

MAREK MACIEJCZAK

‘PASSIVE-ACTIVE’ AS A FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTION IN HUSSERL’S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract. This article discusses passive and active aspects of consciousness as two equally justified roots of life experiencing the world (*Weltbewusstseinsleben*). The passive domain involves the synthesis of internal time, association, habituality, bodily aspects, etc. The active domain includes strictly cognitive competences of consciousness: thinking, judging, etc. What has been actively constituted becomes passive as the basic level for higher form of understanding. The two domains interweave, influence each other, complement each other, and also remain in a certain tension and discrepancy. In the broader perspective of the system of consciousness and its various layers, the passive-active differentiation must be treated functionally, and not as hierarchically arranged or constituted by separable concepts. It reflects the dynamics of the consciousness system at all its levels, and its meaning oscillates between the opposite and the overlapping.

Keywords: inner time; consciousness; passivity; activity; habituality; evidence

1. Introduction. 2. The conditions of passive genesis. 3. The conditions of active genesis. 4. Conclusion.

1. INTRODUCTION

This article considers passive and active aspects of the system of consciousness. The passive domain involves the synthesis of internal time, association, habituality, the role of the body, etc. The active domain involves strictly cognitive competences of consciousness: thinking, judging, etc. I would like to show that in the broader perspective of the system of consciousness and its various layers, the passive-active differentiation must be treated functionally, rather than as hierarchically arranged or constituted by separable concepts. Its meaning oscillates – as we shall see – between opposition and overlapping. Passivity and activity complement each other in the system of consciousness, as two equally legitimate aspects of

cognition. Its passive aspects, including the temporalization of experiences, the organization of an associative structure of sensory fields, the creation of complex units of meaning by joining together kinesthetic impressions, etc., motivate and enable acts of cognition in the *strict sense*: judgment, evaluation, etc. The interplay and the tension between passive and active aspects of consciousness trigger the dynamics of cognition, determining in particular the mutual influence and reconciliation of acquired forms of experience (practical schemes, common knowledge, scientific knowledge, etc.). Lastly, the passive-active dichotomy, as one of the conditions that enable the dynamics of the system of consciousness at all its levels, strengthens the system's effectiveness and autonomy.

The differentiation between passivity and activity in the late genetic phase of Husserl's thought also leads to a substantial change in the concept of ego (Schwabe-Hansen 1991). If consciousness of a judgment, thought, notion or object were not accompanied by a pre-reflexive self-awareness, one could not pay attention to the very process of cognition. One could not develop specific competences and differentiate between aspects of experience, ways of perceiving, attitudes, etc. Passivity and activity, or pre-predicative and predicative, are inextricably bound structures of subjective experience and they are what constitute subjectivity. Ultimately, the becoming of the personal subject is closely related to the formation of his own lived world as the intersubjective world of community, the domain of language, tradition, myth, religion, etc. The 'I' becomes the center of the faculties of consciousness, bearing in mind that it constantly involves a passive dimension (Husserl 1989, 265).

2. THE CONDITIONS OF PASSIVE GENESIS

The first condition of passive genesis is the constitution of immanent temporality. The synthesis of inner time consciousness is the most basic type: it gives conscious experience a permanent existence in

time and it also unifies all aspects of conscious life.¹ It is in virtue of such synthesis that reflectively identifiable experiences are temporally ordered (they have a beginning and end in time), and simultaneous and consecutive experiences appear within the unlimited horizon of immanent time, stretching from a past to a future course of experience.² All conscious experiences are governed by synthetic unification. “Primordial forms of time consciousness,” a continuous synthesis that create different time slices, constitute consciousness as the unity of a self-conscious system. Each experience occurs in the living present and receives its own temporal place in the stream of experiences.³ The current present, the actualizing of experience is a continuation of the past and a harbinger of future experiences. It is transformed by the retentive phase and the protentive phase (*Entgegenwärtigung*) in such a way that, although the experiences are passing, their irreversibility and order in time, as well as the persistence of consciousness as a whole, are ensured.⁴ Retentive consciousness applies to current

1 The description of the constitutional process of passive genesis is about an understanding of objectivity in reference to the acts of consciousness. It concerns the ways of presentation in which the sense of objectivity is created. See: Tugendhat 1967, 212.

2 “The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing consciousness of internal time. The correlate of this consciousness is immanent temporality itself, in conformity with which all the life-processes belonging to the ego that can ever be found reflectively must present themselves as temporally ordered, temporally beginning and ending, simultaneous or successive, within the constant infinite horizon: immanent time” (Husserl 1960, 43). The experience of time is the foundation of other experiences.

3 The “living present” manifests itself as a constant presence of the ‘I am’ and includes all forms of self-experience. Temporality is the synthetic unity of the stream of lived experiences. (Held 2003, 43).

4 “The continuous modification of the apprehension in the continuous flow does not concern the apprehension’s as what is, its sense. The modification intends no new object and no new object-phase. It yields no new time-points, but constantly the same object with the same time-points. Each actually present now creates a new time-point because it creates a new object, or rather a new object-point, which is held fast in the flow of modification as one and the same individual object-point” (Husserl 1980, 68). The aim of the theory of inner time consciousness is not only that of explaining the perception

experience: our streams of consciousness are constituted by episodes of immediate experience constantly changing. An object manifests itself as being shifted back in time and as maintaining its own identity. What is retained recedes from the present until it passes into the domain of forgetfulness. The irreversibility and order of experiences in time, as well as the persistence of consciousness as a whole is thus ensured. In this way, the foundations are laid for the constitution of identical objects and each concrete life of consciousness.⁵

As experience passes by, it enters the “background of sedimentary contrasts” and “awakens” its horizon backwards, thus defining the sense of the present experience. Before an object, for example a thing, is placed at the center of an objectifying gaze, it is already pre-given through structured sensory fields (*Sinnesfeld*). The data or their groups, distinguishing themselves from the field, awaken (*Weckung*) the self which “captures” the object in its type and properties. The self is thus tied into a unity of a system of synthetically related functions.⁶ The sensual fields, that is sound, touch, visual, etc. already have a temporal structure determining the succession and coexistence of sensual data, which are based on the primary consciousness of time. However, the way in which the data are differentiated from the background and

of temporal objects. “It had to do with the very manifestation of subjectivity” (Zahavi 1999, 67).

- 5 “The all-embracing essential form of intentional genesis, to which all its other forms relate back, is that of the constitution of immanent temporality, which governs each concrete life of consciousness with a rigid regularity and gives all processes of consciousness an abiding temporal being. Stated more precisely: a life of consciousness is inconceivable, except as a life given originally in an essentially necessary form of factualness, the form of the all-embracing temporality, wherein each process of consciousness has its identical temporal locus, which it receives throughout the flowing changes in its typically modified manners of givenness within a living present, and then retains abidingly by virtue of essential sources pertaining to habituality” (Husserl 1969, 318).
- 6 This system develops in degrees, each of which is subject to a form of temporality. The hierarchical system of forms of perception, that is of constituted objects, contains an equally permanent ontological structure of the universe. Husserl stresses that without association it is impossible to think of the ego (Husserl 1960, 81).

the relations between the sensual fields (visual to acoustic, etc.) are determined by the laws of association. A motivational association arises in consciousness through “the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego; it is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progress from here...” (Husserl 2001a, 169).

Association is otherwise a “pragmatism” of the intentionality of consciousness, including the configuration of sensual data with respect to coexistence and consequence, and the content shaped by the principles of similarity, contrast and contact. Something resembles something, one points to the other, and at the same time contrasts with what is not similar. For example, red patches are cut off from a white surface because associations form the unity of the sensual field allowing the red patches and the white surface to be (visually) related to each other, although they are different (heterogeneous) in relation to the field of acoustic sensations. As a result of association, sensory data are cut off from a homogeneous background; borders and contours are distinguished; sounds gain intensity and can be noticed (Husserl 1972, 76-80). Lived experiences produce affections in the self, they are the allure given to consciousness. They constitute a relief of that same allure when the self reacts to them. Associations form an impressional sphere, associative motivation networks, create affective unity and multiplicity, thus conditioning the constitution of objectivity.⁷

In addition to the synthesis of immanent temporality and association, the next condition of passive genesis is habituality. Habitualities are developed in concrete situations of experience. They determine the cognitive styles of the types of possible objects of experience by networking. For this reason, each object (including

⁷ The intentionality of drives is the source of empty representations of present time slices as standing time (*Zeitigung*). Their content is intended for the purpose of satisfying the drive (Husserl 1973a, 595).

the immanent object) refers to a structure defined by a regularity, according to which it could be given to other forms of consciousness, possibly in the typics outlined by their essence (Husserl 1960, 53, 54). By virtue of typics, the world and its objects are experienced as ordered into types: things are experienced as trees, bushes, animals; more precisely, as a pine, wild rose, dog, viper, swallow, etc. (Husserl 1972, §83). Each new individual is already known in advance and evokes what is similar, because he or she is already captured according to his or her type in the horizon of possible experience and with appropriate indications of similarity. In a way, he or she possess “in advance” the anticipated types of properties not yet experienced, but already expected. Therefore, when we see a dog, for example, we immediately anticipate its possible ways of behaving, moving, eating, playing, etc.

The subject has only a limited degree of control over such intentional modifications, which are formed spontaneously as in the case of ambiguous figures. Experience (the initial situation) shows whether, for example, a given feature is exemplified or not. The subject of consciousness is capable of interpreting current experience because he reaches out to latent and inactive meanings deposited in habitual structures (as a result of past experiences) and recalled as the horizon of current experience. Unconscious meanings belong to such structures: repressed emotions of love, humiliation, resentiments, and the kinds of behavior unconsciously motivated by them.⁸ The inhibition and satisfaction of impulses (*Triebintentionalität*) also belongs to affective passivity (Husserl 1973a, 148, 594). Typicality of experience is one of the most important cognitive aspects of consciousness, because it limits the essential inadequacy and ambiguity of the object. Its contribution can be clearly seen in the perception of things. A thing is always seen from one point of view, from a certain perspective – its perception

8 For further details about the emotive dynamics of passive intentionality and the tendencies of the body, its instincts and drives, etc.; see: Brudzinska 2012, 23-52.

is inadequate. It is the co-conscious deficiency (incompleteness) of presentation that indicates intentionally the possibility of replacing the current perception by a continuum of possible perceptions in infinitely many directions. Alternative perceptions belong to the horizon of things and its indeterminacy is grounded in its opacity. Husserl speaks of horizons: the inner horizon (e.g. in the case of a thing its perceived properties require further explication), the outer horizon (the set of possible perceptions of co-data objects in the background of the current perception), and the comprehensible world horizon (the infinite totality to which every outer horizon refers).⁹ An object perceived is placed in a visual field and the field is a segment of space infinitely expanding in all directions.

The outer horizon is founded on the temporal, retention-protection structure of experience, as well as in the corporeality that enables the practical “I can” (*ich-kann*) and “I do” (*ich-tue*). The body has a special function for the cognitive competence of consciousness. The body is given in an external perception - it is a physical thing, filled with sensuous qualities. When it is given in an internal perception, it is a field, a carrier of sensations. The body moves at will, explores and experiences: “Thus each thing that appears has *eo ipso* an orienting relation to the body, and this refers not only to what actually appears but to each that is supposed to be able to appear” (Husserl 1989, 61). The body experiences and moves – this is the zero point of all orientations, the central “here”, in relation to which everything else is “there”, i.e. in relation to which the surrounding objects are experienced as being placed close, far, to the right, to the left, etc. (Husserl 1989, 164, 165).

The subject experiences the body in kinesthetic consciousness - his own feeling and movement. The body is a system of kinesthetic possibilities, of “I can”: move in the environment of things, conduct

9 According to Geniusas, “*Welthorizont*” can be interpreted as “horizon of the world” and “world as horizon” (Geniusas 2012, 179).

– move away, approach, touch, etc. It is a system of places where impressions may appear. Kinesthetic impressions are connected with impressions representing objects and features of external objects. The body contributes to the constitution of the spatial world. In this sense, it is the link between consciousness and the world. Owing to the body, the constituting life – the ego, its stream of consciousness and habituality – finds its place in the natural time and space, in the right place and at the right point in time. The body as a zero point of orientation and the consciousness that constitutes time are the conditions of the constitution of the natural world in its space-time determinations, not simply some “»here« and »now«” that can be located in time and space.

The embodied consciousness is responsible for pre-reflective knowledge, the “assimilation” of the world and its objects, the passive aspect of experience. States of affairs, values, goals, etc., are always experienced against some background, in some vaguely conscious horizon of an unspecified reality, the horizon of the world. This pre-reflective world consciousness, undefined in its content, serves as the basis for experience, judgment, etc. Husserl described its most advanced structures with the concepts of typics and prototype. With reference to typics, a prototype limits ambiguity and inadequacy, enables anticipation in the form of a leading, goal-oriented “image” (*eines Leitbildes*) in a defined, ordered scale of possible variations. For this reason, in perception, for instance, there is no question of arbitrary exemplification of meaning (notional or regarding the content of experience), but a systematic indication of its contexts (Smith, McIntyre 1982).¹⁰ Prototypes are also active in acts of recollection, as research on memory shows. One explains the recalled images by referring to a certain scheme, consisting of a prototype and

10 This state of affairs testifies to the concept of the noema as a meaning “directed to the world”, as an objective and at the same time pragmatic meaning for the subject, who is thus able to anticipate, that is, to know in advance the object of perception.

its transformations. Also, uncertainties and gaps in memory indicate the anticipation of an optimum of recollection (Husserl 1966, 280-282). The gradation and orientation towards a certain optimum: "... in general is the universal law of consciousness" (Husserl 1966, 203, 221). It is also a condition for the possibility of combining perception and thinking, experience and concept, that is, acts of different types and objects of different kinds.

3. THE CONDITIONS OF ACTIVE GENESIS

Every judgment and cognitive operation is based on pre-predictive acts, receptive experience, and unclear knowledge. Gradually formed sedimentations and habits become part of the subject's history that influence present and future experience (Sousa 2014, 43). At first, our attention is drawn to the object as an undefined object of empirical consciousness. Next, on the basis of a continuous synthesis of identification in which the object is given as something identical to itself, its individual properties are revealed. Simple intentions are, for example, fulfilled in ordinary perception: I see a dog, a desk, a computer. However, we always pay attention to certain features, whereas other features are already in the field of perception and we only need to direct our grasping gaze at them. What an object is in itself and for itself is anticipated in a general way and exclusively with regard to horizons, while its features, parts and properties are constituted by conscious explication (Husserl 1960, 101). The grasping of the moment of a part, as the part of a given unity, and thus also the grasping of a sensuous feature, as a feature, as a sensuous form, as a form, presents the object in a new way, as a subjective or objective component. The fact that a dog belongs to the German Shepherd's breed, that a desk is black, that a computer is next to the books, etc., requires a change of attitude – a categorical attitude. We recognize a dog as an exemplification of a specific breed, we identify a specific state of affairs and articulate it in judgment – e.g., we assign blackness

as a property of the desk. The categorical elements of the meaning of words such as “is” and “beside”, as well as abstract objects such as justice, freedom, truth, number, collection, gravity law, etc., can only be grasped by a higher order act, founded on the acts of perception. “... [I]n this way we would leave the sphere of »sensuality« and enter the sphere of »intellect«” (Husserl 1968, 152).

The predicative function characterizes all acts of predicative thinking – cognition. The role of subjective determination is to identify the thing about which something is to be said, while a predicative expression says something about the thing so identified. Judging expresses the conviction that something is or is not thus and so. Husserl distinguishes between an object that is judged in judgment and a state of affairs that is assumed. The objective correlate of a full judgment is a state of affairs, which is also the correlate of acts of question, doubt, wish, etc., as well as what the question concerns, what is wished, what is doubted, etc. The scope of the categorical attitude also includes procedures: conceptual analysis, argumentative structure, operations of ideation and variation that result in the essence, etc. With concepts and procedures consciousness becomes a broad field of experience, which is not limited to individual objects, but includes general and abstract objects as well. It can define the ‘what it is’ and ‘how it is’ of an object. In other words, consciousness pursues the goals of cognition.

Consciousness experiences itself in a special way. Husserl speaks about splitting the I (*Ich-Spaltung*) into a pure I and a non-I. However, he emphasizes that they are inseparable. The non-I includes subjectivity, the world and inter-subjectivity (Husserl 1973a, 131).¹¹ The I grasps itself as the identical I of each cogito, accompanies each representation, and determines its sameness by maintaining consistency in its attitudes. In reflection it refers to itself as having

11 The ego is a unity of awake and hidden life, as a ‘pole’ carries within it both activity and passivity.

beliefs or attitudes, it can cancel them, negate them, annihilate their validity, move freely from one attitude to another. The ego constitutes itself for itself in, so to speak, the unity of its own history. As an intentional pole, it directs itself in its own way to objects of a certain type, and can then return to them in repeated acts. It exists in such a way that it constantly orientates itself towards the corresponding types of objects or states of affairs: e.g., it recognizes them in being. That is, it permanently assimilates and correlatively identifies itself with habitual properties that arise as a consequence of “acts of taking a stance”. The unity of the I is created by the habitual sedimentation of past experiences. Husserl also speaks in this context of the fate of consciousness (*Schicksal des Bewusstseins*) and inner historicity (*einer inneren Geschichtlichkeit*) (Husserl 1966, 38, 211, 360).

In reflection, through thematic insight the I discovers the meaning of what has been previously experienced but not noticed. Subsequent experience may confirm or refute the results of its application. Also, the I cannot fully understand itself. “The I should not be called the I, it should not be named at all, for then it would immediately become an object; it is unspeakable and nameless, not standing, not flowing, not existing above everything, but ‚functioning‘ in terms of comprehending, valuing, etc.” (Husserl 2001b, 227-228). The I is the subject of its own life, it comes from life and develops in it. “The I emerges from the world, it controls itself in the affective-kinaesthetic layer to return to the world and itself in acts of perception and judgment” (Prokopski 2013, 10). Full subjectivity, a concept encompassing all aspects of the I, means “life experiencing the world” (*Weltbewusstseinsleben*). It is always concrete, determined by individually acquired habitual properties and character traits, although it is constantly changing and has its own history.

The I may play the role of a ‘disinterested’ spectator of its own life experiencing the world (Husserl 1973a, 287). The I may differentiate its presence, may step forth or step back in its flux of lived-experiences. It is capable to reactivate levels of previously active

and actually latent lived-experiences. The “passive-active” distinction explains the possibility of directing reflection from the subject of cognition to the very process of its course.¹² If our consciousness of a judgment, thought, notion or object were not accompanied by a pre-reflexive self-awareness, one could not pay attention to the very process of cognition.¹³ One could not develop particular competences and differentiate between aspects of experience, ways of perceiving, attitudes, etc. The I becomes the center of the faculties of consciousness, although it always involves a passive dimension (Husserl 1989, 265).

By differentiating between aspects of experience, ways of perceiving, attitudes, etc., consciousness gains access to the fields of reality and irreality (transcendental reduction), fact and essence (eidetic reduction). The auto-constitution of consciousness is at the same time the world’s becoming. As a result, the subject perceives himself as worldly – embodied, socialized. In other words, as a human being: subjectivity means life experiencing the world (*Weltbewusstseinsleben*) (Husserl 1973a, 287).

12 “Obviously it can be said that, as an ego in the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental ego, but that I know about this only by executing phenomenological reduction” (Husserl 1960, 37). Claesges states that the belief in the existence of the world corresponds to the basic definition of the intentionality of natural consciousness as world consciousness. The splitting of the ego is a condition for phenomenological reflection: the ego, which deals with the world, is watched by an uncommitted observer, who reveals a natural attitude, a spontaneous conviction in the existence of the world as an experience of consciousness determining the reality of the world of experience, which so far consciousness fulfilled naively, rather than thematically, and anonymously (Claesges 1964, 20).

13 The pure ego may differentiate its presence, may step forth or step back in its flux of lived-experiences. It is capable to reactivate the levels of lived-experiences previously active and receded into the background (latent). An active part of the ego decides and acts, a passive part exerts self-preservation and is always in contact with the instincts and drives of the body, habituality, sensations such as feelings of pleasure or pain, etc. The active part of the ego is always in contact with the passive part: for instance, in sensations, feelings, etc.

Reflexive consciousness distinguishes (enables) between the objects that it creates (constitutes) and is entirely responsible for thoughts, ideas, fantasies, etc. In addition, there are objects for which it is responsible only in part, since they require external information for their constitution. The distinction between transcendent and immanent objects corresponds to the respective types of acts: perception makes external objects available, while recollection, imaginative representation and thinking make immanent objects available. The inner objects consciousness creates and maintains itself. Such objects are always accessible to it and, in this sense, relatively independent of time. As for transcendent objects, on the contrary, their presentation requires specific, qualifying *noesis* (bodily behavior), which consciousness must employ, and they are not freely accessible. Transcendent objects are a world alien to the self, that is, a form of “non-ego”, “other ego”. External objects are also connected with a certain point in time and a certain orientation in space.

The world is the world for all of us, it exists “once and for all” not only for me but for everyone; it is constituted by shared experiences, on which we can all agree, through the exchange of our experiences. The relation of consciousness to the environment, by setting boundaries, shapes and structures the system and correlatively establishes one’s own environment. It is only when objects that do not belong to consciousness are established that consciousness becomes a defined and each time separable unity: as a noetic and noematic unity, it distinguishes between itself and the surrounding world as the whole of what is different, other than the unconscious. As a result of this distinction, consciousness constitutes the world of the environment as independent of itself and attributes to it activities which it does not govern. Consciousness and the surrounding world become incommensurable, asynchronous systems with autonomous times.

Through this type of activity, the complexity, depth and density of consciousness increase. Layering and habitual structures are developed, as well the relationships between them – correlatively,

the world of the subject gains new aspects or properties. A historical structure emerges in which each type of activity has its own place, which is determined by the laws of coexistence and consequences in an egological time. This way, experiences are ordered and do not occupy a random place in the stream of consciousness. The I determines its identity by maintaining consequences in its attitudes.¹⁴ The I exists in such a way that it is constantly orientated toward the appropriate types of objects or states of affairs: for example, it affirms them in existence, that is, it assimilates them permanently and correlatively. Consciousness identifies itself with the habitual properties that arise as a result of its “acts of attitude” (*Habitualität seiner Stellungnahme*) (Husserl 1960, 68). Correlatively to the structures of habituality, it is created the surrounding world known to the subject with its non-thematized horizons and the possibility of anticipating future attitudes, thinking and acting. The construction of the lived world is at the same time the constitution of the structure of the subject.¹⁵

The factor that affects the dynamics of the system of consciousness (intentional life) is the pursuit of evidence: each type of consciousness strives to move into such a modus of presentation, in which what has not yet been anticipated in a specified way becomes more and more precisely defined.¹⁶ Although consciousness may present the object in different ways (in perception, fantasy, and conjecture, respectively, as existing in reality, possibility or probability), the modality “existing

14 “... Rather, I am even therein and a priori the same ego, insofar as I, in taking a position, necessarily exercise consistency in a determinate sense: each »new« position-taking institutes a persistent »opinion« or a thema (a thema of experience, of judgment, of enjoyment, of will, etc.) so that, from now on, as often as I grasp myself as the same I used to be or as the same as I now am and earlier was, I also retain my themata, assume them as active themata, just as I had posited them previously” (Husserl 1989, 119).

15 The relation between habitualities and the constitution of the self enables a better understanding of the concept of the subject in the late period of the genetic phase of Husserl’s analysis (Cavallaro 2016, 237-261).

16 In this context, Holenstein refers to the so-called ambiguous figures from which a new figure emerges spontaneously and unexpectedly (Holenstein 1980, 78).

with certainty” stands out because it functions as the primordial form of all modalities of existence: the remaining modalities can be reduced to it.¹⁷ Perception presenting the object directly is then the primordial form of awareness.¹⁸ Evidence is the experience of truth, it gives the intention of perception, judgment, etc.: that is, it gives “the fullness of content of the object itself” (Husserl 1993, 121, 122).

Evidence constitutes the realm of “ideal immanence” or “permanent property”, as a potential horizon of presumptions referring to the same object and which the ego can constantly return to, recreate in secondary recollection or restore in perceptions. The I can repeat these processes over and over again. “Without such possibilities there would be for us no fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world. Both of these exist for us thanks to evidence or the presumption of being able to make evident and to repeat acquired evidence” (Husserl 1960, 60). Evidence concerns all acts that present objects originally. Because the overlapping of intentions with what is given may be incomplete, the evidence may be characterized by a different degree of adequacy and inadequacy. An example of inadequate evidence is the perception of things, as their properties still refer to those already announced but not yet fulfilled. An inner perception is also inadequate, since experiences are always on the horizon of what happened earlier and will happen later.¹⁹

17 “In fact, all of the being characteristics originating from it, the ones to be specifically called being-modalities, have in their own sense a relation back to the primal form” (Husserl 1983, 251).

18 The point at stake here is the full correspondence in an act of synthesis (*Dekungssynthese*) between what is presumed and what is given, the act that gives meaning and the act that fills in meaning, intention and fulfillment. The evidence for this correspondence is its very experience, which takes place, for instance, in the observation of the self-presence of an object.

19 Habitual properties are important in this context because they play a normative role: they are the patterns for the typical course of perception, thinking, and action. They are a form of memory of past experiences and can also tie together acts of the same or different types: e.g., a perception can be a motive for remembrance, etc.

The system of consciousness is structurally very complicated. That is why keeping its unity is not easy. Current modifications of experiences, their passing and coming, the temporal unity of system, bring about such inclusion by controlling and selecting experiences that are only partly determined. This may cause opposition and inconsistency, that is, disturbances between experiences caused by contextual elements, discrepancies, and contrasts within the system. As a result, the ego and correlatively the lived world may become unfamiliar and mysterious. This situation leads to identity crises and loss of meaning in the workings of consciousness. Through reflection consciousness may investigate or ignore these phenomena. Consciousness may, for instance, rearrange the unity of its system, its history one more time. Loss of stability may cause pathological phenomena (Stolorow 2009, 407). Reflection is the awareness of potential attitudes, a kind of intentional mastery over them (*Walten*), a necessary condition for the will to act and evaluate that leads to fundamental values. The personal I emerges from motivational structures because it remains to some extent consistent in its acts of attitude. Being consistent conforms to a principle of comprehensibility. The I is rational, i.e. it acts purposefully, selects the appropriate means for its purposes, anticipates the effects of its choices, and fulfils specific needs and values.

From the point of view of the system, it is the consistency of the network, rather than individual judgments, convictions, attitudes, inclinations, etc. that guarantees to a large extent the rationality of the subject. Ultimately, it is reflectivity that characterizes personal identity, setting up the difference between the relation to itself and the world.

4. CONCLUSION

Husserl used the terms “passivity” and “activity” to qualify the characteristics of consciousness and its levels: experiences, processes and

structures. Passivity conveys the pre-predictive, pre-linguistic and pre-theoretical aspect of experience. Consciousness is the awareness of a coherent world of experience and all its aspects – the general form of coexistence and succession (connection) of all conscious objectivity generated by the synthesis of inner time. Time consciousness provides the formal conditions for the possibility of consciousness of an identical object experienced in different acts, and creates the unity of the stream of experiences “with its past and future”. Time consciousness also enables the fundamental structure of consciousness, the noetic-noematic correlation, which binds the constituting side of experience with the constituted one (Husserl 1930, 12).²⁰ At the level of experiences, the basic function of consciousness is association, which connects experiences according to the laws of simultaneity, succession, contact, continuity and homogeneity. Association links the current experiences of the I with the network of motivational relationships (associations) and its own history contained in the habitual layer – the typical structures created as a result of the experiences performed.

Passivity and activity complement each other in the system of consciousness, as the two equally legitimate roots of cognition. The primary passive aspects of consciousness include: temporalizing experiences, creating an associative structure of sensory fields, creating complex units of meaning by joining together kinesthetic impressions, etc., motivating and enabling acts of cognition, judgment and valuation and their objects. In other words, the passivity of consciousness concerns primarily conceptual structures and ethical, aesthetic and cultural characters. The I is a pole of being that is both affective and being affected. The equivalent of the imaginative I is the imaginary world, which in turn is the equivalent of the setting up in existence the real world. In ordering experiences, the I has its own world at its disposal, as its own property acquired in earlier acts and the history that continues with them. Habituality, style

20 See: Held 1966, 89.

and disposition reflect the constituted aspect, ready-made cognitive structures and correlatively the ordinary, familiar, everyday world in which we live. The constituting aspect reflects current cognitive processes, including the creative process, and correlatively meanings, ideas, values, etc.

The tension between the constituted and the constituting, the passive and active aspects of consciousness triggers the dynamics of cognition – the mutual influence and mutual agreement of the acquired forms of experience and the aspiration to the evidence – truth. The pursuit of the evidence stimulates the system of consciousness. Each kind of objectivity, i.e. intentional units or units of possible experience has an equivalent in a specific type of experience – the evident, the style of experiencing. From the point of view of the system, all kinds of being, both real and ideal, are the intentional effect (*Leistung*) of its cognitive efficiency.²¹ Evidence so broadly understood, that is, as referring to the whole life of consciousness, sets the goal for every act. Furthermore, it determines the teleology of the life of consciousness as such. In this context, Husserl speaks of a reason-oriented approach, of demonstrating the accuracy or of crossing it out, and of habituality, habitual acquisition and crossing out (Husserl 1969, 160).

The units of meaning thus constituted form the realm of secondary passivity – habituality. Recalled by reproductive associations and ordered by memory, they create a horizon, a context for the act of consciousness. They also pose a certain threat. The context of the current experience may be incorrectly identified, which leads to erroneous recognition and recollection. Sedimentation is also a form of forgetting: events that are increasingly distant from the current context become poorer and poorer in terms of content, and eventually become forgotten. As time passes, an undefined horizon

21 Husserl considered this kind of understandableness as “the highest imaginable form of rationality” (Husserl 1960, 85).

of past experience escapes. Secondary passivity is also the realm of routine, automatism, disposition and habitual skills. Uncritical trust in them distances a subject from the initial experience: "... secondary passivity is the main obstacle that philosophy should seek to overcome in order to enable rebirth, scientific and moral progress" (Biceaga 2010, XVIII).²²

Husserl notes that the constitution of the "cognitive apparatus" and its products have a historical character – the world as a horizon of experience (*Erfahrungsspielräume*) is the correlate of historically shaped cognitive activity. The transcendent subject is in the "world-in-which-we live", the practical life, with its valuations, aspirations and norms. Finally, Husserl takes into account the situation of a subject acting in the world, an "incarnate and socialized subject". He recognizes anonymous causality (*Leistung*) as the ultimate basis for the world we live in, in its practical and theoretical aspects. Whole subjectivity – a concept covering all aspects of the I means: "life experiencing the world" (*Weltbewusstseinsleben*).²³ It emerges gradually from the basic layer of "original passivity" to complete categorical acts, encompassing the inner consciousness of time, associations of sensory fields, the awakening and spreading of affect, the formation of complex units of sense through kinesthetic impressions, memory and habituality.

In the broader perspective of the system of consciousness and its various layers, the passive-active differentiation must be treated functionally, rather than as hierarchically arranged or constituted

22 Husserl speaks also of the unconscious: of repressed emotions of love, humiliation, resentments, and the kinds of behavior unconsciously motivated by them. See: Husserl 1970, 237. See also: Legrand, Trigg 2017.

23 The uniqueness of this basic relationship follows from the fact that consciousness as a whole is founded in this very body, in its own, specific body (Husserl 1973b, p. 4f, 114). The carrier of consciousness is not the body itself, but man as a psychophysical whole. As it seems, the body is also founded in consciousness. Thus, the unity of body and soul is realized through a mutual foundation.

by separable concepts. Together they reflect the dynamics of the consciousness system at all its levels, and their meaning oscillates between opposition and overlapping. The passive and active aspects of consciousness interweave, influence and complement each other. They also remain in a certain tension, which causes discrepancies between them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Biceaga, V. (2010). *The Concept of Passivity in Husserl's Phenomenology*. Heidelberg – London – New York: Springer.
- Brudzinska, J. (2012). *Depth Phenomenology of the Emotive Dynamic and the Psychoanalytic Experience*. In: D. Lohmar, J. Brudzinska (eds.), *Founding Psychoanalysis Phenomenologically. Phenomenological Theory of Subjectivity and the Psychoanalytic Experience* (Phaenomenologica 199), 23-52. Dordrecht – Heidelberg – London – New York: Springer.
- Cavallaro, M. (2016). Das Problem der Habituskonstitution und die Spätlehre des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls. *Husserl Study*, 32, 237-261.
- Claesges, U. (1964). *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Geniusas, S. (2012). *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl's Phenomenology*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Held, K. (1966). *Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsfrage des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeiproblematik*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Held, K. (2003). *Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World*. In: D. Welton (ed.), *The New Husserl. A Critical Reader*, 32-62. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Holenstein, E. (1980). *Von der Hintergebarkeit der Sprache, Kognitive Unterlagen der Sprache*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Husserl, E. (1930). *Manuscript C*.
- Husserl, E. (1960). *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*. The Hague – Boston – London: Martinus Nijhoff Publ.
- Husserl, E. (1966). *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1968). *Logische Untersuchungen, II/2*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
- Husserl, E. (1969). *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publ.

- Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Husserl, E. (1972). *Erfahrung und Urteil Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
- Husserl, E. (1973a). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935*. Den Haag: Verlag Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1973b). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil: 1905–1920*. Den Haag: Verlag Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1980). *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*. Dordrecht – Boston – London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, E. (1983). *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology). The Hague – Boston – Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution). Dordrecht – Boston – London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, E. (1993). *Logische Untersuchungen. Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
- Husserl, E. (2001a). *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, E. (2001b). *Die "Bernauer Manuskripte" über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18)*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Legrand, D., Trigg, D. (eds.). (2017). *Unconsciousness Between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis* (Contributions to Phenomenology 88). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Prokopski, M. (2013). *Cielesna geneza czasu i przestrzeni [Bodily Genesis of Time and Space]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
- Schwabe-Hansen, E. (1991). *Das Verhältnis von transzendentaler und konkreter Subjektivität in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls*. München: Wilhelm Fink Vlg.
- Smith, D.W., McIntyre, R. (1982). *Husserl and Intentionality. A Study of Mind, Meaning and Language*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Sousa, E. (2014). Phenomenological Psychology: Husserl's Static and Genetic Method. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 45, 27–60.
- Stolorow, R. (2009). Individuality in Context. *International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psychology*, 4, 405–413.
- Tugendhat, E. (1967). *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Zahavi, D. (1999). *Self-Awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

MAREK MACIEJCZAK

Politechnika Warszawska

(Warsaw University of Technology, Poland)

ORCID <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5199-6651>

marek.maciejczak@pw.edu.pl

DOI 10.21697/spch.2022.58.A.02



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. (CC BY-ND 4.0).

Received: 26/01/2022. Reviewed: 28/03/2022. Accepted: 12/05/2022.