PEDAGOGICAL AXILOGY IN SOCIAL THOUGHT OF JÓZEF TISCHNER (1931-2000)

AKSJOLOGIA PEDAGOGICZNA W MYŚLI SPOŁECZNEJ KS. JÓZefa TISCHNERA (1931-2000)

Abstract: The article is devoted to social thought present in the philosophical and pedagogical concept by Józef Tischnier. The following analysis focuses first on presenting the basic theses contained in the philosophy of drama, which are the foundation for the original concept of religious education. It is primarily about the theory of goodness, hope, and freedom in the order of philosophical and religious thought. The following text reconstructs the author’s basic theses. However, it is also an attempt to research the educational potential, with particular emphasis on social issues, especially in the era of challenges faced by democratic societies in the 21st century.

Keywords: Józef Tischnier, philosophy of education, pedagogy, social pedagogy

Streszczenie:artykuł poświęcony jest sferze wartości w kontekście społecznym obecnej w projekcie filozoficznych i pedagogicznych ks. prof. Józefa Tischnera. Poniższa analiza skupia się w pierwszej kolejności na prezentacji podstawowych tez zawartych w filozofii dramatu, które stały się fundamentem dla autorskiej koncepcji wychowania. Następnie analizie poddana jest fenomenologia wartości, która składa się z teorii dobra, nadziei i wolności. Całość wywodu rekonstruuje podstawowe aksjologiczne tezy filozofii Autora, ale również jest próbą wskazania potencjału edukacyjnego, przy szczególnym uwzględnieniu problematyki społecznej w dobie wyzwań postawionych przed społeczeństwem demokratycznym w XXI wieku w Polsce.

Słowa kluczowe: Józef Tischnier, filozofia wychowania, pedagogika, pedagogika społeczna

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Introduction

Not so long ago, in 2021, we celebrated the 90th birthday anniversary of Fr. Prof. Józef Tischner (1931-2000). This fact has been noted in the literature on the subject. It has also become an opportunity to re-think the author’s work and its topicality in terms of responding to the challenges faced by contemporary education in Poland, including religious education (Dąbrowski 2021). The text directly problematizes the main issues included in the philosophy of drama to indicate on this basis those elements that can be an inspiration for analyzes in the field of general and social pedagogy. Thus, the argument here has been subordinated to the overarching goal to examine the possibility of adapting and implementing the solutions discussed here to the most current educational problems of individual, local and social scope. In connection with the article’s main objective set in this way, the description will first concern the basic assumptions and postulates of Tischner’s original philosophy, which is to enable the extraction of the source educational context. Indicating the pedagogical plane will reveal those elements which, based on social research, are still up-to-date and cognitively creative. It means talking primarily about analyzing the phenomenon of dramatic existence and, within it, about the phenomenology of values and their implementation in education. The order and structure of the categories described result directly from the chronology of the constitution of the philosophy of drama (Bonowicz 2020; Tischner 2001a, 2001b).

The methodological thesis underlying the following text is recognizing Józef Tischner’s overall output as originally permeated with inspiration and pedagogical commitment (Dąbrowski 2016, 2018a, 2021). This assumption became an essential element of the following reconstruction, in which phenomenology is understood as a trend of contemporary philosophy, from which the author directly drew and analyzed critically. (Tischner 2002, 13-26). On the other hand, it has also become a specific method of philosophical cognition and description, creating an alternative model of understanding to the Thomistic-personalist trends of Christian philosophy in Poland (Dąbrowski 2021; Jawor 2019; Dąbrowski 2016). The consequence of the method adopted by Tischner was to provoke an internal discussion based on Polish Christian philosophy in the 1970s. Moreover, this fact makes it possible to reveal a broader context of the discussed project for contemporary humanistic and social thought. In order to outline the image of this complex cognitive and methodological structure, it is necessary to analyze the most basic categories (drama, good, hope, freedom), which constituted the philosophy of drama as a project open ontologically and anthropologically. The following text is intended to provoke reflection on the contemporary and current educational and religious challenges that demand resolution in history and today in Polish society (Dąbrowski 2021).
The phenomenon of dramatic existence

Józef Tischner draws the concept of drama from the classical theory of Greek drama as a literary form in which the main character of the events is placed between two parallel scenarios. In one, the events are so intertwined that a person’s fate is heading towards failure, loss, collapse – in other words, one directly experiences tragedy. The other scenario arranges the roles, places and time in such a way that the events lead the hero to oppose evil; they are a struggle that ends in victory, i.e. a moral victory over evil. According to Józef Tischner, these two possibilities are inherently present in every human existence (Tischner 1991, 12-15). The whole event takes place in the order of dialogical and axiological relations. This means that in the dramatic human existence, the good and evil is rooted in what is outside because it is the effect of dialogue and meeting with the other. Dialogicality is entering into direct contact with another human being. It is a contact based on specific content in which moral values play a very important role. They make it possible to discover a partner, an ally in another person, because they reveal the presence of those elements that directly shape a person’s identity. We are talking here about basic values that determine the understanding of all other values. Acting in the logic of dialogue as the space of axiology is contact with the other understood as a value, thus confronting me with myself as a value. The dramatic nature of the event discussed here covers at least several levels. On the one hand, we are talking about an internal subjective perspective in which human life is primarily limited to two possibilities. In everyday life, in direct experience, we balance between what enslaves and frees us, closes and opens, frightens and encourages us (Tischner 1991, 15-19). The difficulty is that this experience is most often heterogeneous and impossible to predict, plan or read. Attention is focused on the other person, who is the carrier, but also the catalyst of what is most valuable. It is he who, on the horizon of the meeting, appears in an aura of mystery and a certain danger to the integrity of what is most precious to me. It is different, sometimes even contradictory, and causes fascination and reluctance at the same time. It is fascinating because it reveals a hitherto unknown world, but at the same time at the deepest level, it raises questions that I can be afraid of, and also which can lead to the disintegration of my Self. The other person in the meeting, talking about his pain, is at the same time asking about my pain. By manifesting his own success, he confronts me with what my success is. Revealing content as important, valuable and meaningful, he asks me what is of value in my existence. There is nothing light about this event, everything has its weight and deep meaning. If the meeting occurs based on values (revealing what is most valuable), a radical change in me takes place. However, this change does not have a determined ending; the outcome does not have to be positive for the self (Tischner 2017, 5-33).

However, the drama of the meeting does not end there. This event takes place in a concrete physical reality, on a concrete earth, on a drama scene that can also take two faces. Space can appear favorable or hostile when taking up challenges before
the self. The difficulty, however, is that where space is seen as closed, inaccessible, „unknown”, there what is internally known and what secures identity remains “untouched”. It is the perception of the world in which man feels safe only inside himself, and resigns from what is transcendent, from contact with what is outside. This resignation makes it possible to preserve what is constitutive, because it does not put itself to the test before others. Such a space closes, settles, binds but also withdraws from the activity and the desire to act outside. The paradox of a scene constructed in this way consists in an internal contradiction in which a person tries to preserve what is integral, resigning from experiencing what is „outside”, thus avoiding what is potentially developmental (Tischner 2001a, 5-9). In the second case, when the meeting place presents itself as open, transparent, and flexible, it also raises fear of what is new, unknown, and requires reaction, but at the same time, reveals itself as potentially developmental and cognitively creative because it encourages, invites and dares to act. Openness entails the necessity of contact with what is objectively and subjectively (personally) external. This, in turn, enables dialogue in the sphere of axiology, which presents itself as a challenge for the self. Again, the internal contradiction of such a stage form comes to the fore, in which the desire to go out, to get to know what is transcendent and new, with the simultaneous fear of losing what is known and internalized, is ambivalently intertwined. Thus, the dramatic nature of the meeting place of I and You is expressed in the fact that each choice is presented in the logic of achieving a specific good (maintaining identity or knowing externality) with the simultaneous possibility of losing an equally specific value (security or development). The complete picture of the human drama is closed in the third perspective, which is noticeable only from the level of the „meta” analysis. This is the time when the event of encounter and dialogue takes place. To be a dramatic being means to live a given time with others around you and the earth as a stage under your feet. A human being would not be a dramatic existence if it were not for these three factors: openness to another human being, openness to the drama scene and the flow of time (Tischner 2001a, 5).

The third element, namely time, is understood here not only as the moment of action in the „now”, that is, between the past, which specifies the action, and the future, which shows the direction. Time, in the dramatic sense, is seeing the internal dynamics of the encounter as a tangle of many elements, on the one hand, open, free, inclusive, but on the other, irreversible, significant and determining. Time somehow leaves its mark on the participants, the place, and the dynamics of change, pointing to the inherent ambivalence of the event of the meeting and the dialogue. The first moment is associated with a certain optimism because there is a conviction that a possible meeting with the other person and the outside world belongs to the autonomous sphere of choice of the Self. Moreover, this choice is always aimed at a specific good (security or development), which makes it appear justified, but also possible to change and at least partially reversible. Things change dramatically when we make a choice and act on it. At this point,
time begins to run differently for both existences. A man who withdrew and closed himself off from the other person kept what was integral to him (protected from the world), but thus became even more aware of his own loneliness, separateness, and individuality. Time at this point appears as irreversible, emphasizing the event as an unused opportunity for the development of the Self. On the other hand, a man who chooses a relationship with the other, opens up to what is outside, also changes his time, points to the irreversibility of the decisions made, but also an internal, reinforcing strength for the Self appears. It is an immanent voice saying that, regardless of the effects of what happens next, the courage to transcend myself is a feature that I have realized and recognized. The time of the drama does not allow for predicting what will be the effect of the meeting, what will happen next, and whether the main character will ultimately win or fail. What, however, remains as a fact at the level of phenomenological analysis is the existence of man in the logic of a solitary I (monad) or I being in a relationship (dialogical) (Tischner 2017, 35-63).

**Phenomenology of values**

The drama of human life, which, according to Józef Tischner, is most fully revealed in deep dialogue and the event of a meeting, does not take place in an axiological vacuum. The basic values in the drama structure are good, hope, and freedom. These three elements, along with many others, i.e. love, truth, faith, are the core of Tischner’s anthropology. It seems that extracting the pedagogical potential of the category of good, captured in the concept of agathology, may be an interesting proposition in discussions about the basic axiological foundations in contemporary models of upbringing and learning. In turn, the concept of hope is part of the sphere of the constitution of the education goals because it enables the creation and protection of the integrity of the individual’s development process. The third element is freedom, understood as an educational axiom, i.e. the primary and source space in which internal and conscious change becomes possible. In the educational drama, these three values form the framework of Tischner’s concept, for which the sphere of axiology is, simultaneously, the content, form and space of what belongs to the development process. In other words, these categories contain the “key” to effective and sustainable upbringing and education. The language of Tischner’s pedagogy of drama is saturated with metaphors and symbolism; therefore, I will try to place it at least partially on the ground of school and educational practice.

The category of good, in Józef Tischner’s description of dramatic existence, does not belong to essentialist concepts, but rather it points to its existential source. This means that good as a value is not assigned in the logic of classical metaphysics to the sphere of being as such. Man as a dramatic being is not defined as good due to belonging to the sphere of being (order of ontology). His existence is directed towards good instead. However, this orientation also does not fit into the logic of being or the classical (e.g. Thomistic) concept of ethics but becomes
a constitutive (founding) element for human action. Firstly, the theory of good (agathology) is based on cognitive phenomenalism, in which axiology does not determine the cognitive order, i.e. the existence of a given value is not assumed. Then its existence is justified or disavowed in the cognitive structure. Formulating the theory of agathology, Józef Tischner points to the existence of good and evil in the direct experience of man, whose effects become an element explaining a given axiological context. The agathological makes one think. That which is axiological points at directions of action. That which is agathological causes existence to become a problem—the axiological points at ways of salvation. The agathological knocks man out of his present rhythm of day and night, knocks him into a border situation, in which freedom accepts or rejects itself, reason wants to or does not want to be the reason, conscience disavows or avows itself. That which is axiological is the space in which freedom, reason, and conscience operate. The size of this space depends on the sense of human power. Hence it is getting smaller or bigger. The agathological awakens a sense of power and powerlessness. Man is aware of the boundaries of humanity (Tischner 2001a, 51-52). The metaphorical language of this passage does not make it easy to explain or define what good and evil really are in human experience. However, it is indicated here that these elements directly affect the understanding and experience of other values, i.e. freedom, reason, conscience, etc. Therefore, in the human drama, good and evil become the foundation, in the sense that they directly determine the understanding of subsequent values. They become a plane of original or source interpretation, in which a man can reject himself or recognize himself as a value. In other words, the perspective of participating in good or evil directly changes how we perceive ourselves and the outside world. At this point, the synergy of Tischner’s philosophical and pedagogical concept is fully revealed. Where a person perceives himself as a value, i.e. a being justified, creative, capable of development, but also free and endowed with hope, human life (including the lives of others) is presented in the logic of good. On the other hand, wherever condemnation, passivity, lack of hope appear in the man’s inner experience, and thus the conviction of the determinism of reality towards the individual, human life (including the lives of others) exists in the logic of evil. The biggest problem, and therefore the source of drama, is the impossibility of fully objectifying the causes, but also the effects of existence in the agathological horizon. On the one hand, the context of causes is unpredictable because each time it depends on the participation of another person who brings with him what is external, incoherent, not identical with the Self. The drama of human life includes dialogicity, i.e. the mutual conditioning of I in You and You in I. The consequence of this state of affairs is the perception that it is the other person who brings content whose agathological meaning can be recognized only at the moment of meeting. In truth, it is possible to predict what you carry, but it is always a transcendent, unknown, unpredictable content covered with some form of mystery. On the other hand, the result and consequence of existence in the sphere
of agathology are also unpredictable due to the original openness to the good of a particular Self, which tries to recognize it in everything it participates in. In other words, what we experience from the other person and the outside world becomes a structure that we then recreate and grant value and meaning. In a way, our actions are a projection of the sphere of experience that we subjectively consider important. The problem, however, is that only at the moment of participation, in real existence, it turns out whether such a structure and actions in accordance with it leads to justification and freedom, or whether they condemn and make a person dependent. The phenomenological analysis of values uses a similar scheme in interpreting the existence of the phenomenon of hope and freedom in the dramatic sphere (Tischner 2002, 487-492).

The drama of human life consists primarily of the awareness of existence in a constant threat of tragedy, i.e. the possibility of evil, which becomes a form of interpretation of the principles and structure of the world’s existence. On this basis, hope appears, which for Józef Tischner is the energy that protects and secures the self against the loss of what is most precious. In this case, it is the sphere of values in which a man recognizes himself and perceives himself as an irreducible value. *Man experiences himself most profoundly when he feels that he is some kind of mysterious value, even to himself. At its very core, the human “I” is an axiological “I.” It serves as the basis for his hope. Hope is the most profound way of protecting this value. Man uses his hope to defend himself and to fight to have a human face.* (Tischner 2001c, 6). The metaphor of the face taken from the tradition of the philosophy of dialogue, and especially from the philosophy of Emanuel Levinas, indicates a direct correlation between the spheres of hope and freedom. The face symbolizes what originally and integrally belongs to man, and what he himself often hides from the world and other people behind a mask, game or role. We hide the most personal to protect ourselves against potential invasion by what is external and unknown. In this perspective, the world is interpreted as threatening and dangerous, and the emerging hope indicates a different perspective of understanding the present and the future. On the one hand, it confronts man with the fact that his existence is an irreducible value because his source is located in himself, and it is only verified in what is external. The irreducibility of the self as a value consists in noticing the location of the source content of this phenomenon. On the other hand, hope introduces the perspective of seeing the world as a highly ambivalent space, but potentially developing and able to serve the self. Hope in this place points to the unconditional presence of a You, where the external world is revealed in dialogue and meeting with another human being. The experience of the encounter can lead to both acceptance and adoption, but also to negation and rejection. The possibility of such an ambivalent experience confirms the role and meaning of what is immanent. Here, the awareness of the boundaries of what is inside and outside takes place. In other words, hope carries information that man cannot lose the most precious thing, i.e. understanding himself as a value,
because he is the basic source of it. On the other hand, the other person appears simultaneously as threatening and supportive, as condemning or saving from possible evil. Hope in this place broadens the vision of the axiological horizon of a possible meeting. It shows the boundaries of what is internally important (mine and dependent on me) and externally important (yours and testifying to the world). The awareness of the existence of this border is the beginning of deep participation in the personal drama and recognition of the importance and dependence on another person’s drama (Tischner 2001a, 29-31).

Apart from the category of time and, above all, the present, which hope reinterprets, another sphere of the source experience of man is also revealed. We are talking here about the category of freedom and autonomy, where hope determines their understanding but also indicates the importance and significance for the entire sphere of axiological reality. This is because in the space of irreducible value, which is a man for himself, and the potential, developmental value, which is the other for me, thinking and acting in a free and autonomous form can be most fully present. It is a way of understanding and influencing reality in which the Self directly impacts how, where and what it experiences. On the other hand, it is also seeing the world in which another man presents his own sphere of independence and autonomy, which is challenging for me. The category of hope in the educational order in Tischner’s approach is connected in a special way with the category of freedom. It is hope that allows us to see the limits of our influence on ourselves, as well as on what surrounds us. We are talking here about the world of things (the drama scene), about the relationship with another human being (dramatic dialogue) and self-reflection (loneliness in the drama). In this regard, hope presents itself as the primary and constitutive sphere for freedom. Freedom is, therefore, not so much the ability to act and cause change in oneself, or even a direct impact on the world of things and the drama of another person. First of all, it is an awareness of the possibility of choosing this freedom. „(…) to choose freedom, one already needs to be free, but one is not free if one has not chosen freedom.” (Tischner 2001b, 349). This apparent contradiction most deeply reveals the structure and context of the original experience of basic values in the anthropological sphere. Hope enables experience, then experiencing and understanding what freedom is, and only as a result, internalization and choice (action) consistent with freedom itself (Tischner 1993).

Phenomenology of values in the educational dimension

In the educational dimension, Józef Tischner’s phenomenology of values reveals one of the most profound truths of the complex process of maturing, growing, and becoming independent. This proposal consists of a specific concept of the ethics of education, in which the concept of hope goes to the fore in the sphere of axiology, and the principles of fidelity and trust become the norm of action. It must be said
that only those who have hope can teach and nurture. It must be added that they teach by shaping the hopes of pupils. Education is work upon the spirit – work according to hope (Tischner 2005, 88). The full sphere of values, such as love, friendship, responsibility, faith, etc. is constituted based on hope, which is understood here as the basis (soil) enabling the birth and growth of what is most precious in a human being. Hope, on the one hand, is the awareness of the normative complexity of the surrounding world, but also the internal energy that allows you to take action and change what is perceived and experienced in life. From it stems the principle of fidelity and trust, which are intertwined. Fidelity is a declaration of the possibility of existence and openness to axiological participation in a relationship with another human being. Trusteeship is the existential fulfillment of the above obligation. The combination of these two elements enables the mutual hope of the participants of the dialogue and meeting to emerge. In terms of education, it is a projection of reality in which the teacher (educator) plays the role of Socrates, i.e. obstetrician, midwife, companion and guide in the process of reaching the student’s maturity. The vision adopted here bursts the traditional system, in which the teacher, by providing the ward with given content (subject and moral), thus fulfills the basic pedagogical mission. The strategy derived from Tischner’s phenomenology of values is different. The teacher and pedagogue can only actively accompany the student, relying on his own hope and practicing the principle of fidelity and trust towards himself as a person. The consequence of this process may be the emergence of trust and educational security. However, bearing in mind the structure of the existential drama, the result of this cooperation is always unpredictable and impossible to fully plan or control (Tischner 1996, 41-45). Moreover, where the sphere of axiology is omitted (consciously or unconsciously) in the logic of educational interactions, there is no room for the slow creation of a relationship based on trust between the educator and the pupil, and the most profound educational process does not take place. The lack of an axiological plane between I and You results in the lack of a relationship or the creation of a façade, superficial or apparent relationship. This, in turn, indicates why educational and upbringing processes are so demanding and difficult to implement in practice, and why they often take the form of sham and morally inauthentic activities (Tischner 1966, 1334-1345).

The order of dramatic existence and the sphere of values related to it in the project of Tischner’s pedagogy make it possible to indicate the dangers and errors of traditionally practiced education. This is especially true of the so-called classical socialization and adaptation, which assign very rigid tasks and responsibilities to the teacher and student (Kluss-Stańśka 2018). In this proposal, the basic role of the pedagogue in the subject dimension is to lead, create, control and evaluate the conveyed content. In the sphere of relations, it is about full verification and management of group and individual processes. In education, seen in this way, the teacher not only creates and organizes the student’s development process but is also fully responsible for it and has (at least declaratively) a direct influence
on it. In the logic of such action, the teacher has both subject content and moral values and is therefore obliged to pass them on to the student in their entirety. Tischner's value analysis reveals both the error of the original assumption and the impossibility of achieving the basic goals and tasks of the process defined in this way. All elements of classically constructed education boil down to one assumption that the teacher and pedagogue in this space become a "toti-potential" subject. A person who not only has a total influence on himself, the environment and the place of the processes being carried out, but also, allegedly, his impact on the student is absolute and comprehensive. Incorrect initial assumptions and excessive expectations of such a model result in another significant consequence. We are talking here about the role and tasks of the student, who is socialized primarily to the attitude of a reactive, submissive and passive recipient in this strategy. Worse, the attitudes of reproductive adaptation and socialization become both the goal and the criterion for interpreting the effectiveness of this form of education (Klus-Stańśka 2018). In other words, the approach of traditional socialization is based on reducing the sphere of freedom and independence of the student, whose main task is to reproduce the teacher's procedures and thinking as faithfully as possible. The direct effect of such education in practice is great difficulty or even impossibility of the existence of the principle of fidelity. In the logic of Józef Tischner's argument, the phenomenon of fidelity cannot appear there either in a space where there is no room for freedom. Without affirmation and experiencing freedom, people's meeting cannot occur because the values of the people in the relationship are not revealed. Such contact is usually superficial or apparent, and also takes place in the so-called the logic of the participants of the educational process passing each other (cf. Tischner 2001c).

The proposal of Tischner's model of upbringing shows that in a situation where the participants of the meeting reveal the sphere of values, an individual and subjective perspective of the teacher and the student may emerge. At this point, both sides become partners in dramatic order. On the one hand, the educator begins to realize the reciprocity in the relationship with the student, where both the student's success and failure become his victory. What's more, the educator begins to understand that his personal hope, sincerity and authenticity become the content of the message, but also a form of justification for what, how and what he says. On the other hand, the student responding to the teacher's actions and attitude must confront what he receives and acquires with his own sphere of values and beliefs. Thus, he verifies his attitude to what is external, as well as confronts himself. The dramatic order is revealed here as an unknown, uncertain space, impossible to control or plan, and thus open to the axiological and existential. From the above proposal, a specific ethics of education emerges, responding to educational confessions, understood here as events of a dramatic nature. The task of the teacher (school, family, social, cultural, etc.) is first to take responsibility for his own hope, which then has educational potential. It is only on this basis that
thinking about tools, methods, educational techniques that can help the student's self development and growth. However, it will not be a didactic apparatus aimed at reproducing or imitating even the best actions and choices of the educator. Fidelity, which is the main motivation for action here, in the first place protects the inner self (teacher and student), i.e. it directs the awakening, awareness and internalization of the autonomous sphere of values. In practice, this means that the educator is obliged to face the basic moral choices openly, in which he fights with himself, wanting to preserve and protect what is already integrated and internalized axiologically. Therefore, the deepest message of Tischner's pedagogy is not the hope associated with the belief that every fight will end in victory. On the contrary. It is the emerging awareness that courage and internal consent to take up this fight testifies to the process of continuous maturation and gaining person's independence, regardless of age, experience and social role (Tischner 2005, 91-92).

**Phenomenology of values in the social dimension**

Tischner's project of upbringing in the social aspect deconstructs and blasts out the role of basic values, which are often understood as universalizing axiologically, bypassing their direct existential experience. This danger is complicated to diagnose and eliminate in the sphere of education, because the assumed axiological goals are seemingly achieved at the systemic (social) and normative (cultural) levels. The problem lies in seeing the basic values in their universal range, i.e. usually declarative and, above all, verbal. It is the understanding of cardinal values (e.g. freedom, goodness, hope, fidelity, etc.) in their universal form, ignoring their direct and personal experience in a specific place and time. *One is encouraging the fight for worldwide peace but is not capable of teaching how to sustain peace within the family. One is commanding compassion for the misery of Africans but not teaching to see the lot of an overworked mother. Instead of sharpening man's natural sense of reality, this education blunts it.*, (Tischner 2005, 92-93). The indicated difficulty reveals at least two serious axionormative problems, important from the perspective of analyzes of social pedagogy. On the one hand, the question arises whether the sphere of values declared as universal, at the same time, does not require the inclusion of direct social experiences in the space, as necessary to be implemented and promoted. On the other hand, there is also a question about the need to see the basic normative assumptions of the education system in the inter/intra-social sphere (through criteria and goals both external and internal to the social structure). Thanks to the phenomenological analysis of values, it becomes possible to combine what results from the sphere of subjective justifications in individual experience (e.g. personal hope) with what comes from the external order, i.e. the social sphere (e.g. educational hope). For the social order, Tischner's ethics of education, based on the presented structure of values, assumes the necessary presence of particular
and personal justifications (e.g. existential) as well as collective and universalizing (e.g. group) justifications.

For education, it is a postulate indicating not only the need to combine both perspectives (cognitive holism), but also their mutual correlation on the basis of the common sphere of social life (axiological holism) (cf. Śliwerski 2020, 7-20). An example here is the understanding of education itself as a process of individual development (personal maturation), which becomes an important element of building a group process (upbringing and educational relationship) (Tischner 1968, 903-913). In the space of axiology, the combination of the category of hope and the principle of fidelity reveals the combination of what is internal-external and what is subjective-objective into one whole. It indicates the necessary presence of both spheres of justification, but also their interdependence. In social practice, it is an appreciation of the role of bottom-up (subjectivizing) activities, which become an impulse for changes in the group and collective (objectifying) scope. The effectiveness of education based on Józef Tischner’s phenomenological ethics in the practical dimension depends on the degree of axiological awareness of all participants in the development process, but also on the possibility of establishing contact and meeting people who are in this relationship. For the educational sphere, it is a postulate of special attention to individual, personal and local processes. It is focused on mindfulness and internal sensitivity, which is to result in openness to cooperate with what is outside. The logic of conduct leads from individual and personal experience to group and social experience. This postulate of education promotes the practice and training of particular skills, sensitivity to the needs of the local community, as well as supporting full social involvement. Putting the above proposal into the framework of a broad pedagogical strategy, many analogies can be seen with the models described in the pedagogical literature as constructivist and transformative didactics (Klus-Stańska 2018; Sajdak 2013). In them (as in Tischner’s thinking), the main goal is to create a bottom-up change, based on criticizing the existing models of socio-cultural and religious reality, within which possible changes and solutions of personal and local scope are designed (Dąbrowski 2017, 2018, 2021).

**Summary**

The outlined concept of upbringing and education of Fr Prof. Józef Tischner was captured here through the method of social phenomenology, in which the basic criterion for verification and description of phenomena was the analysis of processes and correlations that occur between what is individual and what is social (Dąbrowski 2018a, 33-38). First, Tischner used the tool of phenomenology to reveal the path that a given idea (in this case, a value) must take, from personal experience, through the context of meeting and relationship with another person, to the moment of its appearance in the social sphere. Therefore, the educational (development) space
is here identified with the sphere of common experience, presence and meeting of people based on what is axiological. Authentic educational activity, in this sense, is based primarily on the common experience of what is important, but not necessarily consistent or identical for all participants. However, what determines the possibility of an upbringing relationship is the moment of communication and meeting of what is important for me and you. However, the dramatic nature of the event is revealed here, which consists in uncertainty as to the further fate of the participants of the meeting. At this moment, there is a space for common hope, which gives energy and strength to act. The emerging hope entails the belief that it is necessary to be faithful to the one who has revealed what is most important to him (Tischner 2005, 35-39). This is where the sphere of human freedom is most fully manifested. I can stay with you, it can be faithful to what they both experienced, or it can marginalize this experience. In the first case, the revealed internal struggle, dilemma, and struggle of another person (student) also become a challenge for me (the teacher). His personal experience becomes my experience, which makes my sensitivity to the outside world more attentive, sensitive, especially to what is not fully understood, internalized, identical with me. Through the experience of what another person experiences, an awareness appears in me that allows me to listen to and acknowledge what I experience myself (Tischner 2005, 104-111). In the second case, when I marginalize and am indifferent to what happens to another person, I also do it indirectly towards myself. Not only do I dull my own moral sense and attention to what I’m experiencing, but I also deny the fact that I may experience similar dilemmas myself. By cutting myself off from the sphere of values and their experience by another person, I distance myself from my own sphere of what is most important. In both situations, bringing closer or farther away from another person, the issue of the inevitable merging of what is personal and individual (experienced internally) and what is group and collective (experienced in a relationship) comes to the fore (Tischner 2005, 57-62).

For education, the above proposal is a new reading of the correlation between two often independently perceived spaces of human experience: the individual and the social; the subjective and the objective; and the internal and the external. An innovative reading of the relationships of the above spheres of human experience on the basis of upbringing and learning is, on the one hand, a critical reinterpretation, while recognizing the achievements and importance of ideas, concepts and methods of action taken in the past and rooted in tradition (Dąbrowski 2017, 87-114). On the other hand, it is a postulate to see today’s school as an institution that not only has to keep up with the dynamics of contemporary changes, but above all, should design a space for individual activism and grassroots social activities (Dąbrowski 2018b, 389-404). For educational practice, it is a proposal to apply specific strategies and models of work within three interdependent spheres: individual, local and social (including global) life. It is a project to include the context of the phenomenology of values and the resulting didactic model and strategies into the contemporary
school, which have been quite precisely recognized in the pedagogical literature (Śliwerski, Rozmus 2018). It is primarily about the meaning and role that are currently given to the phenomenon of bottom-up activation, i.e. the critical awareness of an individual subject participating in the process of socialization. In the literature on the subject, this model is best described in the field of analyzes of constructivist or transformative didactics, which emphasize the importance and meaning of a conscious, critical and actively acting subject (Klus–Stańska 2018, 187-259; Żylińska 2013; Malewski 2010). These models are focused on the development of the ability to independently assess and analyze phenomena of individual, local and global scope, and to activate resistance and creative activities. It is recognized here that strengthening sensitivity and activity in relation to the sphere of values (immanent and transcendent) constructs a subjective attitude necessary for the full existence of an open, civic and engaged society. Analysis as well as critical thinking about values become a tool in the process of maturing to individual autonomy (Dąbrowski 2020, 263–287). The understanding of autonomy, however, is rooted in the theory of moral development, in which a person at each stage of life only gradually deepens the scope and manner of understanding their own freedom. Due to this, education focused on arousing in the pupil and student, the attitude of self-reflection and awareness, with simultaneous activity and willingness to act, is to result in the acquisition of competences in subsequent increasingly complex life choices. Contemporary didactic models promote strategies aimed at training a pupil, student in independent analysis of matters concerning both the personal and social spheres. This analysis is to be aimed at the widest possible diagnosis of a given situation, problem, issue, to generate solutions, activities and actions on this basis independently. The foundation of this procedure is the axiological sphere (the sphere of values), which has the potential to reveal and raise awareness of what is personally and socially most important. This procedure appears as a tool for existential and social prevention. The contemporary world is a dynamic, changeable and unpredictable reality. The education based solely on the analysis of what was in the past and what is current today seems insufficient. In this context, one of the basic tasks of education of the 21st century is to raise awareness and knowledge of how my actions today (especially everyday moral choices) affect the future and what their scope and importance are in relation to the individual, local and social spheres (Kamińska-Malek, Oleśniewicz 2020; Denek, Zimny 1999).

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