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STEIN'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE HUMANITIES

Abstract. Should we approach the lived experience and/or understand the other with the sense of things? If this is the case, how are we to treat the human experience *par excellence*? Paradoxically, Edith Stein gives a fresh meaning to the Husserlian term “*leibliche Selbstgegebenheit*.” In contrast to Max Scheler’s account, she develops the “*persönliche Note*” criterion of authenticity. And against Martin Heidegger’s existential philosophy, a concern for human existence itself resonates. Based on these three dimensions, this article discusses the idea of “the lived experience” according to Edith Stein, that is, the human experience contemplated by the humanities.

Keywords: lived experience; human experience; *leibliche Selbstgegebenheit*; *persönliche Note*; authenticity; value; empathy; existence; a-subjective *Dasein*; Edith Stein; Roman Ingarden; Martin Heidegger; Edmund Husserl; Max Scheler; Jan Patočka.

1. Introduction. 2. Intentionality, or Stein’s approach to “lived experience.” 3. The “*persönliche Note*” phenomenon of authenticity. 4. The truth of human life. 5. Conclusion.

1. INTRODUCTION¹

Edith Stein’s commitment to Husserl’s phenomenology is inspired by her keen interest in and search for “what is” and the sense of one’s own life. In fact, however what she offers within a Cartesian framework is

¹ This paper, with slight differences, was originally presented at the 6th Bi-Annual International Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Philosophy of Edith Stein (IASPES), *Edith Stein’s Legacy To The World. 130 Years After Her Birth*, 12-15 October 2021, co-organized by Centro de Investigación Social Avanzada (CISAV, Querétaro, Mexico), Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla (UPAEP, Puebla, Mexico), Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí (UASLP, San Luis Potosí, Mexico), and Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo (UMSNH, Morelia, Mexico).

the sense of things (Bello 2015).² Should we approach the lived experience and/or understand the other with the sense of things? If this is the case, how are we to treat the human experience *par excellence*? This question arose at the end of her dissertation – “non liquet” – announcing the necessity of further research, which eventually disappears in the milestone “secretum meum mihi” conviction, shortly after the *Beitrag*e (known as *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*). Paradoxically, Stein gives a fresh meaning to the Husserlian term “leibliche Selbstgegebenheit.” In contrast to Scheler’s account, she develops the “persönliche Note” criterion of authenticity. And against Heidegger’s existential philosophy, a concern for human existence itself resonates. Based on these three dimensions, this article discusses the idea of “the lived experience” according to Edith Stein, that is, the human experience contemplated by the humanities.

2. INTENTIONALITY, OR STEIN’S APPROACH TO “LIVED EXPERIENCE”

A point that is worth stressing from the beginning and that perhaps will make you feel a tension that Stein herself felt in addressing the issue of the “Einfühlung,” concerns the problem of how to understand the other in a relationship that is personal but not “subjective.”³ Roman Ingarden, in a lecture published in Polish fifty years after Stein’s early phenomenological works, says in this regard: “Husserl

2 The problem that arises is that of reality, that is, of “what is.” Bello examines it acutely in regard to Husserlian phenomenology as an approach to the real. Bello’s study serves as a useful background to Stein’s analysis.

3 Stein shares Husserl’s view on this issue. As Alice Pugliese explains: “...the new anthropologism appears as an even more dangerous threat. Namely, it immediately concerns the conception of subjectivity and the possibility... to conceive of a non-empirical subject of experience. Husserl faces the difficulty of preventing the reductive empiricism of the anthropological approach, without giving up the idea of the subject as the original source of meaning, rooted in the world and in its own body, and living in a constant exchange with the surrounding nature by the means of perception, emotion, and action” (Pugliese 2018, 216).

dealt with empathy (*Einfühlung*) in the context of the difficulties that every idealist encounters in order not to be condemned as a solipsist. How is solipsism to be avoided when talking about a pure 'I' and a pure consciousness of the philosophizing subject? ... All this is by no means a starting point for Edith Stein. Probably, she did not know about it either, because she did not know any Husserlian manuscripts at the time. The question of clarifying the possibility of mutual understanding between people drove her most, that is, the question of the possibility of creating a human community, which was necessary not only in theory, but also for her life, in a certain way for herself" (Ingarden 1971, 402).⁴ However, it is not just any necessity "for herself," indeed a "long-prepared crisis" (Beckmann-Zöllner 2010, XXIX, FN. 134). But there is also something else. In a letter to Ingarden dated February 20, 1917, Stein states, "It is impossible to complete a study of the person without entering into questions of God, and it is impossible to understand what history is. Of course, I don't see it at all yet. But as soon as the *Ideas* are ready, I want to approach these things. Those are *the* questions that matter to me" (Beckmann-Zöllner 2010, XXIX, FN. 131; Stein 2008, Br. 9).

Ingarden's approach meets Stein's, especially from the perspective of shared values (Janik 2021a), but there are lacunae. One of the lacunae comes from his not addressing the issue of the genesis of the sense of history, or rather, the sense of the "I" from within the perspective of becoming an "I," that is, within "the lived experience" and time. In other words, the sense of one's very own history. In fact, in his *Man and Time*,⁵ rewritten over three times between 1937-1946, Ingarden states: "So, too, the reference to the way in which – against the background of the second experience of time – the constitution

⁴ Unless stated otherwise, translations of Ingarden's texts are mine.

⁵ I learned about this from Wojciech Starzyński, who discussed it during the seminar session, *Egologiczno-egzystencjalna medytacja kartezyjańska Romana Ingardena* [Roman Ingarden's egological-existential Cartesian meditation], 3 June 2020 (see: <https://ifispan.pl/egologiczno-egzystencjalna-medytacja-kartezyjska-romana-ingardena>).

of myself for me occurs does not allow us to resolve the difficulties into which the existence of two different and incompatible experiences of time have led us. For although the reflection on the way in which my 'I' is constituted for me strongly undermines my conviction that I exist as a human being transcending my present experiences and my present time, it is not able to overthrow this conviction completely, nor is it able to make me believe that this way of learning about myself and constituting my 'human' 'I' excludes that this 'I' exists in itself and is as it appears in experience. ... This is a task that we are not equipped to solve today" (Ingarden 2009, 55).

Stein, on the contrary, not only devotes her energy to analyze the sense of the history, but this issue can be considered her *leitmotif*. A similar gap, but at the same time also a nuance, can be traced in Ingarden's controversy with Scheler on the objectivity of values. In this regard it concerns a pronouncement on the existence of "some values," however not yet given in existence, that is, as findings. Ingarden notes: "What is important at this point is merely that in posing this question I do not have in mind any ideal objects or ideas, but only something that, while existing effectively as a particular determination of an individual object, is itself individual and, while existing in a particular connection with that object, makes that object a 'good' in Scheler's sense. However, it can be argued that the question of the way in which values exist is formulated in too general a manner, since it claims that all values – regardless of their kind – exist in the same way" (Ingarden 1966, 103). Even if *unable to solve the task*, Ingarden at least sketches a solution. What matters, according to Ingarden, is the finding, that is, "something" that (1) "while existing effectively as a particular determination," (2) "of an individual object," (3) "is itself individual," (4) "while existing in a particular connection with that object," (5) "makes that object a 'good'." A closer examination of these points leads immediately to a metaphysical question, which Ingarden prefers not to address. Instead, Ingarden coins the term intentional objects, which are "*ambi-valent*," but at

the same time are of value to an individual. However, an object is a private thing to what one believes. These “creatures,” or “inventions” emerge within the language of the artwork and belong to that world. This position can be traced back from to Henri Bergson, whose works had been a source of inspiration for Ingarden since his dissertation. Thus Ingarden does not contrast Bergson on this point, as Stein did. Indeed, Stein notes: “Furthermore, we’ve seen that even in cases where the action apparently follows with the necessity of a natural event, the ‘free ego’ is merely ‘letting matters take their course,’ but that it could just as well put a stop to the occurrence. That would certainly be absurd if – as Bergson believes – the ego coincided with the total lifestream. That thesis certainly is to be rejected. The willing ego that we have in view, the subject of the resolve, is the *pure* ego, which Bergson regards as a mere construct of the intellect” (Stein 2000, 96).

Ingarden is right when he points out that the gravity of Stein’s research lies precisely in equating “empathy” (*Einfühlung*) with the experience (*Erfahrung*), as opposed to the aesthetic account of time, that is, with mere “empathized experiencing” (Ingarden 1979, 474-5). There is more, however. Stein fully subscribes to Husserl’s “return to things themselves,” leading to the tension of either finding something or perishing (Beckmann-Zöller 2010, IX-XI). As Ingarden notes, for Husserl the experience, also called original (*Originär*) or first – in the sense of *first philosophy* – consists in perceiving the “self-present, self-given” things (Ingarden 1979, 475-6). In other words, “get[ting] to know something initially without the help of the substitute data” (Ingarden 1979, 476). Ingarden states in this regard: “Edith Stein takes up the term [*original experience*] without analyzing it further. In my opinion, this is a mistake. I am convinced that it is a concept that needs further analysis” (Ingarden 1979, 476). I will try to nuance this statement and perhaps even clear up certain misunderstandings.

Above all, Stein differs from Husserl in her account of intentionality.⁶ For Husserl, the term “intentionality” means trying to find out how things are on the way to insight (*Einsicht*).⁷ It is a mathematician’s point of view, as in the case of Descartes. Not surprisingly, Stein discusses David Hume’s views, but not those Descartes’s. For Stein, Scheler’s position, with his claim to follow the heart – as in the case of Blaise Pascal and Augustine of Hippo – lacks “presence” of the person (Stein 2000, 200). As if it were still a theory, or rather a theoretical “construction” of the heart, and not the heart itself.⁸ For Stein, intentionality means “relational feeling,” rather than insight. The objective is always considered in the context of one’s attitude (Stein 2000, 48-49) and commitment to values.⁹ The sense of response is based on the mood (*Stimmung*). Even if this means principally the intention (*Vorsatz*) toward one’s own action, surprisingly Stein states: “I am not faced with any choice. ... I can yearn for religious faith and fret about it with all my might, and yet that doesn’t make it happen for me. I can become absorbed in the greatness of a character without being able to muster up the admiration it deserves. In these respects, then, I am not free” (Stein 2000, 48-49). The consequence of such an idea of intentionality is that of tuning

6 However, the *Ideas of Pure Phenomenology*, in Stein’s redaction, leads to the *Beiträge* (known as *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*). Stein admits this explicitly, saying, “If we now separate consciousness in the sense of the noetic from the correlates of all steps, this seems to us to be required by Husserl’s own investigations concerning original time-consciousness, and we hope to find his concurrence in it” (Stein 2000, 2).

7 This may be valid in the time of *Ideas*. However, as Jagna Brudzińska rightly notes, in the late Husserl, the lived body is interpreted as from a transcendental-phenomenological stance (Brudzińska 2018).

8 The principles of the heart which cannot be traced by reason alone, according to Pascal, are time, space, motion, and number. Scheler does not go with the Galilean views of motion, but refers to Aristotle’s concept of attraction, as he states explicitly in *The Nature of Sympathy* (Scheler 2017).

9 “...the intuitive givenness is a *condicio sine qua non* of full value-experiencing, but it doesn’t suffice to ensure it. Rather, an inner condition of the subject must be added in order to render possible the acquisition of the value” (Stein 2000, 161-165).

the experience (*Erfahrung*) with experiencing (*Erlebnis*). In other words, intentionality can mean neither experience nor experiencing, if not both at the same time. Put differently, it is rather the *lived self-abandoning*. However, controversy arises even before these two approaches to intentionality. Ingarden is right that the origin of this concept needed to be explored. But to call Stein's failure to provide such analysis "a mistake" is excessive.¹⁰

Intentionality, as Franz Brentano introduces the term to his students, including Edmund Husserl, comes from the Middle Ages. It is René Descartes who assimilates it from the metaphysical doctrine of Francisco Suárez (Janik 2021b), whom he became acquainted with during his studies at the Collegium La Flèche.

Following Descartes, Brentano calls an idea the concept of a product (*res*), which in turn inspired Husserl's notion of ideas. This is a mature fruit of the tradition that goes back to the Greeks and undergoes a further change with Saint Augustine. Brentano applies the term "intentionality" to what was known as "mental in-existence," (Brentano 2009, 67) and translates the term literally as "indwelling" (*Einwohnung*). At the same time, he cautions not to confuse "in-existence" with "existence." On the other hand, he equates "mental content" with Descartes' "res," as if it were readily accessible. Later, the abstract term "res" – Suárez's "aliquid in rerum natura" – is mistaken in common usage for the "thing." Husserl's urgency to "return to the things themselves" is in line with this shift, although he uses the term "Sachen" rather than "Dingen." Not coincidentally, today we returned to the linguistic usage of "findings," rather than "things themselves." Hence, "insight"

10 However, this is but a translation, namely: "Das ist meiner Meinung nach ein Fehler" (Ingarden 1979, 476; 1999, 249). Ingarden is more cautious, writing "To moim zdaniem jest pewien brak, bo jak sądzę jest to pojęcie do dalszego zanalizowania", which means "This, in my opinion, is a certain *deficiency*, as I think this is a concept to be further analyzed" (Ingarden 1971, 405). [Italics added].

(*Einsicht*) and “empathy” (*Einfühlung*) are the two sides of the same source experience.

For Brentano, the idea in its proper sense is the presentation (*Vorstellung*) that is the “rightly”¹¹ given or, better, “true in perception” (literally: *Wahr-nehmung*), either by *insight* or through *feeling, empathy*. Beyond the idea, the unity of experience is not possible at all. Taking this into consideration, Augustine’s *dictum*, which made history thanks to Anselm, namely “*credo, ut intelligam*,” requires an update as “*credo adjectum, ut intelligam*.” The term “*adjectum*” means the way of approaching the findings.

3. THE “PERSÖNLICHE NOTE” PHENOMENON OF AUTHENTICITY

Already in 1917, Stein admits that “[i]t is impossible to complete a study of the person without entering into questions of God,” but this only becomes clearer further on in her subsequent book *Beiträge*, known as *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, due to the rigorous “investigations undertake[n] to penetrate into essence of sentient reality and of the mind from various sides ...” (Stein 2000, 1). The issue that such questions open is the overcoming of the sensate (*psychischen*) mechanism, or the mechanism of the individual personality. Stein captures the phenomenon of the influence from beyond (*jenseits*) that allows one to get out of the “mechanism,” that is, of the *non-personal* response to a situation. In what sense is it a “mechanism”? On the one hand, it is the feeding and consuming of the energy of life, the function that occasionally fails with the effect that there is no desire to do something, the fatigue that prevents any action of its own, the lack of a reason to act and the acting out of fear. The solution comes perhaps thanks to the unexpected visit of a friend, with whom it is possible to share what is important and

11 George E. Moore (1903) criticizes this use of the adjective, while endorsing Brentano’s criterion of morality.

close to one's heart (Stein 2000, 173-4); sometimes it helps to take the book with the poem to get out of inner "paralysis" (Stein 2000, 77), etc. On the other hand, by "sensate mechanism" (Stein 2000, 112), Stein means the "natural" pattern described by David Hume as the association of "impressions," besides that of "ideas." For Stein, the association of "impressions" proves ambivalent, that is, it allows a "twofold" interpretation, that of "connection of meaning." The "pattern" is here understood as a "re-productive course," because "thought originally in this sequence once." Put differently, Stein states: "any phenomenally given associative coherence becomes a manifestation of an acquired capacity, of a *schema* for the future activation of life-power" (Stein 2000, 113).

In a footnote, the American translators of *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* mention a characteristic concerning the notion of "pathways," which contrasts with that of neuropsychology, cognitive science, and also with Sigmund Freud's approach. According to them, it is the case "of 'paths of least resistance,' rather than as manifestations of special allotment of energy." These two opposing interpretations make it clear that the issue turns ambivalent. However, it does not affect the sense that it is the acquisition of an attitude or a pattern, which Stein explains elsewhere.

Related to this sublime difficulty is the theme of "*sham* sentiments" (*eingebildeten Gefühlen*) that have nothing to do with the authenticity of the person. Certainly, Stein does not want to judge anyone, in fact she notes: "In such cases we're prone to talk about 'simulated' sentiments, self reception, or even hypocrisy. That's unjustified" (Stein 2000, 267). If we pay attention to the word used by Stein, we realize that such feelings are not about the sensate reality – as in the case of *shame*, as it may be – but rather imagination (*Einbildung*), and eventually of the *sham* due to awareness, as it were. For this very reason the sentiments cannot stand the test of life. Stein notes: "Regardless of the fact that they violate the unity of the personality, the sham (*unechten*) sentiments and properties have a remarkable

inner hollowness and feebleness that sets them apart from genuine ones. They can be exposed and shattered when the corresponding personal layer breaks forth so that the want of them comes to light (for example, if the ‘moralist’ falls short as soon as he’s put to the test). But it can also happen that the sham (*unechte*) character holds up, because favorable development conditionings for the character’s genuine predisposition are lacking, or because the sentient individual isn’t ‘living out of his soul’” (Stein 2000, 267). The issue of authenticity, that is, of the genuine character, leads immediately to the “responsibility of the person” that “can’t be suspended by appeal to either environmental influences or natural predispositions” (Stein 2000, 269).

Marianne Sawicki’s approach to render “verbal nouns with English gerunds in order to retain the sense of agency: for example ‘experiencing’ rather than ‘experience’ for substantive uses of the infinitive *Erleben*, or ‘doing’ rather than ‘deed’ for *Tun*,” addresses the aspect of the lived experience, as opposed to abstract knowledge, as in the case of verbal nouns (Stein 2000, XXII). Or at least, as may be so. In such a case it is certainly a moral matter – Sawicki in fact uses the adjective “sham,” a derivative of the word “shame,” rather than “fake” or “illusory,” for *eingebildeten* – that comes into play thanks to the origin of the concept “Humanities” (Gadamer 2018, 3). Properly understood, this is an ontological or anthropological question, and no longer a psychological one. In this context, it is worth noting a transcription error between the 1922 version of the text and the recent Herder publication. It is about the term *Anpassung des Erlebens* (Stein 2010, 25) (i.e. *adaptation*) instead of *Anspannung* (Stein 1922, 23) (i.e. *tension*). This echoes a question posed by Ingarden regarding Stein’s philosophical interest, namely, how experiencing can be said to be the experience. Stein is right that it is both a personal issue and it concerns the sense of history.

According to Stein, the problem of the psyche – or, to render it better, of the character – is tied to that of the living body.¹² Stein opposes Scheler on the mere possibility of the impersonal psyche, which is reflected, according to her reading, in his *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*. There are two moments of particular importance in her insightful analysis: one on the so-called zero point of the living body and the “inherent mental” *habitus* – translated as “inclination” (Stein 2000, 157) – which consists in the close relationship, which is not to be scrutinized, between “two different things,” namely, “feel” (*Fühlen*) and “feeling” (*Gefühl*). The question of “habitus” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 202) is the precise point of divergence in Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of perception*, around which everything revolves. The second moment is about the “being-with” that is prior to any experience, that makes one understand the other without any pretense, as she explains in the example of the leader (Stein 2000, 131). On this point Stein contrasts Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Stein states explicitly: “This [being-with] is not a finding of other subjects that are present-at-hand, but is instead a being-with-one-another which is already presupposed for learning and understanding (*empathy*)” (Stein 2007, 59). It is interesting to note, among other things, that Stein reads Heidegger’s analysis as if it were made from God’s point of view. Stein says: “It can hardly be doubted that Heidegger wants to understand *Dasein* as the human kind of being. We could also say: ‘human beings,’ as *Dasein* often is called ‘a being,’ without opposing the being, as ‘that which is,’ with being itself. It is also directly said that the essence of human beings is existence. That means nothing else than that something is claimed for human beings which according to the *philosophia perennis*

12 Mette Lebeck stresses that “The body is constituted, for Stein, because it is the best way of making sense of what we in fact experience, but this is a matter of fact, not of necessity. Also, the body could not be prior to constitution as nothing can be, given that constitution is identification” (Lebeck 2008, 18).

is reserved for God: the identity of essence and being” (Stein 2007, 69). Stein’s reading of Heidegger is certainly influenced by the historical situation. Somehow, Heidegger claims to be “a little god” (Stein 2007, 69), who decides about life or death: the Nazi affair. Two aspects come into play here. The first is the way of proceeding of modern science after Galileo and the “*lumen naturale*” (Stein 2007, 59) issue related to thought experiments. Put differently, it is a matter of objective status, or, as Heidegger himself calls it, of *hermeneutics of facticity*. Responsibility is replaced with responsiveness as a new factor of human experience. The second aspect is the shift in perspective, which is not that of God in the sense of *philosophia perennis*, due to “*analogia entis*” not to be mistaken for analogy in the modern sense. Stein does see this clearly. Heidegger works along the lines of Thomas of Erfurt’s *Grammatica Speculativa*, misattributed to Duns Scotus. The issue is that Heidegger’s findings have to be ambiguous, as known. In the light of history, Stein’s authenticity is unequivocal. No doubt, the concept of “the authenticity” has different meanings for Stein and for Heidegger. Both, however, deal with philosophical sense of “being/entis”: Heidegger, seizing on Kant’s idea, speaks in terms of “onto-theology;” Stein devotes herself to the “finite and Eternal Being,” with the intent of ascending to the sense of Being, that is, the “consummate sense.” Stein’s findings (Stein 2000, 222 and 283) concern the “distinct” or “prominent” personality (*ausgeprägten Persönlichkeit*), that is, the idea of the constitutive character for both the person and community life. It is hardly a coincidence that Stein uses the term “eine individuelle Note” as a synonym for “Farbe” or “Färbung,” perhaps meaning “Farbe bekennen,”¹³ that is, to come clean, to declare oneself. And in the term “Note” perhaps Latin and French resonate: indeed, the very peculiar “being touched” (*Berührtwerden*) by another’s personal character (Stein 2000, 222).

13 In the sense of “putting one’s cards on the table,” taking a stand or speaking one’s mind openly, see: [https://etymologeek.com/deu/Farbe bekennen](https://etymologeek.com/deu/Farbe%20bekennen).

To sum up, Stein's idea of authenticity implies the concept of a living body in a way unknown to Platonic philosophy, which nonetheless resonates in the echo of Socrates' "living out of the soul" and "ausgeprägten Persönlichkeit," the key concept of the *Theaetetus*, and the "limit and the Unlimited" issue of the *Philebus*. In Stein, "the living body" manifests and dialogues, or functions as a mechanism to be seen in its action to exhaustion and perhaps recovery. But in this strangeness still lies the possibility of taking possession of it, of being "One-Self." However, in the case of inauthenticity, the moral concept of guilt (*shame*) is replaced by the false (*sham*), that is, the imagined and hence vain, conceited (*eingebildeten*).

4. THE TRUTH OF HUMAN LIFE

What does the "truth of life" mean? First of all, there appear to be two terms to consider. One is that of truth, the other that of life. Nevertheless, they are like the two sides of the same coin. As regards the coin, so to say, one can refer to it in three ways in Stein's approach. There are three interrelated areas of analysis here, namely: (1) that of the "pure I," which according to Stein, "Bergson regards as a mere construct of the intellect" (Stein 2000, 96); (2) that of the world of life, or rather the "world of values"; and (3), the beyond (*jenseits*), that is, the source of life-power. For Stein, unlike Heidegger, truth does not consist in the renunciation of *something*, that is, in turning one's back on "values" because believing in them would be blasphemous; on the contrary, truth consists in the engaging in the context of the lived situation considered as a test of the character in relation to "values." The term "values" means *something* you believe in or consider important. Thus, the truth is about the relationship itself, as if it were the *something*, that is, *something* to be seen in terms of responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*) (Stein 2000, 269), the real-life involvement that is under the investigation of evidence, as in the case of the subject "of greatest importance to the historian" (Stein 2000, 299-300).

Heidegger's critique in *Being and Time* concerning the analysis subject to values and of the impersonal approach in both Husserl and Scheler does not apply to Stein for one simple reason: what is asserted to be authentic in the Heideggerian sense is ambivalent, ambiguous. Therefore, Heidegger's product does not stand for reason, which instead is uniqueness. Stein challenges Heidegger's critique because she understands authenticity not as an insight, but as a commitment within facticity. Indeed, the term "facticity" is the place of the intersection and clash of these two approaches. However, Stein's authenticity as reason contrast with Heidegger's authenticity as product, that is, the factuality as *pragma* for *Dasein*, because of reification. This clash between these two proposals is but the challenge of European history. Indeed, "a-subjective *Dasein*," as it might be thought of in light of Jan Patočka's analysis (Janik 2021b) demands to be "lived-experienced" as human intelligence (Janik 2021c). But this would require an in-depth analysis.

5. CONCLUSION

Stein's opus, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, remains of particular interest because it marks, on the one hand, a rigorous search for "what is," or the sense of *existence* understood as the meaning of one's life; on the other hand, it characterizes a pre-confessional position, not relying on the data of a revealed faith. The criteria of authenticity are found in humans or, better yet, in the test of man in history. Stein's willingness to serve as a nurse and her general openness to the other – unsurprisingly, the theme of her philosophical reflection – are well-known qualities of her personality, which are also reflected in her letters. All this transpires in her approach to intentionality, to "what is" as personality, embracing a commitment to values, which can be grasped as what matters to be experienced.

Stein's exact analysis is guided by a desire to be with the others. On the one hand, her attitude of "natural" openness allows for critical

reflection and refined evaluation of philosophy. Put differently, it allows for “thinking together” as a shared experience (“con”-“scientia”), for being an engaged “listener” in one’s research, which she proved as Husserl’s assistant, among other things. On the other hand, it raises a question of authenticity as a “personal note,” that is, a particular way of manifesting oneself as the outcome of understanding. In this context, the psyche or character turns out not to be a monolith; on the contrary, a “fake” character is possible, which does not actualize, but fails, in the existential test. In contrast to Heidegger’s *Dasein*, which is a reality in its own right, Stein focuses on human experience lived as personal and as history. Thus, it is a vision, the one offered by Edith Stein, that allows for a philosophical synthesis, involving anthropology or, as Gertrude E.M. Anscombe asks in *Modern Moral Philosophy*, an attempt to ground either moral philosophy or the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*). At the same time, “pure authenticity,” – the term coined in a phenomenological vein – that is, the human posture, conceived from this perspective proves to be the distinguished frame of reference for the humanities.

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