THE LOGIC OF MODERN EDUCATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTROVERSIALITY

: In recent years, philosophy of education increasingly has been addressing the question of which controversial issues should be taught as controversial in the context of public education. In this article, I will consider this question from an educational point of view; in other words, keeping in mind the specific logic of modern education. On the one hand this enables us to contextualize the debate about the principle of controversia-lity in terms of educational theory. On the other hand, it grapples with a specific gap in educational descriptions of public education: Although there is support for the principle of controversiality, the question about possible criteria for differentiating between issues that are to be addressed in a directive versus non-directive manner has received little attention up to now. My proposed solution to this problem involves a combination of two criteria, each of which can be justified in relation to the overarching task of modern education – the enablement of Bildung .

If we understand education as a practice that aims to introduce children and young people into society, and if we also assume that controversies are typical of life and living together in modern societies, then we may conclude that education also includes the task of introducing newcomers to public controversies.Clearly, this does not tell us which controversies children and young people should be introduced to at all, nor does it answer the question of which controversies should be taught as controversial in the context of public education.In recent years, the latter question in particular has been discussed intensively in the philosophy of education ( ).In this context, it is correctly noted that it makes a di erence whether one uses, for example, a behavioral, political, or epistemic criterion to di erentiate between issues that should be taught as settled and issues that should be taught as controversial.It is simply a di erent matter to claim that a question should be addressed as controversial if it is discussed controversially in the public sphere, if this question cannot be answered in relation to the values of a liberal democratic society, or if it is the subject of reasonable disagreement.Each of these proposals refers to speci c presuppositions, entails speci c burdens of justi cation, and leads to di erent conclusions in assessing speci c issues (evolution, migration, euthanasia, homosexuality, climate change etc.).
ere is as yet no generally accepted answer to the question of which criterion should be used to designate those subjects that should be taught as controversial in the context of public education.To put it bluntly: e controversy over the principle of controversiality itself has the form of an open debate.In addition, it is worth noting that, in this debate, hardly any attempts have been made to deal with the problem from an educational point of view. is can be seen in the fact that none of the relevant contributions to the topic starts from a theory of education that attempts to clarify what is meant by education.Instead, there is a tendency to accept what education "is" or what the term education means, as more or less given.It is of no use here to refer to events in certain institutions that we usually call "educational," because here, too, we would have to ask how -for example in the context of schools -we can di erentiate between education and alternative forms of interaction.In other words in order to determine whether education is taking place, we need a concept of education -such a concept is developed and justi ed within a theory of education.In this sense, education is not simply given, but is constituted as an object of inquiry within the speci c perspective of an observer.
is makes it clear that it is important -if only for the sake of methodological control -to introduce an educational perspective into the debate about the principle of controversiality in public education.e fact that this has not happened to the necessary degree may have to do with the speci c con guration of the context in which (public) education is usually addressed in the English-speaking world, which is vastly di erent from that which characterizes the German-speaking context (see Bellmann , pp. f.).In the English-speaking world it is typical for education to function as an object within a multidisciplinary eld.e discourse on education is found in connection with disciplines that are traditionally termed "educational studies."e central perspectives on education include those of philosophical, sociological, psychological and historical inquiry.Importantly, these perspectives are conceived as applied philosophy, sociology, psychology or history, so that education -while addressed from a philosophical, sociological, psychological and historical perspective -is not addressed from an educational point of view.For someone in the multidisciplinary eld of educational studies, this reference to an original educational way of thinking may be irritating, since in this context the possibility of asking educational questions about education is sometimes explicitly rejected: " ere is no distinctively 'educational' way of thinking" (Tibble , p. ).Anyone familiar with the continental European and in particular German-speaking tradition of educational theory might, on the other hand, nd it more than surprising that education is not at the very least also considered from an educational perspective -one in which the question of what education "is" is asked in the rst place, and in which the attempt is made to describe education in the light of a speci c educational normativity (see Benner ). e latter can be seen, for example, in the fact that education from an educational point of view is traditionally not reduced to the introduction of children and young people to cultural content (knowledge, skills, values, norms etc.), but rather is described as a form of interaction "in which the freedom of the new generation is at stake" (Biesta b, p. ). e assumption that there is an educational perspective on education that cannot be reduced to other perspectives, does not derive from them, and also cannot be replaced by them, is, of course, not linked to the assertion that there is no disagreement on how the educational perspective can be determined in detail and -accordingly -how education can be described from that perspective.However, it makes a di erence whether or not the educational perspective plays any role in the academic study of education.
is also applies to the question which issues should be addressed as controversial in the context of public education.In my article, therefore, I would like to explore this question, deliberately taking into account the speci c logic of modern education.As I will try to show, this account opens up the possibility for theoretical progress in at least two ways: On the one hand it is possible to contextualize the debate about the principle of controversiality in public education in terms of educational theory, and at the very least to supplement the philosophical approach with an educational one.On the other hand, this paper also grapples with a gap in educational descriptions of public education, where the principle of controversiality may be favored but where the associated problem of criteria has so far received little attention.
I will begin by explaining the speci c logic of modern education in terms of the principles of Bildsamkeit, self-determination and the summoning to self-action.
is sets the framework for the considerations that follow.en I will reconstruct how the principle of controversiality in public education has been discussed from an educational perspective up to now.I will argue that the question of which criteria can be used to determine those controversial issues that should be taught as controversial has so far been sorely neglected.Finally, I would like to present my own proposal for a solution to the problem.In doing so, I will try in particular to show that the combination of two criteria that I propose can be justi ed with regard to the overarching task of modern education -the enablement of Bildung.

Modern education as non-a rmative education
Which issues should be taught as controversial in the context of public education?
In order to answer this question from an educational point of view, I will rst clarify the basic structure of modern education.By modern education, I mean a speci c understanding of education, whose development is irreducibly bound together with the process of social transformation that took place in Europe, mainly from to , in which people began to understand themselves as free and equal, bound to one another in solidarity.e concept of mutual respect between people as human beings becomes a central point of orientation in this process, which we describe today as the modernization of western societies -also in educational thinking (see Brüggen , pp. .).Seen from a systematic point of view, this period marked a turning point beyond which education can now be understood in both an a rmative and a non-a rmative sense, whereby the latter stands at the center of the following considerations.In short, when we discuss in the following text the logic of modern education, my main concern is with clarifying the speci c logic of non-a rmative education.
Descriptions of education as an a rmative or a non-a rmative practice share the assumption that education is a form of interaction that is constitutive of human life and co-existence.Education is understood as a practice that responds to a speci c and persistent human condition: the fact that we are born into a society and have to be introduced into it.Conversely, education ful lls the function of ensuring that a history of living together that has already begun can be continued by the next generation (see Sünkel ).Unlike the description of education as a rmative -in which education is reduced to a means of enforcing social expectations of the next generation -a description of non-a rmative education focuses on education as a traditional and transforming intergenerational practice (see Benner / ).In this context, the question of what is to be favored or disfavored in living and in living together is understood as one that has not already been answered in human history, so that education would only have to pass on answers that have already been found.Rather, nona rmative education hands over the aforementioned question as a question.is includes helping newcomers to re ect on answers that others have already found in their search for orientation.But these answers do not provide a standard to which education would have to be oriented.Rather, they become the object of discussion in education itself -which of course implies that children and young people may transform tradition in their own way (on the international reception of a theory of non-a rmative education see Uljens, Klimaki ).Given this background, to describe education as non-a rmative can be interpreted as an attempt to de ne an education in which the newcomers' thinking, judging and acting are not standardized.It is precisely in this regard that such an understanding of education itself proves to be non-neutral.Rather, it expresses a normative position that is speci cally directed against attempts to instrumentalize education for the implementation of extra-educational purposes.Modern education in the non-a rmative sense takes its starting point by social expectations addressed to the next generation, but it does not a rm these expectations.Rather, it treats them as cultural objects generated by people; objects that -since people are imperfect living beings -can eventually be reconsidered as points of departure for the future interplay between the individual and the world.e speci c task of non-a rmative education, traditionally referred to as Bildung, is that children and young people be drawn into this interplay and helped in relating to "external" demands.Accordingly, modern education can also be described as the enabling of Bildung -and thus as a form of interaction that does not only consists of introducing newcomers to culture, but rather addresses them in a speci c sense as subjects -that is, o ers them the opportunity to examine claims to validity (see Rucker b, pp..).Here I would like to take a closer look at the logic of modern education.I do so by distinguishing three principles of a non-a rmative education, namely selfdetermination, the summoning to self-action and Bildsamkeit.
Linking education to the task of releasing the individual for a life of selfdetermination must not be misunderstood in a relativistic way.Rather, the development of one's own positions, to which non-a rmative education calls for, presupposes "working through" the di erent experiences that arise in the confrontation of the newcomer with the resistant world.However, education as a means of enabling Bildung does not only involve confronting the individual with a resistant world and helping him or her to work through experiences of di erence.Instead, Bildung also implies that the individual "brings him-or herself into play as a judging and acting subject with respect to his or her own culture" (Brüggen , p. ).With that in mind, non-a rmative education involves opening up the possibility for the individual to relate him-or herself to the world -particularly given the world's resistance -as well as to expose his or her own positioning to potential experiences of di erence (e.g. in the confrontation with alternatives) in order to nd positions that "coordinate," so to speak, with the resistance of the world.
is de nition of the task of education correlates with a speci c form of the educator's interaction with children and young people.e term used to describe this form, in the context of a theory of non-a rmative education, is the "summoning to self-action." is term brings modern education into focus as a form of interaction in which newcomers are confronted with a resistant world, a world whose demands on the individual could be said to shake his or her self-reference.Summoning to self-action also means helping the individual to work through experiences of resistance -but in such a way that the individual is given the opportunity to relate to the respective demand, i.e. to bring him-or herself into play.
At this point, Gert Biesta has suggested a di erence that I nd lends even more contour to the concept of summoning to self-action: Since non-a rmative education should not be mistaken for an invitation to children and young people to articulate their "own" opinions and in this sense to "self-action," Biesta prefers to di erentiate between the call to "Be yourself!" and the call to "Be a self!"He considers the latter kind of summoning to be of educational value (see Biesta a, pp. .).In the context of a theory of non-a rmative education, the call for self-action is understood in the sense of "Be a self!" -namely, not as a call to show who you are, but rather a call to show how you position yourself vis-à-vis an object as you work through an experience of di erence.While the rst case addresses a person's identity, the second case is about addressing the newcomer as a subject.
A description of education in which it is understood as a call to self-action, is based in any case on a speci c anthropological premise: that the individual can work through experiences of di erence, and in this sense become someone else -for whom the world will also appear di erently in the future.In the theory of nona rmative education, this assumption is designated as the principle of Bildsamkeit (see Anhalt ).Without the prerequisite that the human being is bildsam -that is, that we are not determined by nature and at the same time capable of developing new abilities through self-thinking, self-judgment and self-action -it would make no sense to understand education in a non-a rmative sense at all.And conversely, the individual is always assumed to be bildsam when addressed as a subject.
In this context, to understand the individual as bildsam does not only mean to assume that he or she is responsive to education.Nor does it only mean that the individual is to be seen as someone who can develop his or her own positions visà-vis a resistant world.Beyond these aspects, Bildsamkeit refers to the individual's capacity to understand him-or herself as a subject.Non-a rmative education is also, and above all, oriented towards addressing this aspect of Bildsamkeit, enabling the individual to experience his ability to bring him-or herself into play when dealing with a resistant world.In other words: To summon the individual to selfaction and to bring him into, for example, a situation of having to choose between options, should not only make the individual decide but also make him or her aware of the option to see him-or herself as the one who chooses.It is important to emphasize this point, because the experience of being able to be a subject may be a prerequisite for individuals to begin to relate to the world on their own initiative, thus making further education super uous.

Public education, controversial issues and the criterion problem
e development of a modern understanding of education and the clari cation of its constitutive principles must, as mentioned, be seen against the background of the fundamental social transformation processes that took place in Europe, particularly between and . is was the period when societies started becoming modern, which in this context refers to a process of social di erentiation.Today, modern societies describe themselves as complex societies that are di erentiated into various contexts, each of which functions according to its own logic.ese contexts -whether science, politics, religion, art, economy, law or morality -o er their own speci c perspectives on issues of the day (see Luhmann , ).Seen in this light, we might expect a description of modern education as non-a rmative to be "sensitive" to the fact that growing up in modern societies takes place under the conditions of a plurality of perspectives -perspectives that may or may not be in harmony, and may also contradict each other.Moreover, it must be clear that controversies do not only appear between di erent social areas, but also within them.Controversies are found not only between morality, politics, religion or science, but also between various moral, political, religious or scienti c positions.
is inevitably raises the question of how to react -from an educational point of view -to the fact that certain issues are discussed controversially in modern democratic societies.
If one sees education as one of many social contexts, then one may ask how the relationships between these contexts can be determined in such a way that the di erent areas can actually function according to their own logic.It should be clear that the likelihood of a non-a rmative education depends to a large extent on the fact that the other areas of society refrain from taking education into their service.
is condition applies along the same lines to all areas of society.If each area is to operate according to its own logic, then the various contexts must categorically refrain from granting one area primacy over the others.In the theory of nona rmative education this imperative is called the principle of non-hierarchicality (see Benner , pp. .). is principle of a non-hierarchical order of social contexts not only requires that education must not be instrumentalized for external purposes.Education itself -and this is decisive -must submit to the principle of non-hierarchicality; in other words, education may not claim primacy over other social areas.If there is con ict within science, politics, religion, morality or between di erent social contexts, then -so it seems -it cannot be the task of education to resolve any individual con ict by favoring one particular side.An education that decides controversies in this sense would thus -one might think -claim primacy for itself -something that education must deny to other areas in order to operate according to its own logic.Such a violation of the principle of non-hierarchicality can -as the argument could go -only be avoided if newcomers are not steered to certain positions in the case of public controversies, but rather are drawn into these con icts.In short: Apparently, in education, a principle of controversiality derives directly from the principle of non-hierarchicality.
In the third section of my article I will show that such a conclusion would be premature.It would mean overlooking the fact that there are good reasons not to treat all public controversies as equal, and to teach only certain issues that are controversially discussed in society as controversial in the context of public education -especially when referring to the logic of modern education.Here, I am only concerned with pointing out that a description of modern education as nona rmative actually requires paying attention to the questions raised by the principle of controversiality. is is why it is surprising that, at this point, the question of how to deal with the fact that many issues are discussed controversially in modern societies has only been explored to a limited extent within the framework of a theory of non-a rmative education.In particular, very little attention has been given as yet to the question of which issues should be taught as controversial in the context of public education.is question is usually answered with a reference to the socalled Beutelsbacher Consensus , in which, among other things, the imperative is so formulated that current issues that are discussed controversially in politics and science should also be addressed as controversial in education -at least in the context of public education.Benner, for example, suggests that the demand that teaching "must also grapple with plural and controversially discussed issues in a plural and controversial manner" is not restricted to civic education or natural science subjects, but "can also be applied to other subjects in the school curriculum" (Benner , p. ).A er all, in modern democratic societies, controversies are not only found in political and scienti c matters, but also in moral, religious or economic questions.Whatever the category, it is not the task of public education to "lead students to a rm position on controversial issues, but rather to give them insight into con icting positions and to initiate processes of developing one's own judgment, expressly without leading them to a speci c conclusion" (ibid., pp.f.).In short: Students should be introduced to di erent positions when dealing with public controversies, so that they understand these positions and can develop their own judgments, without being forced to take a de nitive position.e process of developing one's own judgment should rather be kept open for Bildung processes beyond education, in which positions -once taken -can be reexamined, questioned again, and even changed.
Michael Hand describes education in this sense as non-directive and distinguishes it from directive education: "To teach a claim directively is to teach it with the intention of persuading students of its truth or falsity; to teach a claim nondirectively is to teach it with the intention of not so persuading them" (Hand , p. ). Directive education can be recognized by the fact that a subject is addressed with the intention of persuading others.is means that an issue is presented as settled.
e educator tries to lead the student to the one correct answer; the person to be e Beutelsbacher Consensus is named a er a conference site where the then-leading theorists of civic education in the German-speaking world met in .It still marks an important break in the theory of civic education.e Consensus was not an o cial decision of the conference, but rather an impression of the conference formulated retrospectively by participant Hans-Georg Wehling.In his view, what the representatives of di erent didactical positions were able to agree on as the principles of civic education in modern democratic societies were in particular a prohibition against overwhelming the student -sometimes also called a prohibition against indoctrination -and the principle of controversiality (see Wehling , p. ).
educated is to accept the only correct position.Non-directive education, on the other hand, means addressing a subject without any intention of persuasion.In other words, the content is taught as open to debate.e educator tries to introduce children and young people to a controversy about the right answer to a particular question.e di erent positions considered in this context should be treated as neutrally as possible.e person to be educated should understand the various positions and their justi cations, as well as develop his or her own position in light of the con icting alternatives and be able to defend that position against objections (see Hand , p. ).e di erence between directive and non-directive education can be freely combined with the distinction between theoretical and practical issues.is is evident from the simple fact that not only practical problems -those whose answers demand a value judgment -are controversially discussed in the public sphere.Value judgments are neither a necessary nor a su cient condition for public controversies.For example, in paleontology there is still a lively debate about what caused the mass extinction of the dinosaurs.In mathematics, there is still disagreement over the assumption that every even number is the sum of two prime numbers.On the other hand, there are practical questions for which there is a clearly established "correct" answer.For example, it should be undisputed that Caspar David Friedrich could create works of art more beautiful than the author of this text (and perhaps also the reader) could.Similarly, there would be no disagreement with the statement that it is morally wrong to trick an elderly woman to enter one's home in order to murder her and then use her money to go to the cinema (see Lobkowicz , p. ).Being freely combinable means that theoretical questions are not always about issues that should be taught directively, and practical questions are not always about issues that should be discussed non-directively.Rather, theoretical and practical issues can be addressed both directively and non-directively.
e question thus arises as to which criteria should be used to decide which issues should be taught in a directive or non-directive manner.Benner's position that public education must deal with controversial issues in a controversial manner is only plausible at rst glance.True, information is provided here about what it means to address a controversial issue in a non-directive way.But it remains unclear whether the position of addressing all controversial issues as controversial in the context of public education is actually supported here, or whether criteria are used implicitly to restrict the range of relevant issues.
At this point I would like to emphasize that by favoring a principle of controversiality for public education, one inevitably takes a stand on the criteria that should be used to distinguish between issues that are addressed in a directive versus in a non-directive manner.Arguing for a principle of controversiality is necessarily linked to the question of corresponding criteria.Even the explicit renunciation of such a criterion is tantamount to claiming a criterion: namely that all controversial issues should also be addressed as controversial.But that also means that certain criteria are always taken into consideration whenever someone argues in favor of a principle of controversiality.e failure to take this fact into account is the "blind spot" linked to the principle of controversiality in the context of a theory of nona rmative education.is undermines the demand of a modern understanding of Wissenscha , namely to structure the presuppositions of our descriptions of education as rationally as possible.ere is thus a risk of accepting criteria without subjecting them to critical examination.is kind of de cit can only be corrected by explaining criteria and discussing their advantages and disadvantages.However, it cannot be assumed that known criteria, as developed in philosophy of education, can be integrated into a description of non-a rmative education without di culty.Rather, it might be necessary to deal with the problem independently in light of the reconstructed logic of modern education, in other words to develop an educational proposal for a justi ed criterion or criteria.

e principle of controversiality -an educational approach
My proposal provides for a combination of two criteria, each of which can be justied by the speci c logic of modern education.Only those issues should be addressed as controversial in the context of public education in which, rstly, positions that accept a speci c value orientation con ict with each other and, secondly, in which there is no overriding rule of judgment that would allow a position to be designated as the sole correct one.Below we will take a closer look at these combined criteria.
Non-a rmative education is oriented towards enabling Bildung.Knowing this, it would be absurd, on the one hand, to argue for supporting newcomers to form their own judgments while at the same time treating as equal -or worthy of discussion -those positions whose normative orientation is incompatible with that of education that aims to enable Bildung.In other words, if one agrees that non-a rmative education is based on speci c normative premises, then one understands that it would ultimately undermine these premises if one actually taught every controversial issue in society as controversial.One would then have to answer the question of why one favors education as enabling Bildung at all, if at the same time one is willing to relativize the normative claim associated with itthat each individual is to be considered and treated as an end in itself -by giving equal considerations to positions that are incompatible with this orientation.Seen in this light, not only does the principle of controversiality demand that certain public controversies be taught as controversial in the context of education but also demands that certain positions in this context be either le out or exposed to criticism.
is position is further substantiated if one considers not only the normative premise of education as the enabling of Bildung, but also the fact that Bildung processes themselves are normatively limited in speci c respects.As I have tried to make it clear, Bildung refers to the process in which the individual develops the ability to lead a self-determined life.Self-determination must not be misunderstood -and this is a key thought here -in an individualistic way.Rather, it is linked to the demand that the individual develops the ability and willingness to grant freedom to all other people as well, or to enable them rst and foremost to selfdetermine their own lives (vgl.Rucker , pp. .).If one assumes that Bildung means the development of the ability to self-determination, and furthermore if one assumes that one needs space in order to lead such a self-determined lifesomething one cannot merely count on in the interaction between people but that must be established and stabilized -one should understand that Bildung cannot be described solely as the development of the ability to lead a self-determined life.Bildung must also be understood as the development of the ability and the willingness to grant others the freedom to lead a self-determined life or to enable this in the rst place -at least if the development of the ability to self-determination is understood as an aspiration to which all people are entitled.
If you do not rush to de ne the freedom that education is supposed to o er as "neo-liberal freedom," but rather as "democratic freedom" (Biesta , p. ), you can also -given this background -argue for a speci c interpretation of the principle of controversiality in public education.It would be no less absurd if Bildung implied the development of an attitude to treat other people as "ends in themselves," while at the same time -in the context of public education -treating positions that deny people equal freedom to nd, live out and further develop their own positions as legitimate.
e question arises whether, in the context of a theory of non-a rmative education, one should further limit the spectrum of issues that should be taught in a non-directive manner.Let us rst examine some controversies that, in the context of this theoretical approach, are supposed to be discussed as open-ended.Among them are, rstly, controversies between political positions in which the interests of preserving society collide with the interests of changing society (see Benner, Stepkowski , pp. .);secondly, con icts between scienti c paradigms that operate with di erent methodological guiding questions andsubsequently -produce di erent forms of knowledge (see Benner , pp. .);and thirdly, con icts between di erent social contexts such as politics, science, religion, morality, art, business and education, each of which follows its own logic (see Benner , p. ).Are there similarities between these di erent kinds of con icts?I think one similarity might be that in none of them there is an overriding rule that could justify -in a generally binding way -the preference of one position over all remaining options.Instead, it is always possible to confront a position with alternatives for As we can now add, the con icting positions must reveal a commitment to the democratic values of freedom, equality and solidarity.
which there are also good reasons, without there being one best reason available that could justify someone's decision.
In order to better grasp the nature of such controversies, I nd it helpful to consider the distinction between simplicity, complicatedness and complexity as introduced in complexity theory (see Rucker, Anhalt , pp. .).Simple and complicated problems di er from complex problems in o ering known rules to solve a given problem successfully.When it comes to simple problems, the rules required to solve them can be applied without any interference.But to solve complicated problems, it is generally not possible to apply rules without interference, perhaps because people do not know those rules.In other words, a certain problem that appears simple to experts may seem complicated to a layperson.Complex problems, on the other hand, are characterized by the fact that there are no known rules that would allow anyone -even experts, and this is important -to solve a problem de nitively.
If one works with the di erence between simplicity, complicatedness and complexity, one can distinguish between di erent kinds of controversies: those that can be resolved by referring to an overriding rule to determine which answer to a particular question is correct, versus those in which di erent positions collide and there is no possibility to refer to an applicable rule.e latter type proves irreducible in a speci c sense.When it comes to complex problems, there is no universal answer to the question of what the only correct position is to take on an issue.And conversely, it means that we have to grapple with di erent positions, each of which may be justi ed.
Given the di erence between simple, complicated and complex problems, it is possible to de ne more precisely the criterion that seems to play an implicit role in the theory of non-a rmative education in order to di erentiate between issues that one should address directively and those that one should address nondirectively.According to this criterion, one should address complex problems as non-directive, whereas those that are merely complicated should be taught as directive.Any controversies that are also observable in complicated issues can certainly be taken up in education -but not in such a way as to place the con icting positions on an equal footing.In the case of complicated questions, non-a rmative education is not oriented towards summoning newcomers to develop their own At this point the considerations are unmistakably close to what is discussed in the context of philosophy of education as the epistemic criterion: is criterion states that in the context of public education only those issues should be taught as controversial that are the subject of reasonable disagreement, i.e. controversies whose resolution cannot be based on the only correct answer to a question (see Hand ).
judgments, but rather aims at supporting an individual in gaining insight into the correct answer to a question.e fact that a theory of non-a rmative education seems to refer to complex problems in order to specify the principle of controversiality does not yet indicate whether -or even how -such a criterion can be justi ed in this context.Finally, I will zero in on this question, in an e ort to show that it would be equally problematic to address open questions as settled and settled questions as open.
A type of education that treats issues as settled despite the fact that there are alternative, justi ed positions available is incompatible with the task of nona rmative education to enable Bildung.In this case, education cannot be carried out consistently as a call to self-action.When it comes to complex problems, since no position can o er an argument that has decisive rational force, such education would have to resort to methods and means that prevent the individual from appearing as a subject, in order to make him or her consider a certain position to be justi ed (concealing alternatives, presenting positions in a "distorted" manner, persuading a person to adopt a position by means of sympathy etc.).However, Bildung speci cally eschews committing oneself to positions in such a manner that requires the suspension of self-action.In order to enable Bildung, the educator must not decide controversies in which di erent, equally justi able positions may be adopted.Rather, the educator should help children and young people "to nd and follow their own path" (Ballau , p. ).Similarly, an education that treats issues as open despite the fact that one position is superior to all the others also undermines the aim of preparing an individual for a self-determined life.On the one hand, there is a danger that newcomers would adopt false opinions, and on the other hand, there is a risk that they might believe that there is no preferable answer to the question at hand.In both cases, the signi cance of an already achieved level of knowledge -a "historically achieved level of thought" (ibid., p. ) -integral to an education that enables Bildung is undermined.e individual should be released to determine him-or herself in relation to the world.We de ne knowledge as descriptions that have passed the test of critical examination over time, so that we currently have no reason to question their validity.An education with a non-directive orientation, despite addressesing issues that could be considered settled, risks at the very least "removing" children and young people from the real world and contributing to living their lives in a web of deception.is would not only be problematic from a moral point of view, as it could cause considerable harm to the newcomers ("I didn't know that smoking increased the risk of lung cancer!").It would also undermine a claim traditionally associated with the concept of Bildung: that education should help children and young people to develop the ability to take positions based on objective e question of how simple issues should be addressed is super uous, because in this case there is no need for education, or education has already come to its end.
insights.Clearly, Bildung does not mean to become entangled in deception.From an educational point of view, the educator must aim to persuade newcomers that a certain position is correct, if it is the only one for which good reasons can be given today.
Ultimately, the questions arise: Might the proposal developed here con ict with the principle of non-hierarchicality? Does this principle not mean that public disputes must not be settled through the means of education?Is education accorded undue primacy here?
Regarding the criteria I have suggested, the rst objection could in fact be that education is not entitled to resolve public controversies in relation to certain normative premises.e choice of one's way of life should not be predetermined in the context of public education.It is possible to counter such an objection by arguing that the objection itself represents a normative claim: at is, public education must keep the possibility open of determining one's own way of life.But that is exactly what the claim of Bildung is about.It would be unreasonable to refer to the idea of self-determination to give equal weight to positions that reject this very idea.
e second objection could be that education is not entitled to resolve controversies relational to the claim that only reasonable di erences of opinion should be taught as controversial. is objection can be countered by the argument that education would only claim primacy when attempting to resolve controversies in which no position could claim primacy.On the other hand, in all those cases the position to be favored or deferred is clear -precisely because an overriding rule of judgment is available -education does not violate the principle of non-hierarchicality.For the hierarchical order of positions is not brought about by education; rather, it is a "given," and education simply serves the function of confronting newcomers with this reality.
e principle of non-hierarchicality thus proves fully compatible with the proposed combination of criteria.It does not require that all issues discussed controversially in the public sphere be addressed in the context of public education as if the answer to the question at hand had not already been determined.In the context of public education, only questions should be taught non-directively, when con icting positions are compatible with the idea of mutual respect for human freedom; and in addition, when no overriding rule is known that would rank the respective positions according to the only "correct" order.A future task will be to relate this combination of criteria to alternative proposals.Another challenge will be to defend the position that education should be oriented towards enabling Bildung in the rst place, since such an orientation is itself no longer self-evident today (see Rucker a). ).e Case for Contention Teaching Controversial Issues in American Schools.Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press.