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THE INTERNATIONAL MERCENARY MARKET IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE: SOLDIERS FROM THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH IN THE SERVICE OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN PRINCE (1679-1685)

**Międzynarodowy rynek najemniczy w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej:
Żołnierze z Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów w służbie księcia Siedmiogrodu
(1679-1685)**

Abstrakt

Podczas ostatnich lat wojny francusko-holenderskiej (1672-1678) król Francji Ludwik XIV zawarł sojusz z przywódcami powstania węgierskiego oraz księciem Siedmiogrodu Michałem Apafim I. Celem tego sojuszu było stworzenie militarnej dywersji na wschodniej flance Habsburgów, ówczesnych wrogów Francji. Z pomocą króla Jana III Sobieskiego francuscy agenci w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów werbowali na ten cel armię najemników. Po dwóch latach niejednoznacznych kampanii prowadzonych na Węgrzech większości najemników pozwolono wrócić do domu. Jednak trzy kompanie piechoty (około 300 ludzi) zostały zatrzymane jako straż księcia Siedmiogrodu na kilka kolejnych lat. Niniejsze studium przypadku rzuca światło na zasięg i mechanizmy wczesnonowoczesnego międzynarodowego rynku najemniczego w regionie Europy, który w dużej mierze został pominięty w badaniach.

Słowa kluczowe: Siedmiogród, najemnicy, wojna, dyplomacja, Michał Apafi, Jan III Sobieski, Ludwik XIV

Abstract

During the final years of the Dutch-War (1672-1678), the French King Louis XIV formed an alliance with the leaders of the Hungarian rebellion and the Transylvanian prince Michael Apafi I. The objective of this alliance was to create a military diversion on the eastern flank of the Habsburgs, enemies of France at the time. With the help of King Jan III Sobieski, French agents in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth recruited an army of mercenaries for this purpose. After two years of inconclusive campaigns fought in Hungary, most of the mercenaries were allowed to return home. However, three infantry companies (roughly 300 men) were retained as the guard of the Prince of Transylvania for several more years. This case study sheds light on the extent and mechanisms of the early modern international mercenary market in a European region that has largely been overlooked by research.

Keywords: Transylvania, mercenaries, warfare, diplomacy, Michale Apafi, Jan III Sobieski, Louis XIV

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Introduction

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have rightfully been labelled as the “golden age” of mercenary service in the armies of Europe’s emerging modern states. During this period of transition from medieval levies to the standing armies of the modern age, the “soldier of fortune” seeking employment beyond his homeland became a ubiquitous figure. The importance of mercenaries in the military organization of Western European states has been emphasized by many authors over the past seven decades.² Mercenaries were highly mobile individuals who easily crossed political, cultural, and religious boundaries. They belonged to a distinct category of migrant labourers³ engaged in the dangerous but lucrative business of war. The high demand for their services led to the formation of an international mercenary market which extended across Europe and beyond.⁴

The evolution of foreign mercenary networks in East-Central Europe remains largely unexplored despite important contributions in recent decades.⁵ Foreign soldiers, along with other specialists in war related crafts (such as gunsmiths, engineers, military architects, etc.) have been identified as key agents of cultural and technological exchange in the borderlands of the Ottoman Empire.⁶ It has also been argued that the regional mobility of mercenaries during the late medieval and early modern period was one of the main factors in shaping

² Some of the significant contributions on this topic are: V.G. Kiernan, *Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy*, “Past & Present,” 1957, no. 11, pp. 66-86; P.H. Wilson, *The German ‘Soldier Trade’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: a reassessment*, “International History Review,” 18/1996, pp. 757-792; S. Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*, Oxford 2007; D. Parrott, *The business of war: military enterprise and military revolution in early modern Europe*, Cambridge 2012; M. Sikora, *Change and continuity in mercenary armies: Central Europe, 1650-1750*, in: *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labour*, ed. E.-J. Zürcher, Amsterdam 2013; P.H. Wilson, *Foreign military labour in Europe’s transition to modernity*, “European Review of History,” 27/2020, no. 1-2, pp. 12-32; K. Boterbloem, *The Dirty Secret of Early Modern Capitalism: The Global Reach of the Dutch Arms Trade, Warfare and Mercenaries in the Seventeenth Century*, New York 2020.

³ J. Lucassen, E.J. Zürcher, *Conscription as Military Labour: The Historical Context*, “International Review of Social History,” 43/1998, pp. 405-419; E.J. Zürcher, *Introduction: Understanding changes in military recruitment and employment worldwide*, in: *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labour*, ed. E.-J. Zürcher, Amsterdam 2013, pp. 11-41; J. Lucassen, L. Lucassen, *The mobility transition revisited 1500-1600: what the case of Europe can offer to Global History*, “Journal of Global History,” 4/2009, pp. 347-377.

⁴ D. Potter, *The International Mercenary Market in the Sixteenth Century: Anglo-French Competition in Germany, 1543-50*, “The English Historical Review,” 111/1996, no. 440, pp. 24-58; O.A. Nozdrin, *The Flodorf Project: Russia in the International Mercenary Market in the Early Seventeenth Century*, in: *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800*, ed. B.L. Davies, Leiden 2012, pp. 109-118.

⁵ Much of the international research dealing with this European region has been focused on the Russian armies of the seventeenth century, see for example B.L. Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500-1700*, London 2007; P.B. Brown, *Command and Control in the Seventeenth-Century Russian Army*, in: *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800*, ed. B.L. Davies, Leiden 2012, pp. 249-313; Ch.S.L. Dunning, *Scottish and Irish Soldiers in Early Seventeenth-Century Russia: The Case of George Learmonth and the Belaia Garrison*, “The Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies,” 2014, no. 2, pp. 23-42.

⁶ G. Ágoston, *The Ottoman Empire and the Technological Dialogue between Europe and Asia: The Case of Military Technology and Know-How in the Gunpowder Age*, in: *Science between Europe and Asia. Historical studies on the transmission, adaptation and adaptation of knowledge*, ed. F. Günergun, Dhruv Raina Dordrecht 2011, pp. 27-39; G. Ágoston, *Empires and warfare in east-central Europe, 1550-1750: the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and military transformation*, in: *European Warfare, 1350-1750*, ed. F. Tallett, D.J.B. Trim, Cambridge 2011, pp. 110-134; G. Ágoston, *Firangi, Zarbzán, and Rum Dasturi: The Ottomans and the Diffusion of Firearms in Asia*, in: *Şerefe. Studies in Honour of Prof. Géza Dávid on His Seventieth Birthday*, ed. P. Fodor, N.E. Kovács, B. Péri, Budapest 2019, pp. 89-104.

a distinctive “war culture” in these regions.⁷ However, many questions remain unanswered. With most research focused on empires and large states, it is still unclear whether the smaller polities of Eastern Europe played a role in the evolution of the international mercenary market. How did states with limited territorial size and resources such as the Cossack Hetmanate⁸ or the Danubian vassals of the Ottoman Empire (Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania) manage to recruit foreign soldiers? Were they able to establish connections with the primary providers of Central Europe such as the German states or did they rely exclusively on neighbouring countries?

The primary objective of this article is to provide some preliminary answers to these questions by analysing the case of a group of soldiers from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth who served in the court army of Prince Michael Apafi for several consecutive years. Often referred to in Transylvanian sources as the “French flags” or “French companies,” these mercenaries were initially recruited and paid with subsidies provided by King Louis XIV, sought to create an eastern diversion against the Habsburgs. Records from the Transylvanian court, along with a few other narrative and official sources, suggest that the Polish mercenaries were successfully integrated into an already ethnically diverse army serving one of the most important European vassals of the Ottoman sultan.

Political Context

The Principality of Transylvania had reached its political and military apex during the reigns of Gabriel Bethlen (1613-1629) and George Rákóczi I (1630-1648), benefiting from the favourable context of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648).⁹ Seeking to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors, the ambitious Prince George Rákóczi II (1648-1660) attempted to take the Polish Crown by force in 1657. Although his military expedition in the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was well prepared, it ended in complete failure, marking the beginning of Transylvania’s decline as an autonomous state. The final years of his reign were dominated by foreign invasions, civil strife, and significant territorial losses.¹⁰ It was in this unfavourable context that the reign of Michael Apafi I (1660-1690) began. Nevertheless, he managed to restore a degree of stability and ensured the principality’s survival for three more decades.

The new status of Transylvania was clearly demonstrated during the peace negotiations between the Habsburg and the Ottomans which concluded with the treaty of Vasvár (August

⁷ J.B. Szabó, *The Army of the Principality of Transylvania in the Period of the Thirty Years War*, in: *The Princes of Transylvania in the Thirty Years War*, ed. G. Kármán, Paderborn 2022, pp. 21-58.

⁸ In this particular case it has been demonstrated that the inability to employ mercenaries from Central and Western Europe has determined a reorientation towards more accessible regions like the Balkans, O. Sokyрко, *At Hetmans’ Service: Natives of the Balkans and Podunavlje in the Mercenary Regiments of Cossack Hetmanate in the Mid-Seventeenth through Early-Eighteenth Centuries*, “Hiperboreea,” 8/2021, no. 2, pp. 227-248.

⁹ The general outline of this period in the history of Transylvania has been made available to the international reading public by some recent monographs and volumes of studies: *The Princes of Transylvania in the Thirty Years War*, ed. G. Kármán, Paderborn 2022; D. Harai, *Gabriel Bethlen: Prince de Transylvanie et roi élu de Hongrie (1580-1629)*, Paris 2013; F.N. Ardelean, *The Army of Transylvania 1613-1690: War and military organization from the ‘golden age’ of the Principality to the Habsburg conquest*, Warwick 2024.

¹⁰ E. Pavelesco, *Georges II Rákoczy Prince de Transylvanie (1648-1660). Essai sur sa politique extérieure*, Iași 1924; G. Kármán, *II. Rákóczi György 1657. évi lengyelországi hadjáratának diplomáciai háttere*, “Századok,” 146/2012, pp. 1049-1084; J.B. Szabó, *Erdély Tragédiája 1657-1662*, Budapest 2019.

10, 1664). The principality was as a bargaining chip between the two empires and its prince and estates were not consulted on decisions that directly affected them.¹¹ The nobility of Royal Hungary was also deeply dissatisfied with the treaty's provisions and was on the verge of rebellion against the Habsburgs. Prince Apafi, along with a significant part of the Transylvanian political elite, expressed support for the disgruntled Hungarians but their ability to act was constrained by Ottoman suzerainty as long as the sultan wished to maintain peace with the Habsburgs. From the early stages of the movement against the Habsburgs (the so called "Wesselényi conspiracy"), the rebels explored the possibility of securing French support in the form of financial subsidies.¹² However, Louis XIV was reluctant to make any commitments while he remained officially at peace with Habsburgs. When the situation changed in 1674, the French King and his councillors acknowledged the benefits of an eastern military diversion, and the plan to provide financial assistance to the Hungarians and the Transylvanians began to take shape.¹³

In 1670, the Hungarian dissidence erupted into a direct conflict with the Habsburg authorities, but Transylvania was unable to intervene directly. Habsburg troops swiftly suppressed the rebels, executed the ringleaders, and confiscated the lands of those involved or associated with this movement.¹⁴ The remaining rebels, mostly nobles and soldiers from border garrisons, sought refuge in Ottoman-held territories and Transylvania.

Prince Apafi found himself in a delicate position. While he wished, to offer shelter to the refugees, he also needed to maintain good relations with both of his imperial neighbours.¹⁵ Initially, the Ottomans refused to support the Hungarian rebellion but in 1672, during the campaign against Poland, the Grand Vizier encouraged Apafi and the Hungarian exiles to attack the Habsburgs, who were allied with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the time. Michael Teleki, a leading Transylvanian noble, was elected military leader of the exiles and organized an expedition into Szatmár (Satu Mare) County, but his forces were repelled by the local Habsburg garrison.¹⁶

Plans for French support of the Hungarian rebellion moved closer to fruition in 1674, when Jan Sobieski was elected King of Poland on May 21. The new ruler of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was seen as a reliable intermediary between the Hungarian-Transylvanian faction and the French Crown. Several months later, in September, the first French envoy

¹¹ H. Tóth, *The Circumstances and Documents of the Peace of Vasvár*, "Archivum Ottomanicum," 34/2017, pp. 243-256.

¹² Á.R. Várkonyi, *The Last Decades of the Independent Principality (1660-1711)*, in: *History of Transylvania*, vol. 2, ed. L. Makkai, Z. Szász, New York 2002, pp. 330-335.

¹³ I. Hudita, *Histoire des relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Transylvanie au XVII^e siècle (1635-1683)*, Paris 1927, pp. 232-251.

¹⁴ G.B. Michels, *The Habsburg Empire under Siege: Ottoman Expansion and Hungarian Revolt in the Age of Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü (1661-1676)*, Montreal 2021, pp. 157-172; On the extent of the confiscation policy in the particular case of Szatmár (Satu Mare) County see, L. Magina, F.N. Ardelean, *Fortuna brevis: destine și averi în 1674 în comitatul Satu-Mare*, "Banatica," 2/2019, no. 29, pp. 121-143.

¹⁵ Relations with the Ottomans were tensed because of territorial disputes in the borderlands. Apafi and his councillors were focused on establishing a clear border with the newly organized *eyalet* of Oradea (Nagyvárad) through diplomatic means and were thus unwilling to risk the wrath of their liege lord, the sultan, Á. Szalai, *Conflicts of joined sovereignty on the border of the Principality of Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 17th century*, "Eastern European History Review," 5/2022, pp. 181-199; Á. Szalai, *Erdély és a váradi vilájet határkonfliktusa 1671-1672-ben*, "Történelmi Szemle," 2/2023, no. 65, pp. 237-255.

¹⁶ Á.R. Várkonyi, op. cit., pp. 336-340.

arrived in Transylvania. Colonel Beaumont, commander of a regiment of dragoons in the Polish-Lithuanian army, met with Michael Teleki in the northern parts of the principality to discuss the details of a future expedition against the Habsburgs. During his talks with the chief councillor of Apafi, Beaumont learned of the political divisions within Transylvania regarding the Hungarian rebellion as well as the fragile ties between the leaders of the exiles and their increasingly reluctant Transylvanian hosts.¹⁷

While French diplomats in Constantinople worked tirelessly to secure a peace treaty between the Ottomans and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth¹⁸ – eventually concluded at Żurawno in October 1676 – negotiations with Apafi and the Hungarian rebels continued in Transylvania. In March 1675, a new embassy led by Roger du Fresne Akakia travelled from Warsaw to Transylvania. Negotiations took place at the princely court in Făgăraş (Fogaras), culminating in an agreement on April 28. The French promised to provide financial support and to facilitate the recruitment of Polish mercenaries. In return, the Transylvanian Prince agreed to allow Michael Teleki to command the Hungarian exiles in another campaign against the Habsburgs and to secure diplomatic support in Constantinople for the election of a Hungarian King. This agreement marked the beginning in a significant diplomatic process that would shape Transylvania's foreign policy. Relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had improved considerably since the disastrous campaign of George Rákóczi II in 1657, and renewed contacts with France opened the door for a potential military collaboration against the Habsburgs.¹⁹ During the negotiations, Teleki expressed his willingness to lead an army of 12,000 men against the Habsburgs provided that France supplied him with monthly subsidies and 6,000 Polish mercenaries. In turn, the French representatives explicitly stated that they expected an effective attack on the eastern flank of the Habsburgs, similar to the one performed by Prince George Rákóczi I in 1645.²⁰

The details of the Făgăraş (Fogaras) agreement were soon discovered by both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. At the time, both empires saw this potential alliance as a threat to the political stability of the region and made constant diplomatic and military efforts to obstruct or at least to delay its formation. Very little progress was made throughout 1676 although the French King had sent a new ambassador to Warsaw, the Marquis de Béthune.²¹

In the spring of 1677, Dávid Absolon arrived in Warsaw at the head of larger delegation of Hungarian and Transylvanian diplomats to negotiate the final terms of the treaty with the Kingdom of France. According to the final draft signed on May 27, Prince Apafi and the leaders of the Hungarian rebellion agreed to raise an army of 15,000 soldiers (9,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry) and appointed Michael Teleki as commander-in-chief. The French

¹⁷ I. Hudita, op.cit., pp. 251-260; G. Volkmer, *Siebenbürgen zwischen Habsburgermonarchie und Osmanischem Reich: Völkerrechtliche Stellung und Völkerrechtspraxis eines ostmitteleuropäischen Fürstentums 1541-1699*, München 2015, p. 447; according to the diary of Michael Teleki, Beaumont began his return journey to Poland on 14 October, *Teleki Mihály udvartartási naplója (1673-1681)*, ed. J. Fehér, Cluj-Napoca, 2007, p. 151.

¹⁸ In December 1675 Michael Apafi was designated as mediator for the Ottoman-Polish peace talks, S. Andea, *Transilvania, Țara Românească și Moldova. Legături politice (1656-1688)*, Cluj-Napoca 1996, pp. 266-268.

¹⁹ Á.R. Várkonyi, op. cit., p. 343-344.

²⁰ I. Hudita, op. cit., pp. 264-266.

²¹ François Gaston de Béthune, Marquis de Chabris, began his career as a military man, commanding a regiment during the campaign in Flanders, in 1667. Later he was assigned to various diplomatic missions in Bavaria and in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He was married to Marie-Louis de la Grange d'Arquien, sister of the wife of King Jan III Sobieski, *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, vol. 7, ed. M. Holban, București 1980, p. 399.

ambassador was supposed to recruit mercenaries in the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, who would be given free passage through the principality and, if necessary, temporary quarters there. The offensive was scheduled to begin that same year in July. In addition, de Béthune promised to provide French officers for the mercenary troops dispatched from Poland. He was also responsible for securing the transport of funds for the mercenaries' wages across Polish territory, while Apafi and Teleki were tasked with safeguarding the subsidies once they reached Hungarian or Transylvanian territory. If the Porte pressured Apafi to cease hostilities against the Habsburgs, the Transylvanian prince had the obligation to continue supporting the rebels in secret, while Teleki was required to maintain his position as commander-in-chief. Neither the Transylvanian Prince nor the rebels were allowed to conclude peace with the Habsburgs without the consent of France. If the French reached a peace agreement with the Habsburgs, their allies were to be included in the treaty and would continue receiving the subsidies as initially agreed.²² The treaty was ratified by Louis XIV on July 17. While the Ottomans did not openly oppose the plan, they did insist on postponing the expedition until the spring of 1678.²³

The mercenaries on campaign (1677-1678)

When the war with the Ottomans ended, the Polish-Lithuanian army was diminished, leaving a significant number of soldiers available for hire abroad.²⁴ In this favourable context, Béthune began recruiting mercenaries for the campaign in Hungary, with Sobieski's approval. The recruitment process was successful because the French ambassador was helped by some influential nobles like Lubomirski, Chinafski, and Voienski. However, other nobles, like Dimitri Wisnowietski, sought to obstruct the project and informed the Viennese court on its developments.²⁵

The troops began crossing the border into Transylvania in the autumn of 1677. Colonel Boham was appointed commander of the mercenaries and led a larger contingent of 2,000-3,000 men toward the northern border of Transylvania.²⁶ On their way, they joined a group of armed rebels in the vicinity of Munkács (Munkacevo) and had their first encounter with the enemy at Nyalab (today Korolevo, Ukraine). Despite being outnumbered, Boham and his mercenaries secured an unexpected victory on October 10, 1677. Afterwards they continued marching towards Debrecen, where the main camp of the Hungarian rebels was situated at the time.²⁷

²² I. Hudita, op. cit., pp. 291-293.

²³ S. Andea, op. cit., pp. 279-280; Á.R. Várkonyi, op. cit., p. 348.

²⁴ In 1675 Polish soldiers were already seeking opportunities of service abroad. For example, two cavalry captains, Jan Rybiński and Dobrogost Jaskólecki were recruited in the guard of the Prince Elector of Brandenburg, S. Augusiewicz, „*Gwardia polska Najjaśniejszego Księżęcia Kurfirsta jegomości Brandenburskiego*” w latach 1675–1676, „*Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie*,” 2021, no. 3, pp. 425-443.

²⁵ I. Hudita, op. cit., pp. 294-303, 333.

²⁶ The size of the mercenary army was initially much larger but eventually only 3,200 soldiers crossed the border into Transylvania in two larger detachments. They were Polish and Lithuanian Tartar mercenaries and other East-Central European type of soldiers, J.B. Szabó, G. Kármán, *Külföldi zsoldosok az erdélyi udvari hadakban*, „*Had-történelmi Közlemények*,” 4/2022, pp. 774-775.

²⁷ E. Héjjas, *A kurucmozgalom francia kapcsolatai 1674-1679*, „*Az Országos Széchényi Könyvtár Évkönyvei*,” 3/1983, p. 293; I. Hudita, op. cit., pp. 306-308; G. Volkmer, op. cit., p. 452.

While these events unfolded in the western borderlands, Transylvania again faced another major internal threat. The Szekler Seats were on the verge of an armed uprising under the leadership of Pál Béli who was accused of treason by the ruling prince. Bloodshed was avoided when Béli fled to Constantinople the following year. There he attempted to convince various members of the Ottoman court that Apafi and his councillors – especially Teleki – had defied the sultan and aided the rebels. One of his main arguments against the prince was that by bringing in foreign mercenaries he was jeopardizing the peace and stability of the country.²⁸

Because the Ottomans remained unwilling to give their official consent for a direct intervention of Transylvania against the Habsburgs, Apafi decided to secretly assist the rebels, thus honouring at least some of the provisions of the treaty signed with France. His most important concession in this regard was allowing Teleki to take command of the army. Another French agent, Forval, travelled to Chioar (Kővár) and on February 17, 1678, reached an agreement with the wealthy Transylvanian nobleman. The details of the agreement closely mirrored the provisions of the treaty signed the previous year (May 27, 1677) in Warsaw. In exchange for his services, Teleki and his family were promised the protection of the French King and a monthly pension of 1,000 florins. This agreement was crucial for the rebel cause as Boham and his mercenaries needed a secure base until the new expedition could begin. Teleki provided them with quarters in Maramureş (Maramoros) County which he controlled as lord-lieutenant (*comes*).²⁹ The first group of mercenaries (300 men) had already arrived in early February³⁰ followed shortly by the rest of the army. Commander Boham himself arrived almost a month later, on March 4.³¹ There they prepared for a new incursion into Habsburg territories, but a severe lack of funds quickly became an issue. Teleki wrote to the French ambassador urgently requesting the necessary funds to pay both the Polish mercenaries and the soldiers recruited by the Hungarian rebels.³²

After several weeks of preparations, the army began marching towards Upper Hungary. On April 27, 1678, Teleki travelled to Baia Mare (Nagybánya), accompanied by a guard of 400 mounted soldiers, to join the rest of the troops. Although the sultan had formally prohibited Apafi from mobilizing his army for the rebel cause, the prince provided Teleki with 12 cannons for this expedition.

All in all, this heterogeneous army grew to a respectable size of 12,000 men. As Teleki advanced through the counties of north-east Hungary, the number of soldiers under his command steadily increased. According to an Italian report from early August, he had amassed an army of 20,000 Transylvanians, Hungarian rebels, French, and Polish soldiers (*...il Teleki con li Transilvani, Ungheri rebelii, Francesi e Polacchi in numero di circa m/20 huomini*).³³ Advancing cautiously, they avoided direct confrontation with a smaller Habsburg force of 7,000 and instead they decided to besiege the town of Prešov (Eperjes).

²⁸ S. Andea, op.cit., pp. 280-281; I. Hudita, op.cit., pp. 309-310.

²⁹ I. Hudita, op. cit., pp. 313-315.

³⁰ *Teleki Mihály levelezése: A római szent birodalmi gróf széki Teleki család oklevéltára*, vol. 8, ed. S. Gergely, Budapest 1926, p. 65.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 95.

³² *Monumenta Comititalia Regni Transylvaniae(MCRT)*, vol. XVI, ed. S. Szilágyi, Budapest 1893, pp. 460, 550-551.

³³ *MCRT*, vol. XVI, p. 554.

However, the local population was reluctant to support the army as expected.³⁴ Nevertheless, the Viennese courts took the new menace seriously and dispatched additional troops under Generals Leslie and Dünewald in early August. Fearing a confrontation with a superior enemy, Teleki withdrew home, to Chioar, with his small Transylvanian entourage. The rebels reorganized and appointed the young Imre Thököly as their new leader, although Boham was appointed commander-in-chief of the whole army. Under the new leadership, the rebels achieved victory in direct combat with the Habsburg forces and captured several smaller towns and settlements.³⁵

As winter was approaching, the situation in Hungary was about to take a radical turn.

Sobieski was facing increased pressure at home to cease his support for the enemies of the Habsburgs. Under such circumstances, the Polish King changed his attitude and took measures against those who were recruiting mercenaries for the war in Hungary. Some French and Hungarian agents in the frontier area were arrested and the lines of communication with Transylvania were strictly supervised. Wisnowiecki even executed a Hungarian agent who had come to recruit new mercenaries.³⁶ The impetuous Count Thököly gradually lost momentum and began to suffer defeats in direct confrontations with the enemy. At the same time, negotiations between the Habsburgs and the French progressed well and the two monarchs were close to reaching a peace agreement. The French ambassador in Warsaw was ordered to dissolve the mercenary army fighting in Hungary and to withdraw all French officers. The military diversion in the east was no longer useful to Louis XIV. Boham and his men retreated towards the Transylvanian border, and some of the mercenaries, especially the mounted troops, were allowed to return to Poland under the pretext of a mutiny.³⁷

Most of the Polish infantry was left behind and they found themselves in a difficult situation. Back home, they were seen as traitors by some of the pro-Habsburg nobility who insisted that they should be arrested, and their properties confiscated. However, the most urgent problem was to find winter quarters, and the solution was provided once again by the Transylvanian prince. The situation of the mercenaries was discussed by the Diet during a meeting held in Alba Iulia in October,³⁸ and the estates agreed to respect the provisions of the treaty. According to a document issued on October 15, 1678, 810 soldiers, of whom 300 were mounted, received lodging on various princely estates. The chief commander of this small army was General Boham. Most of the other officers were Polish subjects (Tunkevicz, Kransor, Gemego, Csesziroczi, Ogrinczki) but some of them had German names (Triszszenhansz, Von Hoffen, Edelhoff).³⁹ Initially, Boham and a significant part

³⁴ Throughout this short campaign, Teleki made constant efforts to be perceived as a defender of religious freedom and of Hungarian rights and privileges as shown by the declaration addressed to the inhabitants of Szabolcs County on 4 June 1678, *MCRT*, vol. XVI, pp. 505-508.

³⁵ I. Hudita, op. cit., pp. 319-321; G. Volkmer, op. cit., p. 454.

³⁶ I. Hudita, op. cit., pp. 326-328.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 340.

³⁸ *MCRT*, vol. XVI, p. 609.

³⁹ J. Koncz, *Francia-lengyel hadal laktáborzása Erdélyben 1678-ban*, "Hadtörténelmi Közlemények," 4/1891, pp. 136-137.

of the troops resided in Debrecen, on the western frontier of the principality,⁴⁰ but before the end of the year they had to move elsewhere due to a plague outbreak.⁴¹

In the service of the Transylvanian Prince (1679-1685)

In 1679, France prioritized the retreat of Boham and the other French officers from Transylvania, while maintaining good relations with Apafi and the leaders of the Hungarian rebellion with the promise of new subsidies. In a letter issued on 24 July 1678, Béthune had already expressed the idea that some of the mercenaries who were fighting in Hungary could be employed directly by the Transylvanian Prince in exchange for more French subsidies.⁴²

Throughout April 1679, Béthune sent several orders to Boham and to the two diplomatic agents, Révérand and Forval, to leave Transylvania discreetly along with the other French officers. Initially, Apafi refused to allow them passage through Maramureş County and called them to his court. A few weeks later, he consented to their departure because he wanted to maintain good relations with France. Boham, Forval, and the other French soldiers left Transylvania in May but Révérand was kept by Apafi at his side to intermediate future contacts with the French Monarchy.⁴³

The remaining Polish mercenaries were presented with a new opportunity for service in the court guard of the Transylvanian prince. On May 22, 1679, some of the captains and officers of the mercenaries swore an oath of loyalty to their new employer, Prince Michael Apafi I. The leading figures among them were: Henrich Fen Ofen (Hinrich v. Offen), Mihael Tenk (Denck), Nicolai Szadoszki, Christoph Grolioszki (Grzoclioffsky), Stanislaus Grotoczki (Grotovski), Casimirus Okinczki, Joannes Podlyeczki (Podlyenszki), Joannes Thomasovszki, Grzegorz Podlewsky and Mikolaj Sadowski.⁴⁴ Most of them are also mentioned in the muster registers of the Transylvanian court issued during the following years. Henrich von Offen (Henrich Fen Offen) was mentioned as captain of the First French Flag (*Első Franczia Zászló*) in 1680⁴⁵ and maintained this position throughout the following years, at least until 1685.⁴⁶ Joannes Podlensky (Podlyenszki) appears as captain of the Second French Flag (*Második Franczia Zászló*) in 1680⁴⁷ and in the following years.⁴⁸ The third high ranking mercenary is Cristoph Grogovski⁴⁹ (Christoff Grzoclioffsky/Grolioszki in the oath of fealty) leader of the Third French Flag (*Harmadik Franczia Zászló*) in 1680⁵⁰ who later appears in service

⁴⁰ Teleki Mihály levelezése, vol. 8, pp. 362-363.

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 396.

⁴² I. Hudita, op. cit., p. 334.

⁴³ Ibidem, pp. 342-345.

⁴⁴ S. Szilágyi, *Hadtörténelmi okmánytár*, "Hadtörténelmi Közlemények," 5/1893, pp. 158-159.

⁴⁵ Serviciul Judeţean al Arhivelor Naţionale Cluj (Romanian National Archives, Cluj County Service) (SJAN CJ), Socoteli princiare (Princely Accounts), 46 Evidenţe nominale de efective militare (Military Name Records), f. 49.

⁴⁶ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 111 (see also Annexe III)

⁴⁷ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 50 v.

⁴⁸ As for example in 1684 (see Annexe II).

⁴⁹ He is quite probably Krysztof Grochowski, descendent of a small noble family from the Podlaskie voivodeship. He began his military career abroad (in the 1670s) and later he served as captain of dragoons in the regiment of Marcin Scibor-Chelmski, M. Wagner, *Słownik biograficzny oficerów polskich drugiej połowy XVII wieku*, vol. 2, Oświęcim 2014, p. 103.

⁵⁰ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 52.

as Cristoph Krakovski⁵¹. The other leaders who signed the oath of fealty were appointed as officers in one of the three units: Mihael Tenk/Denk/Dencsi was second in command (*wice capitaneus*) in the company of Henrich von Offen⁵², Stanislaus Grotoczki/ Grotovski/ Kotorzki was second in command in the unit of Cristoph Grogovski,⁵³ Casimirus Okinczki was flag-bearer (*Zászlóartó*) in the second company⁵⁴ and Joannes Thomasovszki/ Jan Tomaszewski was second in command under captain Podleski.⁵⁵

The first mention of the Polish mercenary units in the accounts of the Transylvanian court appeared in a document issued on May 16, 1679, several days before they pledged their oath of fealty. It is not a regular muster list but a brief mention of the three units, their officers, and the wages they were supposed to receive. The total size of the units is not specifically mentioned, only the yearly expenses with the wages of these mercenaries which were estimated at 13,608 florins. Based on this information and the muster lists issued during the following years, we can assume that each unit had roughly 100 men, including officers.⁵⁶

On January 1, 1680, the infantry guard of the Transylvanian court received their monthly wages. Seven units of foot soldiers are mentioned on this occasion: two companies of German mercenaries (211 men), one company of Hungarian soldiers (64 men), one company of *Seimeni*⁵⁷ (79 men), and the three “French flags” (*Franczia Záslo*) (291 men). It is important to note that, at the time, the soldiers from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were the most numerous group of foreign mercenaries serving at court, representing 45.12% of the whole infantry guard. The names of the three captains (Henric von Offen, Ioannes Podlesky and Cristoph Crakovsky), along with those of the officers and the rank-and-file soldiers are mentioned in the documents alongside the monthly wage received on the occasion. All three captains were rewarded with a monthly wage of 38 florins. Thus, they were among the best paid men in the infantry army of the court, surpassed only by the first German infantry captain who earned 50 florins per month. The other Polish officers and common soldiers received generous pays: 20 florins for the vice-captain, 10 florins for the sergeant, 9 florins for the clerk, 6 florins for the muster master, 6 florins for the corporals, 4 florins for the drummers, 4 florins for the *decuriones* (who were in charge of 10 soldiers) and 3 florins for common soldiers (*gregari*).⁵⁸

In July 1681, the mercenary guard of Prince Apafi gathered on the estate of Iernut (Rádnot), where they received their monthly wages. On this occasion, only the documents referring to the units of captain Crakovski (81 soldiers) and Podleski (93 soldiers) survived.

⁵¹ See for example Annexe I.

⁵² SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 111 (see Annexe III).

⁵³ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 114 (see Annexe I).

⁵⁴ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 114 (see Annexe I).

⁵⁵ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 200 (see Annexe II).

⁵⁶ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 40; F.N. Ardelean, *Organizarea militară în principatul Transilvaniei (1541-1691): Comitate și domenii fiscale*, Cluj-Napoca 2019, pp. 192-193.

⁵⁷ Initially they were mercenaries from the Balkan region fighting in the army of Wallachia, but in time many locals (Romanians) joined their ranks. They were infantry soldiers with firearms often compared with Ottoman *seğban* infantry or even janissaries. In the second half of the seventeenth century, they were also employed by the rulers of the Transylvanian Principality, F.N. Ardelean, *Seimeni în slujba principilor Transilvaniei în a doua jumătate a secolului XVII*, “Banatica,” 22/2012, pp. 119-134.

⁵⁸ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 43-54; F.N. Ardelean, *Organizarea militară*, pp. 193-197.

The structure and the size of the units were almost the same as in the previous year with a notable difference: the units were now referred to as companies rather than “flags.”⁵⁹

Later that year, between August and November, the Transylvanian army was on campaign in Upper Hungary. On this expedition, the Transylvanian army was expected to have 8,000 men but the actual size was no more than 7,000 along with five cannons, according to the memoirs of Nicholas Bethlen. The voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia also sent smaller detachments of about 1,000 cavalry each.⁶⁰ Among the troops mobilized by Apafi for this expedition we find the units of captains Crakovski and Podleski. The two officers and their men are mentioned in the journal of Mátyas Miles who describes this expedition in detail. According to Miles, during the night of August 31, 50 of the so called “French soldiers” from the company of captain Podleski (*Podlenzky*) were defeated in a skirmish with the enemy. A few days later, as the Transylvanian army was approaching the fortress of Fil’akovo (Füleke), 29 soldiers from the company of captain Crakofsky (Cracofzky) deserted during the night.⁶¹ Later that year, on November 16, most likely after the army had returned from their campaign in Upper Hungary, the mercenaries of the court were inspected and received their wages. The total size of the court infantry had now increased to 724 men, with the „French flags” still representing the largest detachment of 327 soldiers (36.29% of the total court infantry).⁶² All three captains are now mentioned in the muster registers and the total size of their units has slightly increased compared to the previous year (291 soldiers). The only possible explanation is that new recruits had arrived from Poland, especially if we consider the desertions and the casualties suffered during the expedition.

In 1683, Michael Apafi was summoned by the Ottoman sultan to participate in the siege of Vienna. With an obvious lack of enthusiasm, the prince mobilized 6,000 soldiers and marched for two months until he reached the Ottoman camp of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustapha. It is important to note that in this year the size of the court guard had reached its highest number of soldiers (1,170), divided in 13 cavalry banners (lancers, dragoons, and mounted carbineers) and 7 infantry companies (including the three Polish mercenary units).⁶³ However, not all the mercenaries were mobilized for this expedition. A muster roll compiled on October 1, 1683, mentions eight units: one cavalry banner (50 men); the Polish company of Henric von Offen (99 soldiers); two detachments of German mercenaries (23 and 24 soldiers); 20 mercenaries from the unit of captain Crakovski; 20 mercenaries from the unit of captain Podleski; 8 Hungarian soldiers; 6 Seimeni. According to this document, about half of the Polish mercenaries (139) remained behind, including the entire company of captain Henric von Offen. The other two Polish captains, Crakovski and Podleski, accompanied Apafi at the Ottoman siege of Vienna with the most of their soldiers.⁶⁴

November 16, after Apafi and his soldiers returned from the ill-fated expedition under the walls of Vienna, the Transylvanian court army was reunited. Some narrative sources suggest that the Transylvanian army suffered significant casualties due to disease and lack

⁵⁹ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 79-80. F.N. Ardelean, *Organizarea militară*, p. 198.

⁶⁰ N. Bethlen, *Descrierea vieții sale de către el însuși*, Cluj-Napoca 2004, p. 171.

⁶¹ *MCRT*, vol. XVII, p. 356.

⁶² SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 103-117; F.N. Ardelean, *Organizarea militară*, pp. 198-199.

⁶³ F.N. Ardelean, *The Army of Transylvania*, pp. 134-135.

⁶⁴ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 145-149; F.N. Ardelean, *Organizarea*, p. 203.

of provision. However, the court accounts indicate a less dramatic situation. The total size of the infantry detachments, for example, was reduced by 158 soldiers (21.82%) compared to 1681. Unfortunately, no muster rolls survive from 1682 or the beginning of 1683 making it impossible to determine whether the entire number represents casualties from the expedition. The size of the “French flags” decreased by 56 men, bringing the total to 271.⁶⁵

The size of the mercenary guard decreased slightly in the following years, but the Transylvanian army was no longer involved in major military operations. Apafi and his councillors began negotiations with the Habsburgs as their troops gained the upper hand in the centuries-long conflict with the Ottomans. Within a few years, the political status of Transylvania changed drastically as it became part of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Conclusions

This case study shows that Transylvania was integrated into the vast and complex European network of mercenaries and military subsidies. Throughout the seventeenth century, France frequently relied on military diversions, especially in its confrontation with the Habsburgs. This strategy was particularly successful in relations with Sweden,⁶⁶ but occasionally, even smaller states such as the Principality of Transylvania were considered valuable partners. Eastern Europe was well connected to the international mercenary market though it can be argued that it had a regional specificity, characterised by a more intense short and medium-distance mobility of mercenaries. If we examine the infantry guard of Prince Apafi, we can see that most foreign soldiers originated from neighbouring states: *Seimeni* from Moldavia and Wallachia and, of course, the large group of Polish mercenaries.

The presence of 300 Polish mercenaries in the Transylvanian army was not an exceptional occurrence in the history of the principality. A significant number of soldiers from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had served in the guards of Transylvanian rulers since the second half of the sixteenth century (Isabella Jagiello, John Sigismund Szapolyai, Stephen Báthory) and during the Long Turkish War (1591/1593-1606), primarily as a result of dynastic connections. However, Apafi's mercenaries came under different circumstances. Their recruitment was closely linked to a complex political context, shaped by a series of intertwined events: the Hungarian rebellion against Habsburg rule, the favourable relations of Jan III Sobieski with the French Monarchy, and the Dutch War (1672-1678), concluded with the peace treaties of Nijmegen (1678-1679).

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⁶⁵ SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, f. 165-175; F.N. Ardelean, *Organizarea militară*, pp. 204-205.

⁶⁶ S. Norrhem, *Mercenary Swedes: French Subsidies to Sweden 1631-1796*, translated by Ch. Merton, Lund 2020.

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**Annexe I: SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, 46
Evidențe nominale de efective militare, f.
114-116.**

Az 1681 16 November terminalt Gyalogok fizetésekről való Regestrum

Masodik Francia Zaszlo

Feo Kapitány Cristoph Krakofski f 38

Vicze Stanislao Kotorski – f 20

Zaszlotarto Casimir Okinski – f 14

Strasamester Tomas Pak – f 10

Szállár osztó Mertin Volfski – f 9

Vicze Szállár osztó Jan Klameski – f 3

Iro Diák Stanislav Brodski – f 6

Kaplarok

Jan Wojczki – f 6

Simon Prokimski

Dobosok

Jakob Laffel – f 4

Stefan Martin Kovicz

Tizedesek

Jan Stefkoski – f 4

Vasil Groski

Piotr Lukski

Jakub Kzankovicz

Gerg Greben

Daniel Lukánovski

Juvek Szitgan

Gergorz Patolovski

Közlegények

Bartolome Zamoski – f 3

Piotr Zelaczkowski

Gregorz Karminski

Stanislav Ligiza

Alexander Trojanovski

Casimier Sumski

Vasil Novitski

Jan Zavonski

Jan Markovski

Adám Karminski

Jan Osztroviski

Piotr Wojcziski

Tamis Kozakovski

Vojcsech Vinforski

Vasil Ostrovski

Bartolomi Virazamski

Pavel Bozkovski

Jan Vosinski

Georgz Pancserni

Alexander Badajkovski

Iván Drozdoviski

Stanislav Groski

Jan Matkovski

Stanisláv Pavasovski

Francisech Kruelski

Mathias Grabovski

Jakub Szubovski

Simon Jedsinovski

Stanislav Dabrovski

Stanislav Dobojniski

Vojcsech Lincinski

Andrei Kaminski

Jan Sabanski

Mathias Visnovieski

Andrei Gorimski

Valentin Malcinski

Thomás Jarosovski

Thomás Mátasovski

Andrei Krasnovski

Jacub Tomasovski

Augustin Reger

Vojcsech Csechanovski

Jan Zaleski

Jan Ostrovski

Jan Zemnski

Jan Gilgovski

Pavel Politovski

Andrei Savicski

Cristoph Boroviczki

Nicklai Bezdobn

Jákub Brosovski

ujjek.

Capral Hans Fidicz Hansa f 6

Capral Lorens Smit f 6

Dobos Volf Benzter f 4

Tizedesek

Georg Borgmeiel f 4

Augustin Karlal f 4

Közlegények

Simon Sendlo f 3

Andrei Delzal

Vojcsech Fornaczki

Filip Tokácski

Urban Dobki

Paul Rocitka
 Gerg Zalbier
 Hans Zabokleccki
 Albert Tischmacher
 Andri Smeczki
 Andri Melner
 Hans Adam Rej
 Hans Ritter
 Hans Jakub
 Vencel Rüfol
 Tomas Dejsech
 Andri Furmont
 Melchior Spigner
 Hans Bortner
 Venczel Dudla
 Hans Fydicz Tlefel
 Hans Gal
 Hans Hofman
 Lörens Han
 Daniel Markva
 Relis Gerzler
 Vojcsek Bneta
 Cristian Crassek
 Lukás Provisnik
 Mathias Ezekler
 Hans Vogel
 Bernad Kaczaczki
 Mathias Kracznik
 Hans Joan
 Jan Melnik
 Jakob Voikovicz
 Summa facit f 440

**Annexe II: SJAN CJ, Socoteli princiare, 46
 Evidențe nominale de efective militare, f.
 200-204**

Rolla Companiey Im. Pana Kapitan Podlle-
 skiego pisana Fogoraszi Die 20 May A 1684
 P. Kap. Ioannes Podleski f 38
 P. Povv. Jan Tomaszewski f. 20
 P. Chovs. Frandz Albrycht Sreybeisdorff 14
 Servant Michel Kledzler f 10
 Furyer Handz Jurgelyn f 9
 Munszter Piotr Paszkowski f 6
 Alexander Kruszelnicki f 6
 Kaprale Filip Jarczykiewich f 6
 Gergi Szein f 6
 Furersvyc Kazimierz Rybinski f 4
 Dobosze Gregorz Gruschynski f 4

Handz Kasper f 4
 Decuriones
 Jan Zaleski f 4
 Symon Krupski
 Micolay Gorzynski
 Woyciech Nrebloski
 Jan Siechkovski
 Handz Borkovski
 Andris Holl
 Krystof Hak
 Henrich Obryht Salatna
 Cristyan Charter f 4
 Balcev Skalski
 Adam Sikorski
 Andris Cwibel
 Gergi Wolff
 Woyczzech Uzelovski
 Jan Kapski
 Woyczzech Ktosinski
 Wasil Pietrowich
 Jan Uzanowski
 Jerzy Stencil
 Franciscek Willanski
 Leonard Steimecel
 Blazey Mysztofski
 Krystof Stupnicki
 Woyciech Jagielski
 Iwan Garczyn
 Franciscek Tarnovsky
 Alexander Usatynski
 Jakub Kawecki
 Pawel Wiechorkowich
 Symon Cieselski
 Andris Jakielle
 Jan Kuklinski
 Pawel Piotrovski
 Andrzej Zubald
 Wencel Prochalski
 Stanislaw Rozbovski
 Handz Stawik
 Stanislaw Byczkowski Alba Iulia
 Michailo Tymko
 Francyszek Spevhonski
 Mikolay Dobranski
 Matyász Kochovich
 Wasostyniech Lecki
 Woycsieh Zablusi
 Martyn Stefan

Michal Brzezinski Alba Iulia
 Jan Dynirski
 Alexander Medelski
 Bartolomy Kobylicki
 Stanislaw Lokotorski
 Mikolay Paskiewich
 Sobestyan Rogowski
 Matysz Czwejtner
 Michal Ufnal
 Andrzej Dynovski
 Stefan Wilkowski
 Jan Genborovski
 Jan Radzikewicz
 Matysz Kielmar
 Jakub Csetmicki
 Jan Szelwinski
 Michal Krupinski
 Jan Jablonski
 Jan Ostrowski
 Marcin Kosinski
 Kazimierz Siewierski
 Matyas Suchocki
 Iwan Czurey
 Gergi Szreycev
 Gordzi Michalonski
 Piotr Budkiewicz
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M. n. I Francia zászló
 Lustritia 4ta
 facta Die 18 May Anno 1685
 Dni: Cap: Henrich von Offen f 38
 Wice Cap Michael Dencsi ..20
 Wexillifer Michael Kremsser..14

Inferiores offitiales
 Wigillarius Magister Greger Lessinsky f 10
 Furier Johannes Grabofsky..9
 Schriba Michael Franciskús..6
 Corporal Jacúb Kúrlander..6
 Corporal Mathias Sloboda..6

Timpanistae
 Jánn Wolfsky f 4
 Wallentin Zellinsky

Liberty
 Michaelley Zallefsky f 4
 Michael Krúpsky
 Greger Podnokowitz
 Hansgerge Schallafster
 Stanislag Witkofsky
 Jánn Schlúpsky
 Franciscek Wassillofsky
 Dewald Steirwáld
 Jánn Jaretsky
 Stephan Nifswissky
 Gerge Kamarad
 Cassamir Zipsky
 Rúdbrecht Kopenhagen
 Woycieh Wapkoffsky
 Alexander Staromiesky
 Andres Schalla
 Mathias Súlkofsky
 Jánn Prokopowitz
 Hans Gallitsky
 Jacúb Bierfsider
 Woycieh Kofsinsky
 Wasil Jancisnky
 Gerge Jarssembek
 Söbestian Pawellofsky
 Chrisitian Miller
 Hans Stentzel
 Jakúb Bröchling
 Maxim Czernofsky
 Hans Marcingko
 Simmon Stein
 Michael Goretzky
 Simmon Wessel
 Jakúb Sikalfsky
 Mathias Wesselofsky
 Jossef Fridmansky
 Woycieh Jerinsky
 Jánn Demssky
 Alexander Siratzky
 Mathias Sandomirssky
 Jánn Ossichofsky
 Wasil dabnowitz
 Jánn Jassomirssky
 Jánn Bessinsky
 Jánn Pressemitzky
 Lúkas Krayofsky
 Stanislaús Godssefsky
 Andreae Rosswadofsky
 Stanislaús Wilssky

Woycieh Wissnofsky
Thomas Schimisky
Gerge Schúbart
Jánn Samborssky
Stanislaus Komorofsky
Paúl Mall
Jánn Mlafsky
Háns Wayday
Jánn Merssienofsky
Jacúb Hassan
Thomas Grúdnitzky
Adam Fallinsky
Aúgústín Czerssky
Michael Kúltzitzky
Stephan Zarnofsky
Jánn Strússofsky
Wallentin Czechofsky
Stephan Pissarssky
Stanisslag Pawellofsky
Stanisslag Tainssky
Jánn Wusilkofsky

Adam Biellobrissky
Jacúb Jacobofsky
Woycieh Bezofsky
Jánn Sekúlssky
Mickolay Szawa

Ballásfalwán
Blassy Jablúnsky
Jánn Rochsehitzky
Lorentz Borochofsky
Mathias Gollombitzky
Jánn Botrowitz

Zállátnán
Ellias Zallesky
Jánn Wilkofsky

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