

**DARIUSZ MISZEWSKI**

War Studies University, Warsaw

## **THE NATIONAL CAMP AND THE CONCEPT OF A FEDERATION DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

At the end of the nineteenth century, Polish political thought was split into two dominant ideological and political tendencies with different geopolitical concepts of the country. The National Party (SN) wished to construct a national state (Dmowski's plan, Jan Popławski's agenda) on the territory of the former First Republic with a Polish majority<sup>1</sup>. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the followers of Józef Piłsudski strove to disintegrate Russia and unite closely Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians with Poland<sup>2</sup>. When the Polish Socialist Party saw a peaceful organisation of the state as a federation with the nations on the territory of the former First Republic, J. Piłsudski linked the Jagiellonian idea with Prometheism<sup>3</sup>. He believed that federation projects were one thing and their implementation and the search for support among the nations to participate in them were another issue<sup>4</sup>. The differences resulted from the different degree of development of national awareness of Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians<sup>5</sup>. A federation was supposed to attract other states located between Germany and Russia<sup>6</sup>. Despite its victory over Soviet Russia (1920),

<sup>1</sup> New Documents Archives (Archiwum Akt Nowych, AAN), National Headquarters of the Home Army (Komenda Główna Armii Krajowej, KG AK), 6th Division, Information and Propaganda Bureau (Oddział VI Biuro Informacji i Propagandy, BIP), file no. 203/VII-50, *Koncepcja zwycięstwa, Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy* (WDN), 19 III 1942, no. 5, p. 91; "O rozwój myśli wszechpolskiej", *Walka*, 9 IX 1942, no. 31, p. 213; see T. Kulak, *Jan Ludwik Popławski*, Wrocław 1994, pp. 164-166; R. Dmowski, *Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1988, pp. 220-221, 292, 311.

<sup>2</sup> "O federacji wschodniej Europy", *Robotnik Śląski (RŚ)*, 20 XII 1919, no. 104, pp. 1-2; "Zagadnienie wschodniej Europy", *RŚ*, 3 I 1920, no. 2, p. 1; "Znaczenie Polski w regulowaniu spraw Wschodu", *RŚ*, 30 I 1920, no. 24, p. 3; L. Moczulski, *Geopolityka, potęga i przestrzeń*, Warszawa 1999, p. 560-562; A. Madera, "Prometeizm i polityka etniczna wobec narodów słowiańskich w poglądach i działalności Tadeusza Hołównki", in: *Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w polskiej myśli politycznej*, ed. M. Dymarski, J. Juchnowski, Wrocław 2004, p. 65; A. Juzwenko, "Leon Wasilewski – orientacyjne kłopoty z określeniem kształtu terytorialnego państwa polskiego (1914-1918)", in: *Polska – Kresy – Polacy. Studia historyczne*, ed. S. Ciesielski, T. Kulak, K. Matwijowski, *AUW. Historia*, vol. 116, no. 1636, Wrocław 1994, pp. 109-113.

<sup>3</sup> "O federacji wschodniej Europy", *RŚ*, 21 XII 1919, no. 104, pp. 1-2; A. Nowak, *Polska i trzy Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 roku)*, Kraków 2015, pp. 575-576, 581-585; see *Ruch prometejski i walka o przebudowę Europy Wschodniej (1918-1940)*, Warszawa 2012.

<sup>4</sup> P. Wandycz, *O federalizmie i emigracji. Reminiscencje o rzeczach istotnych i błahych*, Lublin 2003, pp. 13-14, 22-23.

<sup>5</sup> A. Marszałek, *Europejska idea integracji międzynarodowej w perspektywie historycznej*, Toruń 2008, p. 176.

<sup>6</sup> Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich (ZNO), Papiery Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego (PKS), file no. 16501/III/vol. 1, *Sosnkowski do marszałka Piłsudskiego*, Warszawa 3 V 1920, p. 7; *Sosnkowski do marszałka Piłsudskiego*, Warszawa 12 V 1920, pp. 12-13; *Sosnkowski do marszałka Piłsudskiego*, Warszawa 14 V 1920, p. 20; file no. 16501/III/vol. 2, *Sosnkowski do premiera Skulskiego*, Warszawa 4 V 1920, pp. 20-21; *Sosnkowski do generała Rozwadowsk-*

Poland was too weak to organise a federation. Polish public opinion did not share the zeal to set up the federation, being satisfied with independence. Moreover, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians did not support the plans for a common state<sup>7</sup>. It was found unacceptable by their neighbouring states, the western superpowers and Czechoslovakia<sup>8</sup>.

The National Party saw Poland's security between the world wars in anti-German alliances with France, the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia<sup>9</sup>. The Polish historical mission was the organization of states between Germany and the USSR with Poland as a nation state and not as a federative state<sup>10</sup>. After the First World War, the National Party saw the rise to power of national movements across Europe as a positive geopolitical development<sup>11</sup>. It assumed cooperation with the USSR against Germany<sup>12</sup>. The defeat suffered in 1939 resulted from Poland's lack of preparation for the war and its inept conduct, assimilation of national minorities and class divisions running in the nation<sup>13</sup>. It countered the idea of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and the plan of Aristide Briand, as they wished to build a European union on the French-German hegemony, allowing for a revision of the borders set out at Versailles<sup>14</sup>. Polish nationalists described the pan-European idea as "Masonic and Germanophile propaganda", although the Vatican supported a federation within Europe without the USSR<sup>15</sup>.

In an address to his compatriots in Poland, Prime Minister General Władysław Sikorski announced on 18 December 1939 a new political order between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic in the form of a "solidarity group of Slavic states" to stop Germany and keep it separate from Russia<sup>16</sup>. Besides the Central European federation, a Scandinavian, a Balkan and a Latin federation would be formed. As of 1940, this was the official doctrine

*iego*, Warszawa 4 V 1920, p. 22; Sosnkowski o krajach bałtyckich i Rumunii dla bezpieczeństwa Polski, pp. 78-80; PKS, file no. 16502/III, Sosnkowski o polityce wschodniej marszałka Piłsudskiego, p. 2-6; see M. Pestkowska, *Kazimierz Sosnkowski*, Wrocław 1995, p. 55.

<sup>7</sup> A. Marszałek, op. cit., pp. 179-180.

<sup>8</sup> ZNO, file no. 189165, M. Sokolnicki, "Polacy wobec zagadnień międzynarodowych", *Sprawy Obce*, 3/1930, p. 491; K. Lewandowski, *Sprawa ukraińska w polityce zagranicznej Czechosłowacji w latach 1918-1932*, Wrocław 1974, p. 182.

<sup>9</sup> M. Śliwa, *Polska myśl polityczna w I połowie XX wieku*, Wrocław 1993, pp. 167-168.

<sup>10</sup> J. Waskan, *Koncepcje społeczno-polityczne Romana Rybarskiego*, Toruń 1991, p. 109.

<sup>11</sup> K. Kawalec, *Narodowa Demokracja wobec faszyzmu 1922-1939*, Warszawa 1989, p. 154.

<sup>12</sup> M. Śliwa, op. cit., p. 169.

<sup>13</sup> *Walka*, 29 IX 1943, no. 37, p. 1-2; AAN, SN, file no. 206/18, *Uwagi w sprawie wychowania narodowego*, brochure of the Warsaw Board of SN, p. 78.

<sup>14</sup> J. Chodorowski, "Unia Paneuropejska", *Wolna Polska*, 1999, no. 4/154; J. Tombiński, "Początki ruchu paneuropejskiego w Polsce", in: *Z dziejów prób integracji europejskiej od średniowiecza do współczesności*, ed. M. Pułaski, Kraków 1995, pp. 87-89.

<sup>15</sup> ZNO, file no. 209944, A. Romer, "Paneuropa? Między młotem amerykańskim a rosyjskim", *Nasza Przyszłość*, 3/1930, p. 98-101; PKS, file no. 16543/II/vol. 1, R. Rybarski, *Uwagi o przyszłym układzie prawnopolitycznym Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Warszawa 5 XI 1940, pp. 21-31 (International relations should be based on cooperation between nation states and on alliances of states with converging interests. He saw Pan-Europe as a pangermanic idea to restore the German hegemony on the ruins of the Versailles system. He considered European and Polish federalist plans as delusions).

<sup>16</sup> "Odezwa Rządu z dnia 18 XII 1939 r. do ogółu społeczeństwa w kraju", in: *Rzeczpospolita Polska czasu wojny. Dziennik Ustaw i Monitor Polski 1939-1945*, Warszawa 1999, *Monitor Polski*, Angers 19 XII 1939, year XXII, no. 277-284.

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>17</sup>. A two-stage integration of Europe would prevent the hegemony of superpowers. The European federalists assumed a one-stage model of Europe<sup>18</sup>. The issue of peace and security and Poland's geopolitical position determined the government's actions aiming at establishing a new order in Central Europe. It opposed the division of Europe into zones of influence, domination of superpowers or their hegemony in Europe and worldwide<sup>19</sup>. The concept of the Central European Federation was handled by the War Goals Office, and from 1942 onwards by the Ministry of Congress Work<sup>20</sup>. Between 1940 and 1942, the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia concluded agreements on a union open to Central European countries<sup>21</sup>. After the severance of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations in 1943, Czechoslovakia abandoned the confederation with Poland, which was opposed by the USSR<sup>22</sup>. In December 1943, it concluded an agreement with the USSR on friendship and mutual help, rejecting the Polish federation concept. Under the influence of the USSR, the Western powers abandoned their plans to federalise Europe<sup>23</sup>.

The construction of a New Deal in Central Europe with Czechoslovakia sparked discussion in Poland. The threat to Poland from Germany and the USSR was to be neutralised by the enlargement of the territory, the new course of state borders<sup>24</sup>, creation of regional federations between the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea (Polish: Morze Czarne, hence the acronym the ABC area), invoking the Polish tradition of unions<sup>25</sup>. The national camp put forward an imperial idea as competing with a federal one. The National Party believed that since the Napoleonic wars, Europe had been dominated by the national idea and that the federal idea had become obsolete. The post-World War I implementation of this idea towards the Eastern nations put Poland at risk of losing its independence in the war with Soviet Russia. In addition, the Polish Socialist Party and the Piłsudski camp supported the

<sup>17</sup> E. Ponczek, "Idea federacji europejskiej w polskiej myśli politycznej (1939-1945)", in: *Proces integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, ed. P. Dobrowolski, K. Stolarczyk, Katowice 2001, pp. 211-212.

<sup>18</sup> F. Gross, *Federacje i konfederacje europejskie: rodowód i wizje*, Warszawa 1994, p. 6.

<sup>19</sup> E. Ponczek, *Polska myśl o pokoju w latach drugiej wojny światowej (1939-1945)*, Łódź 1999, p. 127.

<sup>20</sup> *Dzienniki Czynności Prezydenta RP Władysława Raczkiewicza 1939-1947*, vol. 1 (1939-1942), ed. J. Piotrowski, Wrocław 2004, p. 300; B. Pasierb, "Marian Seyda i resort planowania politycznego na obczyźnie, 1939-1944", in: *Polska – Kresy – Polacy*, pp. 259-263.

<sup>21</sup> M. Pułaski, "Edvard Beneš o projektach konfederacji czechosłowacko-polskiej w latach II wojny światowej", in: *Z dziejów Europy Środkowej w XX wieku*, Kraków 1997, ed. M. Pułaski, p. 153-169; J.R. Sielezin, "Idea federacji polsko-czechosłowackiej jako element gry politycznej w latach 1939-1943", in: *Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w polskiej myśli politycznej*, p. 147-149; J. Němeček, "Czechosłowacko-polskie koncepcje federacyjne w okresie II wojny światowej", in: *Europa unii i federacji. Idea jedności narodów i państw od średniowiecza do czasów współczesnych*, ed. K. Ślusarek, Kraków 2004, pp. 348-349; M.K. Kamiński, *Edvard Beneš kontra generał Władysław Sikorski. Polityka władz czechosłowackich na emigracji wobec rządu polskiego na uchodźstwie 1939-1943*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 74-76.

<sup>22</sup> H. Bartoszewicz, "Związki Sowiecki wobec federacyjnych koncepcji w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej 1941-1948", in: *Z dziejów prób integracji europejskiej*, pp. 139-142.

<sup>23</sup> L. Gardner, *Strefy wpływów. Wielkie mocarstwa i podział Europy od Monachium do Jaltę*, Warszawa 1999, p. 185-187; A. Kastory, *Winston Spencer Churchill*, Wrocław 2004, p. 258.

<sup>24</sup> AAN, KG AK, BIP, file no. 203/VII-67, *Problem przyszłych granic Polski. Materiał dla prelegentów propagandowych*, 1942, p. 11-21; R. Wapiński, *Historia polskiej myśli politycznej XIX i XX wieku*, Gdańsk 1997, pp. 258-259; B. Pasierb, "Polskie prace przygotowawcze do traktatu pokojowego z Niemcami (1939-1945)", in: A. Czubiński, *Druza wojna światowa i jej następstwa*, Poznań 1996, pp. 205-215.

<sup>25</sup> AAN, file no. 202/II-15, Government Delegation for Poland (Delegatura Rządu na Kraj, DR), Department of Internal Affairs (Departament Spraw Wewnętrznych, DSW), *Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie*, 1943, p. 24; see J. Sadowski, *Polscy federaliści i konfederaliści w czasie II wojny światowej*, part 2, *Studia Europejskie*, 4/2005, pp. 25-26.

creation of nation states of Belarusians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians in the Polish civilization area (First Republic)<sup>26</sup>. By his eastern policy, J. Piłsudski rejected Roman Dmowski's incorporation agenda<sup>27</sup>. For this reason, the Second Republic was weak. It lost Gdańsk, East Prussia and Cieszyn Silesia. Polish federalists continued the policy of Vienna and Berlin (*Mitteleuropa*)<sup>28</sup>, that conflicted the eastern nations and the Poles in the Polish civilization area. They were striving to create weak countries in Eastern Europe, hostile to Poland and Russia. R. Dmowski's Polish program aimed at rebuilding Poland on its historical lands and at weakening Germany. If J. Piłsudski had incorporated the Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands into Poland and the Piłsudski camp had assimilated national minorities, there would have been no defeat in 1939 and the murder of Poles by national minorities on Polish soil in alliance with Germany or the USSR<sup>29</sup>.

The Jagiellonian idea was identified by the National Party with the idea of a Great Poland from the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse to the Dnieper<sup>30</sup>, rather than with a federation with eastern nations. In the area between the Baltic and the Black Sea, it would prevent the implementation of the *Mitteleuropa* and *Lebensraum* and would eliminate the Soviet republics. No other country but Poland could exist on the former territory of the First Republic. Lithuanians would receive national and cultural autonomy within Poland<sup>31</sup>. The Byelorussians would be part of Poland due to their inadequate national identity<sup>32</sup>. The Ukrainians had no capacity for forming a state<sup>33</sup>, while the Ruthenians, like the

<sup>26</sup> AAN, DR, Department of Information and Press (Departament Informacji i Prasy, DIP), file no. 202/III-87, "Cywilizacja polsko-chrześcijańska wobec cywilizacji zachodnioeuropejskiej", *Sprawy Narodu*, lipiec 1943, no. 1, p. 98; file no. 202/III-81, "Dwóch wojewodów", *Młoda Polska*, 20 I 1944, no. 2, p. 11; see E. Ponczek, *Dyskurs o kulturze w polskiej myśli politycznej (1939-1945)*, Toruń 2006, p. 16; (During the Second World War, members of the National Party, ABC Radical National Camp and the Phalanx (Falanga) radical national movement set up a few clandestine groups which belonged to a broad national camp).

<sup>27</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 1, *Przed dwudziestu laty*, WDN, 6 III 1943, no. 10, p. 134.

<sup>28</sup> AAN, SN, file no. 206/3, *Co znaczy być narodowcem*, SN brochure, p. 37.

<sup>29</sup> "Zręby frontu ludowego w Polsce", *Walka*, 30 III 1944, no. 13, p. 9-11; "Dwa fronty", *Walka*, 4 V 1944, no. 16, p. 6-8; "Tak zwany głos ludu", *Walka*, 29 VI 1944, no. 24, p. 1-2; "Fermenty", *Walka*, 14 VII 1944, no. 26, p. 3; AAN, DR, DSW, file no. 202/II-22, *Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne nr 1 z życia polskich stronnictw politycznych Polski podziemnej*, SN, I kwartał 1944, p. 197.

<sup>30</sup> "Nie niszczyć dzieła Jagiellonów", *Walka*, 1 VIII 1941, no. 31, p. 1; "Gdzie jest Polska na wschodzie", *Walka*, 12 IX 1941, no. 36, p. 1; "Korektura granicy wschodniej", *Walka*, 24 X 1941, no. 42, pp. 2-3; DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 1, "Usunąć fałszywe drogowskazy"; "Na manowcach federacyjnych", WDN, 27 II 1943, no. 9, pp. 117-118; ZNO, Papiery Klaudiusz Hrabyka (PKH), file no. 16320/II, K. Hrabyk, *Problem rosyjski w polityce endecji*, Warszawa 1971 (typescript), pp. 98-99.

<sup>31</sup> "Litwa", *Walka*, 10 X 1941, no. 40, p. 2-3; file no. 1031/3, "Litwo, Ojczyzno moja...", *Walka*, 30 IX 1942, no. 37, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> "Na śmietniku wschodniego ładu brzęczy białoruska mucha", *Walka*, 11 III 1942, no. 9, p. 4; "Dwie tęsknoty", *Walka*, 7 X 1942, no. 38, pp. 1-2.

<sup>33</sup> "Sprawa ukraińska", *Walka*, 4 VIII 1943, no. 29, pp. 9-12; SN, file no. 206/2, *Stanowisko Stronnictwa Narodowego w sprawie ukraińskiej*, X 1943, pp. 1-1a; AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 2, "Kijowszczyzna – ukraińska ziemia Rzeczypospolitej", WDN, 15 V 1943, no. 19, p. 306; "Historyczne tło kwestii ukraińskiej", WDN, 26 VI 1943, no. 22, p. 412; file no. 202/III-88, "Wczoraj, dzisiaj, jutro zagadnienia ukraińskiego w Polsce", *Służba Informacyjna Walki*, 1944, p. 85; (The Ruthenians derived from the tradition of Ruthenian principalities occupied by Lithuania and Poland. They lived in harmony with Lithuanians and Poles in the First Polish Republic. The Ukrainians were descended from the Cossacks of Sich and Zaporizhzhya, who caused a rebellion led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. They were supported by Russia from the 17th century, by Austria from the 19th century, and by Germany against the Polish state and nation from the First World War. Ukrainian separatism instigated the Ruthenians to create a state with the Ukrainians on Polish soil).

Byelorussians, assimilated with the Polish people. A union with their states would threaten Poland's independence (an alliance with Germany, the USSR) and its territorial integrity (they demanded a border with Poland, at least along the Curzon Line)<sup>34</sup>. Politically, ethnically, culturally, and organisationally they were not prepared to maintain the political and economic independence of their countries. Germans and Russians did not grant them statehood (commissions, Soviet republics). Poland, too, should not jeopardize its potential and independence from the USSR to create such states. After Stalingrad in 1943, in the name of an agreement with Moscow, the National Party were ready to jointly fight their aspirations for independence in return for respect of Polish sovereignty and borders<sup>35</sup>.

The National Party opposed federations or a federation in Central Europe<sup>36</sup>. They would downgrade the importance of Poland in relation to small nations. Within the *Poland of the Three Seas*, the Great Poland would unite nation states between Germany and the USSR<sup>37</sup>. Internationally, socialism and communism promoted transnational integration with the slogans of the international brotherhood of the proletariat, and the National Party favoured a Christian bloc of nation states<sup>38</sup>. Federations would destroy them for the benefit of supranational institutions, in which the anti-national internationals would make decisions<sup>39</sup>. The National Party would not consent to divide the ABC area into the union of Yugoslavia and Greece and the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation. Rather than support the Masonic and pro-Soviet Czechoslovakia of President Edvard Beneš, it opted for a union with national Czechia. They had to agree for Zaolzie to remain within Poland and for Subcarpathian Ruthenia to stay with Hungary (Polish-Hungarian border). Poland would be responsible for foreign and military policy, and the Czechs would be responsible for the economy, as they had succumbed to superpowers at the expense of their freedom. They would get Lusatia

<sup>34</sup> "Wilno i Ziemia Wileńska", *Mysł Polska*, 20 II 1942, no. 19, pp. 333-334; "Litwa", *Mysł Polska*, 5 IV 1942, no. 21, p. 362-363, (Free Lithuania was the motto of every Pole, yet it had to be tied with Poland); AAN, SN, file no. 206/18, *Wrzesień 1939 r.*, p. 100; file no. 202/III-80/vol. 2, "Granica północno-wschodnia Polski", WDN, 12 VI 1943, no. 21, p. 376.

<sup>35</sup> "Bitwy polityczne", *Walka*, 18 XI 1943, no. 44, pp. 1-3.

<sup>36</sup> "Legenda narodu polskiego", *Walka*, 11 II 1942, no. 5, p. 1; "Los w naszych rękach", *Walka*, 22 IV 1942, no. 14, p. 1; "Wyzyskiwanie i nadużywanie uczciwości", *Walka*, 20 V 1942, no. 18, p. 1; "Europa Środkowa ośrodkiem pokoju", *Mysł Polska*, 20 V 1942, no. 24, pp. 401-403 (it should be a confederation of the national states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania).

<sup>37</sup> "Polska Trzech Mór", *Walka*, 19 IX 1941, no. 37, pp. 2-3; "Zadania Polski Trzech Mór", *Walka*, 25 XII 1942, no. 49, p. 2-3; AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 1, "Ku Polsce Trzech Mór", *Polak*, 29 X 1942, no. 4, p. 7; "O przebudowę Europy", *Mysł Polska*, 15 III 1942, no. 20, p. 346-347; M.E. Rojek, "Osobowość polityczna Polski po tej wojnie", *Mysł Polska*, 1 V 1942, no. 22-23, p. 378-380 (a Union of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania).

<sup>38</sup> AAN, SN, file no. 206/1, *Instrukcja dla propagandzistów w środowisku robotniczym*, 1943, 17-22; F. Gross, op. cit., pp. 81-83, (Stanisław Strzetelski "Federation in its Place", *New Europe*, styczeń 1942) believed that after the war, a federation might be a useful instrument to overcome a number of political and economic problems. He did not approve of the doctrine of federalism, which would solve all the existing problems of Poland and Europe through the federal system. It did not solve the problem of self-determination of nations and universal security. He was not able to replace another post-war League of Nations. The federated nations of Central Europe could counterbalance German and Russian imperialism if the links within the union were strong enough to form a viable, efficient and unified structure. Such links could stem from the spiritual community or arise mechanically. The mechanical link led to the centralization of power and administration. In the case of a spiritual connection, the sense of national interest would be subordinated to the patriotism of the wider federal homeland. He believed that *a confederation of the peoples of Central Europe, especially in this era of total warfare, could become an effective and independent instrument as long as it would turn into a uniformly governed empire*.

<sup>39</sup> "Niezdrowe wspólnoty", *Walka*, 29 VII 1942, no. 28, p. 1.

in return for Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The Hungarian-Slovakian border would be based on ethnicity. The Transylvanian region would be left with Hungary<sup>40</sup>.

In the occupied Poland, the idea of a federation was supported by democratic parties, the Piłsudski camp, socialists, syndicalists, and followers of the people's party, which saw the national camp as an ideological and political opponent. Democracy was unacceptable for the National Party, hence its permanent opposition to such a system within the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation. It was in the interest of the UK, for its post-war hegemony on the continent, to have democratic regional federations. They would be too weak to oppose Germany and the USSR on their own. In their internal relations, the federations legally equated national minorities with the ruling nation, towards which they were often disloyal. Post-war Poland would be a nation and a Catholic state, not a national one, without Germans and Jews and social reforms depriving Poles of property. The rights for the Slavic and Lithuanian minorities were dependent on their conduct towards Poles during the war. They were punished for their anti-Polish crimes, and the Ukrainian minority was displaced far away into Poland or into the USSR in exchange for Poles. Only the *Poland of the Three Seas* (a Great Poland and its bloc of states within the ABC area) was able to oppose German and Soviet imperialism, guarantee peace in Europe and secure freedom and development to Central European countries. Germany would be cut off to the Rhine by France, Schleswig and Holstein would be seized by Denmark, lands up to the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse with Rügen, Usedom and Wolin would be taken by Poland, and Saxony up to Chemnitz would be taken by Czechia. A Sorbian state would be created. Württemberg, Baden, Bavaria, and Austria would form a Catholic state<sup>41</sup>. In the east Poland would border on Russia, irrespective of its political system. The National Party defined its limits of security as a territory between Szczecin, Trieste, Odessa, and Pskov, corresponding to the area of the *Poland of the Three Seas*. A peaceful organisation of the security quadrilateral was a historical and vital necessity for Poland. It would include brotherly nations threatened by Germany and the USSR, from Czechia to Serbia<sup>42</sup>.

<sup>40</sup> "Polska-Czechy", *Walka*, 25 X 1940, no. 29, p. 6; "Unia polsko-czeska", *Walka*, 15 XI 1940, no. 32, p. 3; "Związek polsko-czeski", *Walka*, 1 XI 1941, no. 43, pp. 2-3; "Związek polsko-czeski", *Walka*, 24 VI 1942, no. 23, pp. 1-2; "Co będzie z unią polsko-czeską?", *Walka*, 25 VIII 1943, no. 32, pp. 4-5; AAN, KG AK, BIP, file no. 203/VII-48, "Nasze stanowisko. Na marginesie konfederacji polsko-czechosłowackiej", WDN, 15 II 1942, no. 2, pp. 115-116; "Związek Polski i Czechosłowacji", *Mysł Polska*, 20 II 1942, no. 19, pp. 328-330 (a Union of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be the epitome of the Jagiellonian idea).

<sup>41</sup> "Granice Polski", *Walka*, 15 XI 1940, no. 32, p. 1; "Odra – Nysa Łużycka", *Walka*, 26 IX 1941, no. 38, pp. 2-3; AAN, SN, file no. 206/18, *Wrzesień 1939 r.*, pp. 95-97; KG AK, BIP, file no. 202/VII-32, "Wielka polityka czy pieniacka zaściankowość", *Walka*, 10 XII 1942, no. 47, p. 15; "Straż nad Odrą", *Młoda Polska*, 10 V 1943, no. 9, p. 33; DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 1, "Idea w poniewierce", *Młoda Polska*, 20 II 1943, no. 4, p. 107; "Testament Chrobrego", *Młoda Polska*, 24 IV 1943, no. 8, p. 246.

<sup>42</sup> "Czworobok bezpieczeństwa", *Walka*, 7 XI 1941, no. 44, pp. 1-2; SN, file no. 206/18, *Prawdzie*, "Zagadnienie strefy środkowej", 1944, pp. 103-110 (it would not consent to the ABC area being split into the north and south bloc); "Strefa środkowa", *Mysł Polska*, 1 XII 1943, no. 59, pp. 834-835 (The Central Zone was the opposite of *Mittleuropa* and coincided with a slightly vague concept of Central Europe. It was a geographical whole, united by political and cultural ties. Three great dynasties were formed here: the German Habsburgs, the Polish Jagiellons and the Hungarian House of Anjou. Their characteristic feature was integration on a voluntary basis, which Poland retained until its partitions. Central European unions smashed the aggressions of Germany and Russia. Within the Central Zone, northern (Poland) and southern (Yugoslavia) blocs should be formed, which would be united by a union or a loose confederation of economic and military nature. They could not isolate any state in the Zone, be hostile to Italy and Turkey and aggressive towards Germany and the USSR. Internationally, they would be guided by solidarity and disputes would be resolved by compromise).

A Great Poland would not be an imperial, or national state. Its restoration within the historical borders would not be imperialism but a return of the Polish lands seized by the Germans and the USSR<sup>43</sup>. The National Party cared more for the national idea, the nation state and the borders than a federation of Central Europe. Regional federations were an anachronism in a world where nation states and nations striving for freedom dominated. They could form blocs or unions without violating state independence. The federation idea divided historical nations and territories of states in the name of minority rights and human rights. A federation of Europe threatened to lead to the hegemony of the superpowers (United States of Europe, Churchill's Council of Europe of 1943, Paneuropa, the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe)<sup>44</sup>.

The response of the National and People's Military Organisation (Narodowo-Ludowa Organizacja Wojskowa) to the federation idea espoused by the government was a *West Slavic State*<sup>45</sup>. Karol Stojanowski's concept merged programs of Polish political thought over the centuries, which he adapted to the international situation of the day. The course and outcome of the war, regional neighbourhood, common history, geopolitical location, Catholic religion (Poles, Lithuanians, Slovaks, Czechs, Sorbs, Hungarians, Croats, Slovenians, which did not eliminate Orthodox Serbs, Bulgarians and Romanians, but it would be better if they converted to Catholicism, Latvians and Albanians) would unite the Central European nations in the ABC area<sup>46</sup>. The German occupation strengthened their national awareness and unity. The West Slavic State would be a union of their states with limited sovereignty for strictly defined common tasks in defence, foreign and economic affairs without supranational structures. Member States would have the right to national, cultural and social development. Only in this territorial and ideological form could Poland defend itself and Central Europe against Germany and the USSR. The National and People's Military Organisation opposed the federation of Europe<sup>47</sup> as it would be ruled by the superpowers and ideological internationals. And the idea of a regional federation in Central Europe was a German plan to organize small nations and countries around Germany. This plan was taken over by J. Piłsudski and his supporters in order to break up Russia, which prevented R. Dmowski from implementing the Polish incorporation plan.

<sup>43</sup> "Imperium narodu polskiego", *Walka*, 29 VIII 1941, no. 34, pp. 2-3; "Tylko wielka i silna Polska", *Walka*, 5 IX 1941, no. 35, p. 1; "Polska idea narodowa", *Walka*, 17 VI 1942, no. 22, p. 1; "Tam gdzie była Polska", *Walka*, 18 VIII 1943, no. 31, pp. 3-6; DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 2, "Mały nacjonalizm i abstrakcyjny katolicyzm", *Młoda Polska*, 29 V 1943, no. 10, p. 364.

<sup>44</sup> AAN, Polish Units in the United Kingdom (Polskie Ugrupowania w Wielkiej Brytanii, PUWB), file no. 220/vol. 27, *List otwarty do Antoniego Słonimskiego*, Szkocja, 1 III 1941, signed D., p. 1; "Stany Zjednoczone Europy", *Walka*, 26 VII 1940, no. 16, p. 4; "Europa jako forteca niemiecka", *Walka*, 29 XI 1940, no. 34, p. 2; "Europejskie czy polskie rozwiązanie?", *Walka*, 18 VIII 1943, no. 31, p. 7.

<sup>45</sup> National Library (Biblioteka Narodowa, BN), mf. 54706, J. Kaliski, *Państwo Zachodniosłowiańskie*, Warszawa 1942, p. 3-32; AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-115/vol. 1, "Państwo Zachodniosłowiańskie", *Polski Informator Narodowy*, 25 XI 1942, p. 4-5; see P. Eberhardt, *Polska i jej granice. Z historii polskiej geografii politycznej*, Lublin 2004, pp. 181-182; P. Grabowiec, *Od partykularyzmu do uniwersalizmu. Polskie koncepcje międzynarodowej integracji politycznej w latach 1939-1945. Zarys problematyki*, in: *Federalizm, teoria i koncepcje*, ed. W. Bokajto, Wrocław 1998, pp. 216-226.

<sup>46</sup> BN, mf. 54706, J. Kaliski, *Państwo Zachodniosłowiańskie*, pp. 3-6.

<sup>47</sup> E. Ponczek, *Polska myśl o pokoju ...*, p. 129.

The National and People's Military Organisation was irritated by the re-emergence of "false signposts" of a federation during the Second World War<sup>48</sup>. The Polish-Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav-Greek agreements of 1942 were treated as the beginning of the West Slavic State. Poland would take on the organization of Central Europe because of its unionist and independence traditions. Its fight against the hegemony of Germany and the USSR in Europe, its wartime contribution, the absence of a collaborative government and its opposition to the Big Three's sphere of influence gave it the right to play a leading role in Central Europe as an "elder brother" rather than a hegemon. The Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation and the Yugoslav-Greek Union could not integrate Central Europe<sup>49</sup>. They pursued British interests with rights for national minorities and a democratic system. Poland was to be national, Catholic and authoritarian; national minorities would not have equal rights with the Poles. The agreements of 1942 divided the ABC area, which would make it dependent on the western powers to defend itself against Germany and the USSR. They caused disputes between Slovaks and Czechs on the one hand and Croats and Bulgarians and Serbs on the other, making their shared states weak and vulnerable to hostile external interference. The West Slavic State would not antagonize but defend the Slavs. It would work closely with the Scandinavian and Latin blocs to uphold peace<sup>50</sup>. For its implementation, Poland would have borders on the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse, the Baltic coast from Rügen to East Prussia, and the Riga border (or even that from 1772)<sup>51</sup>. Borders in the ABC area would be drawn on an ethnic basis in order to eliminate nationality problems and interference by the superpowers<sup>52</sup>. Slovakia would be independent, but lands with a Hungarian minority would be given to Hungary; Romania would grant Transylvania to Hungary. Zaolzie would stay with Poland. The Czechs and Slovaks could create a single state, but without centralism and Czechoslovakism. Poland, in a union with national, rather than Beneš's Czechia, would be responsible for foreign and military policy in the West Slavic State, and the Czech Republic would account for economic policy. The National and People's Military Organisation was in favour of the Lusatian state between the Oder and the Elbe<sup>53</sup>. Lithuania would be part

<sup>48</sup> "1723" (Kazimierz Próchnik), "Usunąć fałszywe drogowskazy", *Głos*, 27 II 1943, p. 30; idem, "Na manowcach federacyjnych", *Głos*, 27 II 1943, p. 31; "Baryka" (Tadeusz Przeciszewski), "Przed dwudziestu laty", *Głos*, 6 III 1943, p. 34.

<sup>49</sup> "Prus", "Nasze stanowisko. Na marginesie konfederacji polsko-czeskiej", *Głos*, 18 II 1942, no. 14, pp. 4-5; "1723", "Na manowcach federacyjnych", *Głos*, 27 II 1943, p. 31; AAN, KG AK, BIP, file no. 203/VII-66, *Dyspozycja referatu o sytuacji wewnętrzno-politycznej na kurs informacyjny dla kandydatów na stanowiska w BIP-ach polowych*, 362/5P, no. 171/43, p. 50.

<sup>50</sup> "Prus" (Tadeusz Maciński), "U podstaw zagadnienia granicy zachodniej", *Głos*, 11 VI 1942, p. 10; AAN, DIP, file no. 202/III-91, "De Gaulle", *Państwo Narodowe*, 10 II 1944, no. 1, p. 17.

<sup>51</sup> "Prus", "U podstaw zagadnienia granicy zachodniej", *Głos*, 11 VI 1942, p. 8-9; "Lar" (Z. Domański), "Problem granicy wschodniej", *Głos*, 9 VII 1942, pp. 12-14; "1723", "O starą granicę Piastów. Przed doniosłą decyzją", *Głos*, 21 VIII 1943, pp. 56-60; "Prus", "Nasze stanowisko w sprawie wschodniej granicy Polski", *Głos*, 29 I 1944, pp. 77-78; see P. Eberhardt, op. cit., p. 174.

<sup>52</sup> BN, mf. 54706, J. Kaliski, *Państwo Zachodniosłowiańskie*, pp. 9-27; see S. Fertacz, *Polska myśl słowiańska w okresie drugiej wojny światowej*, Katowice 2000, 62-65.

<sup>53</sup> "Prus", "Łużyce organizują się", *Głos*, 28 XI 1942, p. 17; "Prus", "Jeszcze o Łużycach", *Głos*, 6 II 1943, p. 27; "4044", "Łużyce i ich realna podstawa wyjściowa", *Głos*, 1 I 1944, pp. 72-76.

of Poland for its alliances with the USSR and Germany<sup>54</sup>. Byelorussians did not yet form a nation<sup>55</sup>, while the Ukrainians had not yet grown up to create a state.

The Homeland (Ojczyzna) organisation saw the Polish-Czech-Slovak bloc as the foundation of unity in Central Europe<sup>56</sup>. Austria would regain its freedom and Germany would be divided along the Danube and Weser rivers into southern, Catholic state and northern, Protestant one. The organisation considered the creation of a unified United States of Europe to be unacceptable. Their loose structure would not have prevented Germany from having an economic and military hegemony. The countries of Central Europe would form a tight bloc of nation states to avoid forced integration by Germany (*Mittleuropa*) and the USSR (Soviet republics). The war experiences of these states made them aware of the superiority of the community interest over national egoism. The Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation would unify the northern part of the ABC area. It would be based on a common political and economic leadership. Poland would form the Central European bloc with Czech nationalists and agrarians, not E. Beneš. After the war, the Czechs and Slovaks would decide on their political union. It would then be extended onto Romania and Hungary. Lithuania would be a Polish protectorate with free national development for its submission to Germany and the USSR. In return for the “wrongs of the Treaty of Trianon” (1920), Hungary would keep the Subcarpathian Ruthenia and lands with the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania. Hungary would give up the areas occupied in 1941 to Yugoslavia for its armed struggle. The Central European Union would implement Poland’s motto “from sea to sea”. It was a geopolitical necessity to push back the influence of the USSR from the Baltic-Black Sea to the borders of Polish civilization – the Daugava River, the Smolensk Gate and the Dnieper River. With the help of Greece, the Balkans would integrate federal Yugoslavia, creating a Great Yugoslavia with Bulgaria. Should the Balkan bloc not be formed, Yugoslavia would be part of Central Europe. The Scandinavian bloc together with the Central European bloc would eliminate the Germans from the Baltic region.

Poland would regain the Oder-Lusatian Neisse line<sup>57</sup>. Zaolzie would remain within its borders. It would have the Baltic coast from Rügen, Usedom, Wolin, the Szczecin Lagoon up to Lithuania. The area between the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse and the Riga border was indivisible for any other country (a Great Poland)<sup>58</sup>. Poland would be the leader of Central Europe as a nation state, unitarian, Catholic and authoritarian due to its biggest territorial, demographic, economic, and military potential<sup>59</sup>. Germans and Jews would leave Poland.

<sup>54</sup> “Cz.”, “O idei jagiellońskiej i co z niej wynikło”, *Głos*, 18 XII 1943, pp. 63-71.

<sup>55</sup> AAN, DR, DSZ, file no. 202/XIV-16, “Lar”, “Problem granicy wschodniej”, *Głos*, 9 VII 1942, pp. 12-14; idem, “Północno-wschodnia ściana”, *Głos*, 6 II 1943, pp. 23-24; idem, “Białoruś – zapomniana i zaniedbana córka Polski”, *Głos*, 29 V 1943, p. 45-47; idem, “Granica północno-wschodnia Polski”, *Głos*, 12 VI 1943, pp. 51-53.

<sup>56</sup> AAN, DR, DSW, file no. 202/II-22, *Deklaracja ideowa grupy „Ojczyzna”*, 14 XII 1942, pp. 118-129; DIP, file no. 202/III-61, Jan Moszyński, Zygmunt Wojciechowski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie i problem Europy Środkowej*, ed. Biblioteka Wielkopolska, D.I. Druk, Warszawa 24 V 1941, p. 26, *Sprawozdanie z wydawnictw propagandowych*, no. 160/43, 18 XI 1943, pp. 25-26; „*Ojczyzna*” 1939-1945, *dokumenty, wspomnienia, publicystyka*, ed. Z. Mazur, A. Pietrowicz, Poznań 2004, pp. 359-370; “Federacja polsko-czeska podstawą ładu środkowoeuropejskiego”, *Kraj*, 27 VII 1943, no. 2, pp. 1-2.

<sup>57</sup> “Pomorze, Wielkopolska, Śląsk”, *Biuletyn Zachodni*, sierpień 1943, no. 3, p. 10; “Główny cel wojny”, *Kraj*, 3 V 1944, no. 15, pp. 4-6.

<sup>58</sup> K. Szajnocha (Z. Wojciechowski), *Szkice historyczne*, (vol. 1, Warszawa 1938, 1943), in: “*Ojczyzna*” 1943-1945, pp. 411-415.

<sup>59</sup> “Warunek siły przyszłej Polski”, *Kraj*, 15 VII 1943, no. 1, pp. 2-4.

Poles would receive citizenship by birth, while minorities would be granted it for their merits for Poland. Europe would be based on regional ties of states equal to the superpowers. In international relations, Christian morality, international law and the ban on wars would apply. The aggressor would be excluded from the international community. Poland would unite the ABC area in an alliance with the western powers and Turkey, with which it would guarantee peace in Europe. Only historical nations could rule. It was difficult to compare Poland with Lithuania or other smaller nations formed in the nineteenth century, which should subordinate themselves to larger ones<sup>60</sup>. For their collaboration with the Germans and the USSR, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians would not be granted independent states. Due to low national awareness, Belarusians would become part of Poland. In time, Ukrainians would create a country beyond the Riga border in alliance with Poland.

The Secession of the National Party promoted the creation of a Great Poland with a border on the left bank of the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse and the coast from Rügen to the mouth of the Daugava River<sup>61</sup>. In the west, it would border on Lusatia. The Secession of the National Party postponed the extension of Polish influence beyond the Riga border onto the eastern nations until the Western program had been implemented. Germans and Jews would be removed from Polish lands. In the ABC area, the main political force would be the Western Slavs in the “Polish political system” of nation states. The Slavic peoples would have equal rights and obligations. The entire people of the national and Catholic Poland had to make a joint industrial, military and cultural effort to create a “great Western Slavic civilization”. It would liberate Central Europe from the influence of European powers and guarantee lasting peace on the continent. A customs, monetary and defence union headed by Poland would bring strength and power to the Central European nations on the international scene. During the war, the Piłsudski camp, who put forward federal and Promethean plans for the eastern nations instead of assimilating them, were responsible for anti-Polish activities of national minorities. Civil rights would be granted to them individually for the fight for Polish independence. For the crimes against the Poles, the Ukrainians would be displaced from the South-East. The peace with the USSR required the renunciation of the 1772 border, but the Riga border would be rectified to a more strategic one shifted eastwards<sup>62</sup>. The Secession of the National Party did not approve of the autonomy of Byelorussians and Ukrainians. Lithuania would be incorporated into Poland. Hungary would retain Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Bukovina to prevent the formation of a Czechoslovak-Soviet border. The federation idea was promoted by enemies of the national idea (socialists, democrats, liberals, freemasons, and communists), who would destroy the nation state and the national community within a

<sup>60</sup> “Problem tzw. mniejszych państw”, *Kraj*, 21 XII 1943, no. 17, pp. 3-6; “Tajemnica Europy”, *Kraj*, 21 XII 1943, no. 17, p. 1-3, (reprint of an article by Jan Rembliński from London-based *Sprawa*, referring to the creative, ideological, political, and economic uniqueness of Europe with respect to the other continents and the USSR).

<sup>61</sup> AAN, DR, BP, file no. 202/I-54, *Uchwała o granicach*, Ogólnopolski Zjazd Delegatów SN, Warszawa styczeń 1943, p. 313a, *Uchwała o Wielkiej Polsce*, p. 313a; *Uchwała o Państwie Narodowym*, p. 313a; *Uchwała Polska w Europie*, p. 314; DIP, file no. 202/III-83, “Zjazd działaczy SN Q.V.”, *Polski Informator Narodowy*, 3 II 1943, no. 3, p. 10; file no. 202/III-86, “Na drodze do Wielkiej Polski”, *Wielka Polska*, 13 IV 1944, no. 3, p. 77; NSZ, file no. 207/39, TNRP, *O co walczy Ruch Narodowy*, 1943, pp. 4-4a.

<sup>62</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 2, “Niebezpieczeństwo granicy czesko-sowieckiej”, *Wielka Polska*, 19 VI 1943, p. 429; file no. 202/III-81, “Czy możemy dopuścić do powtórzenia się 1939 roku”, *Narodowa Agencja Prasowa*, 28 VI 1944, no. 6, p. 160.

federation<sup>63</sup>. A federal concept of government would serve British interests. It would divide the ABC area into smaller geopolitical units around Poland and Yugoslavia. This deprived Central Europe of its balancing power against the German and Soviet powers, maintaining its dependence on Western powers. The Secession of the National Party opposed any variant of a federation within Europe, Central Europe and with eastern nations. It rejected cooperation with pro-Soviet and Masonic E. Beneš, whose 1943 agreement with the USSR enslaved the nations of Central Europe by the Soviets, destroying the only alternative for liberating Poland. The federal idea of the government and groups in the country was ideologically alien to the Polish nation and diluted its significance in relation to other Central European nations. It threatened the partition of historical Polish lands by neighbouring nations, Poland's enemies (Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians). Built on the Polish historical territory in line with the national idea, the Great Poland would safeguard the freedom of the nations of Central Europe against Germany and the USSR.

The Polish Organisation (Organizacja Polska, Grupa "Szańca") saw the idea of a federation as harmful to the national idea<sup>64</sup>. It was put forth by socialists (socialist federation, autonomy for national minorities), syndicalists (syndicalist union of the nations of Europe), communists (soviet republics), democrats (regional federations), liberals (economic liberalism, parliamentary democracy), the Piłsudski camp (federation with the eastern nations), the people's party (peasants' confederation). One communist state in Europe was a Jewish dream, and the Paneuropa that destroyed nation states and historical peoples was a Masonic utopian concept. The Polish Organisation rejected the "absurd" ideas from the old times of the League of Nations: a union of democratic states of Europe (United States of Europe), European or world army, guarding peace and security (Churchill's Council of Europe, Roosevelt's UN), allied bases around Germany and guarantees of peace in Europe based on the Polish-British alliance (plans of W. Sikorski's government). The Polish-German-Slovak and Yugoslavian-Greek agreements of 1942 were conceived by Western democracies<sup>65</sup>. They aimed to set up between Germany and the USSR weak regional federations of small states, dependent on western superpowers. Due to its traditions of forming unions in the past, Poland did not need the anti-national federation idea. Relations between the states would be decided by the nations concerned rather than by governments in exile. Poland would be dominant in the union with the national Czechia and not E. Beneš's Masonic Czechoslovakia. The materialistic and pro-Soviet Czech nation did not harbour universalistic ideas, had no spirit of fight and interests on a European scale. The Polish Organisation did not rule out a merger of the two countries in the long run, but without a democratic system. After all, liberal democracy, international

<sup>63</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-86, "Głos angielski za państwem zachodniosłowiańskim", *Wielka Polska*, 20 IV 1944, no. 4, p. 76; file no. 202/III-39, "Negatywny stosunek wobec koncepcji federacyjnej", *Narodowa Agencja Prasowa*, 13 VI 1944, no. 5, p. 36; file no. 202/III-88, "Polityka Benesa, Narodowa Agencja Prasowa", 13 VI 1944, no. 5, p. 16.

<sup>64</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-82, "Jaką chcemy mieć Polskę", brochure of "Szaniec" and "Pobudka", press release no. 5a, 27 X 1941, pp. 26-27; "Polska ideologia wojskowa", *Naród i Wojsko*, listopad 1941, no. 1, p. 2; "Polska trzech W", *Szaniec*, 1942, no. 20, in: *Mysł*, styczeń 1942, no. 2, p. 16, (After the Poland of A, B and C, and before the Poland of Three Seas, there must be the Poland of three W: *Wodzów, Wojska i Walki* [Commanders, Army and Struggle]).

<sup>65</sup> "Polacy na wszystkich frontach", *Naród i Wojsko*, styczeń 1942, no. 1, pp. 1-2; "Kierunek ekspansji", *Naród i Wojsko*, kwiecień 1942, no. 4, pp. 1-3; AAN, KG AK, BIP, file no. 203/VII-48, "Układ polsko-czeski", *Szaniec*, 31 I 1942, no. 77, p. 114; "Układ polsko-czeski", *Szaniec*, 15 II 1942, no. 78, p. 114; DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-83, "Akt konfederacji polsko-czeskiej", *Szaniec*, 1 I 1943, no. 1, p. 1.

law on war and peace and human rights, which the West and E. Beneš promoted, led to the collapse of Czechoslovakia. The Polish Organisation granted Catholic Slovakia the right to independence or autonomy within Poland.

Poland could not conduct its Western and Eastern policies simultaneously. After the war, it would implement a geopolitical concept consistent with the national idea<sup>66</sup>, so that it would not disintegrate again into two factions, like after the First World War. The expansion of the Riga border eastwards would weaken the Polish state with respect to national minorities. The eastern federalism of the left and of the Piłsudski camp were threatening a war with the USSR and the creation of foreign states within the Polish historical area. More important than moving the Riga border eastwards (until 1943 the Polish Organisation planned strategic corrections in the Minsk and Zhytomyr regions) was to reach the border on the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse, the coastline from Rügen to the mouth of the Nemunas River, the creation of Lusatia and the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland. In the south, Poland would border on Hungary and Zaolzie would stay within its borders. The Federation with Belarus and Ukraine threatened German and Soviet infiltration<sup>67</sup>. Incapable of establishing their own states, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians would mature within Poland. For the return to the Riga border and non-interference in Poland's internal affairs, the Polish Organisation promised the USSR to jointly stifle the aspirations for independence of the above nations. If the USSR wanted to enslave Poland or truncate its territory, Poland would strive to crush it with Japan. Within the federation, Poland would not defend Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine against the USSR. The Eastern nations wanted Polish lands, not a federation. After the expansion to the west, the next generation would expand Polish influence to the east.

The Danube area was a better direction for Poland to form unions of states<sup>68</sup>, because it offered more real political, economic and military benefits than the eastern ones. It did not lead to disputes with the USSR but cut off Central Europe from German influence. Germany would be trimmed by Poland, France, Denmark, and Czechia. Austria, Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg would leave the German Reich. The Sara and Ruhr basins would be occupied for a long time. Poland would be at the helm of Central Europe as the strongest state in the western Slavic region, forming a national defence and economic community. The Polish Organisation did not rule out building this community with the help of the Polish army. The economic community would make the states of Central Europe free of the financial and economic dependence on the superpowers. Poland would be an arbitrator in border disputes between them. Hungary would retain the lands of Czechoslovakia and Romania peopled by the Hungarian minority. Bulgaria would occupy the Romanian Dobrudja. Polish expansion would be directed towards Scandinavia and the Balkans to avoid German and Soviet blockades. Central and Southern Europe and the Baltic States, with Sweden, Italy and Turkey as natural allies, were to be the Polish security zone. The Central European Union would be established on the basis of a close alliance in foreign, economic and military policy, and in other areas cooperation would rely on consultations. It would form the basis

<sup>66</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 2, "Na rozstajnych drogach", *Szaniec*, 22 IX 1943, no. 12, pp. 512-513.

<sup>67</sup> AAN, DR, DSW, file no. 202/II-11, "Wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego", *Placówka*, 1 I 1943, no. 1, p. 268; DIP, file no. 202/III-81, "Ogniem i mieczem", *Praca i Walka*, 15 I 1944, no. 2, p. 9.

<sup>68</sup> "Nic bez nas w Europie", *Naród i Wojsko*, styczeń 1943, no. 1, p. 4; AAN, KG AK, BIP, file no. 203/VII-50, "Węgry", *Placówka*, 28 II 1942, no. 5, p. 46; DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 1, "Uchwała Rady Narodowej w sprawie granic", *Szaniec*, 1 I 1943, no. 1, p. 16; "Nad Odrę", *Placówka*, 1 I 1943, no. 1, p. 16.

of Poland's superpower status in Europe. Participation in the bloc would result from the national interest of the states rather than from compulsion and conquest. Security in Europe would be based on bilateral and multilateral agreements of states rather than federations. The federation idea would result in a war with the USSR, the imposition of parliamentary democracy and liberal capitalism in Poland, equality with national minorities, and the loss of the Polish Eastern territories for the sake of federated nations<sup>69</sup>.

The National Armed Forces fought for the Oder and Lusatian Neisse, Silesia, Lubusz Land, Rügen, Usedom, Wolin, East Prussia, and the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland, and in the east for the Riga border. The West Slavic Union was to be established on the ABC area under the leadership of Poland<sup>70</sup>. A Great Poland would be national, and the national minorities were meant to assimilate with the Polish nation. The National Armed Forces based the post-war Polish security system on the organization of Central Europe<sup>71</sup>, rather than on the new League of Nations or a multilateral international security system. The weakness of the Second Polish Republic lay in the class struggle of the left wing and in the federal and nationalistic disputes of the Piłsudski camp. A Great Poland meant a march westwards towards the borders from the Piast dynasty, and only later towards the Jagiellonian borders, with the exclusion of the federation. It would create a Latin empire in the ABC area, protecting small nations from Germany and the USSR. Paneuropa, the United States of Europe and the Union of European Soviet Republics threatened the independence of Poland. The Central European Federation was a weak geopolitical structure to build lasting peace and security on. As a rule, it assumed a lack of domination of any particular state. In multilateral structures, there had to be a dominant entity over the other participants, which was natural given the disparities in the states' potential. The federation was stripped of any ideology, not very coherent, easy to interfere with from outside. All contemporary federation projects were hostile to great, Catholic and national Poland and its concept of an empire. The federation idea undermined the importance of Poland in Europe and would not assure it security. It would mean as much within the European federation as Switzerland. Its implementation under the authority of Great Britain as the United States of Europe (Council of Europe) was impossible due to the political, economic and cultural diversity of European countries. This idea, on a European and regional scale, threatened the territorial reduction of historical Poland in favour of independent Eastern nations. It meant another partition of the lands of Polish civilization. Since the fall of the First Republic, these nations have always harmed Polish national interests. They refused to have relations with Poland, choosing either Germany or Russia. The National Armed Forces accepted a union solely with national Czechia<sup>72</sup>. Political and military affairs would be conducted by Poland, while Czechia would be in charge of the economy. Both countries would form the Central European Union. Through it, they would promote the national idea and Catholicism. The Polish-Czech-Slovak and Yugoslavian-Greek

<sup>69</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-80/vol. 1, "Jak w mądrym Rzymie", *Szaniec*, 29 I 1943, no. 3, p. 79.

<sup>70</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-86, A. Rawicz (Jan Lilpop), *O co walczą Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*, 1943, pp. 40-41.

<sup>71</sup> AAN, NSZ, Section III, file no. 207/23, Służba Wychowawczo-Oświatowa NSZ, *Na drodze do Wielkiej Polski*, 1943, p. 1-3; *Propaganda idei uderzenia na zachód*, 1943, p. 9; *Misja dziejowa Polski*, 1943, pp. 50-55; *Prawdy historyczne*, pp. 56-60; "Rachunek", *Chrobry Szlak*, 24 VI 1943, no. 7, pp. 1-3.

<sup>72</sup> AAN, NSZ, file no. 207/6, *Blok Środkowoeuropejski*, Raport 7/73/43, 1943, p. 40; "Polityka polska a rzeczywistość", *Chrobry Szlak*, 15 IX 1943, no. 10, p. 2.

agreements of 1942 were in the interest of the western superpowers and various kinds of anti-nationalist internationals. The federal structure destroyed the attributes of the nation state in international relations<sup>73</sup>. Lithuania would become part of Poland, with Latvia and Estonia closely linked. Poland would take under its protectorate Romania, unable to defend its independence and territory. Subcarpathian Ruthenia would remain within Hungary for the sake of a shared border with Poland. In its historical area, Poland was not imperialistic. The eastern nations, in return for their alliance with Poland's occupants, could not be independent even within a union with it<sup>74</sup>.

The Confederation of the Nation (Konfederacja Narodu: "Falanga", National Radical Movement) pursued the disintegration of the USSR and the reduction of the German territory to build the Slavic Empire between them<sup>75</sup>. Only in this way would Central Europe, organized by Poland, defend itself against their imperialism, create a balance in Europe and bring about lasting peace. The German-Soviet war was supposed to lead to the disintegration of the USSR and the trimming of Germany by its neighbours. No international organization, like the League of Nations, with the right to ban wars, would protect Poland from their simultaneous aggression. In the west, the empire's border with Germany would extend from Rügen, the Oder, the western border of the Lusatian state and the Lusatian Neisse, in the north from East Prussia and Gdańsk. Lithuania and Belarus (a revived Union of Lublin) would become part of Poland, and Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine would join it. In the east, the border would follow the 1772 line. The Polish sphere of influence in Central Europe ran from the Baltic Sea through Szczecin to Trieste (the border of Western and Central Europe Elbe – Upper Danube), the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas, and the Leningrad – Rostov line in the east (the border of Eastern and Central Europe – the Don). Germany would lose all lands belonging to the Slavs. The area between the Oder and the Dnieper, the Baltic Sea and the Danube and the Black Sea was a natural place of settlement for Poles<sup>76</sup>. Germans would be removed from the Slavic Empire, which would cut off the USSR from the Balkans once it had taken over the area between the Black Sea and the Baltic. Its economic and military potential would offset that of Germany and Russia. It would be immune from the changing interests of its western allies. The pursuit of nation states on the historical Polish lands of Lithuanians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians resulted from the misguided Eastern and national policy of the Piłsudski camp. Built on national and Catholic principles, the Slavic Empire would unify the Polish lands belonging to the Piast and the Jagiellonian dynasties. Within its framework, each nation could develop freely, but Poles would be in charge of

<sup>73</sup> AAN, NSZ, Section III, file no. 207/23, SW-O NSZ, *Program Wielkiej Polski*, 1943, pp. 11-12; "Polityka polska a rzeczywistość", *Chrobry Szlak*, 15 IX 1943, no. 10, p. 1.

<sup>74</sup> "Nie damy wschodu Polski", *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*, 30 VI 1944, no. 8, p. 2.

<sup>75</sup> "Pokolenie Polski Wielkiej", *Nowa Polska*, 25 IV 1941, no. 1, in: "Program 'Nowej Polski'", *Mysł*, wrzesień 1941, no. 2, pp. 4-7; AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-82, "Czy Polska może być niepodległa", *Nowa Polska*, 22 XII 1941, no. 15, p. 72; "Granice Europy Środkowej", *Biuletyn Słowiański* (BS), 8 XI 1943, no. 6, pp. 3-8; see A. Dudek, G. Pytel, *Bolesław Piasecki. Próba biografii politycznej*, Londyn 1990, p. 127; E. Ponczek, *Dyskurs o kulturze ...*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>76</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-82, *Imperium Słowiańskie "Nowej Polski"*, Sprawozdanie tygodniowe no. 7/42, 28 I 1942, p. 51; Biuro Prezydyjalne (BP), file no. 202/I-35, "Wschód Polski", *Nowa Polska* 12 X 1943, no. 60, p. 149; "Przez Polskę narodową do Polski katolickiej, nie na odwrót", *Fakty na Tle Idei*, 4 IX 1941, no. 3, pp. 1-3; "Idea wielkiego pokolenia", *Do Broni*, 20 V 1942, no. 8, p. 1; "Międzymorze bałtycko-czarnomorskie", *Do Broni*, 29 VI 1942, no. 11, p. 5; "Imperializm i czyn", *Do Broni*, 31 III 1943, no. 4, pp. 1-3; see S. Fertacz, *Polska myśl słowiańska ...*, p. 40.

governance. Without Belarus and Ukraine, the Slavic Empire would lose its *raison d'être*<sup>77</sup>. The union of Poland with Ukraine was more important than the union with the Czechs. The Confederation of the Nation envisaged a war with the USSR for the Riga border and the autonomy of the eastern nations.

The Confederation of the Nation rejected the establishment of a federation in Central Europe according to socialist, agrarian, liberal-democratic, and Piłsudski-related principles, which dealt a blow to Polish historical lands<sup>78</sup>. The Polish-Czechoslovak and the Yugoslavian-Greek agreements of 1942 facilitated the construction of the Slavic Empire<sup>79</sup>. As regional unions, they would not offset the strength and power of Germany and the USSR. The Confederation of the Nation supported the federal concept of W. Sikorski because it inspired the unity of nations between Germany and the USSR. The basis of the Slavic Empire would be the Polish-Czech-Slovak-Serbian-Sorbian union rather than E. Beneš's Czechoslovakia, which would be a model of integration with common institutions. The Western Slavic Union would merge, through Romania and Hungary, with the Great Yugoslavia (including Bulgaria and Albania), which would be in union with Greece. In the empire, Hungary would curb the influence of the USSR on Czechs, Slovaks and Serbs. The elimination of German influence from the Danube area required its ethnic and territorial reconstruction. Hungary would benefit from this at the expense of Czechoslovakia (southern Slovakia, Subcarpathian Ruthenia), Romania (Transylvania) and Yugoslavia. In return, Slovakia would receive northern Burgenland and Yugoslavia southern Burgenland and the latter would take over from Austria and Italy areas with Slavic populations. Bulgaria would take away Dobruđa from Romania. The Confederation of the Nation did not mind that the ABC area would be integrated to the north by Poland, and to the south by Yugoslavia<sup>80</sup>. Rather than in the British schemes, it saw more harm in E. Beneš's pro-Russian agenda, which hampered the construction of the Slavic Empire. Because of it, the Confederation of the Nation favoured the federalisation of Czechoslovakia or its division into Czechia and Slovakia. In the case of multinational Yugoslavia, it favoured its centralisation, with equal rights for Serbs and Croats. After the USSR severed ties with Poland, the Confederation of the Nation called for the acceleration of the merger of the Central European nations within the Slavic Empire. After W. Sikorski's death, it demanded the continuation of his plan of regional federations<sup>81</sup>. They were indispensable at the first stage of construction of the union state. The Confederation of the Nation was disillusioned by the policy of the UK and the US, which in 1943 ceased to support federation in Europe. It saw the agreement between E. Beneš and Stalin concluded in

<sup>77</sup> "Skromne postulaty PRN", *Do Broni*, 16 XII 1942, no. 21, p. 8; "Humań czy Hadziacz?", *BS*, 30 VI 1943, no. 5, p. 2; "Granice Ukrainy", *BS*, 6 XII 1943, no. 7, pp. 2-4.

<sup>78</sup> "Do firmowych działaczy katolickich", *Fakty na Tle Idei*, 1 XI 1941, no. 7, p. 4; "Przekleństwo mówienia", *Do Broni*, 5 V 1942, no. 7, p. 1; "Międzynarodowa i narodowa solidarność", *Do Broni*, 12 VII 1942, no. 12, pp. 5-6.

<sup>79</sup> "Ku imperium", *Do Broni*, 25 VIII 1942, no. 15, pp. 1-2; "Sojusz Grecji z Jugosławią i konfederacja polsko-czechosłowacka", *Do Broni*, 4 II 1942, no. 4, p. 5; "Z emigracji i z ziem słowiańskich na emigracji", *BS*, październik 1942, no. 8, pp. 16-17; "Konfederacja polsko-czeska", *BS*, listopad 1942, no. 9, p. 9; "Sprawa Węgier na tle zagadnień słowiańskich", *BS*, 31 I 1943, no. 1, pp. 2-4.

<sup>80</sup> "Imperium to jedność Słowian – w jedności siła", *Do Broni*, 8 XII 1943, no. 12, p. 1.

<sup>81</sup> "Testament Sikorskiego", *BS*, 8 XI 1943, no. 6, p. 1-3; AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-86, "Prasa aliancka o problemie federacji", *Nowa Polska. Wiadomości Codzienne*, 23 XI 1943, no. 248, p. 6; "Problem federacji wśród aliantów", *Nowa Polska*, 8 XII 1943, no. 63, p. 6.

December 1943 as a treason of the states and nations of Central Europe as it would preclude the creation of the Slavic Empire.

“Pobudka” (Wake-up Call) assumed a political, economic and military union of Central European states, which would also resolve disputes between them<sup>82</sup>. It supported the regional unions in Europe promoted by W. Sikorski in his alliance with the western powers, in particular the Polish-Czech cooperation (following the example of the Polish-Lithuanian union). It saw Poland at the helm as the largest state in Central Europe and due to its contribution to the war. It called for a speedy creation of a Polish-Czech-Slovak customs and monetary union<sup>83</sup>. For access to the Polish market, the Czechs would be obliged to make investments and allocate financial resources in Poland, expanding its economic potential. Poland would have the dominant role as regards foreign and military policy. The close Polish-Czech-Slovak union was to become a Central European superpower, not a copy of the Little Entente (intergovernmental cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia). Rapid economic and military integration would improve the standard of living and security of nations, which would secure their consent to political integration and the accession to the union of subsequent ABC states. Lithuania had to belong to the union with Poland in order for Estonia and Latvia to join it. Otherwise, they would have had to be occupied by the Soviet Union. The main task of the Central European Union was to control Germany, split into Protestant and Catholic sections. Austria, Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria would join the Central European Union in order to prevent the reconstruction of the next Reich. Their foreign and domestic policies would be controlled by the union’s bodies, which would grant them constitutions with a division into national and union powers. Germany would be occupied by Polish troops up to the Elbe River. The Union of Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria would cooperate with Italy, which would form a Latin union with Spain and France. “Pobudka” opposed the Soviet Slavic idea, the federation of the communist republics of Europe and German Paneuropa, leading to their hegemony<sup>84</sup>. The concept of a global state and a European federation was not feasible due to national and cultural differences and the potential of countries. It did not envisage the creation of regional federations and a Europe based on liberal-democratic, rural, socialist, and communist ideologies. It called for the principles of European cooperation to be written down in the Charter of Europe, ensuring respect for the rights of both small and large states.<sup>85</sup> The peace system would be based on the Atlantic Charter and the balancing power of regional federations in Europe and a global economic system that removes barriers to raw materials, trade and migration in search of jobs<sup>86</sup>.

The Western doctrine of self-determination after 1918 did not correspond to Central and Eastern Europe, where the territories of historical states and nations were broken up by Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey. This sparked excessive hopes of the young Eastern

<sup>82</sup> “Polska a pokój”, *Pobudka*, luty 1942, no. 2, pp. 4-11; “Polska a małe narody”, *Pobudka*, luty 1942, no. 2, pp. 11-16.

<sup>83</sup> “Unia gospodarcza”, *Pobudka*, lipiec 1942, no. 6, pp. 15-21.

<sup>84</sup> “Istota przemian społecznych w Polsce”, *Pobudka*, wrzesień 1941, no. 5, p. 20-21; AAN, DR, DSW, file no. 202/II-22, *Pobudka*, luty 1943, pp. 154-155.

<sup>85</sup> “Rola Polski wśród zwycięzców”, *Pobudka*, luty 1942, no. 2, pp. 1-4.

<sup>86</sup> “Imperializm czy pacyfizm”, *Pobudka*, styczeń 1942, no. 1, pp. 29-32; “Europa w dniu zwycięstwa”, *Pobudka*, czerwiec 1942, no. 5, pp. 7-9, 11.

nations of having their independent states; as a result, from the 19th century onwards they supported Germany, Austria and Russia against the Polish nation. The superpowers did not intend to create those small states, but rather to occupy them. "Pobudka" did not deny them independence, but within the USSR. Poland would bind Lithuania (autonomy) by a strict union and would seek freedom for Belarus and Ukraine in the international arena, but there would be no war with the USSR to reach this aim. The border would extend from the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse in the west and from Rügen to Lithuania in the north. The Riga border would be modified in favour of Poland because of the Polish population in the Polish Livonia, Volhynia, Podole, and Bukovina. It rejected the imperial idea because it was based on actual or implied violence. Even a Polish empire built peacefully might be tempted to execute its decisions by violent means. The propaganda of Germany and the USSR accused Poland of imperialism, even if it only intended to regain its lands forcefully seized from it. "Pobudka" called them revindicationism<sup>87</sup>. It deplored the fact that the Polish underground forces did not reach a consensus as to the organisation of Central Europe. The federation idea supported by the socialists, syndicalists, people's activists, democrats and Piłsudski's followers clashed with the imperial idea of national and Catholic camps, such as incorporationism and federationism in the Second Republic. Despite the Beneš-Stalin agreement, "Pobudka" demanded that the government promote the idea of the federation<sup>88</sup>. In April 1944, it proposed that the state and the government should come forward with a proposal for a Central European confederation and establish the Belarusian and Ukrainian Committees as future governments<sup>89</sup>. The Confederation would be based on equality of states and close political, economic and military ties. Until the end of the war, it called for the idea of unity of the states located between Germany and the USSR. Slavic minorities and Lithuanians would have equal rights with Poles. Germans, Jews and Russians had to emigrate.

Wolves Military Organisation (Organizacja Wojskowa "Wilki") believed that the idea of the federation was too idealistic to be implemented in the then geopolitical situation of Poland<sup>90</sup>. First, it was necessary to regain independence and historical borders from the River Oder to the line from 1772 (after Stalingrad – the Riga border) and to carry out rapid industrialization. It would implement its traditional mission of unification with the neighbouring nations, creating a bloc of nation states between Germany and the USSR, only as the Great Poland. The Wolves Military Organisation was opposed to the federalisation of Central Europe and the continent. In the union of Central European states, Poland was supposed to dominate rather than be a state on a par with small nations. It did not envisage any supranational structures and the rights of national minorities depended on their own stance and the interest of the Polish state rather than on international law.

<sup>87</sup> "Imperializm czy pacyfizm", *Pobudka*, styczeń 1942, no. 1, pp. 19-21; "Niezgoda narodowa", *Pobudka*, maj 1944, no. 1, pp. 4-10.

<sup>88</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-86, "Jak sądzić czeską politykę?", *Słowa Prawdy*, 15 luty 1944, no. 2, p. 42-43; "Konfederacja a konsolidacja", *Pobudka*, maj 1944, no. 1, pp. 19-21.

<sup>89</sup> AAN, DR, DIP, file no. 202/III-81, "Polska i Wschód", *Słowa Prawdy*, 7 IV 1944, no. 4, pp. 98-99.

<sup>90</sup> "Propaganda a rzeczywistość", *Aktualne Wiadomości z Polski i ze Świata*, 1 VIII 1941, no. 31, p. 2; "Wielką Polskę zbuduje Wielki Naród", *AWPŚ*, 24 X 1941, no. 43, p. 1; "Przez odrodzenie narodu do wielkości", *AWPŚ*, 7 XI 1941, no. 45, pp. 1-2; "Konfederacja polsko-czeska", *AWPŚ*, 6 II 1942, no. 6, p. 4; "Generał Sikorski o organizacji powojennej Europie", *AWPŚ*, 9 IV 1943, no. 11, p. 7; "Sytuacja polityczna Polski", *AWPŚ*, 2 VII 1943, no. 24, p. 1.

Fighting Poland (Polska Walcząca) developed a moral capital but had no material one<sup>91</sup>. Diplomatic actions and propaganda of the federation idea towards western powers and governments in exile in London were not enough to unify Central Europe. The order for a close union of Central Europe and the idea of forced industrialization of Poland were integrally linked, because modern technology, means of communication and production methods required a lot of room. The closest community in Central Europe was formed by the Polish, Czech and Slovak nations, resulting from their cultural affinity, and by the Lithuanian nations, due to shared civilisation and history. This group of nations would merge with the Slavic nations in the south. In time, the bloc of Central European countries in the ABC area would become equal to the European superpowers. It would become an important factor in shaping Europe and the world. Polish economic acceleration led to the building of a strong state and increased national solidarity. Poland's economic power would impact its natural "great space" of the Western Slavs and other nations of Central and Southern Europe. The aim of the Polish idea of their federation was to unleash and harmonize their creative forces. A victorious federation would provide a deep significance to their wartime sacrifices.

The National Revolt Party (Stronnictwo Zrywu Narodowego, SZN) supported the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation<sup>92</sup>. Both countries would strengthen Slavic culture in the western world. Their rivalry led to the occupation of Central Europe. Their collapse allowed them to find a way to cooperate for the benefit of the countries wedged between Germany and the USSR. The common culture was founded on close tribal kinship, shared historical past and geopolitical conditions, i.e. the western-most ramparts of the Slavs. Their relationship guaranteed their independence, economic growth and security. Subcarpathian Ruthenia would be free within the Central European Union or would be incorporated into Poland rather than Hungary. For the benefit of all the Slavs and the Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation, E. Beneš should step down as a politician. In the east, Poland would regain the Riga border. In the west, it would reach the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse. Lusatia would gain independence. Germanized Slavs would return to Polish culture. The SZN did not deny the right of the Ukrainians and Belarusians to independence but opposed the sacrifice of Polish potential in the struggle for their independent states with the USSR. It saw Polish expansion in the ABC area in order to build Slavic power together with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It stressed that Lithuanians and Ukrainians had rejected the Jagiellonian idea, accusing Poland of "cultural imperialism". They were afraid of the peaceful interpenetration of cultures, which implied their weakness. Their participation in the Central European Union was more in their own interest than in Poland's<sup>93</sup>. The rights of the Slavic minorities in Poland would be equal to those enjoyed by Poles.

The Sword and Plough (*Miecz i Pług*) movement believed that Poland would not build a union of Central European countries on the foundation of the nationalism of the National

<sup>91</sup> "Siły dźwigające", *Zryw*, 15 VI 1942, no. 4, pp. 5-6; "Wielki zryw narodowy", *Zryw*, 1 VIII 1942, no. 5, pp. 4-7; "Konstytucja czy plan pracy?", *Zryw*, 2 IX 1942, no. 8, pp. 3-5; "Mobilizacja przodownicza", *Zryw*, 25 X 1942, no. 10, pp. 4-5; "Przeciwnikom idei Zrywu Narodowego", *Zryw*, 23 XI 1942, no. 11, pp. 1-2.

<sup>92</sup> "Rozmowy Sikorski-Beneš", *Zryw*, 15 VI 1942, no. 4, p. 6; "Polska i Czechy", *Zryw*, 15 VI 1942, no. 4, pp. 1-3; "Wspólny Dom", *Zryw*, 1 I 1943, no. 13, pp. 4-6; "Dlaczego chcemy i musimy być demokratyczni", *Zryw*, 1 VI 1943, no. 23, p. 3; "Węgry i dookoła Węgier", *Zryw*, 1 I 1943, no. 13, pp. 2-6; "Rocznica paktu polsko-czeskiego", *Zryw*, 1 II 1943, no. 15, p. 6.

<sup>93</sup> "Sprawy ukraińskie", *Zryw*, 10 V 1943, no. 21, pp. 7-8; "Różnąć Lachów – cywilizacyjna idea Ukraińców", *Zryw*, 25 IX 1943, no. 27, pp. 3-5; "Sprawa Ziemi Wschodnich", *Zryw*, 26 II 1944, no. 30-31, pp. 4-5.

Party and Catholicism. It drew on Slavic culture and religion because the Slavic Empire was to be a community of Slavic nations<sup>94</sup>. Allied and hostile superpowers treated Poland as a second-rate state and thus it would base its international position on the strength of the unity of the Central European nations. Multinational and multi-religious Poland was a superpower during the reign of the Jagiellonian dynasty; the inhabitants would become Polonized in a peaceful manner. Patterned on the Jagiellonian and British Empires, the Slavic Empire would offset the power of Germany and the USSR. It would affect the pursuit of Polish and regional interests internationally. The federal structure did not guarantee freedom and rapid development of the member states due to their vulnerability to the influence of the superpowers. Polish imperialism was a defensive reaction to the German and Soviet ones. The Sword and Plough did not share Dmowski's doctrine claiming that it was better to border on Russia than on the states of the eastern nations<sup>95</sup>. Great Belarus and Great Ukraine would join the Slavic Empire as a union with Poland. The Baltic States, Lusatia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria would follow suit. As part of the Slavic Empire, Poland would regain its historical lands seized by the Germans and Russians. In time, a Slavic nation would develop. The Sword and Plough believed that the Slavic Empire could not possibly be formed without the resources of Poland, Czechia and Ukraine<sup>96</sup>. The Polish-Czechoslovak and Yugoslavian-Greek agreements facilitated the establishment of the Slavic Empire. It required the government to support the independence of Belarus and Ukraine. It opposed the federation of Europe in the interests of Germany (*Mitteleuropa*, Paneuropa), the USSR (Soviet republics) and the UK (Council of Europe)<sup>97</sup>. The Sword and Plough deemed E. Beneš and Marshall Josip-Broz Tito traitors of the Slavs.

The Legion of the Union of the Slavic Nations (LUNS) favoured the creation of the Slavic States Bloc headed by Poland and the incorporation of territories inhabited by Slavs<sup>98</sup>. He sought to dismantle communism in the USSR. After the fall of the dictatorships, Italy and Germany would be subject to economic scrutiny and the Italian colonies would be transferred to the Slavic empire. In the Confederation of Slavic Nations, Poland would take a dominant position not through violence, like Germany and the USSR, but on account of its military merits, moral superiority and rapid and robust economic growth. The ideological and political agenda of the Legion of the Union of the Slavic Nations aimed at strengthening Poland's power and authority. Its internal policy would subordinate the economic and social development of the nation to this goal. National Legions with a common ideological basis were to be created among the Slavic nations, which would have national autonomy within the framework of LUNS.

<sup>94</sup> AAN, Ruch *Miecz i Plug*, file no. 208/1, *Deklaracja ideowa Ruchu Miecz i Plug*, 1943, pp. 3-4; *Program Ruchu Miecz i Plug*, pp. 5-8; "Synteza działalności politycznej Ruchu Miecz i Plug", *Miecz i Plug*, 1 IX 1943, no. 29, pp. 2-5; mf. 52214, "Widmo zagłady małych narodów Europy Środkowej", *Wiadomości Codzienne*, 23 IV 1943, no. 94, p. 2.

<sup>95</sup> "Jaki winien być polski nacjonalizm", *Miecz i Plug*, 5 VIII 1940, no. 16, pp. 2-4.

<sup>96</sup> "Droga do wielkości wymaga wielkości", *Miecz i Plug*, 10 V 1942, no. 13, p. 8; "Jedyna droga", *Miecz i Plug*, 7 XII 1942, no. 20, p. 4; BN, mf. 52214, "Witaj Maj, Trzeci Maj, szczęściem płonie cały kraj", *Wiadomości Codzienne*, 3 V 1943, no. 98, p. 1.

<sup>97</sup> "Przyszłość widziana oczami Churchilla", *Wiadomości Codzienne*, 23 III 1943, no. 67, p. 2.

<sup>98</sup> AAN, LUNS, file no. 211/4, *Statut LUNS*, p. 1; *Instrukcja Prac Organizacyjnych*, pp. 2-4.

The simultaneous attack of two neighbouring superpowers in September 1939 to destroy the Polish state and the Polish nation prompted the national camp to put forward the imperial idea. Only a Great Poland stretching from the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse to the Daugava River, the Smolensk Gate and the Dnieper River and the organization of the Polish empire in the ABC area guaranteed the independence, growth and security of all Central European countries. The national camp refrained from copying German and Soviet imperialisms and justified that by creating it peacefully and on a voluntary basis. It assumed that the experiences of the Central and Eastern European nations with German and Soviet terror were conducive to Polish plans, and the small states understood that they could not defend themselves. It predicted the defeat of Germany and the collapse of the USSR resulting from their war. The imperial idea vied with the concept of a federation of the Central European government and Polish socialist, syndicalist, peasants', Piłsudski-related, and democratic groups at home and in exile. The national camp was fighting the federal idea because: 1) the national idea was dominant since the Napoleonic era and the Congress of Vienna; 2) it restricted the sovereignty of the nation state; 3) it threatened to transform the nation state into a federation; 4) it introduced supranational structures that appropriated the attributes of the nation state; 5) it threatened the domination of the European powers; 6) the federation was conducive to the emergence of political, economic and financial internationals, hostile to the national idea; 7) it imposed a uniform political and social system; 8) it was promoted by opponents of the national idea, the nation and the nation state: socialists, liberals, democrats, and communists; 9) it strengthened regional (Kashubian, Silesian) and supranational awareness (Soviet, European, Slavic people); 10) it introduced equal rights for national minorities; 11) it threatened multinational states, provoking their hostility and armed reactions; 12) it provided for the autonomy and equality of small and large states in the federation; 13) it was hostile to the imperial idea; 14) it dismantled the historical territories of states and nations, as the Russians, Germans and Polish federalists did, supporting Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian separatisms, inimical to the historical Polish nation since the Lublin Union.

During the Second World War, Polish political doctrine responded to the Soviet and German imperialisms with two different geopolitical concepts of the Central European Federation and of the Polish Empire. Both assumed the defeat of Germany and the collapse of the USSR. Threatened by the imperialism of the two states, the countries and nations of Central and Eastern Europe were to be gathered around Poland. The main difference between the two geopolitical entities was their form and structure. The national camp proclaimed the idea of imperialism as they saw it as the sole way to preserve the independence of Central Europe from Germany and the USSR and to rebuild a strong, national and sovereign Polish state.

### **The National Camp and the Concept of a Federation During the Second World War Summary**

During the Second World War, the national camp preached the idea of imperialism in Central Europe. Built peacefully, the Polish empire was supposed to protect the independence and security of countries in Central Europe against Germany and the Soviet Union, and thus went by the name of "the Great Poland". As part of the empire, nation-states were retained. The

national camp was opposed to the idea of the federation as promoted by the government-in-exile. The “national camp” saw the idea of federation on the regional, European and global level as obsolete. Post-war international cooperation was based on nation states and their alliances.

**Keywords:** Second World War, national camp, Fighting Poland, Polish idea of federation, Polish idea of the imperial, Polish political thought in the 20th century.

**About the Author:** Dr Dariusz Miszewski, historian, graduate of Wrocław University, assistant professor in the Department of International Relations of the Institute of Political Science of Zielona Góra University (1999-2013), as of 2016 assistant professor in the Faculty of National Security of the War Studies University, specialising in Polish-Czech-Slovak relations in the 20th and 21st c., national minorities in Central Europe and Polish political doctrine of the 20th c.

*Translated by Marcin Turski*