like institution in Keuhnelt-Leddihn; belief in an absolute idea and a corresponding moral teaching, symbols and rituals in Hayes; belief in a non-empirical reality, symbols, and rituals in Bossy, Cavanaugh, Luoma-aho, or Cox; and so on.

In some cases, as the above list shows, the criteria are too few to define religion, while in others, so precise and numerous that of all traditional faiths only Catholicism may count as a “real” religion. In both cases, however, we remain confused about how to separate the secular from the religious.

If one or two features like dogmatism and reliance on some ultimate principles are sufficient, then almost every overarching ideology or moral theory can be called a “religion”; and saying that the these are not genuinely “supernatural” or “transcendent” is also of little help. The Constitution, the People, the Proletariat, the State, the Nation, the idea of the human self, the Market, money, or Mother Nature are just as non-empirical as anything that a so-called “real” religion and its adherents believe in. Because of this, it has by now become surprisingly
frequent to define religion as nothing more than an attempt to “create meaning” (see e.g. Harari 2015 and Gray 2018) in an otherwise meaningless world; but this is already a complete dissolution of the secular/religious divide. On the other hand, if a well-defined set of dogmas, an infallible magisterium, an official liturgy, and a fully-fledged symbolism is required, then only some forms of totalitarianism and – once again – Catholicism will count as religions, while the majority of the world’s so-called “religious” traditions will remain outside the category of religion.

Let us make it very clear that no author in the “secular religion” tradition had a solution to the problems outlined so far, and maybe necessarily so. The very term “secular religion” implies a contradiction, for the meaning of “secular” can hardly be anything else than “non-religious.” As for dictionary entries: the Cambridge English Dictionary defines “secular” as “not having any connection with religion.” In the Oxford English Dictionary, it is “not connected with spiritual or religious matters.” In Macmillan’s, it is “not religious or not connected with religion.” In Collins, “things that have no connection with religion.” A “secular religion” would therefore mean a “religion that has no connection with religion” or a “not religious religion.” A curious exception is Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary in which “secular” is “not overtly or specifically religious.” At first sight, this definition seems to retain the possibility that “secular” is not necessarily non-religious, only covertly or non-specifically religious. Yet the same dictionary also says that “secular” is “of or relating to the worldly or temporal”, so the inconsistency surfaces once again, for “worldly” is: “of, relating to, or devoted to this world and its pursuits rather than to religion or spiritual affairs.” In other words: despite all attempts to invent more and more complex definitions, secular religion theorists are still left with the notion of a religion which is devoted to other things than religion.

Conclusion
The reason why so many great thinkers – some of the best in their own times – failed to notice the contradiction in the very concept of “secular religion” would be worthy of further investigation. The first and most obvious reason is that almost all of them took Christianity as a starting point, a “model religion”, and from this perspective it seemed natural that democratic and totalitarian ideologies, the cult of the state or the nation (and many others) were not Christian but something else; which may be true, but says nothing about their difference from “religion” in general. In other words, I would suggest that when they spoke – and
some of them still speak – of “secular” (political, inner-worldly, immanent, and so on) religions, they actually mean “non-Christian”, which means, at the same time, a cultural appropriation of Christian principles and values in different forms.

The significance of all this is not merely semantical or philosophical. In the field of politics, it also means that the only difference that seems to remain between real and secular religions is that the latter do not overtly accept the religious label. It also means that the very idea of secularism may best be described not as an attempt to break with the former, allegedly “religious” foundations of politics and society, but as an attempt to obfuscate the real nature of modern ideologies, presenting them as more rational or more scientific than the traditional ones they wish to replace. The discourse of “secular religions” – regardless of its terminological incoherence – therefore remains a useful way to “unveil” such attempts, and to emphasize the continuity between our past and present belief systems, whether we call them “religious” or not.

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