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## EDITOR'S NOTE

The Special Issue no. 1 of *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 56(2020) features articles originally published in the Polish language in this journal in the years 2000-2018, most of which were written by philosophers who are or were associated with the academic milieu of the Institute of Philosophy at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. Publishing a selection of translated works by the mentioned authors is aimed at disseminating their research findings in the field of classical philosophy and, in particular, its continuation within the current of the broadly understood Christian philosophy, addressing the range of problems of theoretical and practical philosophy.

This issue features articles within the thematic scope belonging to the history of philosophy, logic, epistemology and philosophy of language. It is a collection of works representative of the issues addressed by the aforementioned philosophers in these research areas. Their publication is intended to offer to the international philosophical community an insight into the philosophical views developed by the authors of these articles and draw attention to those of their aspects which appear to be of particular import and which could provide ideas for further research and discussion.

The translation of the published texts was rendered possible by the financial support received under the Science Dissemination Activities programme [Polish: Działalność Upowszechniająca Naukę – DUN] (No. 676/P-DUN/2019 of 2 April 2019) financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. This programme applies to implementation of tasks supporting the development of Polish science by disseminating, promoting and popularizing the results of research and development, innovation and inventions, including on an international scale, as well as tasks related to the maintenance of resources of great importance for science and its heritage.

To standardize the structure and form of the published translations, minor changes were introduced in the layout of selected texts and footnotes. At some points, footnotes and bibliographies were supplemented or corrected. Minor corrections were also introduced due to the necessity of adjusting the source articles to their translation into English.

We would like to express our gratitude to the authors of the published articles for making their translation possible. We would like to address our special thanks to: Prof. Jan Krokos, Prof. Grzegorz Bugajak (†2020) and Michał Łatawiec, Ph.D. and GROJ Translations company for their help in preparing this special issue.

*Adam Świeżyński*  
Editor in Chief



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History  
of Philosophy  
– Logic





MAGDALENA PŁOTKA

## PERMISSIVE NATURAL LAW AND ITS SCOPE IN PAUL VLADIMIRI'S PHILOSOPHY\*

**Abstract.** The article attempts to provide a more precise answer to the question of Paul Vladimiri's (Latin: Paulus Vladimiri; Polish: Paweł Włodkowic) account of the concept of permissive natural law. This purpose is realized in two steps. First, a brief history of permissive natural laws in the tradition of medieval philosophy is discussed, and the historical context, in which Paul Vladimiri developed his concept of natural law, is outlined. Next, some excerpts from Vladimiri's writings, in which he uses phrases indicating the presence of the concept of permissive law in his philosophy, are analysed.

**Keywords:** Paul Vladimiri; natural law; permissive law; philosophy of law; history of Polish philosophy; history of medieval philosophy; history of law

1. Introduction. 2. Sources and context of the concept of permissive law (*ius*) as defined by Paul Vladimiri. 3. Permissive law and the law of obligations in Paul Vladimiri's *corpus diplomaticum*. 4. Conclusions.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The claim that concerns the presence of the concept of natural permissive law (claims law) in the philosophy of Paul Vladimiri, a 15th-century canonist, diplomat and professor at the Krakow Academy, and a student of Franciszek Zabarella's law school, is not new. On the contrary, it was developed at the beginning of systematic research on the legacy of Vladimiri, and with the evolution of it, it gained sharpness: from the careful classification of Vladimiri as a humanist

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\* This article was originally published in Polish as: M. Płotka, *Uprawnieniowe prawo naturalne i jego zakres w filozofii Pawła Włodkowica*, *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 51(2015)1, 123-140. The translation of the article into English was financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland as part of the activities promoting science – Decision No. 676/P-DUN/2019 of 2 April 2019. Translation made by GROJ Translations.

thinker<sup>1</sup>, through a more courageous comparison of his diplomatic work with the activities of Francisco Vittoria and Hugo Grotius<sup>2</sup>, to the explicit attribution of human rights theory<sup>3</sup> to the Vladimiri. Although the last statement – that Paul Vladimiri developed an outline of human rights, as they are understood today – is somewhat exaggerated, nevertheless, his concept of the natural law is in line with the contemporary permissive law (not obligation law) and in this sense is an antecedent to more contemporary approaches<sup>4</sup>.

Describing Vladimiri's "rich vision of law and legal order"<sup>5</sup> in the context of his diplomatic activities, the researchers draw attention to several elements which, in their opinion, speak for the early-modern character of the concept of law formulated by the Paul Vladimiri. First, the anthropological and subjective source of the law<sup>6</sup>; second, the rational character of the natural law<sup>7</sup>; third, the subordination of human law to self-fulfilment<sup>8</sup>; and fourth, the presence of claims, for example,

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- 1 L. Ehrlich, *Paweł Włodkowic i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza*, Warszawa 1954, 35.
  - 2 S. F. Belch, *Paulus Vladimiri and his doctrine concerning international law and politics*, London – Hague – Paris 1965, 25.
  - 3 "In my opinion, the category of human law appears in Vladimiri's work in three dimensions. First, as any law that is not divine. Secondly, as a law encoded in human nature and recognized by natural reason, and demanding work and effort of each specific person in its application. Third, as law opposed to natural law, and this is where there is a contradiction - created by the human being himself, and thus as if identifying himself with the positive law" (T. Jasudowicz, *Śladami Ludwika Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowica po naukę o prawach człowieka*, Toruń 1995, 65).
  - 4 S. F. Belch, *Paulus Vladimiri and his doctrine concerning international law and politics*, op. cit., 245.
  - 5 T. Jasudowicz, *Śladami Ludwika Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowica po naukę o prawach człowieka*, op. cit., 57.
  - 6 "... the focus on the human being determines its view of the law", T. Jasudowicz op. cit., 19); "Laws are embedded in humanity" (Ibid, 32); See also: S. F. Belch, *Paulus Vladimiri and his doctrine concerning international law and politics*, op. cit., 240–241).
  - 7 "... the universalism of human rights is the consequence of participation in rational human nature" (T. Jasudowicz, *Śladami Ludwika Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowica po naukę o prawach człowieka*, op. cit., 37); S. F. Belch, *Paulus Vladimiri and his doctrine concerning international law and politics*, op. cit. 244); "human right derived from natural reason" (L. Ehrlich, *Paweł Włodkowic i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza*, op. cit., 142–143).
  - 8 "... human rights are ... deliberately and axiologically conditioned equitable means of

for the admissibility of (right to) self-defence<sup>9</sup>. Thus, Vladimiri's concept of the natural law can be summarized as follows: human being is the source of the natural law that is rational as such; thanks to it, man can – by means of claims – achieve his goals and values.

The picture that emerges from the statements of researchers is quite broad, and Vladimiri's concept of natural law – vague and unclear. It is difficult to distinguish specific aspects of Vladimiri's theory: dependence on Augustinian and Thomistic inspirations, its nominal and averroistic sources, or original and pre-modern elements. Therefore, the aim of this article is an attempt to sharpen this image, and thus – to provide a more precise answer to the questions about the very presence, character and scope of the permissive natural law Vladimiri's account.

This goal will be achieved in two stages: first, a brief history of the permissive natural law in the medieval tradition will be discussed and the historical context in which Paul Vladimiri developed his theory of the natural law will be outlined. Then, selected excerpts from Vladimiri's writings in which he uses expressions indicating the presence of the concept of permissive law in his philosophy, will be analysed.

## 2. SOURCES AND CONTEXT OF THE CONCEPT OF PERMISSIVE LAW (*IUS*) AS DEFINED BY PAUL VLADIMIRI

Considerations should begin with a few terminological remarks. Paul Vladimiri uses two terms to refer to the concept of natural law *lex* and *ius*<sup>10</sup>. He does not use them interchangeably, and the use of each of them – in procedural documents when describing

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human self-realization" (T. Jasudowicz, *Śladami Ludwika Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowica po naukę o prawach człowieka*, op. cit., 42).

9 L. Ehrlich, *Paweł Włodkowic i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza*, op. cit., 143.

10 Włodkowic used two terms to denote the law (*lex* and *ius*), therefore his legal theory can be an excellent example of the transformations in the understanding of natural law (principles governing an act) in late medieval thought. He separated the concept of law from the metaphysical structure of the world (structure of being) and based on anthropology he formulated his own theory of laws (*ius*). Vladimiri emphasized the anthropological aspect of natural law even more than Stanisław of Skarbimierz. Cf. S. Belch, *Paulus Vladimiri and his doctrine concerning international law and politics*, op. cit., 240–241.

particular situations or presenting arguments – is by no means accidental. The differences in the meaning of the terms *lex* and *ius* can be reduced to several aspects: while the *ius* is anthropological, the *lex* is metaphysical, while the former focuses on obligation, the latter on claim. Usually, *lex* is identified with the natural law – the law of the cosmos; such an approach to the law seems to overlook the emphasis on human activity arising from his or her freedom, but rather emphasizes the necessary nature of human obligations arising from, and imposed by law. The scope of the terms *lex* and *ius*, both present in the writings of Paul Vladimiri and in the medieval legalistic tradition, correspond to the definition proposed nowadays by Marek Piechowiak: “Substantive law (*lex*) defines norms determining the area of freedom, determining the range of goals set for free choice, while the term Right (*ius*) is reserved for defining everything that remains in the power of the subject’s will as consistent with the Substantive law (*lex*)”<sup>11</sup>.

The starting point for the search for historical sources of Right are the texts of twelfth-century decretists, i.e. the commentators of *Decrees*<sup>12</sup>. In fact, the author of the *Decrees* himself – Gratian – has distinguished the permissive function of law. He wrote: “The function of secular and church law is to prescribe what is necessary, to forbid what is wrong, to allow what is permitted”<sup>13</sup>. Stephan of Tournai, the leading founder of the French school of canonists, completed Gratian’s definition. He distinguished four types of law: counsel, precept, permission and prohibition. He stated that permission (*permissio*) is voluntary, covering the area of free choice acts, for example, the celebration of marriages<sup>14</sup>.

11 M. Piechowiak, *Filozofia praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka w świetle ich międzynarodowej ochrony*, Lublin 1999, 204.

12 Gratian was the author of *Concordantia discordantium canonum*, which was known as *Decretum*. See: B. Tierney, *The idea of natural rights. Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150–1625*, Grand Rapids 1997, 43.

13 “Officium vero secularium sive ecclesiasticarum legum est praecipere quo necesse est fieri, aut prohibere quod malum est fieri, vel permittere licita” (*Decretum Magister Gratiani in Corpus iuris canonici*, dist. 3, dictum post c. 3, ed. E. Friedberg, Leipzig 1879, 5).

14 “Si enim volueris nec consilio acquiesces, nec permissionem suscipies; praecepto vero

New voices in the discussion on permissive law appeared in the 14<sup>th</sup> century in the debate on evangelical poverty. The basic problem of this controversy was the question of whether Christ and his disciples owned or only used things<sup>15</sup>. The solution to the problem was important, as long as it depended on the determination of an evangelical way of life for the newly established Franciscan Order<sup>16</sup>. Pope John XXII argued, among other things, that the use of goods must involve their ownership. He argued that the biblical Adam had the right to own land before the fall, and that he was the natural subject of that right. The debate resulted in the formulation of the concept of the individual right to own property and the right to acquire property.

One of the main participants in the discussion about poverty was William Ockham. He separated the individual's right to own property from joint property rights. Although Ockham emphasised the individual dimension of the permissive law, in Vladimiri's writings one can point to the fragments on the right of collective beings, for example, he mentioned the right of a nation (as a group) to own land. For both thinkers, Ockham and Włodkowiec, permissive law (*ius*) is of Right nature. Ockham's original contribution to medieval discussions on law also consisted in equating law (*ius*) with power (*potestas*)<sup>17</sup>. In *Breviloquium*, Ockham wrote that not only rights must be respected, but also 'freedoms' (*libertates*) guaranteed to mortals by God<sup>18</sup>.

The concept of natural permissive law developed in the Middle Ages on the margins and on the occasion of other discussions: on the codification of law, and especially on evangelical poverty. It was

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et prohibitioni non impune resites" (*Studien zur Summa Stephans von Tournai*, ed. H. Kalb, Innsbruck 1993, 117).

15 B. Tierney, *The idea of natural rights*, op. cit., 157.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid, 27.

18 "Nec solum iura imperatorum, regum et aliorum ... sunt excipienda, sed etiam libertates a Deo et a natura concesse mortalis excipi debent" (W. Ockham, *Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico*, in: *Wilhelm Ockham als politischer Denker und sein Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico*, ed. R. Scholz, Leipzig 1944, 90–91). On the shaping of the terminology of permissive law during the debate on poverty, see: B. Tierney, *The idea of natural rights*, op. cit., 93–206.

no different with Paul Vladimiri's theory of the natural law. It was created for the needs of the trial of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Teutonic Order at the Council in Constance in 1415<sup>19</sup>. The Council became the venue for a court hearing between the Jagiellonian legation (including Paul Vladimiri) and representatives of the Teutonic Order<sup>20</sup>. It was also an opportunity to present the theory of international law (*ius gentium*) of the Polish school; theoretical principles allowed to formulate the accusations of the Polish faction against the Order and – on this basis – to demand the cessation of the Teutonic Order's plundering activities in the territory of the Republic of Poland, and to leave it. Vladimiri directly stated that since it is not possible to sue the Teutonic Knights by way of civil law, it remains to base the argumentation on natural law<sup>21</sup>. He refers to the Roman legal tradition, but not directly: the law that Vladimiri refers to is divine, natural and canonical, but not directly Roman law, because it was "imperial law" and did not apply in Poland<sup>22</sup>.

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19 The Council of Constance was opened in November 1414 and closed on 22 April 1418. See: L. Ehrlich, *Paweł Włodkowiec i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza*, op. cit., 45.

20 The dispute between Vladimiri and the Teutonic Order of the Teutonic Knights also arose because both sides used different sources. While Vladimiri referred to the Pope Innocent IV concept of the law of the nations (who referred to the Gospel and natural law), the Teutonic Knights referred to influential lawyer Henry of Segusio, who based his doctrine on the proposal of St. Augustine. See: S. Wielgus, *Polska średniowieczna doktryna ius gentium*, Lublin 1996, 52–53.

21 "Quia postquam iusticia non habet progressum iure civili vel politico et defensio est iuris naturalis, recurrendum est ad ius naturale" (Paweł Włodkowiec, *Ad Aperiendam 1416*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, ed. L. Ehrlich, vol. 1, Warszawa 1968, 219).

22 "Poland and England did not recognize the sovereignty of the Emperor nor Roman law, nor did the rulers of Poland, England or France had a fief law towards rulers of other countries" (L. Ehrlich, *Paweł Włodkowiec i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza*, op. cit., 7). In addition, Stanisław Bełch stresses that Vladimiri, when arguing against the Order, often based on the historical independence of Poland from the empire. Similarly, the emphasis on Poland's independence from both the empire and the papacy is a frequent motif in Wincenty Kadłubek's writing. See: S. Bełch, *Paulus Vladimiri and his doctrine concerning international law and politics*, op. cit., 51–53.

### 3. PERMISSIVE LAW AND THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN PAUL VLADIMIRI'S *CORPUS DIPLOMATICUM*

Difficulties with the development of a coherent and systematic theory of the natural law Vladimiri's account – difficulties that also had the above-mentioned researchers – probably result from the fact that the Vladimiri did not leave behind any synthetic elaboration of his own concept of the natural law. Numerous passages about rights, claims, freedoms and obligations are scattered throughout his *corpus diplomaticum* and are presented while discussing the current political issues of Poland at the time. Nevertheless, following the references to the natural law in Vladimiri's writing, one can outline his theory of permissive law.

The basic characteristic of permissive law is its Right nature. Human being is a subject to the law in the sense that the law is the property of his nature. In the context of his reflections on the appropriation by the Teutonic Order of lands belonging to Lithuanians and Samogitians, Paul writes: "It is illegal to deprive someone of its right without a legitimate cause and without due consideration of the case, because both are against the natural law"<sup>23</sup>. Paul argues that taking land away illegally from its rightful owner is tantamount to depriving an owner of his rights. Ownership of land is therefore the possession of rights to it. What is more, the violation of other people's rights, as Paul writes, is against the natural law. The expression *privare aliquem iure suo* – "to deprive someone of their right" – suggests that a right can be deprived as if it were property, so it belongs to the individual in the same sense as a property; and thus, it may indicate that the legal and natural discourse present in Vladimiri's work is a subjective discourse.

Apart from its subjective character, permissive law also has other aspects, which, according to Brian Tierney, are expressed in specific contexts in medieval legal literature. Paul Vladimiri was a lawyer, he

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23 "... paria enim sunt privare aliquem iure suo sine causa legitima et sine debita cognitione cause quia utrumque est contra ius naturale" (Paweł Włodkovic, *Ad videndum 1421*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 182).

studied in Padua and there is no reason to believe that he did not refer to the decree tradition. Tierney offers a list of the five most fundamental terms, the occurrence of which in medieval legal, philosophical and theological theories marks the presence of a discourse of permissive offers. Following Tierney one can therefore mention: (1) *demonstratio-permissio* – according to the decretist Rufinus of Bologna, these are situations in which natural law neither precepts nor prohibits an action; natural law here refers to neutral land<sup>24</sup>, for example, the marriage, which the natural law neither precepts nor prohibits; (2) *fas* – what is compatible, permitted; this term is already present in the Gratian's *Decretum*; for example, crossing someone else's land is allowed (*fas*) but is illegal (*ius*)<sup>25</sup>; (3) *libertas* – the Italian canonist Huguccio in *Summa decretorum* lists *libertas* – a freedom that belongs to everyone – among the many meanings of *ius naturale*<sup>26</sup>; (4) *tolerantia* – appears in a number of arguments that concern what would normally be considered sinful and unlawful; *tolerantia* describes situations that force us to choose the lesser evil; an interesting example of such a situation discusses Huguccio: divorce is allowed (tolerated) if it avoids the greater evil (murder of the wife)<sup>27</sup>; (5) *licitum* – the term expresses a permissive natural law relating to a range of acts performance of which is a matter of free choice – “All things are allowed to me, as long as they are not prohibited by law”<sup>28</sup> – for example, to say something or not to say, to eat or not to eat.

24 B. Tierney, *Liberty and law. The idea of permissive natural law, 1100–1800*, Washington 2014, 26.

25 “Fas lex divina est; ius lex humana. Transire per agrum alienum fas est, ius non est” (*Decretum Magister Gratiani in Corpus iuris canonici*, dist. 1, c.1, op. cit., 1). Cf. B. Tierney, *Liberty and law*, op. cit., 29.

26 Ibid, 36.

27 Ibid, 40-41.

28 “Ius naturale ... licitum et approbatum quod nec a domino nec consuetudine aliqua precipitur vel prohibetur, quod et fas appellatur, ut repetere suam vel non repere, comedere vel non comedere” (R. Weigand, *Die Naturrechtslehre der Legisten und Dekretisten von Irnerius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis Johannes Teutonicus*, München 1967, 209 (cited follow: B. Tierney, *Liberty and law*, op. cit., 44).



The context of the *licitum* – the sphere of acts of free choice and what is voluntary or involuntary – is the most common context in Paul Vladimiri writings where he discusses the natural law. Let us therefore take a close look at his arguments, all concerning the illegal occupation of Lithuanian lands by the Teutonic Order. The first of one ends with the conclusion that taking someone else's property away is an offence against human law: "Although from the beginning of man all things were common at all, yet by the law of nations, to wit, natyral and human, there have been distinguished dominions of things and therefore those things which have been previously occupied by one, another is not allowed to seize, because natural law prohibits, to wit: "What thou wouldst not have done to thee do not to another", and divine law: "Remove not the landmarks of thy neighbour"<sup>29</sup>. Paul refers here to the inalienable right to own one's own property (land), but what strikes one the most in the passage quoted is the coexistence of two types of natural law: the first is the natural law (*ius naturalis*), which, together with human law (*ius humanum*), belongs to the law of nations (*ius gentium*). The second kind of natural law (*lex naturalis*) Paul mentions along with the divine law (*lex divina*). Vladimiri assigns each of the rights an area of validity. Thus, under the natural law of man and nations (*ius*), the right of property has been established, and an example of a second type of natural law is the imperative of love of one's neighbour (*lex*), which Paul sets on a par with the proscription against violating territorial boundaries (*lex*). So what is the difference between the two types of natural law? The first one is of a claim nature, because it describes the right of a nation (as a subject) to own a property (land). The second includes precepts and prohibitions, so it belongs to the law of obligations (*lex*). In other words, natural human law (*ius humanum*) concerns claims, and natural and divine law concerns

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29 "Quamvis a principio creature omnia erant omnibus communia, iure tamen gentium videlicet naturali et humano distincta sunt rerum dominia, et ideo preoccupata ab uno iam non licet alteri occupare lege naturali prohibente, scilicet 'Quod tibi non vis fieri alteri non facias', et lege divina 'Ne transgrediaris limites proximi tui', etc." (Paweł Włodkowiec, *Opinio Ostensis 1415*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 121).

obligations. Permissive law falls within the scope of human law, and the law of obligations falls within the scope of natural and divine law.

The permissive nature of *ius humanum* confirms the following passage: “And because pagans possess their dominions by the natural law of nations and justly, therefore their dominions can not licitly (*licite*) be seized”<sup>30</sup>. Włodkowiec repeats here that pagans claim their own lands under natural law, while the brothers of the Teutonic Order are not allowed to (*licite*) occupy them. If we would like to follow Tierney’s indications faithfully, the expression *non possunt ... licite* should be read not only as “they are not allowed” (which is in accordance with the Belch’s translation) or “they are forbidden”, but more strongly – “they have no right to”<sup>31</sup>. While the context of *licitum* in the Middle Ages usually concerned – as Tierney suggested – the area of free choice, the term used by Vladimiri, together with a denial (*non licitum*), refers to what is beyond the free choice, what is forbidden, what *is not allowed*.

The term *licitum* can be read as the expression “Secondly, there were produced on the part of the said brothers many and diverse articles and privileges, some of which seemed prima facie to contain heresy: as if it were allowed to Christians to invade countires of infidels with the intention of seizing their dominions, whereas this is directly contrary to that commandment of the Lord: “Thou shalt not steal”, “Thou shalt not kill”, while, however, no one of sound mind doubts that infidels have just dominions and (that they have them) by the natural natural law of nations”<sup>32</sup>. To the question of

30 “Et quia pagani sua dominia iure naturali gencium possident atque iuste ideo non possunt eorum dominia licite occupari” (Paweł Włodkowiec, *Quoniam error 1417*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, vol 2, op. cit., 229).

31 On the proper interpretation of the expression *licitum* in medieval legal discourse see: B. Tierney, *Liberty and law*, op. cit., 44–47.

32 “Secundo pro parte dictorum fratrum producti erant articuli et privilegia multa et diversa, inter que non nulla videbantur prima facie heresim continere: quasi esset licitum Christianis parte infidelium invadere animo occupandi ipsorum dominia, cum hoc sit directe contra preceptum Domini: ‘Non furtum facias’, ‘Non occidas’ etc., cum tamen nullus dubitat sane mentis apud infideles esse iusta dominia ac de iure gencium naturalis” (Paweł Włodkowiec, *Ad Episcopum Cracoviensem 1432*, in: *Pisma wybrane*,

whether Christians are allowed to occupy a state that belongs to the infidels, Vladimiri gives a negative answer, again claiming that this is against the natural law. Solving this issue, Vladimiri classifies the right to own land as an example of the natural right of nations (*ius gentium*). Let us note the way in which Paul deals with the problem: his current formulation of the quasi *esset licitum Christianis parte infidelium invadere* can be read as “whether Christians have the right to occupy the countries possessed by infidels”.

Going further, Paul’s negative answer – “Christians have no right to occupy countries possessed by unfaithful” – can be understood in two ways: (1) by occupying the countries of the infidels, the Teutonic Order violates the (state) law prohibiting this; (2) by occupying the countries of the infidels, the Teutonic Order violates the pagans’ rights to these lands. According to the first interpretation, Vladimiri indicates the legal prohibition of invasion of other people’s lands. The passage quoted “it is not allowed to occupy other people’s land” would mean that “the occupation of other people’s land is prohibited by law”. By accepting this reading of the above passage, one should therefore admit that the comment made by Paul Vladimiri is trivial. However, according to the second interpretation (which omits the context of the legal provisions), the above passage would mean that Christians cannot claim the right to occupy other people’s lands, they have no power to do so in the sense that they have no power to invade Lithuanian lands. What ultimately makes the second interpretation of Vladimiri’s statement more accurate than the first is the historical context. At the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century – at the time when Vladimiri was preparing trial documents – neither Roman nor canonical law was in force in the lands belonging to pagan Lithuanians, Samogitians and Prussians, and the law regulating international relations was only in *statu nascendi*. Vladimiri, as a lawyer, could therefore not, during the trial, invoke international law governing relations between Christian and non-Christian countries<sup>33</sup>. It can

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op. cit., 214).

33 On the development of international law in the 15th century, see: S. Swieżawski, *U źródeł*

therefore be presumed that, by pointing out situations in which pagans have the right (property) to their lands, and by justifying that the Teutonic Knights do not have the right to invade those lands, Paul describes the natural law *ius humanum* – the natural permissive law, which is inherent to human nature.

While the expression *licitum* in the medieval literature on law was usually used to describe the sphere of acts performed under free choice, the expression *non licitum* – “forbidden”, “not allowed”, “has no right to” is more frequent in Vladimiri’s writings<sup>34</sup>. Anyway, the *licitum* is not the only expression that creates the context of discussion on permissive law in his legacy. Here is another part of his work: “Besides, since infidels are not to be compelled to the Faith but are to be tolerated and are to be induced by salutary exhortations, what toleration would this be and what wholesome exhortation to the Faith, if it took away from them dominions and honours”<sup>35</sup>. In the list of terms indicating the presence of permissive law in the Middle Ages, Tierney lists tolerance in the penultimate place. The concept of Vladimiri’s tolerance is very different from a more contemporary understanding of the term<sup>36</sup>. Following Vladimiri, A tolerates B when: (1) A disagrees with B; (2) A does not force B to change its opinion and (3) A induces B to change its opinion by “salutary exhortation” (*salubris exhortatio*). Paul’s use of the word *tolerantia* does not depart

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etyki nowożytnej. *Filozofia moralna w Europie w XV wieku*, Kraków 1987, 231–262.

34 B. Tierney, *Liberty and law*, op. cit., 44.

35 “Preterea ex quo infideles non sunt ad fidem cogendi sed tolerandi et sanctis exhortationibus inducendi que tolerancia esse e que salubris exhortatio ad fidem si auferret eis bona dominia et honores” (Paweł Włodkovic, *Ad aperendam 1416*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 79).

36 The entry “toleration” in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* discusses four main contemporary concepts of tolerance: *permission conception*, *coexistence conception*, *respect conception* and *esteem conception*. Each of the four concepts of tolerance indicates a positive emotional component (respect, approval, love), which is an important element of tolerance itself. R. Forst, *Toleration*, in: *Stanford Encyccklopedia of Philosophy*, ed. E. Zalta, 2012, (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/>), [accessed on: 10/2014]. Cf. E. Podrez, *Moralne uzasadnienie tolerancji: studium z etyki personalistycznej*, Warszawa 1999; M. Walzer, *O tolerancji*, transl. T. Baszniak, Warszawa 1999.

from the customary use of the term by other medieval law theorists and practitioners, because *tolerantia* means permission (*permissio*) for lesser evil. The choice of “salutary exhortation” instead of less sacred types of persuasion is indeed a choice of the lesser evil, but the term *tolerantia* indicates the presence of permissive law in Vladimiri’s writings.

At first glance, it would seem that Paul is writing about the right of infidels to freedom of religion: infidels should be tolerated because they have the right to their own religion. However, such a solution should be rejected, because, firstly, it is untenable in the light of other passages of Vladimiri’s writings on the matter<sup>37</sup> and, secondly, the canonistic tradition suggests a different interpretation. According to Gratian, committing acts that are contrary to the natural law is not allowed unless it proves necessary in a situation of choosing between greater and lesser evil<sup>38</sup>. The decretist Rufinus gives an example of a situation where a man swears to kill his brother<sup>39</sup>. Although breaking your oath is evil, in this case it is allowed (tolerated) because it avoids the greater evil (killing the brother). Tolerance is therefore a permission to committing a wrongdoing. Just as a brother is allowed not to keep his oath, so Christians are allowed to tolerate the religion of the infidels. This means that a Christian will commit less evil if it accepts pagan beliefs than if it were to use violence to promote Christianity. In other words, just as a brother has the right not to keep his oath, so Christians have the right to refrain from persuading infidels to change their religious worldview.

The problem of tolerance appeared in medieval writings on the law when moral problems such as those mentioned above were

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37 Tolerance of other faiths is not based, in Paul Vladimiri’s case, on the right of infidels to freedom of religion, but rather on the prohibition (God’s law) to use violence to convert by faith: “Sed non apparet esse dubium, quod amplificatio fidei per vim et per arma bellica ac rapinas non solum est prohibita per generale Concillium Tolletanum, sed etiam est naturali iuri et divino contraria” (Paweł Włodkowic, *Quoniam error 1417*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 257). Similarly in: Idem, *Saevientibus 1415*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 60.

38 See: B. Tierney, *Liberty and law*, op. cit., 37.

39 Rufinus von Bologna, *Summa Decretorum*, ed. H. Singer, Aalen 1963, 32.

discussed. However, there are two difficulties here. The permission (*permissio*) to commit a lesser evil, understood as having the right to commit a lesser evil, was questionable by earlier living theologians<sup>40</sup>. The Decretists were accused of prematurely establishing the equivalence between the claims “it is permissible to commit act A” and “I have the right to commit act A”. However, even if we agree to a strong interpretation of “permission” in the spirit of permissive law (“I have the right to what is allowed”), it seems to be more difficult for the contemporary reader to understand Vladimiri’s very understanding of tolerance. While in the modern concept of tolerance, the subject of permissive law is a tolerated person (“I have the right to tolerate my views”), in Paul’s view, the subject of law is a tolerant person (“I have the right to tolerate his views of others”). In the light of the aforementioned tradition of commenting on the *Decretum* and the above considerations around Vladimiri’s writings, the radical and modern character of the views of the Krakow professor’s views – attributed to him by researchers<sup>41</sup> – is losing its focus. It turns out that the terms “religious freedom” or “tolerance” which have so far described the legal theory developed by Vladimiri, have different meanings than those of today.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Paul Vladimiri’s theory is the most systematic Krakow study on the theory of permissive natural law, but not the only one. Following the works of Krakow masters, one cannot help feeling that their legal and natural discourse is *de facto* a permissive discourse: Benedykt Hesse lists the right to own money<sup>42</sup>, the anonymous Krakow author of the manuscript BJ 723 mentions the right to use armed assistance<sup>43</sup>, and Jan Dąbrówka takes up the subject of entitlement,

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40 B. Tierney, *Liberty and law*, op. cit., 40.

41 T. Jasudowicz, *Śladami Ludwika Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowica po naukę o prawach człowieka*, op. cit., 17.

42 S. Świeżawski, *U źródeł etyki nowożytnej*, op. cit., 162.

43 *Notatka Revolutur*, BJ 723, in: L. Ehrlich, *Polski wykład prawa wojny w XV wieku*,

because he wonders whether a woman has the right to get married without her parents' consent<sup>44</sup>.

In the work of the Krakow diplomat, two approaches to the natural law are present: on the one hand, Paul Vladimiri refers to the natural law of God, on the other hand, in his argumentation he often refers to the natural law of man and the law of nations – *ius humanum* and *ius gentium*. In this twofold – natural and, at the same time, human – nature of the natural law, some researchers see a contradiction within his doctrine<sup>45</sup>, but the contradiction turns out to be only apparent. Paul calls natural law both the commandments of God and the set of prohibitions and orders governing human relations, and the area of claims which are the work of a human (such as the right to property) but are not codified by positive law, and which are universal and universally accepted by nations (as a right to self defence<sup>46</sup>). In other words, the first type of natural law is a law of obligations, the second type is a permissive law, a right.

Furthermore, in his work, Paul not only formulates a number of specific rights, but also proposes a hierarchy of them: he mentions the right to have one's own state<sup>47</sup>, following Stanisław of Skarbimierz, he points to the right to preserve oneself in existence, which

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Warszawa 1955, 201; see: J. Rebeta, *Czy notatka „Revocatur” należy do polskiej szkoły prawa stosunków międzynarodowych z połowy XV wieku?*, *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki* 20(1975), 533–540; S. Wielgus, *Polska średniowieczna doktryna ius gentium*, op. cit., 13–14.

44 K. Bochenek, *Filozofia człowieka w kontekście piętnastowiecznych krakowskich dyskusji antropologicznych (ciało-dusza)*, Rzeszów 2008, 97.

45 “In my opinion, the category of human law appears in Vladimiri's work in three dimensions. First, as any law that is not divine. Secondly, as a law encoded in human nature and recognized by natural reason, and demanding work and effort of each specific person in its application. Third, as law opposed to natural law, and this is where there is a contradiction – created by the human being himself, and thus as if identifying himself with the positive law” (Ibid, 65).

46 Paweł Włodkowiec, *Ad videndum 1421*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 183; Ibid, *Ad Aperiendam 1416*, 234.

47 Idem, *Quoniam error 1417*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 229–231.

underpins the right to defend oneself<sup>48</sup> and to oppose violence<sup>49</sup>. He argues that freedom is a condition of legal bond (obligations imposed on a person by natural or established law). For a person to be able to fulfil their legal obligations, they must be a free person. Therefore, the right to freedom – Vladimiri justifies – is a primary and fundamental human right<sup>50</sup>.

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48 Idem, *Ad videndum 1421*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 183; Ibid, *Ad Aperiendam 1416*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 234.

49 “*ius quippe naturale est, ut unusquisque se conservet in esse et vim aut violentiam, prout potest, reprimat et contrario resistat. Hoc enim est cernere in creaturis irrationalibus, quae se, prout possunt, tuentur et defendant, et interdum in se ferientem remordendo consurgunt*” (Stanisław ze Skarbimierza, *Sermones*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1979, 330).

50 “*Natura enim omnes homines errant liberi*” (Paweł Włodkowiec, *Saevientibus*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 13). Freedom is the right to something (to defend oneself, to own property, etc.), it is connected with the obligation to act actively, to make efforts and to safeguard one’s own interests. This understanding of freedom is closely linked to Vladimiri’s argumentation in favour of peace: peace as a natural state is not given in advance, but is rather a result of active action of people themselves. Domański rightly concludes, therefore, that “Włodkowiec does not repeat Stanisław’s argumentation of the natural law as the basis of justice of defensive war. However, Włodkowiec significantly complements Stanisław’s doctrine with his own theory of power and the conditions of its legitimacy. This theory is based on the tacitly accepted assumption not only of the equality of all people, but also of their essentially unlimited freedom: only God, as the supreme being, the source and principle of all being can exercise power over people” (J. Domański, Z. Ogonowski, L. Szczucki, *Zarys dziejów filozofii w Polsce. Wieki XIII–XVII*, Warszawa 1989, 62). Cf. Paweł Włodkowiec, *Ad Aperiendam II*, in: *Pisma wybrane*, op. cit., 47; cf. T. Jasudowicz, *Śladami Ludwika Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowca po naukę o prawach człowieka*, op. cit., 153.



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## SAMUEL DUCLOS' CRITIQUE OF ROBERT BOYLE'S CORPUSCULAR PHILOSOPHY: A CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF 'CHEMISTRY'\*

**Abstract.** The seventeenth century witnessed the transition from qualitative to quantitative physics. The very process was not easy and obvious and it consisted of discussions in many fields. One of them was the question about the nature of chemistry which was at the time undergoing some changes towards the form we know now. The main argument concerned the explanatory principles one should invoke to understand properly certain outcomes of chemical experiments. The present paper is a presentation of such an (indirect) argument between R. Boyle, a prominent proponent of corpuscular, quantitative principles and S. Duclos, an al-chymist and a proponent of paracelsian, qualitative ones. What is interesting, Duclos knew *The Sceptical Chymist*, Boyle's main work which contained a severe critique of paracelsian chemistry, and attempted to point out some weaknesses of Boyle's own position. Duclos scrutinized Boyle's experiments described in his *Certain Physiological Essays* and other works and argued for certain shortcomings of Boyle's laboratory skills, his failure to indicate some literature sources and, first of all, insufficiency of Boyle's arguments for the corpuscular thesis. According to Duclos, Boyle did not follow in laboratory certain procedures recommended by himself, using unclear notions and applying the corpuscular principles without proper justification. What is more, Duclos argued also in favour of paracelsian chymistry presenting some qualitative explanations in experiments in which Boyle failed to give quantitative ones. Knowing the further development of natural philosophy, it seems interesting to realize how complex it was. The present paper shows also how much irremovable from scientific research is the theoretical component.

**Keywords:** Boyle; Duclos; theory of matter; chemistry; experimental method

1. Introduction. 2. Boyle's experimental programme versus chemical philosophy. 3. "Chemist" versus Boyle's experiments. 4. Conclusions.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The question concerning the nature of the material world determined one of the main areas of disputes that accompanied the transformation of philosophy in the 17th century. As it is commonly known, the rejection of Aristotle's hylomorphism forced modern philosophers to seek another theory explaining observed changes taking place in the material world. The long discussions and search for the new methods of practising philosophy, and the natural philosophy in their framework, resulted in the widespread adoption of the atomic concept of matter, but this happened long after the end of the 17th century. The 17th century itself is the time of birth and maturation of corpuscular concepts, and, above all, the time of searching for arguments that would indicate their accuracy<sup>1</sup>. The latter process took place in the fire of polemics conducted with supporters of competing theories. The disputes between atomists and Aristotelians are well known, but in the arena of the 17th-century philosophy of nature there were also supporters of the lesser-known, and then very influential, chemical philosophy<sup>2</sup>. It was a philosophy of nature and human, its beginning was given by Paracelsus (approx. 1491-1541), and it was developed by his many followers. Like atomists, Paracelians rejected the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, criticizing primarily its overly discursive character. Obviously, the key field of research in that current of natural philosophy was "chemistry"<sup>3</sup>, as new observations and experiments, which allow us

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1 Cf. C. Meinel, *Early Seventeenth-Century Atomism: Theory, Epistemology, and the Insufficiency of Experiment*, *Isis* 79(1988), 68-104.

2 The term was proposed by A. Debus. The "chemical philosophy" in this approach consists of elements of alchemy, paracelsian and neoplatonic theories, natural magic and J. B. van Helmont's concept. Cf. A. Debus, *Chemical Philosophy*, Dover Publications, New York 2002.

3 The use of this term should be explained at the outset. The literature points to serious problems occurring here. Only two terms, "alchemy" and "chemistry", are commonly used, but they are not enough to describe the extremely complex processes involved in changes in natural philosophy area and ultimately leading to modern chemistry. The term "alchemy" has pejorative connotations (pseudoscience), which is why English

to discover how components of solid bodies separate from each other and merge, play a fundamental role in it. They believed that this was the only way to discover final components of matter.

An interesting fragment of the then disputes about the nature of the material world was a discussion between representatives of chemical philosophy and one of the main advocates of corpuscular philosophy, Robert Boyle. In this case, both sides of the conflict referred to the results of their experiments to demonstrate the validity of their theories. Hence, they are on the same side of another, widely discussed at that time, a dispute over the usefulness of an experimental method in philosophical and natural research<sup>4</sup>. Although today we know that history agreed with Boyle, some of the details of that dispute concern issues whose topicality have not become outdated to this day. This article is about the (indirect) discussion between Robert Boyle and a much lesser-known “chemist”, Samuel Duclos<sup>5</sup>.

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literature uses the seventeenth-century term *chymistry* to refer to a field represented by supporters of chemical philosophy, operating in the seventeenth century. It is emphasized in this way that it is a transition phase between ancient and medieval alchemy and modern chemistry. Cf. W. Newman, L. Principe, *Alchemy vs. Chemistry: The Etymological Origins of Historiographic Mistake*, *Early Science and Medicine* 3(1998), 32–65. In this text, the term *chymistry* is indicated by the word “chemistry” in quotation marks.

- 4 Cf. e.g.: S. Shapin, S. Schaffer, *Leviathan and the air-pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Guildford 1985; P. R. Anstey, *Experimental versus speculative natural philosophy*, in: *The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century*, eds. P. R. Anstey, J. A. Schuster, Springer, Dordrecht 2005, 215-242.
- 5 Samuel Cottureau Duclos (1598-1685), a French philosopher and al-“chemist”, was mentioned for the first time in historical sources in 1666 as one of the founding members of the French Royal Academy of Sciences. As one of the two “chemists” in that group, he was highly respected because of his extensive knowledge and particular skills in experimental practice. As part of the research carried out by the Academy, Duclos established a chemical laboratory and was the director of the work carried out there. He only published two works: *Observations of the Mineral Waters of France* (1675) and *Dissertations on the Principles of Natural Mixts* (1680), however, we can learn a great deal about his views from his manuscripts and the minutes of weekly meetings of the Academy members.

## 2. BOYLE'S EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMME VERSUS CHEMICAL PHILOSOPHY

An important context for the dispute in question is provided by Boyle's views on the above-mentioned chemical philosophy, which he expressed, among others, in his most famous work *The Sceptical Chymist* of 1661. As an advocate of corpuscular philosophy, Boyle criticizes Peripatetic philosophy that is dominant at universities, primarily rejecting its theory of matter referring to four elements. However, it seems that he is much more severe in his assessment of *tria prima* theory, which is put forward and defended by "chemists" (*chymists*). The hypostatic principles, i.e. underlying all material objects, they called salt, sulfur and mercury. These are the ones that should be referred to in the search for explanations of phenomena taking place in the material world. As far as Boyle treats Peripatetics with some respect, recognizing some value of *a priori* analyses in natural philosophy, he takes a strongly critical attitude towards "chemists", i.e. supporters of Paracelsian solutions. He presents them as philosophers whose "eyes and minds are obscured by the smoke from their furnaces", who, "not being able to even understand the Peripatetic theory, pretend to be the creators of a new one, and call the earth salt, fire – sulfur, and fumes – mercury (*mercurius*)". Their writings are "dark, ambiguous and enigmatic", "they use names in a completely arbitrary way", which results in the fact that it is not known what is their designator, they do not give clear and distinct concepts of elements. Boyle criticizes most the experiments carried out by "chemists". In this case, certainly, the allegations could not relate to the practical side, after all, those were people who were perfectly familiar with the secrets of laboratory work. After all, Boyle himself began his adventure with natural philosophy from alchemical interests, so he knew the skills of his adversaries. Thus, Boyle's criticism was not directed at the practical side of experiments, but at the interpretation of results obtained. In his opinion, "chemists" are somehow doomed to draw such conclusions because they look at the results achieved through the prism of the *tria prima* theory accepted at the starting point. The validity of a theory depends on

the accuracy of conclusions<sup>6</sup>. In general, Boyle accused “chemists” of interpreting experiments using “too few and narrow rules”. Their mistake was that they only indicated the material factor causing changes, but neglected to explain how this factor had worked. It was supposed to be the advantage of corpuscular philosophy, obviously, that on its grounds, according to Boyle, the way of affecting was explained<sup>7</sup>. As Boyle himself says: “there is a big difference between the ability to conduct experiments and the ability to give a philosophical explanation”<sup>8</sup>.

Criticism of chemical philosophy was to highlight the advantages of the experimental programme proposed by Boyle. It was to serve primarily to provide arguments in favour of corpuscular philosophy, an essential part of which was the theory of matter, defining the final components of solid bodies as indivisible particles – atoms endowed only with shape, size and movement. This objective was likely to be achieved by “appropriate” interpretation of the results of conducted experiments, which was to justify the corpuscular thesis. Boyle devoted a lot of effort and attention to this programme, defending it from all sorts of accusations<sup>9</sup>.

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- 6 Cf. V. D. Boantza, *Chemical Philosophy and Boyle's Incongruous Philosophical Chymistry*, in: *Science in the Age of Baroque*, eds. O. Gal, R. Chen-Morris, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, 260–261. Quoted from: *Sceptical Chymist: An Introductory Preface*, (no pagination) (<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22914/22914-h/22914-h.htm>), [accessed on: 08/2015].
- 7 Cf. R.-M. Sargent, *Learning from experience: Boyle's construction of an experimental philosophy*, in: *Robert Boyle reconsidered*, ed. M. Hunter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, 63.
- 8 R. Boyle, *The Sceptical Chymist*, in: *The Works of Robert Boyle*, eds. M. Hunter, E. Davis, vol. 5, Pickering and Chatto, London 1999–2000, 294.
- 9 The comprehensive stage of Boyle's experimental philosophy – see R.-M. Sargent, *The Diffident Naturalist. Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago – London 1995. One of the most frequently cited experiments in the literature to speak in favour of corpuscular philosophy was the process of melting and redistributing silver and gold samples. The possibility of decomposing the mixture of gold and silver into its original components was supposed to prove that these substances consist of particles that retain their identity in the mixture. Most likely, Boyle knew about this experiment from works of Daniel Sennert, an alchemist from Wittenberg. It is worth noting that Sennert, unlike Boyle, understood atoms qualitatively (i.e. that atoms

It is not easy to clearly assess Boyle's attitude to "chemists". The above-mentioned criticism of their views does not contradict the fact that Boyle's own position was strongly influenced by al-"chemical" works. What is more, Boyle allowed some al-"chemists" to be accepted in the community of experimental philosophers. He acknowledged their proficiency in the art of laboratory tests and did not question the facts they discovered. However, he strongly required from them that they must abandon the hermetic language in which they describe experiments and renounce their theories with which they interpret the phenomena they discover. Boyle was likely to take such a position because he considered that the link between the language of facts and the language of the theory was not necessary, but only casual. Thus the price of joining philosophers-experimenters was the resignation from the mystery that covers research as well as the approval for interpretation of phenomena in categories accepted by this community of researchers<sup>10</sup>.

### 3. "CHEMIST" VERSUS BOYLE'S EXPERIMENTS

This is the context in which Samuel Duclos' speech occurs. In 1667–1669, he led meetings for members of the Academy, analyzing, above all, Boyle's work *Certain Physiological Essays* of 1661 and formulating his critical remarks on him. Importantly, Duclos knew Boyle's views on chemical philosophy and expressed them in his flagship work *The Sceptical Chymist*<sup>11</sup>.

In its *Report* of 26 March 1667, he refers to some experiment that Boyle describes in *The Origins of Forms and Qualities*. The idea was to

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are endowed with an attribute of a given substance, e.g. atoms of gold are "gold", atoms of silver are "silver"). Cf. E. Michael, *Daniel Sennert on Matter and Form. At the Junction of the Old and the New*, *Early Science and Medicine* 2(1997), 286–287.

10 Cf. S. Shapin, S. Schaffer, *Leviathan and the air-pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life*, op. cit., 69–71.

11 Cf. V. D. Boantz, *Chemical Philosophy and Boyle's Incongruous Philosophical Chymistry*, op. cit., 258. R. Boyle, *Certain Physiological Essays*, (<http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/a28944.0001.001/2:A28944.0001.001?page=root;size=125;vid=63094;view=-text>), [accessed on: 08/2015].



obtain, using complex chemical operations, sweet salt crystals from salt material, tart and sour ones. Interestingly, in no way can it be said that Boyle, contrary to the principles he postulated, describes this experiment clearly and transparently. He gives only a few characteristics of the salt obtained, describes them as (*anomalous*) and then declares that he cannot give details of the operations carried out or even the type of material from which he obtained those sweet crystals. Besides, he cites advice concerning the experiment, given to him by a mysterious, outstanding “chemist”, about whom he says nothing closer<sup>12</sup>.

Hence, it is easy to predict in which direction Duclos' criticism goes – Boyle does not act according to the standards set by him. Instead of clarity and transparency, we have a puzzle to solve – from where is the sweetness in a tart and sour material? Moreover, according to Duclos, this puzzle had long been solved by Paracelsian Joseph Duchesne (+1609), which was in turn described by Johann Schröder in the work *Quercetanus redivivus, hoc est, Ars medica dogmatico-hermetica* (1638). Duclos gives a very detailed description of this experiment, including all the information needed to carry it out. They will be useful only for those who have appropriate knowledge of “chemistry”, and only they will be able to understand what these procedures are about. Duchesne also gives information about other than sweetness characteristics of the crystals obtained, e.g. extremely effective dissolution of gold or the ability to restore freshness to wilted flowers. Boyle, on the other hand, although he mentions some other characteristics of the salt obtained, does not give any further information on this subject (“because this is not the right place to deal with these matters”)<sup>13</sup>.

12 Cf. *Académie Royale de Sciences Procès-Verbal de séance*, Paris, France 1, 93–94 (description of the Duclos' reports that he presented to the members of the Academy is given as follows: V. D. Boantz, *Chemical Philosophy and Boyle's Incongruous Philosophical Chymistry*, op. cit., 262–263).

13 Cf. V. D. Boantz, *Chemical Philosophy and Boyle's Incongruous Philosophical Chymistry*, op. cit., 261–264. Quote from R. Boyle, *Origins of Forms and Qualities*, in: *The Works of Robert Boyle*, eds. M. Hunter, E. Davis, vol. 5, Pickering and Chatto, London 1999–2000, 407.

The analysis of Boyle's and Duchesne's texts leads Duclos to the conclusion that they must be about the same thing – sweet crystals obtained through complex chemical operations, made of salty and sour materials. Duclos further rejects *de facto* validity of Boyle's theses concerning the observed phenomena. For Boyle, both the biggest problem and mystery was the difference between the sweetness of the crystals obtained and the characteristics of components from which they were obtained. Duclos points out that there is no mystery here if we simply refer to components used in the experiment, which “materially cooperate” in the formation of these crystals. And these are, according to Duchesne, sea salt, honey vinegar and acid. There is no need to refer to the corpuscular hypothesis to know the cause of the formation of these crystals. The explanation is the quality of materials used in the experiment<sup>14</sup>.

Duclos' discussion with Boyle is essentially a dispute over the nature of chemistry. Duclos rejects the project of transforming chemistry into physico-chemistry, which is ultimately Boyle's postulate, and wants to demonstrate weaknesses of the program itself as well as the incompetence of his adversary. To that purpose, he undermines Boyle's credibility as a chemist. If crystals from Boyle's and Duchesne's experiments are the same (and this is even obvious), then either Boyle did not know Duchesne's work, and this undermines his knowledge of important works from the scope of chemistry, or worse – he does not mention sources he uses, aspiring to originality (and Boyle writes that he came across such salt for the first time).

The weaknesses of the very idea of transforming chemistry into a physico-like field are more clearly demonstrated by Duclos when analyzing the experiments that Boyle described in *Physico-Chymical Essay Containing An Experiment with some Considerations touching the differing Parts and Redintegration of Salt-Petre*<sup>15</sup>. It was about

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14 Cf. Ibid, 266–268. *Sprawozdania Duclosa* [Duclos' reports] cf. *Académie Royale* 1, 97–103.

15 Cf. R. Boyle, *Physico-Chymical Essay Containing An Experiment with some Considerations touching the differing Parts and Redintegration of Salt-Petre*, in: Idem, *Certain*

experiments with potassium saltpeter (potassium nitrate). Its significance was, among other things, that it is commonly found as a component of many different bodies, from minerals to animals. Hence, it deserves to be tested carefully (however, Boyle, from the outset, points out that due to “big things” there is no time for such very thorough exploration). Boyle is especially interested in inflammableness of saltpeter, so he wants to explain what that feature is about. He immediately comes to the conclusion that it is the result of the very rapid movement of particles which it consists of. These particles “shake violently one another, as if the heat was nothing else but a fast movement of the smallest particles of the body”. In response to this suggestion, Duclos notes that although one can agree that it is movement that causes heat, Boyle does not answer the fundamental question – what the cause of this movement is, because he “would probably not attribute it to shapes and positions of the particles”. This brings us to the core of the dispute. Duclos believes that the reference to “shape and arrangement” of particles of matter to explain phenomena cannot be a valid explanation in terms of chemical research. Here, one has to refer to other rules. Duclos explains the inflammableness of nitrate. It is based on numerous experiments in which this feature was tested in various combinations of saltpeter with other substances. According to these experiments, saltpeter burns only in combination with substances which, in chemical terms, contain much sulfur salt. Its inflammableness actually concerns the “stormy movement” which is caused by “mutual interaction of salts of different properties”<sup>16</sup>.

Another phenomenon – “selective” inflammableness of saltpeter – was related to this, the explanation of which caused Boyle much trouble. The point was that this feature was only present in some of

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*Physiological Essays*, op. cit., 129-158.

16 Cf.: R. Franckowiak, *Du Clos and the Mechanization of Chemical Philosophy*, in: *The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy*, eds. D. Garber and S. Roux, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, 289–290. V. D. Boantza, *Chemical Philosophy and Boyle's Incongruous Philosophical Chymistry*, op. cit., 273. Quotes from: *Sprawozdania Duclosa* [Duclos' reports], see *Académie Royale* 6, 1.

the circumstances created in the laboratory. It burnt every time it came into contact with live coals, but when placed e.g. in a hot melting pot, “this strange salt melts, but does not ignite”. Boyle, based on corpuscular assumptions, could not find any satisfactory explanation. Duclos, in turn, does not see anything mysterious about this phenomenon. Again, referring to numerous experiments, he states that saltpeter will never light up from the flame of a candle, burning oil, melted lead, silver or gold. It will ignite and explode only if it comes into contact with hot flammable materials such as coal, sulfur, sulfurous minerals, molten tin or red-hot iron. The principle is that the more sulfuric salt the material contains, the easier it is to ignite saltpeter. Coal contains large amounts of sulfuric salt (we find out about this by investigating the ash remaining after burning the coal), that is why saltpeter ignites after contact with hot coal as well. Lastly, Duclos argues – contrary to Boyle – that saltpeter is not flammable. It ignites and explodes “only as a result of the opposite reaction of the air it contains and the fire which ignites the materials with which saltpeter is mixed”<sup>17</sup>.

As one can see, Duclos in his discussion with Boyle attempts, above all, to show the weaknesses of his adversary’s argumentation. Thus, he shows with some success that his knowledge of *arcana* of work in the chemical laboratory is certainly not worse than Boyle’s, and moreover, he is able to conduct experiments with much greater meticulousness and systematicity. Duclos proves that Boyle does not know enough about the literature he deals with. Mainly, however, he adopts erroneous interpretative categories of observed phenomena – referring only to the size and arrangement of particles of matter cannot be sufficient to explain chemical reactions. That is why Boyle so often confesses to failures when trying to explain the phenomena investigated.

We are dealing here with a fundamental difference between Duclos’ and Boyle’s views – they were advocates of two different concepts of “chemistry”. Boyle’s atomist concept is widely known,

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17 Ibid, 271-273. Quotes from: *Sprawozdania Duclosa* [Duclos’ reports], see *Académie Royale* 6, 1.

but it must be stressed here that Duclos also saw a need to modernize the field. In no way did he accept all the theories of matter that emerged over time in the Paracelsian current. For instance, he rejected the theory of five principles – phlegm, earth, spirit, oil and salt – believing that it was the result of inaccurate distillation. He also rejected hermetic tradition and *tria prima* theory which sees salt, sulfur and mercury as final elements of matter. Duclos himself was a supporter of the views of Jan Baptista van Helmont, considered to be the most modern of “chemists”<sup>18</sup>. Just like Boyle was inspired by Bacon, Duclos was inspired by Jan Baptista van Helmont.

What field should chemistry be then? First of all, the explanation of phenomena takes place in chemistry on three levels, to which three types of principles – body, spirit and soul – correspond. The first corresponds to what is purely physical, and Duclos emphasizes that at this level it is necessary to sensory capture the phenomena studied. Like van Helmont, he assumes that water is first matter at this level. Only it remains after complete distillation of all other substances. However, it cannot be ruled out that there is some causative factor in water which is not accessible to the senses and which can produce new forms in it – salt, sulfur and mercury. Duclos calls this factor a “transforming spirit” and its resulting forms – “accidental”. There is also a third, highest level, made up of “ideal mixtures”, at which the effect of the “spirit”, as well as salts, sulfur and mercury produced by it, cannot provide a definitive explanation. It is about, as we would say today, living matter. Its “mercury, salts and sulfur are so varied that they cannot be created from the transforming spirit alone”; it is necessary to accept the existence of a third, “more dynamic and even less corporeal than the spirit” principle, which is the soul. It is the one who acts in ideal mixtures.

Duclos stresses that these principles must be closely linked to the results of experiments – “it may take rather a long time to check these things, and in order to investigate, discuss and acquire this

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18 Cf. e.g. S. Ducheyne, *Joan Baptista van Helmont and the question of experimental modernism*, *Physis, Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza* 42(2005), 305–332.

knowledge we will have to make many observations and experiments". Chemistry should be based primarily on advanced experimental practice, which will reflect chemists' unique abilities as well as deep and extensive knowledge of substances, circumstances of their emergence and their behaviour<sup>19</sup>. Chemistry is to be qualitative. Duclos believed that any attempt to give up "sensory quality for the sake of austerity *matter* in motion" was an unjustified and dangerous reduction. He pointed out that attempts at corpuscular interpretation of chemical experiments are as "dark, ambiguous and almost enigmatic" as criticised "chemists" theories for Boyle. Therefore, according to Duclos, true chemistry must refer in proposed explanations to categories available to sensory cognition. On a material level, it was an operational epistemology in which all causative explanations had to be based on available by senses experimental data. There was no room in it for hypothetical particles of matter<sup>20</sup>.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The discussion presented above makes us aware of how complex the process of transformation of natural philosophy in the 17th century was. In this case, it is primarily about the formation of a modern, quantitative form of science. Its ultimate success was preceded by a long stage of disputes with supporters of other concepts for research concerning the material world. They include, as we have seen, representatives of the Paracelsian, qualitative (vitalist) current of chemical philosophy. Interestingly, they based their theories on extensive experimental research, showed great proficiency in them, and considered the obtained results

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19 Duclos was an advocate of decomposition of the tested substances by means of solvents (*alkahest*); he pointed to weaknesses of the method of decomposition of substances by means of fire (gradual heating). Cf. V. D. Boantz, *Alkahest and Fire: Debating Matter, Chymistry and Natural History at the Early Parisian Academy of Sciences*, in: *The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge. Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science*, eds. Ch. Wolfe, O. Gal, Springer, Dordrecht 2010, 78–84.

20 Cf. V. D. Boantz, *Chemical Philosophy and Boyle's Incongruous Philosophical Chymistry*, op. cit., 275–277 (with quotations).

as proof of the correctness of the adopted interpretative categories. It can be said that at the methodological level they were “modern”, but ultimately they opted for a “nonmodern”, qualitative theory of matter. However, in discussions they were a completely different adversary than supporters of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature.

From the point of view of philosophy of science, the above-mentioned discussion also points to a problem that remains valid even today – every experiment brings theoretical assumptions with it. They are concerned with the very selection of tools and materials used, and they show their nature most fully in the interpretation of results. That truth about the experiment can be clearly seen in Duclos’ discussion. In fact, it is a reaction to Boyle’s declarations about the need, or even the necessity, to apply a corpuscular hypothesis to interpret the results of experiments. However, in the light of the polemics presented, the question arises here – does Boyle pre-establish the whole discussion in such a way as to make a corpuscular hypothesis the model and only appropriate way of interpreting the results of experiments, actually making the same mistake of which he accused his adversaries accepting the qualitative interpretation?

Or is it what Catherine Wilson claims that the supporters of atomism could not show that their theory explained observed phenomena better than competitive theories? It seems that Boyle himself did not so much derive corpuscularism from his experiments as he simply interpreted their results according to this theory. Moreover, if we put the discussion concerning atomism in a broader context, Boyle’s reference to the atomism of the ancients can be interpreted as an attempt to find a respectable philosophical theory for conducted experiments. This was supposed to protect the experimental method from the label of “mechanical practice” and introduce it to the group of respected research areas<sup>21</sup>. With Robert Boyle’s enormous contribution, it finally worked. As we all know, corpuscular and experimental philosophy has removed

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21 Although Boyle saw that Epicurean atomism, interpreted in an atheistic spirit, could pose a threat to religion, he believed that this could be prevented by developing and promoting natural theology. Cf. M. Johnson, C. Wilson, *Lucretius and the history of science*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius*, eds. S. Gillespie, P. Hardie, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, 139–140.

or even forgotten competing concepts concerning the essence of philosophy or natural philosophy. However, it was certainly not an easy success, and the 17th-century disputes about the very foundations of acquiring knowledge about nature and its interpretation are a good illustration of this long-lasting process.

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## DIDACTICS OF LOGIC IN KEN SCHOOLS AND THE CONCEPTION OF LOGIC IN THE *ENCYCLOPÉDIE OU DICTIONNAIRE UNIVERSEL RAISONNÉ*\*

**Abstract.** The paper describes the conception of logic in Polish didactics authored by the Commission of National Education (KEN), an important educational institution of the European Enlightenment. Since the documents of the Commission refer to a vision of science presented by such influential works then as the *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné* [Great French Encyclopedia], the paper compares the requirements from the Commission's programmer with the encyclopaedic entries that entail logical problems broadly understood. It turns out that the Commission, following the *Encyclopédie*, not only recommended a list of textbooks of logic but also shared its eclectic vision of logic. Although it is characteristic of modernity to take a relative approach to the importance of traditional logic, transformed into science on method, or literally an outline of epistemology, understood according to É. Condillac as a specific form of metaphysics, nevertheless some elements of logic were eclectically made valid. This logic, from the times of I. Kant, has been defined as formal logic. Practical logical skills were preferred to the knowledge of logical theories. At the same time attention was paid to the meaning of natural logical skills, and drills in logical reasoning when studying languages and mathematics. Despite preferences for the analytical method they also noticed the importance of synthetic method. It seems also that although the documents of the Commission do not say anything about the teaching of syllogistic issues, in didactic practice inspired by the *Encyclopédie* in the schools controlled by the Commission, the room was made to teach these problems. Condillac's book was preferred in the schools controlled by the Commission, nevertheless, it was not, as in the case of other textbooks, a must on the reading list, an obligatory reading matter, therefore it was not published in Poland. The conception of logic presented by the Commission as modelled on the *Encyclopédie* managed to avoid the one-sidedness of Condillac's approach, the approach that in fact eliminated the teaching of logic.

**Keywords:** logic; *Great French Encyclopedia*; Condillac; d'Alembert

1. Introduction. 2. An entry *Logique*. 3. Other entries relating to the issues of logic. 4. Conclusions.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

One of the basic works that largely determined not only the scientific standards of the Enlightenment but also wanted to shape the mentality of the time was the *Great French Encyclopedia*<sup>2</sup>. In a way typical of the Enlightenment, it was an eclectic work, thus ataxic, but with a clearly defined ideological meaning. For this reason, some of the editions were supposed to unify the sequence of entries in the scientific aspect and partially mitigate the anti-religious character of the *Encyclopedia*. An example of such an influential edition is a work published by a group of Swiss Protestants under the supervision of an Italian ex-reformer Francesco de Félice (1723-1789), better known by his monastic name: Fortuné Barthélemy<sup>3</sup>.

The literature concerning *Encyclopedia*, including the topics related to the achievements of individual scientific disciplines, arts and crafts, is extremely rich, however, it is relatively modest in Polish. Therefore, it is time to address, at least in a modest way, selected elements concerning philosophical issues in *Encyclopedia*, which was written after all by declared philosophers, starting with the logic that was treated during the Enlightenment as a tool for the propagation of a holistically understood mental culture<sup>4</sup>, thus not accidentally constituting such an important element of the reformed education of KEN [National Education Commission] in the spirit of Enlightenment<sup>5</sup>. It also

1 For the methodological status of the "history of reception" see e.g.: J. Garewicz, *Kilka uwag o badaniu recepcji filozofii*, in: *Wybrane zagadnienia z historii filozofii polskiej na tle filozoficznej umysłowości europejskiej*, ed. J. Legowicz, Wrocław 1979, 103-107.

2 *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres. Mis en ordre et publié par ... [Denis] Diderot et quant à la partie mathématique par ... [Jean le Rond] D'Alembert*, Vol. I-XXXV, Paris 1751-1780; reprint: Stuttgart 1966-1995; electronic version: Marsanne 1999.

3 *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines. Mis en ordre par M. de Félice*, Vol. I-LVIII, Yverdon 1770-1780.

4 Cf. S. Janeczek, *Z dziejów nowożytnej koncepcji logiki. Od F. Bacona do É. Condillaca*, *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* (2009)3, 21-33. Cf. Idem, *Logika czy epistemologia? Historyczno-filozoficzne uwarunkowania nowożytnej koncepcji logiki*, Lublin 2003.

5 See: Idem, *Jeszcze raz o dydaktyce logiki w oświacie Komisji Edukacji Narodowej. Ujęcie É.B. de Condillaca a przepisy i praktyka szkolna*, in: *W kierunku filozofii klasycznej*

seems to be interesting to compare the entries from the first edition of this work with those of de Félice to show more fully the context of the creation and reception of this aspect of the *Encyclopedia*.

## 2. AN ENTRY *LOGIQUE*

The logical views of the publishers of the *Encyclopedia* are mostly revealed by the anonymous entry *Logique*, which is actually a review of achievements and abuse in this field of knowledge, up to the presentation of the best contemporary textbooks. It has been thoroughly reworked by de Félice but without major changes in its substance<sup>6</sup>. According to Voltaire's opinion regarding this edition, it is better edited, it has a clear systematic and historical part. In the first case, it eliminates a rhetorical "excursion" against scholastic philosophy which presents out of context and hence bizarre issues raised in this philosophical tradition. Instead, it incorporates a clear and balanced, thus an encyclopedic statement by d'Alemberto on the nature of logic, taken from *Essai sur les éléments de philosophie, ou sur les principes des connaissances humaines*<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, it removes the final batch, which is to a large extent a reprint of the elements of the so-called second logic (written in the form of scholastic exercises) of the reformer of Jesuit education in France, popularising in this field the work of Locke and Claude Buffier, who tried to combine modern and scholastic traditions<sup>8</sup>. It also completes an overview of the Enlightenment manuals of logic, reproduced by the original edition following the above-mentioned manual by Buffier<sup>9</sup>.

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*inspiracje i kontynuacje. Księga jubileuszowa ofiarowana Profesorowi Edwardowi Nieznańskiemu*, eds. J. Krokos, K. Świętorzecka, R. Tomanek, Warszawa 2008, 471-483.

6 *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. IX, 637-641; *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connaissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXVI, 507-513.

7 The outline of philosophy was published in the fourth volume of *Mélanges de littérature, d'histoire et de philosophie* (Amsterdam 1759); also published as *Oeuvres complètes de d'Alembert*, ed. A. Belin, vol. I, Paris 1821 (reprint: Genève 1967), 152-155.

8 See: S. Janeczek, *Z dziejów dydaktyki logiki w szkołach KEN. Claude Buffier SJ*, *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 56(2008)2, 83-99.

9 C. Buffier, *Les principes du raisonnement exposés en deux logiques nouvelles avec des*

Already at the first reading, one can notice the eclectic nature of the concept of logic in both approaches to the word *Logique*. On the one hand, it seems that it refers to Buffier, who, in a traditional spirit, values logic for providing *les vrais principes du raisonnement* and maintains its trimodal system as an operation to create concepts, to make judgements and a proper way of thinking; however, in a rather modern spirit, he believes this time that logic should “provide us with rules so that our thoughts are always right”<sup>10</sup>. According to the author of the encyclopaedic entry, logic is “the art of right thinking” and thus according to the Cartesian tradition<sup>11</sup>, or the art of appropriate use of our mental abilities according to the three operations of traditional logic, processed – similarly to what was often done by the logicians belonging to the so-called second scholasticism – in the spirit of the rhetorical tradition of the Renaissance, as operations of defining, sharing and understanding<sup>12</sup>. At the same time, he evokes the modern four-segment arrangement of its lecture, because “to think correctly is to perceive well, to judge well, to reflect well, and to combine ideas methodically”; while, although he described the third operation in the spirit of humanism as *discours*<sup>13</sup> he ac-

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*remarques sur les Logiques qui ont eu le plus de réputation de notre temps* (Paris 1714); quoted as: *Traité des premieres veritez de conséquence, ou les principes du raisonnement*, in: *Cours de sciences sur des principes nouveaux et simples, pour former la langage, l'esprit et le coeur dans l'usage ordinaire de la vie* (Paris), 1732 (reprint: Genève 1971), 745-892; reprinted fragments are in Buffier's work, columns 781-782, 885-888.

- 10 C. Buffier, *Traité des premieres veritez de conséquence, ou les principes du raisonnement*, in: Idem, *Cours de sciences*, op. cit., 747.
- 11 See the title term for logic in: A. Arnauld, P. Nicole, *La logique, ou l'art de penser contentat, outre les regles communes, plusieurs observations nouvelle propres à former le jugement, par le Sieur le Bon*, Paris 1662; quoted in critical edition P. Clair, F. Girbal, according to Paris 1683 – Paris 1965 edition; also: *Logika, czyli sztuka myślenia*, transl. S. Romanowa, Warszawa 1958.
- 12 E.g. S. S. Makowski, *Cursus philosophicus iuxta veram Aristoetelis, philosophorum principis doctrina in alma universitate cracoviensi luci publicae porrectus*, vol. I. Cracoviae 1769, 2, 15. See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 136f.
- 13 “La logique est l'art de penser juste, ou de faire un usage convenable de nos facultes rationnelles, en définissant, en divisant, et en raisonnant ... la pensée n'est autre chose qu'une espece de discours intérieur et mental, dans lequel l'esprit converse avec lui-

tually operated with a broad category of reasoning (*raisonnement*) or even a proof (*démonstration*). It naturally resembles an arrangement which was mostly popularised by Cartesian *La Logique ou l'art de penser*, according to which logical operations are reduced to: (1) “presenting (*concevoir*) something to ourselves”, which is “a simple vision (*la simple vue*) of things appearing to our mind” in the form of ideas (*idée*); (2) judgements (*juger*), that is, “combining different ideas”, by means of which we “we claim that the one is the other one, or we deny that the one is the other one”; (3) reasoning (*raisonner*), in a form of “a judgment out of few others”; and (4) ordering (*ordonner*), also referred to as a method (*methode*) which is “the activity of our mind thanks to which, while having different ideas, different judgments and reasonings relating to the same object ... we arrange (*disposer*) the most appropriate way to get to know this object”<sup>14</sup>.

At the same time, the entry *Logique* quotes F. Bacon’s understanding of logic, whose classification of sciences was referred to by *Encyclopaedia*<sup>15</sup>. The basic aims of logic, according to Bacon, are to be reduced to four functions of reasoning (*raisonner*), reflecting the process of a discovery (*trouver ce qu’il cherche*), consideration of what was discovered (*raisonner de ce qu’il a trouvé*), remembering the judgment that was made (*retenir ce qu’il a retenu*) and finally, teaching others of what was remembered (*enseigner aux autres ce qu’il a retenu*). No wonder that the branches of this art of reasoning, which is still traditionally defined – according to the concept of Aristotle, who claimed it to be a tool of organizing the acquired knowledge – is the art of searching or inventing that is close to modernity (*l’art de la recherche ou de l’invention*), that is the logic of a scientific discovery. He also overestimates the importance of the art of

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mme ... . Comme pour penser juste il est nécessaire de bien appercevoir, de bien juger, de bien discourir, et de lier méthodiquement ses idées; il suit de là que l’appréhension ou perception, le jugement, le discours et la méthode, deviennent les quatre articles fondamentaux de cet art” (*Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., 507-508).

14 A. Arnauld, P. Nicole, *Logika, czyli sztuka myślenia*, op. cit., 39-41; see: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 279f.

15 On the position of F. Bacon to logic see: *ibid*, 166f.

evaluation or judgement (*l'art de l'examen ou de jugement*), retention or memory (*l'art de retenir ou de la mémoire*), eloquence or speaking (*l'art de l'élocution ou de s'énoncer*), whose interchangeable nomenclature proves the continuation of the rhetorical tradition (e.g. *invention*), as well as its modification (e.g. *recherche*). The reference to Bacon also explains a strong aversion to scholastic logic, since it was to be “overused”, hence “it lost the credit of trust” [which was due to it]. Using common stereotypes intensified in the Enlightenment, the “school” logic was to be “loaded with terms and barbaric sentences” or so “sunk in the sea of dry and vain subtleties” that, in fact, it lost its basic purpose. In the place of “supporting the art of right thinking” it has become “an art whose aim is to train the mind in disputes and discussions”. No wonder that “logic was only the art of words which frequently made no sense at all, and served only to hide ignorance, not to improve judgments; to amuse reason, not to strengthen it; and finally to distort reality, not to explain it”<sup>16</sup>.

The author of the slogan *Logic* refers to the modern tradition in a completely different way. This is already visible in the admiration of Descartes, who is, however, more valued on the grounds of postulates concerning the new method (the requirement of precision (*précision*) and accuracy (*justesse*) than on the grounds of philosophical solutions<sup>17</sup>. After all, he appreciates J. Locke more highly, whose work is supposed to relate to Descartes’ and Malebranche’s achievements almost the same as a story relates to a novel. His credit is primarily to make a thorough analysis of our mind’s operations<sup>18</sup>. However, he seems to value Condillac’s achievement the most. Condillac, assimilating the themes of Locke’s descriptive psychology with the principles of the mental function, showed the ways of achieving all the knowledge available to us in an incomparably more concise, clearer and more precise way than Locke himself. In fact,

16 *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. IX, 637-638; *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXVI, 508.

17 See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 178-255.

18 *Ibid*, 362-462.



however, by exposing the role of the algebraic method, he has led to the elimination of teaching of logic from practice transforming it into epistemology in a proper handbook of logic, which was written for schools over time KEN<sup>19</sup>. It is not a coincidence, therefore, that de Félice has significantly shortened the arguments concerning Condillac which presented, in a closer way, the principles of epistemology of this author who was praised, in the original text, for the role of language in cognition, especially the method of analysis, considered to be “the simplest, the clearest and most prolific principle, thanks to which the human mind has its progress for centuries, even if its influence has remained unnoticed”<sup>20</sup>.

It is not a coincidence that both editions of the *Encyclopedia* value the most the approaches that are not only of high methodological value but also, with their whole eclecticism combine the traditional logic with modern epistemology, they prefer, above all, textbooks related to modern empirical tradition<sup>21</sup>. This was probably the reason why this excellent textbook, which was *Port-Royal Logic* by A. Arnauld and P. Nicole, was mentioned only in the context of assimilations of the thoughts of Descartes<sup>22</sup>. In turn, the textbooks of Jean Le Clerc (Clericus)<sup>23</sup> or Buffier’s were an important medium of popularising the views of Locke on the continent. It is not a coincidence that the *Encyclopaedia* aspiringly criticises a textbook of J. P. de Crousaz<sup>24</sup>, who

19 *La Logique ou les premiers développements de l'art de penser*, Paris 1780 (see as: *Logika czyli pierwsze zasady sztuki myślenia, dzieło elementarne... na żądanie bywszej Komisji Edukacyjnej Narodowej dla szkół publicznych napisane i od niej aprobowane, a teraz z przydatkiem niektórych objaśnień i przypisów przez Jana Znoskę z francuskiego na polski język przełożone*, Wilno 1802, 1819<sup>3</sup>; (new edition: ed. T. Kotarbiński, Warszawa 1952). See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 462f.

20 *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. IX, 638-639; *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXVI, 511-512.

21 *Ibid*, 512-513.

22 See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 279f.

23 *Logica sive ars ratiocinandi. Logica, Ontologia, Pneumatologia*, vol. I-II, Amstelodami 1692. See: S. Janeczek, *Z dziejów nowożytnej koncepcji logiki. Propagatorzy poglądów J. Locke’a*, *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 36(2008)4, 102-105.

24 *Système de Reflexion qui peuvent contribuer à la netteté et à l'étendue de nos*

underestimates the achievements of Locke<sup>25</sup>. In this perspective, one can understand the assessment of the approach of Christian Wolff that is more than vague and is limited to quoting the title of his much appreciated and more extensive version of Latin logic, which is also supposed to be an expression of a reduction of principles and rules of logic to evidence, but – what the entry is silent about – tries to maintain a balance between the reasonable and empirical tradition<sup>26</sup>. The edition of de Félice does not differ from the original version and it removes the information about the textbook of Jesuit Buffier, which is the basis for reviewing those books, it also adds three other items to the characteristics of modern logic books. Pointing to his own study<sup>27</sup>, he refers to the achievements of Isaac Watts<sup>28</sup> and Antonio Genovesi<sup>29</sup>, which also belonged, however, to the empirical tradition of Locke. In his own study, he emphasises, above all, the ability to separate theory from science practice, in morality and social life. However, it seems that it was the harmonious combination of those dimensions that was supposed to determine the value of that achievement, an example of which can be found in *Discours sur la maniere de former l'esprit et le coeur des enfans*. This tendency is consistent with the common-sense practice of combining logic, as easily explained as possible, with the

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*connaissances, ou Nouvel Essai de Logique*, Amsterdam 1712. See: W. Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, vol. II, 1640-1780, Stuttgart 1970, 546-549; W. S. Howell, *Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric*, Princeton 1971, 304-331.

25 *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. IX, 639; *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXVI, 508.

26 *Philosophia rationalis sive logica, methodo scientifica pertractatum ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata*, Francofurti 1728 (edition of 1740 published by J. École'a – Hildesheim 1984). See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 306f.

27 *Leçons de logique*, vol. I-II, Yverdon 1770.

28 *Logic, or the Right Use of Reason in the Inquiry after Truth with a Variety of Rules to Guard against Error in the Affairs of Religion and Human Life, as well as in the Sciences*, London 1725 (reprint, published in London 1847 – Morgan, PA 1996). See: S. Janeczek, *Źródła logiki Jana Śniadeckiego. F. Dalham's i I. Watts's textbooks*, in: *Gaudium in litteris. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Księdza Arcybiskupa Stanisława Wielgusa*, ed. S. Janeczek et al., Lublin 2009, 613-621.

29 *Elementorum artis logico-criticæ libri V*, Venetiis 1745, Varsaviae 771. See: S. Janeczek, *Z dziejów nowożytnej koncepcji logiki. Propagatorzy poglądów J. Locke'a*, op. cit., 102-105.

practice of life what was typical for the Enlightenment and what has been revealed since Locke's times, and was typical, for example, for popular works of the Marquis J. B. d'Argens<sup>30</sup>.

A more serious modification made by de Félice in the entry *Logique* was (already signalled) the removal of Buffier's remarks about the nature of logic, taken from his so-called second logic, which deals with issues that remain under consideration within traditional logic. By posing (together with scholastics) the problem of whether logic is necessary to achieve perfection in any science, it limits the importance of so-called artificial logic, i.e. logical theory, indicating that the level of practical logical improvements is determined by the aspect differentiation of the level of natural abilities. The relative value of rules of logic is also to be indicated by the very discovery of logic, which took place without knowing its rules. Buffier, referring these theses to the logic discovered by Aristotle, supported by scholastics, refers to the example of geometers who practice their science independently of the knowledge of rules of logic. In this place, he exposes the role of the so-called natural logic (i.e., natural logical equipment) and natural mind training<sup>31</sup>.

These remarks regarding the need for a study of logic can be compared with d'Alembert's laconic considerations contained in *Essai sur les Eléments de philosophie* from 1759, hence probably known to the author of the original encyclopaedic entry from 1765<sup>32</sup>. De Félice, after all the author of a logic textbook, inserted them in place of impertinent remarks on scholastic logic, contained in the original entry *Logique*. Admittedly, d'Alembert, in line with modern tradition, questions the need to become familiar with a logical theory which, like the

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30 *La philosophie du bon sens, ou reflexions philosophiques sur l'incertudine des connoissances humaines, à l'usage des cavaliers et du beau sexe*, Paris 1737. See: W. Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, op. cit., vol. 2, 522-524.

31 *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. IX, 639; C. Buffier, *Traité des premieres veritez de conséquence, ou les principes du raisonnement*, in: Idem, *Cours de sciences*, op. cit., 781-782, 885-888.

32 *Logique*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXVI, 508-510.

knowledge of ethical treaties, is not necessary to become an honest human being. Similarly, the geometers, “having only the natural sense as their guide, get to the most hidden and abstract truths”. It also limits the basic task of logic, i.e. the concern for proper formulation of truths of a material nature, in the form of examining the relations that take place between ideas, following Locke’s and Condillac’s footsteps<sup>33</sup>. However, he appreciates, among other things, the attention paid to the precision of the terms used, the appropriate approach to the object (analytical), or the proper linking of successive truths, which in the first case seems to be a result of e.g. *Port-Royal Logic*, emphasizing, after B. Pascal, the need to define terms, and in the last two cases it is the fulfilment of the Cartesian intertwining of analysis and synthesis, recommended for example by *Port-Royal Logic*<sup>34</sup>. At the same time, pointing to our cognitive limitations, in relation to which we are doomed to actually use only probable knowledge, he postulates supplementing of traditional logic with the art of conjecture (*art de conjecturer*), which was close to the calculus of probability then discovered<sup>35</sup>. Despite the aforementioned leaning towards the method used by modern mathematicians<sup>36</sup>, d’Alembert, who not only was a mathematician himself but also used speculative methods (constructivism) in physics following Descartes’ steps, is quite sceptical about the possibility of mathematising of all knowledge<sup>37</sup>.

All in all, therefore, the author of the original slogan *Logic*, following d’Alembert’s footsteps, accentuates epistemological themes in the lecture of logic, but in a way characteristic of most textbooks, not only of 17th ones but also of those from the 18th century, his

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33 Ibid, 509.

34 See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 260-261, 300.

35 See: *Historia matematyki od czasów najdawniejszych do początku XIX stulecia*, vol. II, in: *Matematyka XVII stulecia*, ed. A. P. Juszkiewicz, transl. S. Dobrzycki, Warszawa 1975, 90-107.

36 See: H. W. Arndt, *Methodo scientifica pertractatum. Mos geometricus und Kalkülbe-griff in der philosophischen Theorienbildung des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1971.

37 See: S. Janeczek, *Teoria nauki w ujęciu J. le Ronda d’Alemberta. Między empiryzmem, racjonalizmem i intuicjonizmem*, in: *Philosophia vitam alere. Prace dedykowane Profesorowi Romanowi Darowskiemu SJ*, ed. S. Ziemiański, Kraków 2005, 199-212.

approach is eclectic. He sees the value that shapes the rules of traditional logic. Above all, however, he points to the importance of natural logical equipment as well as to the importance of the material basis of knowledge, obtained through empirical research and then processed using the principles of logic-epistemology that is broadly understood, moving away, however, from the seventeenth-century belief in the universality of the “mathematical method” as a method of reasoning of demonstrative nature.

However, one must not forget that the analyses of other statements of d’Alembert, even those contained in the entry *Collège*, allow us to see a more narrow vision of logic that was supposed to be compulsory for the reformed secondary education. In there, it radicalises a modern tendency of transforming logic into epistemology, which is supposed to be the basic science of philosophy, thus following de Condillac it becomes a specific metaphysics (oriented associatively)<sup>38</sup>. In that case, d’Alembert limits logical-philosophical education to “a few lines of logic” (*dans la philosophie, on borneroit la logique à quelques lignes*) and to a presentation of “Locke’s outline”, that is, in fact, the specificity of the principles of functioning of mind that was shown by him and what was considered to be a manifestation of valuable metaphysics (*la métaphysique à un abrégé de Locke*)<sup>39</sup>.

The descriptions of the entry *Logic* in both versions of *Encyclopedia* are quite general and eclectic, or even inconsistent. On the one hand, they prefer to take care of material knowledge rather than to take care for the form of reasoning, because they emphasise that they were

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38 J. le Rond d’Alembert. *Essai sur les Eléments de philosophie*, op. cit., 180-181. See: S. Janeczek, *Przejawy refleksji metafizycznej w filozofii Étienne’a Bennota de Condillaca (1715-1780)*, in: *Z dziejów filozoficznej refleksji nad człowiekiem. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Czerkawskiego (1939-2007)*, eds. P. Gutowski, P. Gut, Lublin 2007, 257-274; Idem, *Z dziejów nowożytnej koncepcji logiki. J. le Rond d’Alembert*, *Roczniki Kulturoznawcze* 4(2013)1, 51-82.

39 *Collège*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. III, 634-637 (pedagogical part). Rewritten entry *Collège* in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connaissances humaines*, in part devoted to *meurs et religion* (op. cit., vol. X, 334-338), repeats d’Alembert’s findings on philosophical and logical education.

rooted in natural logical endowment and prefer to care for the formation of a practical logical culture rather than to care for teaching logical theory, useful both in a purely scientific and practical sphere. On the other hand, however, they see the need to teach logic and to teach it in the form of textbooks. At the same time, they consolidate the Cartesian tendency to transform logic into a science of a method, thus they introduce into it the issue of epistemology with a clear preference for the arrangements characteristic for empiricism which aims at discovering the mechanisms of functioning of the human mind which constitute the foundation for the rules of logic that result from them.

### 3. OTHER ENTRIES RELATING TO THE ISSUES OF LOGIC

This shift of emphasis from the issue of logic to the issue of a method explains the importance which the *Encyclopedie* gives to this issue, starting with the entry *Méthode* (a logical and mathematical part) that was written by d'Alembert. No wonder that it is a great proclamation of the method used by mathematicians<sup>40</sup>, mainly in the spirit of Wolff<sup>41</sup> who was to prove (also in practice) that this method was not only “natural for human mind” (*naturelle l'esprit humain*), but also that it allowed to discover the truths of all kinds (*qui fait découvrir les verités de tout genre*) and it was, therefore, a “method of all sciences” (*la méthode mathématique étoit celle de toutes les sciences*) and thus enabled to achieve high epistemological standards, or certitude (*certitude*). As it was in the case of mathematics. However, in the case of the entry *Logique*, d'Alembert not only draws atten-

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40 *Méthode*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. X, 445-446.

41 The understanding of a mathematical method of proving considered as a method of philosophy, was best formulated by Wolff in *Kurtze Unterricht von der mathematischen Methodew* which starts with *Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften* (Halle 1710; Polish translation and comments: R. Kuliniak, T. Małysz, *XVII i XVIII-wieczne popularne podręczniki studiowania matematyki. With particular emphasis on “Krótki wykład o matematycznej metodzie nauczania”*, in: *Oblicza filozofii XVII wieku*, ed. S. Janeczek, Lublin 2008, 335-356). Cf. S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 311f.

tion to the limitations of the use of this method which he identifies with the evidence procedures (*démonstration*) but he also postulates a contribution of knowledge in the form of a chain of evidence, in which successive sentences are not only explained but are also validated in the preceding sentence, he emphasises the role of the primary principles of this chain of thoughts (*toute science repose sur certains principes*). Hence, they should be sufficiently proven (*tous les principes soient suffisamment prouvés*) that is to say, they should be distinguished by the requirements of certitude *et évidence*. The value of that statement depends on the material value of the individual elements of this chain of evidence, what relativizes the meaning of resulting techniques in a way that is typical for modern times.

In this context, there appears the issue of preference for one of the two methods discussed in the manuals of logic from that time. In the case of the edition published by de Félice, the preference for the analytical method seems to dominate, since he modifies the entry *Méthode* (a logical part) by reprinting the extracts: *O pochodzeniu poznania ludzkiego* [*On the origin of human cognition*] by É. Condillac, which is an enthusiastic proclamation of this method treated as a universal method, that is a method of discovering the truth as well as teaching it<sup>42</sup>. The universality of the analysis results from the fact that it corresponds to the nature of a human mind, which is important not only in terms of discovering the truth but also in terms of teaching it because, in order to present the truth in the most perfect order, it is necessary to notice the order in which it was naturally discovered.

On the other hand, one can notice a preference for analysis also in the original version of the *Encyclopaedia*. This is revealed in the entry *L'Analyse en Logique* written by a Jesuit Claude Yvon who worked on the *Encyclopaedia*<sup>43</sup> and who strongly advocated a preference of the analysis in the spirit of Condillac, hence it is not a coincidence that a Polish translator of the textbook of *Logic* by Condillac included this

42 *Méthode*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXVIII, 538-548.

43 In: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. I, 401-403.



article as an appendix to this work<sup>44</sup>. Supporting Condillac, he describes it as a universal method of discovery and teaching, interpreted in the sense of genetic associationism (consistent with the nature of our mind) in the form of a specific calculation constituting a process of decomposing and composing of concepts in order to compare them (which was traditionally described as synthesis) thus precisely revealing the relationship between them. A more balanced assessment of the analysis is presented this time by de Félice, who, in the spirit of Descartes, despite treating the analysis as *la méthode la plus naturelle* it is however only *la plus sûre for parvenir la découverte de la vérité*, thanks to the *plus claire et plus précise* approach to ideas<sup>45</sup>.

However, a specific counter-proposal for the slogan *Analysis* is d'Alembert's article titled *Analytique*, published in both editions, which treats the method of analysis and synthesis in a complementary way, stating that in the philosophy of nature and mathematics regarding the solving of difficulties one should start from the application of the analytical method, and then only move on to the synthetic method [*il faut commencer à applanir les difficultés par la méthode analytique, avant que d'en venir à la méthode synthétique*]. At the same time, he certainly identifies the analysis with the empirical-inductive method (in the sense of inductive generalization of data obtained from experience and observation<sup>46</sup>).

Eclecticism revealed in the analysis of the entry *Logic* in terms of the needs and tasks of this discipline (art) is also revealed in the approach of the *Encyclopedia* to the question that concerns the need to define precise reasoning procedures, that is the last element of the three-part logic. It is not different in the anonymous slogan *Raisonnement*, which treats this concept in categories of operation on ideas,

<sup>44</sup> *La Logique ou les premiers développements de l'art de penser*, Paris 1780 (*Logika czyli pierwsze zasady sztuki myślenia, dzieło elementarne...*, op. cit., 163-169).

<sup>45</sup> In: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. II, 491-495.

<sup>46</sup> *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. I, 403-404; *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. II, 501-502.



that is characteristic of modernity, although known in general terms<sup>47</sup>. The *Encyclopedia* will define reasoning as the operation of checking ideas, i.e. whether two ideas are compatible with or contradictory to each other, by means of the third idea or other ones. At the same time, it relativizes the meanings of the procedures of reasoning understood in such a way, since the perceptions of relations between ideas are to be obvious, and, hence, it is impossible for every person not to reason in a proper (right) way. This statement justifies, on the one hand, the relativization of the reasoning procedures developed in the history of logic, considered to be over-expanded and useless knowledge (*entièrement superflu et de nul usage*); on the other hand, it leads to – as signalled above – the postulate of taking care of material knowledge, as it is the errors at this level that are primarily the reason for erroneous reasoning. No wonder that this slogan concerns errors in consistently epistemological categories, from errors resulting from inadequate functioning of cognitive organs to imprecise language.

Those views can also be found in the entry *Rozumowanie* [*Reasoning*] in the edition of the *Encyclopedia* by de Félice<sup>48</sup>. First of all, it seems to be a manifestation of the eclectic continuity of the criteriological arguments reaching as far as Descartes, and even more associationist psychology of cognition by Locke who valued the intuitive approach as more important than the discursive one and thus tried to present it as a sequence of intuition<sup>49</sup>. After all, this approach is also typical for Condillac<sup>50</sup>, following which de Félice

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47 *Raisonnement*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. XIII, 776-778.

48 *Raisonnement*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXXVI, 82-85.

49 Although both Descartes and Locke were also far from overestimating their concern for discursive procedures, they attempted to validate them by treating the sequence of reasoning as a sequence of intuitions. See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 98-210, 391-401.

50 Condillac states that “the unknown truth cannot be discovered – only as much as it is contained in known truths” [“on ne peut découvrir une vérité qu’on ne connaît pas, qu’autant qu’elle se trouve dans des vérités qui sont connues”] (É. Condillac. *Logika*, op. cit., 137; Idem, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvres philosophiques de Condillac*, op. cit., vol. II, 409).

reduced reasonings to the “art of deducting of one statement from the other one” enabling “drawing of unknown truths from the truths that are already known”<sup>51</sup>. On the other hand, what Condillac valued the most, was the so-called obviousness of reasoning (*évidence de raison*) reduced to operations modelled on an algebraic analysis, subordinated to exploratory operations. He listed two types of sentences distinguished by obvious reasoning; the first one is to be self-evident and the second one is to be a result of another statement which is self-explanatory; the specificity of the former type of a sentence was intended to make it possible to establish its identity in a direct way (*immédiatement*) while the identity of the latter type of a sentence is only discovered indirectly<sup>52</sup>. De Félice, seems to combine this concept – ignoring only the dazzling category of identity which was typical for Condillac – with Cartesian logic when he states that this deduction is sometimes immediate (*immédiate*) and defining it after Descartes as intuitive reasoning (*intuitif*)<sup>53</sup>. At the same time, just like Condillac who considered the intuitive cognition as the exclusive way of cognition typical for God, while us – due to cognitive limitations – are doomed to indirect reasoning, de Félice states that the weakness of our mind when it comes to the intuitive cognition (*intelligence*) makes it necessary while referring to things that are more complicated for us or less known to us (*choses moins simples ou moins connues*) while comparing two ideas we do not see clearly their similarities or differences or mutual relations that is, we cannot make any intuitive judgment about them, to make proper reasoning

51 “Raisonnement ..., logique, ce, c’est l’art de déduire une proposition d’une autre, de tirer des vérités inconnues de vérités connues” (*Raisonnement*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXXVI, 82).

52 See: S. Janeczek, *Kartezjanizm teorii nauki É. Condillaca*, in: *Filozofia XVII wieku i jej kontynuacja*, ed. Z. Drozdowicz, Poznań 2009, 203-209.

53 *Intuitus mentis*, the condition of which is the analytical reduction of the object to a simple form, which will enable its intuitive grasp. R. Descartes, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, Amstelodamii 1701; Idem, *Oeuvres de Descartes*, eds. C. Adam, P. Tannery, Paris 1897-1913; reprint: 1996, vol. X, 366; Idem, *Prawidła kierowania umysłem*, in: *Prawidła kierowania umysłem. Poszukiwanie prawdy poprzez światło przyrodzone rozumu*, op. cit., Warszawa 1937, 1958<sup>2</sup>, 23.

which is, out of necessity, an auxiliary ability of human mind (*une faculté subsidiaire de l'entendement*). At the same time, de Félice eclectically identifies nature which is understood in an epistemological way, with the broadly understood syllogistics, trying to simplify its principles even more than *Port-Royal Logic*<sup>54</sup>.

A special kind of an associationist concept of reasoning is to be syllogism. The anonymous author of an encyclopaedic entry devoted to this issue – it is worth noting that it is relatively extensive one – on the one hand, he presents an objectified outline of traditional syllogism, on the other hand, however, he formulates a basic, though a rather shorter one, criticism of it, formulated in the perspective of the method of asking about the right means of discovering the truth, fundamental for modern considerations, which were valued higher than the methods of organizing knowledge and teaching it<sup>55</sup>. In its basic form, the entry *Syllogisme* refers directly to a criticism of syllogism done by Locke, recalling the French translation of the basic work of the British empiricist<sup>56</sup>. The syllogism is not an indispensable cognitive tool, since real-life practice shows that people conclude clearly, accurately and precisely (*net, justes, et précis*) without even knowing the principles of logic in the slightest degree, and they are even able to notice the imperfection and falsity of the long and complicated arguments to which they are exposed by experts in logic. “Experience, action and our thoughts” teach us to deduce in a correct way better than any rules do. Thus, ironically speaking, he indicates that peasants have more common sense when it comes to everyday life than the doctors of Sorbonne. The needlessness of the knowledge of syllogistics is also indicated by the history of science and social life, even with reference to mathematics,

54 Cf. A. Arnauld, P. Nicole, *Logika, czyli sztuka myślenia*, op. cit., 16-17, 19-21, 257-265, 294-304; Idem, *La logique ou l'art de penser*, op. cit., 21-22, 24-25, 182-188, 211-217.

55 *Syllogisme*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, op. cit., vol. XV, 719-725.

56 The entry refers to Chapter XVII of Part Four: J. Locke, *Rozważania dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego*, transl. B. Gawecki, Warszawa 1955, vol. II, 414-431; Idem, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, London 1690, actually 1689; quoted from: *The Works of John Locke*, London 1823<sup>3</sup> (reprint: Aalen 1963), vol. III, 115-127. See: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?*, op. cit., 434-455.

which, using the evidentiary procedures, lacks syllogistics. Syllogism does not contribute to showing whether it is possible to strengthen the link between interrelated thoughts through natural, mental improvement. Moreover, the use of syllogism slows down investigation to inference effect. The mind can see more accurately thanks to its own insight, when it is certain and used to thinking, than when it is darkened, blocked or forced by syllogistic forms. Hence, “the art of *syllogism* is not the quickest, simplest and most convenient means of discovering and showing the truth”. What is more, it is not even useful for discovering the misconceptions hidden in complex rhetorical figures, to which – let us add – even Descartes and Locke agreed, who transferred the didactics of syllogistic to the teaching of rhetoric<sup>57</sup>.

A more balanced evaluation of syllogistics is presented by the entry *Syllogisme* in the publication of de Félice<sup>58</sup>. It not only recalls some of the principles of the chapter of part III *Port-Royal Logic* but he also states that “drifting away from them [those rules – S.J.] causes a risk of misunderstanding and confusing an error with the truth”. At the same time, however, he relativises their meaning, stating that those technical rules, even mechanical, do not teach reasoning, and only in some cases can ease the memory in scholastic discussions. Everyday experience is supposed to teach that even in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases per thousand, people are capable of reasoning correctly and making right judgments (*qui raisonnent conséquemment, et qui jugent très bien*) never dealing with the art of syllogism. However, this does not mean a total negation of the usefulness of studying logic, just as it is with the usefulness of studying grammar. Although people speak the language without knowing its rules, this does not mean that it is useless to study it. No wonder that he distances himself from the negative opinion that is often formulated about the need to know the rules of syllogism, which are supposed to be useless even in solving false reasoning or rejecting suggestive

57 E.g. rule X – R. Descartes, *Prawidła kierowania umysłem*, op. cit., 47-51; Idem, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, op. cit., vol. X, 403-406.

58 *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné de connoissances humaines*, op. cit., vol. XXXIX, 624-632.

sophistry. This unfair opinion is meant to have its origin in the fact that those opinion-makers either never studied the art of syllogism or studied it in a very bad way; they studied with bad teachers, they did not work hard enough or they are intellectually limited (*sans intelligence*) which undermines the credibility of those opinions.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Although both approaches are in line with modern preferences, relativising the meaning of traditional logic, which is transformed into a study of the method, or even into an outline of epistemology, they are eclectically inclined to validate the elements of logic defined since I. Kant's times as formal logic, even if only in a modest form. However, it is difficult to indicate which version of the *Encyclopedia* presents a more uniform line regarding the evaluation of logic. The *Encyclopedia* published by de Félice seems to be more moderate in modifying or even questioning the usefulness of the study of logic. However, it is not always consistent in this, and even sometimes exceeds the original edition with a modern tendency to reduce logic to the method of analysis. However, if one can find entries in the *Encyclopedia*, which, in a limited form, sustain the traditional theory of reasoning, even if in a simplified form, the interpretation of this reasoning, following e.g. the *Port-Royal Logic*, is not purely formal, since – as in Descartes – their value ultimately depends on the – subjectively understood – obviousness of first principles and relations between the elements of a chain of results that is closely related, even if defined in categories of deduction. Generally, however, one can see a preference for criticism of traditional logic, formulated in the spirit of empiricism as much in the theory of cognition as in the theory of science, especially in the case of Bacon, Locke and Condillac, but eclectically consistent with Descartes' methodology, which explains e.g. the common reference to *Port-Royal Logic* or, to a certain extent, to Wolff's achievements. However, the solutions adopted by both editions are closest to d'Alembert's eclectic approach. The preference for the method of scientific discovery over the method of lecture leads to relativisation of the rules of traditional logic, formulated to build

a systemic structure of science, especially as the rules of traditional logic are replaced by the mathematical method. Again, however, the *Encyclopaedia* eclectically avoids its absolutisation and postulates its use either as validation of the synthetic method or as a chain of evidence characteristic of Euclid's geometry, or as a method of algebra associated with the analytical method, identified with procedures for scientific discovery.

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## THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL FORM: WITTGENSTEIN AND LEIBNIZ\*

**Abstract.** The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's *The Monadology*. There are many similarities and analogies between those works, and the key concept for them is the category of the inner and acknowledged importance of consideration based on basic categories of thinking about the world. The Leibnizian account allows for a broader look at Wittgenstein's analysis of the relation between propositions and facts, between language and the world. Using the Hanoverian philosopher's terminology allows for the demonstration of the ambivalence of the concept of logical form in the philosophy of Wittgenstein and also the metaphysical nature of his first book.

**Keywords:** logical form; representation; isomorphism; monadology; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

1. Introduction. 2. Problem. 3. *The Monadology* by Leibniz and the *Tractatus*: similarities. 4. The internal and the monad. 5. The law of the series. 6. Proposition and the monad. 7. The concept of expression. 8. Conclusions.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

There is no clear consensus among commentators as to the interpretation of the concept of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (*TLP*). However, it is doubtlessly the central concept of the doctrine in the Tractatian doctrine. It seems that the interpretation of the entire work depends on the interpretation of this concept. This paper is an attempt to decode what

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Wittgenstein said about logical form from a perspective of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's monadology in order to better understand and explain this concept. The Leibnizian perspective allows a more complete formulation of this issue. The thought of this philosopher had a radical impact on the first book of Wittgenstein. The case of logical form is the best example of it, which will be justified in this article.

## 2. PROBLEM

Thesis 4.125 of the *Tractatus* states that the relationship between objects, or atomic facts “expresses itself in language by an internal relation between the propositions presenting them”. It is on this statement that the entire theory of meaning and ontology in the *Tractatus* is based. What occurs between objects, what is an occurrence in the world, finds its *expression* in a proposition. What did Wittgenstein mean? It seems that the triad “name/proposition/language” has a structure analogical to “object/atomic fact/the world”. The structures of language and the world are similar, it can even be assumed that they are identical, but this fact alone still does not justify ascertaining the existence of any relation of correspondence or identity between them, as Wittgenstein did. Such an assertion would require proving that there is some necessary basis on which one structure relates to another. The empirical fact of speaking about something, i.e. the relation of expressions of significant nature to some objects which are designated by them, does not provide such a basis. The very possibility of ascertaining this relation is another issue.

To understand Wittgenstein's position, attention should be paid to the issue of the tautological character of logical propositions and what they *show*. The philosopher argues that in the propositions of logic, which are tautologies, essential properties of language and the world *are shown*. Thus: a tautology shows a certain necessary combination of signs. Necessary – Wittgenstein's reasoning was similar to Leibniz's – means: true in every possible world. Something which would be necessary only in one world, for example in the one which is here and now, does not deserve to be called a necessity. Necessity is closely re-

lated to possibility<sup>1</sup>. It does not have to occur but it is always necessary as a type of potentiality. This was aptly formulated by Bogusław Wolniewicz in his foreword to the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*: “One is therefore allowed to say that something is real by accident, but one is not allowed to say that it is possible by accident”<sup>2</sup>. This is what tautological connections point to. Connections of propositions in a tautology are necessary since a tautology is a proposition that is always true, hence the fact which is *shown* by them cannot be merely logical or empirical, but it has to be the “transcendental fact” itself, a necessary fact pertaining to both the world and language. Indeed, a tautology *shows* the essential properties of language and the world. Otherwise, it wouldn’t have the character of necessity.

Discovering the transcendental concept of tautology, Wittgenstein justified the existence of the necessary connection between language and the world, a proposition and its referent. Each logical “resolution” is at the same time a semantic and metaphysical “resolution”. The entire connection between signs and things signified was described by Wittgenstein as a *representation* which is of an isomorphic nature. The concept, derived from set theory, was most probably adopted from Russell and given a transcendental character<sup>3</sup>. Isomorphism is closely connected with the concept of logical form. Russell distinguished grammatical form of a proposition from its logical form, giving the latter a fundamental status. The conventional grammatical form has a subject-predicate structure, which allows assigning certain qualities

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- 1 Leibniz put it simply: if there is reality in essences or possibles (...) this reality must be grounded in something existent and actual, and consequently, it must be grounded in the existence of the necessary being. (G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, trans. R. Ariew, D. Garber, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989, 218).
  - 2 B. Wolniewicz, *O Traktacie*, in: L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, transl. B. Wolniewicz, Warszawa 2004, XXXI.
  - 3 This is about the isomorphism of language and the World. “Two sets with a structure are considered as equivalent to the structure under consideration if there is a *bijjective* [invertible – M.P.] morphism for which the inverse function is also a morphism). In this case we speak of *isomorphism*, and we call the corresponding sets with structure *isomorphic sets*” (*Atlas matematyki*, eds. F. Reinhardt, H. Soeder, transl. Ł. Wiechecki, Warszawa 2005, 41).

to certain things<sup>4</sup>. Logical form, on the other hand, is a “deep” structure and it actually shows in what way constituents of a proposition, thoughts or facts are connected<sup>5</sup>. According to Russell, the purpose of philosophy is to carry out a logical analysis of propositions, and then to discover and investigate their logical forms<sup>6</sup>.

Wittgenstein disagreed with Russell on the significance of the study of logical form and, what is more important, he did not share the belief that logical form pertains to any semantic or empirical content<sup>7</sup>. Logical form is a relation constituting all possible connections, references, representations. If it did not exist, users of language would be destined to the randomness of signs, the inadequacy of descriptions, incompleteness of meanings. It guarantees that what is said *pictures* what occurs, what is actual<sup>8</sup>. Thesis 2.18 summarises this reasoning in the following way: “What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all – rightly or falsely – is the logical form, that is, the form of reality”. There is no doubt that the connection between language and the world is of a logical, or, in other words, of a structural character. Logical form is precisely the *expression* of the existence of identical structures.

At this point, we arrive at the essential question about Wittgenstein’s structuralism. Namely – what is the character of a logical form? Is it the

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4 B. Russell, *Our knowledge of the external world: as a field for scientific method in philosophy*, Routledge, London and New York 2009.

5 H.J. Glock, *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, Wiley-Blackwell, New Jersey, 1996, 203. .

6 Russell says that “In every proposition and in every inference there is, besides the particular subject-matter concerned, a certain form, a way in which the constituents of the proposition or inference are put together (....) It is obvious that the knowledge of logical forms is something quite different from knowledge of existing things” (B. Russell, *Our knowledge of the external world: as a field for scientific method in philosophy*, Routledge 2009, 34).

7 It would take a separate study to discuss Wittgenstein’s reliance on Russell. There is no place to deliberate upon it here. Those who are interested in it are referred to, i.a. *The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy* by David Pears, Oxford 1987.

8 The concept of picturing, which is immensely important in Wittgenstein’s discourse, shall be discussed in further deliberations.

thing which is represented, or is it a way of representation? Or, in other words: is it the thing projected, it the method of projection itself?<sup>9</sup>

The first possibility was discussed by Erik Stenius in his classic work *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought*. Let us assume, as he did, that there are two fields –  $F$  and  $G$ . The categorial structure of both fields is the same. For this reason, between elements of each category  $F$  and elements of each category  $G$  there is a one to one relation described by Stenius as correspondence. This *correspondence* is “the key to isomorphism”. Knowing this “key” one knows on what principle some elements of field  $F$  correspond to, or represent, certain elements of field  $G$ . The represented form is the sought-after “interpretation key”. The represented form is a shared categorial – inner, as Wittgenstein would say – structure of the image and of what it pictures<sup>10</sup>.

The second possibility was indicated by Vincent Descombes when discussing French structuralism: “Structural analysis starts from the structure, that is, from relations, defined in a purely formal way with the use of certain properties of a set of elements whose nature has not been specified; starting from the structure thus given, the analysis shows that a certain cultural content (kinship system, myth) is in it a ‘model’ or, as it is also called, a ‘representation’. What therefore has been proven? No more, and no less than the fact that such content is isomorphic compared to a certain number of other content. The structure is, strictly speaking, what is established in an isomorphism between two sets” [emphasis added – M.P.]<sup>11</sup>.

And then, in a footnote on the same page he states a thing of prominent importance: “Let us translate the elements, relations and operations of set  $E$  to the elements, relations and operations of set  $E'$ : there is an isomorphism between  $E$  and  $E'$ , if the translation of the result, which was true in  $E$ , is also true in  $E'$ , and if to a false result in

9 This ambiguity was pointed out to me by Andrzej Leder.

10 E. Stenius, *Wittgenstein's "Tractatus". A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought*, Oxford 1960, 93-101.

11 V. Descombes, *Le Même et l'autre. Quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933-1978)*, Editions de Minuit, Cambridge 1979, 104-105.

E corresponds a false result in  $E'$ <sup>12</sup>. The mathematical origin of this formula is outright evident<sup>13</sup>.

The logical form can be on some occasions understood as the projected content, and on other occasions – as the projection itself. It seems that it was not entirely clear to Wittgenstein how to understand logical form. Sometimes he talked about it as a certain structure (from as “the possibility of the structure”, *TLP* 2.033), sometimes as the norm of representation (form as a “representation”).

It was as late as in his article *Some Remarks on the Logical Form* published in 1992 that a thesis is formulated that logical form is a method of projection. It is not so clear in his *Tractatus*. The reason for this is probably the fact that the concept is still strongly imbued with Russell’s metaphysical influences, with their origins dating back to Leibniz’s philosophy. Therefore, to find the answer to the question about the character of logical form, we should go back to the deliberations of the Hanoverian philosopher.

### 3. THE MONADOLGY BY LEIBNIZ AND THE *TRACTATUS*: SIMILARITIES

It might seem surprising to refer at this point to the thought of the 17th-century philosopher, who was certainly not close to Wittgenstein<sup>14</sup>. Although Wittgenstein’s knowledge of Leibniz’s thought was insignificant, it will not be an exaggeration if we say that the *Tractatus* is Leibnizian in its spirit. The essential ideas and concepts in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* have their origins in Leibniz’s monadology.

It was probably through Bertrand Russell, who in 1900 wrote a voluminous monograph entitled *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, that Leibniz’s ideas became known to Wittgenstein. Earlier, between 1898 and 1899, Russell delivered lectures about Leibniz in Cambridge<sup>15</sup>. Russell’s study of Leibniz made it possible for him to

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 105.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. footnote 10.

<sup>14</sup> Wittgenstein’s biographer – R. Monk, does not mention his knowledge of Leibniz’s writings. There are no references in Wittgenstein’s *Nachlass* either.

<sup>15</sup> B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, London 1900, v.

move away from Bradley's idealism and at the same time formulate a programme of philosophy founded on the logical analysis of propositions. What did he find in Leibniz to inspire him to write a book which was "against traditional logic"<sup>16</sup>?

Leibniz's metaphysics was based on the foundation of logical theory. According to Russell, the entire system proposed by Leibniz was based on the assertion that "all judgements can be reduced to a type attributing some predicate to some subject"<sup>17</sup>. The concept of the substance itself, as an existent and complete subject<sup>18</sup>, "something what it unifies"<sup>19</sup>, according to Russell appeared because of the subject-predicate form of the judgement. This form is "projected" to the universe of what is given, and simultaneously treated as the form of the object-substance-monad<sup>20</sup>. Elzenberg stated that all predicates which can be asserted about the substance (impossibility of interaction, inseparability, indivisibility, pre-established harmony etc.) result from this logical foundation<sup>21</sup>, and the principle of analyticity ("all truths are analytical") is a reformulation of the assertion that "in all trues the predicate is included in the subject". As such, it constitutes "the foundation of Leibniz's system and as if his keynote"<sup>22</sup>.

16 H. Elzenberg, *Z historii filozofii*, ed. M. Woroniecki, Kraków 1995, 21.

17 Ibid, 20-21. Elzenberg also pointed to the immense significance of Russell's study of Leibniz's philosophy, proving that the entire 18th and 19th centuries attributed purely historical meaning to him: "the author was showered with flowers, and the system was presented in such a way that, if his reasoning was really as it was presented, it would deserve anything but those flowers" (Ibid, 19).

18 Leibniz defines it as follows: "The nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed". G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, op. cit., 41. [emphasis added – M.P.].

19 M. Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. W. McNeill, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, 72.

20 Design in the sense of constructing a certain structure, creating a certain pattern and at the same time as representing or picturing. Both these meanings of the concept of projection appear in the *Tractatus* doctrine.

21 H. Elzenberg, *Z historii filozofii*, op. cit., 50-51.

22 Ibid, 55. Elzenberg also showed that Leibniz follows the thought of Aristotle presented in *Prior Analytics*, taking into account the content of a proposition rather than its scope. By focusing attention on the content, he can formulate the principle of analyticity. See also:

The metaphysical solutions proposed by Leibniz are based on the form of a subject-predicate judgement. Let us have a closer look at the concept of the substance itself. The definition of substance adopted by Leibniz, together with the principle of analyticity led him to claim that every substance contains all its definitions, i.e. all that can be said about it is included in its concept. To use Wittgenstein's terms, the substance-subject is constituted by internal, formal qualities: such qualities, as to which it is unthinkable that a given object would not possess them (*TLP* 4.123). For this reason, they constitute the structure of an object. At this point, Wittgenstein's and Leibniz's reasoning significantly converge<sup>23</sup>. Let us attempt to compare the following paragraphs from *The Monadology*<sup>24</sup> and the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*<sup>25</sup>:

1. The monad, about which we shall speak here, is nothing other than a simple substance which enters into compounds, 'simple' meaning 'without parts'.	2.02. The object is simple. 2.0272. The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact.
2. And there must be simple substances, because there are compounds; for the compound is nothing but an accumulation or aggregate of simples.	2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
3. Now where there are no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. And these monads are the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.	2.021 Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound.

G. W. Leibniz, *Letter to Arnauld*, In: *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. L. E. Loemker, Dordrecht, Springer, 1989, 148-150.

23 By this "convergence" I mean a certain congeniality of solutions adopted by both philosophers, and not that Wittgenstein was a Leibnizian, of which I was accused by a reviewer writing for a certain philosophical periodical. The Leibnizian style of thinking present in all essays by Russell influenced young Wittgenstein. And, on the other hand, many interpreters speak of the influence of Kant to the *Tractatus*, while according to recent research, Wittgenstein never read Kant's works (this was discussed in Kirchberg (Austria), by Joachim Schulte during the 6th Wittgenstein Summer School in August 2014). He was acquainted with him, like with Leibniz, through Bertrand Russell.

24 G. W. Leibniz, *Leibniz's Monadology. A New Translation and Guide*, trans. L. Strickland, Edinburgh, 2014.

25 Similarities between Leibniz's philosophy and the doctrine of the *Tractatus* were indicated by J. Perzanowski in his *Teofilozofia Leibniza* (cf. J. Perzanowski, *Teofilozofia Leibniza*, in: G. W. Leibniz, *Pisma z teologii mistycznej*, trans. M. Frankiewicz, Kraków 1994, 274).



<p>8. Yet monads must have some qualities [and some changes], otherwise they would not be beings at all [and if simple substances were non-entities, compounds also would be reduced to nothing]. And if simple substances did not differ qualitatively, there would be no way of perceiving any change in things, since what is in the compound can only come from its simple constituents, and if monads were without different qualities they would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not differ quantitatively either.</p>	<p>2.0233. Two objects of the same logical form are – apart from their external properties – only differentiated from one another in that they are different.</p> <p>2.02331. Either a thing has properties which no other has, and then one can distinguish it straight away from the others by a description and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things which have the totality of their properties in common, and then it is quite impossible to point to any one of them.</p>
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Leaving aside certain differences, the style of inquiries made by both philosophers is very similar. The scheme is as follows: each compound thing (in Leibniz's words – substance, in Wittgenstein's – fact or atomic fact) is constituted by simple, not compound elements (monads and simple objects respectively). These, in turn, are elements of reality and as such necessarily have to be based on what is called by Leibniz "intrinsic denomination"<sup>26</sup>, and by Wittgenstein formal or internal structure<sup>27</sup>. In Leibniz's theory, "diversity is generated by combining many simpler substances, ultimately the simplest ones, into more compound complexes"<sup>28</sup>. In Wittgenstein's case, this thought is expressed in the so-called principle of extensionality (*TLP* 5), which is a logical rewording of Leibniz's postulate. All this is based, as we have already mentioned, on the metaphysics of what is internal. For there are no pure external, contingent definitions – there must be an internal principle at the foundation of everything. This is Leibniz's main thought, and the doctrine of monads which "have no windows"<sup>29</sup>, and the theory of pre-established harmony are derived from it.

The area that we have indicated still does not explain the necessity of the "language–world" relationship. Both in Leibniz's and Wittgenstein's

26 G. W. Leibniz, *Leibniz's Monadology*, op. cit., 15.

27 They must be based on necessity, as otherwise they would have to have external – empirical – definitions, which at the same time would mean their compound nature.

28 P. Gut, *Leibniz: myśl filozoficzna w XVII wieku*, Wrocław 2004, 67.

29 G. W. Leibniz, *Leibniz's Monadology*, op. cit., 15.

thought, this relation can have the status of a logical possibility, but the possibility is still not a fact, and both philosophers seem to support the thesis about the founding and necessary character of the sign-referent relation. The key concept for both philosophers is that of logical form and, to be more precise, the assumption that logical form is the form of language, but also – what seems more important – a form of the world. It is not significant here that for Leibniz logical form had the form of a subject-predicate judgment, and for Wittgenstein is assumed the form of Frege's function<sup>30</sup>. It seems irrelevant from an ontological perspective. The most important question is how the two philosophers came to the same conclusion, namely the necessary relation between language and the world. The answer seems obvious: they both started from the same assumptions. However, as we have already noted, Wittgenstein's deliberations are not convincing when it comes to explaining the problem of agreement of forms when dealing with two different forms (language and the world), and identical ones at the same time<sup>31</sup>, or in the case of the form itself, when only one "reconciling" form exists<sup>32</sup>.

We are left with two solutions: either we assume that Wittgenstein "dogmatically" believed in the logical relation between language and the world, or we turn to Leibniz hoping that we find the answer to our question there.

#### 4. THE INTERNAL AND THE MONAD

Leibniz understood substance as a structure governed by the so-called "intrinsic denomination"<sup>33</sup>. All its significant, and therefore necessary properties, are internal properties, and the internal principle is the principle that governs the substantial structure<sup>34</sup>. What decides about

30 *TLP* 3.318: "I conceive the proposition – like Frege and Russell – as a function of the expressions contained in it".

31 This is related to Leibniz's principle of identity of indiscernibles.

32 At this point we go back to our initial question about the character of form.

33 G. W. Leibniz, *Leibniz's Monadology*, op. cit., 15.

34 *Ibid*, section 15: "The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or passage from one perception to another."

the substantiality of substance, about its nature, is drive<sup>35</sup>, the internal factor, “*primum constitutivum* of original unification”<sup>36</sup>. A substance in itself is innerness, since “all predicates and events”<sup>37</sup> are included in its definition. Structure constitutes itself and at the same time determines its possibilities. Leibniz called it “Leibniz’s rule” (law of the series)<sup>38</sup>. From the “innerness” of the substance follows Leibniz’s entire thought called monadology, and the thesis of pre-established harmony. It is worth to have a closer look at it.

Leibniz stated that every substance is governed by *drive*, i.e. a passage from one perception to another. Drive has a strictly internal character<sup>39</sup>. The substance shall be henceforth called monad. What Leibniz understood as monad, combines all essential meanings of the Greek word *monas* – “simple”, “unity”, “the one”<sup>40</sup>. Substance as a unifying individual is a monad by definition, and as such, it is the primary building material for reality, what is constitutive and constituting<sup>41</sup>. Monad as the primary drive is, to use a term from

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35 M. Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. W. McNeill, Cambridge 1998, 74.

36 *Ibid.*, 73.

37 G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, op. cit., 72-73.

38 The right of the series will be addressed in further considerations

39 G. W. Leibniz, *Leibniz’s Monadology*, op. cit., 16-17. Heidegger claims it’s a process of unification, individuation: “What then makes each monad ultimately just this particular monad? How is individuation itself constituted? Recourse to the Creation is only the dogmatic explanation of the origin of what is individuated, and not the clarification of individuation itself. What makes up the latter? The answer to this question must explicate the essence of the monad even further. Obviously individuation must take place in that which basically constitutes the essence of the monad, in drive. What essential character in the structure of drive makes a particular individuation possible and thus grounds the peculiar uniqueness of each monad? To what extent is that which primordially unifies a self-individuating in its very unifying? When we previously set aside the connection with Creation, we did so only inasmuch as it is a dogmatic explanation. Nevertheless, the metaphysical sense expressed in describing the monad as created is its finitude. Considered formally, finitude means restrictedness. To what extent can drive be restricted? If finitude as restrictedness belongs to the essence of drive, then finitude must be defined within the fundamental metaphysical feature of drive. But this fundamental feature is unification, and unification as pre-hending, as surpassing in advance”.

40 *Ibid.*, 63.

41 It functions as Wittgenstein’s simple object/name of what guarantees the intelligibility of the world and language. Cf. thesis 3.23: “The postulate of the possibility of the sim-

systems theory, an organisation, *autopoietic*, self-organising structure,<sup>42</sup> and in this fact one should seek, according to Leibniz, the organisation of the superstructure which is reality.

Monad as a primary, internal organisation, is governed by the same laws as Wittgenstein's logic. Its equivalent is the grid of properties and internal relations. Leibniz called them a true reality. For this reason, as rightly pointed out by Robert Spaemann, "an indefinite structure of monads lies at the foundations of perceptible reality. On the other hand, the perceptible world is a symbol of the non-perceptible world of monads"<sup>43</sup>. Both realities, henceforth defined as inter- and extra-monadic, are divided by not so much an ontological, as by a transcendental chasm. Why?

We are approaching the line of demarcation between necessity (transcendental logic) and contingency (experience), between the sign and the signified. This line is where sense comes into existence. The necessity alone, without referring to what is external, what normalises, is empty, and the experience alone, without normalising principles, referred to as possibilities, is chaos, whereof one must be silent (*TLP* 7).

Is it the same in Leibnizian monadology? In terms of content – it is not. Discourses of the two philosophers are different. However, from a formal point of view, from a structural perspective, Leibniz and Wittgenstein are advocates of the same thesis. One has to have a close look at Leibniz's writings to see it. Leibniz might point to a solution of Wittgenstein's aporia.

## 5. THE LAW OF THE SERIES

Monad was defined as unity, the individual that constitutes and is constituted by drive. At this point, one should search for a law which governs the entire autopoietic system. We have already mentioned

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ple signs is the postulate of the determinateness of the sense".

<sup>42</sup> About autopoietic system, cf. M. Maciejczak, *Brentano i Husserl. Pytanie epistemologiczne*, Warszawa 2001.

<sup>43</sup> R. Spaemann, R. Löw, *Cele naturalne: dzieje i ponowne odkrycie myślenia teleologicznego*, transl. A. Półtawski, Warszawa 2008, 131-132.

about the internal principle, about the being of a monad as a drive, but this is still not an explanation that would satisfy Leibniz. He was rather looking for a law that could be expressed mathematically, that is one that could be formulated in a concrete algebraic equation<sup>44</sup>. This sought-after formula is the law of the series (“Leibniz’s rule”), available only in infinite perceptibility which is, according to Leibniz, available only to God<sup>45</sup>. It is “in its own way an expression of substantial and individual drive”<sup>46</sup>. It contains in itself all possible relations, including the two most important ones – the relations of consequence and simultaneity which are responsible for the constitution of time and space<sup>47</sup>. The law of the series is a prerequisite for the development of every monad, establishing all its relations in the order of succession and simultaneity. “And as every present state of a simple substance - states Leibniz in *Monadology* - is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present state is big with the future. . .”<sup>48</sup>. The discovery by Leibniz of these spatial-temporal vectors, constituted by the monadic subject, is one of his greatest merits, and we believe that it was it that has determined to a great extent the development of philosophy starting from Kant, through Husserl, to Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.

Having established the law of the series, Leibniz said: “Therefore, we must not conceive of a vague Adam, that is, a person to whom certain attributes of Adam belong, when we are concerned with deter-

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44 S. Cichowicz. *Przedmowa*, in: G. Leibniz, *Korespondencja z Antoine’em Arnauldem*, transl. S. Cichowicz, J. Kopania, Warszawa 1998, XXII. P. Gut, *Leibniz: myśl filozoficzna w XVII wieku*, op. cit., 81-83. “The mathematical equivalent of this idea [i.e. the law of the series – M.P.] is the concept of differentiation” (Ibid, 83).

45 Borges formulated this idea – with clear reference to Leibniz – as follows: “What is infinite intelligence? The reader might ask. There is theologian who would not define it; I prefer to illustrate it. The steps taken by a man from his birth to his death draw, in time, an incomprehensible figure. Divine intelligence immediately deciphers this figure, just as human intelligence would decipher a triangle. It is possible that this figure has its specific role in the picture of the universe” (as cited in: S. Cichowicz. *Przedmowa*, op. cit., XXII).

46 Ibid, XXII.

47 G. W. Leibniz, *Leibniz’s Monadology*, op. cit., 18.

48 Ibid., 18.

mining whether all human events follow from his assumption; rather, we must attribute to him a notion so complete that everything that can be attributed to him can be deduced from it"<sup>49</sup>. He then distinguished subject as a person from a subject as the basis for substance. Both of these distinctions disappeared from his thought over time, and substance, monad and subject were considered to be the same. The subject-monad derives its individual history, habitualities and habits from the law of the series, but it is also a vehicle for its future as anticipation, bearing in mind that "this anticipation, however, is no longer an actual possibility of a specific future state of rest, but it is a rule of producing a series of certain states which can be thought of as a functional equation"<sup>50</sup>. All this is already contained in the concept of substance, in its "intrinsic quality".

We are already one step away from "ontological" theses of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein claims: "if I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts. (Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object). ... If a thing *can* occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be pre-judged in the thing" [emphasis added – M.P.] (*TLP* 2.0123, 2.012).

The knowledge of internal properties of an object – its features (as Leibniz says – concept), pertains to its actual and possible positions, configurations, arrangements, establishments, contexts. The logical structure of an object, also known as formal or internal structure, is a logical form, that which is projected by language (assuming the representation of language on the world) or that which projects, determines language (assuming the representation of the world on language).

Wittgenstein, unlike Leibniz, talked about "external" consequences of the constitution of an object, about its configurations in atomic facts, relations to situations and its role in the constitution of the world, what we called the extramonadic sphere (*TLP* 2.01-2.02). Leibniz talked about what is inter-monadic: about the history, genesis, and internal motion of a monad. The difference is visible, but it is not so significant

49 G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, op. cit., 72-73.

50 R. Spaemann, R. Löw, *Cele naturalne: dzieje i ponowne odkrycie myślenia teleologicznego*, op. cit., 130.

as to prevent the assumptions of the two philosophers from converging into a shared conclusion, namely the thesis about the existence of isomorphism. On what grounds do Leibniz and Wittgenstein accept isomorphism? Why is logic a warranty of the language-world relation?

## 6. PROPOSITION AND MONAD

In thesis 5, Wittgenstein stated that an elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself. This means that its sense does not depend on the sense of any other proposition (*TLP* 4.211) The discovery of this fact by Wittgenstein led him to formulate a thesis – rejected later in *Some Remarks on Logical Form* – concerning the independence of elementary propositions. Each elementary proposition is a fully autonomous and, what is more: necessary semantic unit. Why necessary? For what decides about the content of an elementary proposition are simple names, whose obvious referents are simple objects – necessary elements constituting the entirety of facts – the world. This is the first assumption made by Wittgenstein. The second assumption is associated with the so-called postulate of the determinateness of the sense according to which the logical analysis of each proposition has to have its end (*TLP* 3.23)<sup>51</sup>. It is a simple name deriving its meaning from an elementary proposition, in accordance with Frege's context principle (*TLP* 3.3). Both assumptions have a conclusion in common: the assertion of the existence of what is simple, what founds and conditions sense and intelligibility. What is simple is an equivalent of Leibniz's monad.

What is therefore the actual role of what is simple in Wittgenstein's *onto-logic*? Saying that what is simple constitutes what is compound does not solve the problem, because in the concept of "simpleness" already contains the concept of "compoundness", and vice versa: what is compound refers to what is simple. Unfortunately, most Wittgenstein's discussions in the *Tractatus* are centred around

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<sup>51</sup> Wittgenstein, unlike Russell, claimed that logical analysis cannot be infinite. In proposition 3.25 he states that "There is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition".

this type of grammatical deliberations, as the philosopher himself will note after 1930. However, there are some propositions that shed some light on this problem from another perspective.

Namely, it is typical for an elementary proposition that it *expresses*, describes part of reality. This is related to Wittgenstein's thesis that "the specification of all true elementary propositions describes the world completely" (*TLP* 4.26). If one elementary proposition is given, then therewith all elementary propositions are also given (*TLP* 5.524). Why? This is associated with simple names and simple objects correlated with them that reveal all possible propositions (in the case of names) or facts (in the case of objects) designated by propositions (*TLP* 2.012, 2.0123, 3.202, 3.22). It is for this reason that an elementary proposition constituted, for example, by two simple names reveals part of the universe, just as the word "rain" reveals its possible uses with such words as "pouring", "wet". It can be therefore said that an elementary proposition is like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, but one which, once it is used, immediately points to other pieces needed to put the jigsaw puzzle together.

To sum up: the founding order of language and its correlate – the world, is the internal order of structures, relations, grids, lines, constituting places in which a specific intersection, pole, property, or even object appears. The key concept is a structure called logical form by both philosophers. At the very beginning of our discussion of the concept of form and related isomorphism, we asked about the character of the form. Is it a method of projection, a mapping of some structures of one field onto another, or is it rather the very structure which enables isomorphism as the mode of being of language and the world.

We have not answered this question so far, and it is this question that is supposed to point to the answer to the question about isomorphism and the grounds for it. At this point, one should consider in what way what is simple, basic, founding and binding is connected with the problem of isomorphism. Wittgenstein provides the following guidance: an elementary proposition is constituted by simple



names, it “expresses”<sup>52</sup> (Leibniz’s term) part of the world and, because it points to the remaining propositions, which also express the world, such a proposition itself expresses, as it were, the entire world. It can be said that an elementary proposition expresses the world as such.

## 7. THE CONCEPT OF EXPRESSION

The concept of expression is one of the most difficult and troublesome concepts. Leibniz introduced it shortly after the discussion of the nature of monad, in the context of the question about its connection with what is transcendent to it – with extra-monadic reality. It is in the concept of expression that the connection between monad and externality is explained. Monad *expresses* something. Every substance contains, by virtue of its own concept – *eidos*, all of its predicates. Along with these predicates we are given at once all possible relationships, configurations, arrangements in which a given monad can be found (cf. *TLP* 2.012, 2.0123). Leibniz tried to abstract from this concept all ontological consequences and at the same time, he wanted to put it in a conceptual framework, knowing that any intrinsic (structural) quality founds and consolidates each possible external quality<sup>53</sup>. The thesis about intrinsic qualities shows that each monad pictures, reflects, represents, implicates, or finally, expresses, the entire universe. What does it mean that a monad expresses?

“One thing expresses another when there is a constant and regular relation between what can be said about one and the other”<sup>54</sup>. A monad has to contain the principle of expression of the world. The concept of expression (*expressio*) derives from the concept of perception (*perceptio*) and it was meant to accurately reflect the sense of Leibniz’s perception of a monad.

“Defining *perceptio* through *expressio*, through a kind of presentation, Leibniz states in other words that the existence of an item

<sup>52</sup> Wittgenstein expressed this thought using the concept of the form of representation.

<sup>53</sup> For this reason Elzenberg says that there are no purely external qualities. H. Elzenberg, *Z historii filozofii*, op. cit., 59.

<sup>54</sup> G. W. Leibniz, *Letter to Arnould*, op. cit., 339.

implies the whole universe (as a system of co-existence, as the actual and contingent order of various phenomena); and in fact, he finds it the most strongly in his language, so much his own, as to be idiomatic: in section 13 of *Principles of Nature and Grace* and section 61 of *The Monadology* he uses the French word *pli* ('fold', 'ply', 'plait', 'pleat'); this monadic *plis* are usually translated as 'folds': 'But a soul can read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its complexity is infinite'<sup>55</sup>.

A monad's being is its way of expression<sup>56</sup>. Leibniz claims that each monad as an intrinsically constituted structure which "expresses the universe differently" since "its most individual mission is to be a living mirror of being, a concentrated universe"<sup>57</sup>.

Deleuze explained it as follows: "every individual monad expresses the world. However, this thesis is not sufficiently understandable, as long as it is interpreted in the sense of the belonging of predicates to the expressing monad. Because it is undoubtedly true that the expressed world does not exist outside the monads which express it, and hence it exists in monads as a series of predicates [emphasis added – M.P.] which belong to them. ... The expressed world is composed of differential relations and contiguous peculiarities. It composes the world, to be precise, to the extent to which series which depend on each peculiarity converge with series that depend on other peculiarities: *it is this convergence that determines 'mutual existential dependence' as the rule for the synthesis of the world*. Where series diverge, another universe begins which is not mutually existentially dependent with the first world"<sup>58</sup>.

55 S. Cichowicz. *Przedmowa*, op. cit., XXV.

56 Its whole being (Heidegger's *Da-Sein*) is owing to the ability to express, which is the monadic *modus* of perception, and at the same time co-existence (*Mit-Sein*) and Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*). It is through expression that a monad transcends itself and reaches the world which is what is expressed.

57 As cited in: S. Cichowicz. *Przedmowa*, op. cit., XXVII.

58 G. Deleuze, *La Logique du sens*, Paris 1969, 150-152; as cited in: S. Cichowicz, *Przedmowa*, op. cit., XXVIII-XXIX.

A monad reflects the world, expresses it as an expansion “to infinity” of its own predicates, based on the law of the series. The world is a constituted equivalent of a monad, a projected structure resulting from the intersection of one series of predicates with other series. The workings of a monad, its expressibility, consist in a transcendental synthesis connecting some representations with others.

A proposition represents a fragment of reality, expresses it through its infinite and continuous references to the whole logical space. Even the simplest proposition, such as “It is raining today”, refers to all possible propositions describing the conditions in which rain may fall, the rain has to fall, and in which rain will not fall. A network, grid, the constellation is formed – called by Wittgenstein the logical space in which propositions determine places for facts in logical space (*TLP* 3.4). “Although a proposition may only determine one place in logical space” – says Wittgenstein – “the whole logical space must already be given by it. The proposition reaches through the whole logical space” (*TLP* 3.42). Along with the proposition – just like with Leibniz’s monad – the entire world is given. A proposition initiates the process of synthesis which culminates in the workings of language as a whole. The main difference between Wittgenstein’s and Leibniz’s ideas is the fact that the latter demonstrated a dynamic genesis of the synthesis carried out by a monad, claiming that a monad itself is the source of its movement, changes and history. A monad *per se* is expressing. It is, as Leibniz says, referring to Aristotle’s language – an entelechy, a unity whose *eidos* is determined by *telos* – the ultimate purpose. In the case of Wittgenstein, we will not find in a proposition the principle of its movement, the source of projection, representation. This principle, unlike in Leibniz’s conception, is not purely immanent, a proposition in the philosophy of the *Tractatus* is something static, as if in the state of potentiality. It needs what in the metaphysics of the Stagirite is called *dynamis* – a potency<sup>59</sup>,

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59 “Potency” means: the source of motion or change which is in something other than the thing changed, or in it qua other”. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. H. Tredennick, 1019a <http://>

what moves the proposition as a structure. Language, as it is understood by Wittgenstein, does not have in itself what Leibniz calls drive, force, teleology.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS

We have to state it openly that Wittgenstein was a radical continuer of Leibniz's thought. He unintentionally drew the final consequences from Leibniz's theory of innerness, concluding that the entire immanent structure of the world is the structure of language, its logos. Although the *Tractatus* bears clear signs of transcendentalism, the core of this publication is thoroughly Leibnizian, in both speculative and dogmatic sense. Wittgenstein in continuing Leibniz's ontological deliberations remained to some extent within the realm of traditional metaphysics. Wittgenstein's intention is Kantian, but the philosopher himself does not take full advantage of his achievements and falls into logicism, or even logocentrism<sup>60</sup>.

Logical form encompasses the sign – referent relation, which reveals the structural relation sign – signified. We have asked: is it the structure, or is it what is projected from one structure onto another? The atomic fact, proposition and thought have the same structures meant as certain inner combinations of elements and constituting relations, which at the same time determine all possible combinations with other objects. Due to the identity of these structures, we are given a kind of an “isomorphic triad” determined by thought, language and the world. Intuitively, this triad is as follows: the world is thought about (isomorphism of thought and the world), propositions are formulated about it (isomorphism of language and thought) and it is spoken about (isomorphism of language and the world). And all this is centred in the concept of logical form which is the logical form of language, thought and reality.

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[www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3A-book%3D5%3Asection%3D1019a](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3A-book%3D5%3Asection%3D1019a) (access 01.05.2021).

60 It is also associated with a failure to reflect on the role of the subject. A discussion of this issue may be too much beyond the scope of this article.

It seems that logical form is either a “collective form”, however strange it may sound, encompassing the logical forms of thought, language and the world respectively, or it is the sum of these three forms, or it is what determines the logical forms of thought, language and the world. Did Wittgenstein clearly point to one of these options? Unable to decide if the form should be a structure or a manner of projection, he was caught up in a kind of dialectic. The form is ambiguous and it is in this ambiguity that its transcendental character lies. Depending on how a question is formulated, the form *appears* to be either the structure of language and the world or, in the context of a question about the constitution of sense, therefore about the role of thinking – a projection of the structure of language onto the entirety of what in speech is called the world. In the ontic order it is a structure, and in the genetic order – a projection or mapping.

Leibniz says that reality has the form of a subject-predicate judgement and that this form determines the way of thinking about the world and the subject. Logical form is in his opinion something pre-existing, God’s plan, the way how clockwork operates. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, claims that logical form warrants the possibility of speaking in a meaningful way about the world. Logical form as if warrants the *significance* of language (TLP 6.124). Thus it is a condition of intelligibility, not a way in which the world is established, as in Leibniz’s thought.

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EDWARD NIEZNAŃSKI

## PHILOSOPHY AS A SYSTEM OF CONDITIONALS\*

**Abstract.** Philosophical statements are often suppositions. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz proposes in *Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain*, 1704, a method of the construction of assertive conditionals occurring between any philosophical suppositions. If we can infer a philosophical statement from any suppositions then the implication between these suppositions and the obtained statement is assertive. In the article, some examples of the application of Leibniz's method are considered.

**Keywords:** Leibniz; theodicy; supposition; conditionals

The purpose of the sciences about reality is to make assertive, certain statements. Assumptions, opinions are treated as a concession to methodological deficiencies. There are also suppositions which allow for what is logically possible, not contradictory. Philosophy seems to be located in this situation of the weakest bases. Here are some philosophers who accept, for example, suppositions that there is an absolute, immaterial soul, immortality, sense of life, etc., while others, on the contrary, recognise the negation of such suppositions, which also only has the power of suppositions<sup>1</sup>. And the philosopher's subjective assertions are irrelevant.

Leibniz proposes to philosophy to get out of this enchanted circle of suppositions: "It must be added that even principles whose certainty is not absolute can apply if you build on them only by com-

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1 For the sake of comparison, let us quote Henryk Mehlberg's thesis, "The fact that there are unproven assumptions in empirical science seems unquestionable". H. Mehlberg, *O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki*, in: *Logiczna teoria nauki*, ed. T. Pawłowski, PWN, Warszawa 1966, 359.

mand. Although in this case all the conclusions are only conditional and depend on a presumption of the truth of these principles, at least the dependencies and conditional sentences themselves remain valid. So it is very desirable that we have many works written using this method<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, if from the set of suppositions:  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$ , a  $q$  sentence can be deduced according to the rules of formal logic, then the implication  $(p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge \dots \wedge p_n) \rightarrow q$  is certain and sufficiently justified. Let us demonstrate this practice on an example of theodicy. Let us assume that we already have the concept of inherence ratio “ $\varepsilon$ ” (“is”) as a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric relation,<sup>3</sup> according to the semantic postulates:

P1.  $\forall x x\varepsilon x$ ,

P2.  $\forall x \forall y \forall z (x\varepsilon y \wedge y\varepsilon z \rightarrow x\varepsilon z)$ ,

Df.:  $x=y \leftrightarrow x\varepsilon y \wedge y\varepsilon x$ ,

the concept of the counter-return of a part to whole ( $C$ ):

P3.  $\forall x \sim xCx$ ,

as well as the original concept of *raison d'être* ( $R$ ) with the intention of meaning that identities and parts are *raison d'être*:

P4.  $\forall z \forall x [(z=x \vee zCx) \rightarrow zRx]$ .

Then we can define the concept of sufficient *raison d'être* ( $D$ ), the concept of the absolute ( $A$ ) and the simple being ( $P$ ):

Df.D:  $xDy \leftrightarrow xRy \wedge \forall z (zRx \rightarrow z=x)$

( $x$  is sufficient ration  $y$ - $a \leftrightarrow x$  is ration  $y$ - $a$  and each ration  $x$ - $a$  is identical to  $x$ - $em$ . Sufficient *raison d'être* is its minimum ration)

Df.A:  $x\varepsilon A \leftrightarrow \forall z (zRx \leftrightarrow z=x)$

(Absoluteness is the same as any *raison d'être* of existence; it is right in itself and has no right *ab alio*)

Df.P:  $x\varepsilon P \leftrightarrow \sim \exists z zCx$

(Simple being is being without parts)

2 G. W. Leibniz, *Nowe rozważania dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego*, transl. I. Dąmbska, Antyk, Kęty 2001, 393–394.

3 This sense of the relation “... is ...” is equivalent to the relation “each ... is ...”, it is different from the meaning adopted in Leśniewski Ontology. See: E. Nieznański, *Logika. Podstawy – język – uzasadnianie*, Wydawnictwo C. H. Beck, Warszawa 2000, 153–164.



We will prove the three conditionals relevant to the theodicy:

Tw.1:  $\forall y \exists x xDy \rightarrow \exists x x \varepsilon A$

(If the principle of sufficient *raison d'être* applies, there is an absolute)

Proof

$\forall y \exists x xDy$ , thus  $\exists x xDa$ , thus  $bDa$ , Df.D, thus  $\forall z (zRb \rightarrow z=b)$ , P4, thus  $\forall z (zRb \leftrightarrow z=b)$ , Df.A, thus  $b \varepsilon A$ , thus  $\exists x x \varepsilon A$ .

Tw.2:  $\forall x (x \varepsilon A \rightarrow x \varepsilon P)$

(absolute is simple being)

Proof by contradiction

P3, P4, thus  $\forall x \sim xCx$ ,  $\forall z \forall x (zCx \rightarrow zRx)$ ,  $x \varepsilon A$ ,  $\sim x \varepsilon P$  (assumption of proof by contradiction), Df.P, thus  $\exists z zCx$ , thus  $aCx$ , thus  $aRx$ , Df.A, więc  $a=x$ , thus  $xCx$ ,  $\sim xCx$ , thus contradiction.

Tw.3:  $\forall x (x \varepsilon M \rightarrow \sim x \varepsilon P) \wedge x \varepsilon A \rightarrow \sim x \varepsilon M$ , where “M” is a “material being”

(If no material being is simple, the absolute is immaterial)

Proof

P3, P4, thus  $\forall x \sim xCx$ ,  $\forall z \forall x (zCx \rightarrow zRx)$ ,  $\forall x (x \varepsilon M \rightarrow \sim x \varepsilon P)$ ,  $x \varepsilon A$ , Tw.2, thus  $x \varepsilon P$ , thus  $\sim x \varepsilon M$ .

Sometimes it is useful to translate the implication into an alternative, as defined:

Df.v:  $(p \vee q) \leftrightarrow (\sim p \rightarrow q)$

A logical tautology is, for example, a thesis:

Tw.4:  $(p \rightarrow \sim q) \rightarrow \{(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow [(\sim p \rightarrow \sim q) \rightarrow \sim(\sim p \rightarrow q)]\}$

Proof by contradiction

$(p \rightarrow \sim q)$ ,  $(p \rightarrow q)$ ,  $(\sim p \rightarrow \sim q)$ ,  $\sim p \rightarrow q$  (assumption of proof by contradiction), thus  $q \rightarrow \sim p$ , thus  $p \rightarrow \sim p$ , thus  $\sim p$ , thus  $q$ ,  $\sim q$ , thus contradiction.

Tw.4 is inferentially equivalent to the alternative Tw.5:

Tw.5:  $(p \wedge q) \vee (p \wedge \sim q) \vee (\sim p \wedge q) \vee (\sim p \wedge \sim q)$

Proof

Tw.5 only if  $\sim \sim (p \wedge q) \vee \sim \sim (p \wedge \sim q) \vee \sim \sim (\sim p \wedge q) \vee \sim \sim (\sim p \wedge \sim q)$  only if  $\sim (p \rightarrow \sim q) \vee \sim (p \rightarrow q) \vee \sim (\sim p \rightarrow \sim q) \vee \sim (\sim p \rightarrow q)$  only if Tw.4.

An alternative is also a tautology:

Tw.6:  $(p \wedge q \wedge r) \vee (p \wedge q \wedge \sim r) \vee (p \wedge \sim q \wedge r) \vee (p \wedge \sim q \wedge \sim r) \vee (\sim p \wedge q \wedge r) \vee (\sim p \wedge q \wedge \sim r) \vee (\sim p \wedge \sim q \wedge r) \vee (\sim p \wedge \sim q \wedge \sim r)$

Proof by contradiction

$\sim$ Tw.6 (assumption of proof by contradiction), thus  $\sim(p \wedge q \wedge r)$ ,  $\sim(p \wedge q \wedge \sim r)$ ,  $\sim(p \wedge \sim q \wedge r)$ ,  $\sim(p \wedge \sim q \wedge \sim r)$ ,  $\sim(\sim p \wedge q \wedge r)$ ,  $\sim(\sim p \wedge q \wedge \sim r)$ ,  $\sim(\sim p \wedge \sim q \wedge r)$ ,  $\sim(\sim p \wedge \sim q \wedge \sim r)$ , thus  $(p \wedge q \rightarrow \sim r)$ ,  $(p \wedge q \rightarrow r)$ ,  $(p \wedge \sim q \rightarrow \sim r)$ ,  $(p \wedge \sim q \rightarrow r)$ ,  $(\sim p \wedge q \rightarrow \sim r)$ ,  $(\sim p \wedge q \rightarrow r)$ ,  $(\sim p \wedge \sim q \rightarrow \sim r)$ ,  $(\sim p \wedge \sim q \rightarrow r)$ , thus  $\sim(p \wedge q)$ ,  $\sim(p \wedge \sim q)$ ,  $\sim(\sim p \wedge q)$ ,  $\sim(\sim p \wedge \sim q)$ , thus  $p \rightarrow \sim q$ ,  $p \rightarrow q$ ,  $\sim p \rightarrow \sim q$ ,  $\sim p \rightarrow q$ , thus  $\sim q \rightarrow p$ , thus  $\sim p \rightarrow p$ , thus  $p$ , thus  $q$ ,  $\sim q$ , thus contradiction.

The statements made by Tw.5 and Tw.6 will prove useful for our further deliberations. Let us first note that the philosopher does not seek empirical laws or types. He devotes all his attention to the nature of things and matters of interest to him. What is nature? Nature is “the essence of being (an individual substance, an affliction) as the basis of qualities: what a given thing is in itself”<sup>4</sup>. In the nature of things, we distinguish its constitutive components (essential aspects, principles). Let the symbol  $\alpha(x)$  denote an important aspect of nature x-a. Then “ $a \in \alpha(x)$ ” is read: “a is an essential aspect of nature x-a (its principle)”. The aspects remain in opposition to one another (O): either complementary (OK) or disjunctive (OD). We define these oppositions:

Df.OK:  $OK_{ab} \leftrightarrow \forall x (x \in a \leftrightarrow \sim x \in b)$

(a remains in complementary opposition to b, when a and b are contradictory)

Df.OD:  $OD_{ab} \leftrightarrow \forall x (x \in a \rightarrow \sim x \in b)$

(a remains in disjunctive opposition to b, when a and b are opposite)

Df.O:  $O_{ab} \leftrightarrow (OK_{ab} \vee OD_{ab})$

(a remains in opposition to b, when a remains in disjunctive or complementary opposition to b)

<sup>4</sup> A. Posiad, *Słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych*, PAX, Warszawa 2000, 546.

Instead of the opposition, we will also talk about complements. The opposing component of the opposition is called the complement. If e.g. the being and existence are components of the opposition, then the being is called the complement of existence, and vice versa: existence – the complement of the being. The rules are put together in opposition pairs as suggested by Izydora Dąmbska: "... a certain duality is imposed on us both in the construction of the reality we present ourselves and in the forms of cognition, and that at the same time there exists a certain ambition in the conscious subject, which forces them to reduce and remove this duality in various ways, substituting it with some unity"<sup>5</sup>. The Oab opposition is a single opposition. Multiple oppositions ( $O^n$ ) are defined by single oppositions:

Df. $O^n$ :  $O^n(a, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) \leftrightarrow \forall i (i \leq n \rightarrow Oaa_i)$

(a remains in n-fold opposition to the sequence  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n$ , if a remains in a single opposition to each term of that sequence)

For example, In relation to an assertion, multiple (twofold) oppositions (complements) are assumption and supposition (these are disjunctive complements). The relation of a single opposition is non-reflexive (Tw.7) and symmetrical (Tw.8) in a set of principles:

Tw.7:  $\forall a \forall b (Oab \rightarrow \sim a\epsilon b)$

Proof

Oab, thus  $\forall x (x\epsilon a \rightarrow \sim x\epsilon b)$ ,  $a\epsilon a$ , thus  $\sim a\epsilon b$ .

Tw.8:  $\forall a \forall b (Oab \rightarrow Oba)$

Proof

Oab, Df.O, Df.OK, Df.OD, thus  $\forall x (x\epsilon a \leftrightarrow \sim x\epsilon b) \vee \forall x (x\epsilon a \rightarrow \sim x\epsilon b)$ , thus

$\forall x (x\epsilon b \leftrightarrow \sim x\epsilon a) \vee \forall x (x\epsilon b \rightarrow \sim x\epsilon a)$ , thus Oba.

5 I. Dąmbska, *O dwoistości w aspekcie bytu i poznania i o tendencji do przewyciężania tej dwoistości jako podstawie kierunków i stanowisk filozoficznych*, in: *Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii*, eds. J. Kmita, J. Topolski, PWN, Warszawa 1989, 13-21.

The relation between the principles and the opposition is linked to the semantic postulate:

$$P5. \quad \forall a \forall b \forall x [a \varepsilon \alpha(x) \wedge Oab \rightarrow b \varepsilon \alpha(x)]$$

(Complementation of a principle is the principle)

Two principles  $a$  and  $b$  standing in a single opposition to each other  $Oab$  a predicate  $F$  – according to Tw.5 – can be decided in exactly four ways:

$$\begin{aligned} &F(a) \wedge F(b) \vee \\ &F(a) \wedge \sim F(b) \vee \\ &\sim F(a) \wedge F(b) \vee \\ &\sim F(a) \wedge \sim F(b). \end{aligned}$$

The three principles  $a, b$  and  $c$  standing in double opposition to each other  $O^2(a, b, c)$  a predicate  $F$  – according to Tw.6 – can be decided in exactly eight ways:

$$\begin{aligned} &F(a) \wedge F(b) \wedge F(c) \vee \\ &F(a) \wedge F(b) \wedge \sim F(c) \vee \\ &F(a) \wedge \sim F(b) \wedge F(c) \vee \\ &F(a) \wedge \sim F(b) \wedge \sim F(c) \vee \\ &\sim F(a) \wedge F(b) \wedge F(c) \vee \\ &\sim F(a) \wedge F(b) \wedge \sim F(c) \vee \\ &\sim F(a) \wedge \sim F(b) \wedge F(c) \vee \\ &\sim F(a) \wedge \sim F(b) \wedge \sim F(c). \end{aligned}$$

Most often, philosophical standpoints are based on a single opposition of principles, less often – on double and quite exceptionally on oppositions with more components. The relation between the two principles and the standpoints advocating the  $F$  predicate about them is illustrated in the table:

Standpoints/rules	I	II
1.	+	+
2.	+	—
3.	—	+
4.	—	—

Where “+” means  $F(\dots)$ , a “—” —  $\sim F(\dots)$ .

Examples:

(1) By the nature of being: I spirit, II matter; 1. dualism, 2. spiritualism, 3. materialism, 4. neutral monism.

(2) By the complementarity of being: I God, II world; 1. dualism, 2. pantheism, 3. atheism, 4. nihilism.

(3) By the entity of being: I entity in se, II entity ab alio; 1. aggregate, 2. substance, 3. condition, 4. non-being.

(4) By raisons d'être: I ration in se, II ration ab alio; 1. unnecessary being, 2. necessary being, 3. unnecessary non-being, 4. necessary non-being.

(5) By types of cognition: I rational cognition, II sensual cognition; 1. moderate empiricism, 2. extreme apriorism, 3. extreme empiricism, 4. irrationalism.

(6) Due to the being of idea: I sensual empirical beings, II ideal objects; 1. moderate realism, 2. nominalism, 3. platonism, 4. non-essentialism.

(7) By the ultimate motivation of human life: I rush to joy, II strive for perfection; 1. eudemonism, 2. hedonism, 3. perfectionism, 4. cynicism.

The next table illustrates the situation where the alternative of eight standpoints includes three principles:

Standpoints/rules	I	II	III
1.	+	+	+
2.	+	+	—
3.	+	—	+
4.	+	—	—

5.	—	+	+
6.	—	+	—
7.	—	—	+
8.	—	—	—

### Examples:

(1) By the nature of the judgments that exist in science: I assertive, II hypothetical, III suppositional following standpoints are possible: 1. radical criticism, 2. moderate criticism, 3. moderate dogmatism, 4. radical dogmatism, 5. moderate hypothetism, 6. extreme hypothetism, 7. moderate scepticism, 8. extreme scepticism;

(2) By the actual existence of principles: I things, II phenomena, III ideas we get standpoints: 1. phenomenology, 2. realism, 3. Platonic reism, 4. radical reism, 5. Platonism, 6. phenomenism, 7. Platonic fictionism, 8. radical fictionism;

(3) By the purposes of people's acts: I for themselves, II for others, III for nobody (for what is not a person). Standpoints: 1. moderate naturalism, 2. extreme naturalism, 3. moderate egoism, 4. extreme egoism, 5. moderate altruism, 6. extreme altruism, 7. moderate indifferentism, 8. extreme indifferentism.

In a philosophical system of legitimate conditionals and alternatives, as outlined here, a philosopher can define the spectrum and boundaries of solutions in any matter. The choice of a single standpoint is more often a matter of motives than rights.

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Epistemology  
– Philosophy  
of Language



ANDRZEJ PÓŁTAWSKI

## SENSES AND “SENSUAL DATA”\*

**Abstract.** One of the main goals of modern philosophy was to achieve an in-depth insight into the foundations of empirical knowledge. The problem was expected to be resolved by the analysis of experience. However, the road to a plausible account of experience was at the very beginning obstructed by turning the analysis into a search for clear and distinctive elements of experience and by sticking to purely intellectual intuition as means of this analysis. Moreover, clear and distinctive elements of experience were thought of as the basis of cognitive certainty. Both psychology and philosophy, at least until the nineteen-thirties, were deeply influenced by this essentially rationalistic conception of sensor experience. It is gestalt psychology and phenomenology that should be merited for overcoming that ill-conceived model. Only by taking into account the immediate sensor relation between the human subject and the environment, it is possible to show the kind of unity which is the prerequisite of human intellect.

**Keywords:** sensual data; perception; empiricism

1. Introduction: Sensualist construction of impressions in modern empiricism. 2. Sensation (*das Empfinden*) according to Erwin Straus. 3. Sensation and perception 4. Conclusions: Traditional and modern concept of the senses

### 1. INTRODUCTION: SENSUALIST CONSTRUCTION OF IMPRESSIONS IN MODERN EMPIRICISM

Descartes, wishing to base his teaching on solid and unshakable foundations, considered the sensual cognition associated with the bodily functions of particular organs as unclear and uncertain. As a point of departure, he used his – to use a contemporary term – intentional experiences, *cogitationes*. Sensual experience – *sentire* – our direct, live contact with the real material world in its concrete

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form was therefore eliminated. “Sense-perception (*sentire*)? One needs a body to perceive”<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, Descartes believes that sensation – precisely as *cogitatio* – belongs, after all, to this sphere of unquestionable, direct, clear and distinct cognition, to the separation of which out of the uncertain rest he was led by his method of doubt. It, therefore, appears on the next page of *Meditations on First Philosophy* as one of the varieties of *cogitare*, as an immanent feature.

In the further development of modern philosophy, the concept of sensual experience was developed and formulated more precisely, as impressions, some special variety of *cogitationes*, qualities that clearly and distinctly manifest themselves, fully, as it were, authoritatively and adequately outstretched before the “pure subject” that perceives them, and therefore – data, to use a term later coined by Husserl. This intellectualist construction was an even more urgent need for this philosophy as the legacy of Cartesian thought, which grew out of continental rationalism, was almost immediately taken over by British empiricism. This gave rise to this special variety of empiricism which was later continued by philosophy in the continental Europe; empiricism which operated with a rationalist *par excellence* conception of sensual experience.

It can be said that all modern psychology and philosophy, at least until as late as the dawn of the 20th century, and actually until the nineteen-thirties, faced the overwhelming influence of this concept. While in psychology it was gestalt psychologists that probably contributed the most to overcome it; in philosophy – it was phenomenologists, even though it still constituted a point of departure for Husserl himself, who until his death did not fully realise the ultimate consequences of his critique of modern sensualism. His most important contributions in this field can be found in his late manuscripts which have been published only partially so far<sup>2</sup>.

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1 R. Descartes, *Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii*, vol. 1, transl. M. and K. Ajdukiewiczowie, PWN, Warszawa 1958, 34.

2 An extensive discussion of this issue in Husserl's works, taking into account his unpublished manuscripts, can be found in E. Holenstein's *Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion der passiven Genesis bei Husserl* (Phaenomenologica, vol. 44), Springer, Den Haag 1972.

In any case, starting from the thirties of our century, the analysis of sensual experience has begun to take on a distinct shape, separating itself from the traditional construction of the object from pure impressions.

An interpretation of the construction of our experience from sensual materials (data) which is very influential in modern empiricism, is proposed by Friedrich Kambartel; sensual materials or impressions are according to this conception:

(1) devoid of form and meaning, they assume their form and meaning only through the intellect, through intellectual forming and assignment of meaning;

(2) they constitute the basis for all cognition – they are the basis in two ways, i.e. on the one hand as the first and only materials appearing in the consciousness of a new-born child – on the other hand, as a material from which all legitimate, authentic concepts should be constructed;

(3) impressions essentially can always be distinguished from the outcomes of their intellectual processing; they are therefore always accessible in their original form<sup>3</sup>.

Thus, it can be said that according to empiricism understood in this way, our cognition of sensual materials is intuitive: they are objects that can be provided immediately in their entirety and in a direct way. Within this meaning they can also be considered as simple and general qualities, that is general concepts – or as absolute individual objects which always have a specific place in a particular stream of consciousness of the subject that experiences them. In the tradition of empiricism, however, they were considered to be an individual, not a universal.

In his *Logical Investigations* Edmund Husserl still takes this understanding of the empiricist conception – at least to some extent – as his point of departure, and the scheme “interpreted contents – their interpretation as...” (for example, as a perceived table) is of fundamental importance for his theory of the constitution of the object and his transcendental philosophy.

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3 See: F. Kambartel, *Erfahrung und Struktur, Beiträge zur Kritik des Empirismus und Formalismus*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1968.

In this approach, what is given by the senses is limited to impressions or “sensual data”, and the entire meaning of cognition is given to these data by the intellect.

## 2. SENSATION (*DAS EMPFINDEN*) ACCORDING TO ERWIN STRAUS

This atomistic and intellectualist theory of experience was contrasted in the nineteen-thirties by Erwin Straus – a scholar from whom Maurice Merleau-Ponty undoubtedly learned a lot – with the conception of sensation as a separate, total way of communing with the world; a way which in its pure form can be attributed to animals. Sensation cannot be considered, as it is in the case of Descartes and his school, as a worse variety of cognition or an operation merely providing elements as if building blocks, from which cognition is to be built. As a form of communication, sensation involves the spectrum of senses, each of which constitutes a specific mode of our communication with the world. This communication is, however, in its whole range, as pointed out by Straus, total, which means that it constitutes the communication of the subject as a whole with the world, which also acts as a whole in such a communication – the whole is always diversified and becomes more diversified in the lifetime. Nonetheless, sensation is a symptomatic way of communication, as it constitutes a component of the becoming of a subject together with the world, and in the world; it is also a sensation of the subject with its world. None of these two poles, self and the world, has priority over the other. I experience my actuality with the actuality of the world, and I experience it in a primary way when I am directed towards the world and when at the same time the world is directed towards me.

A primary phenomenon of sensation is what is distant and what is close. Sensation is ordered in the space-and-time form of closeness and distance. Since sensation happens in space and time, and not just in space, or just in time, this form is also spatio-temporal, there is a primary unity of sensing and movement. It can also be said that the primary sensual life is the life of sensation and movement, a becoming.

### 3. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION

The difference between sensation and perception is compared by Straus to the difference between a landscape and the geographical space. A landscape always has a horizon, which does not exist in the geographical space. A landscape is open, we can walk from one place to another in it; each of these places has a characteristic area of visibility distinguishing it from other places and determines its relation to them. Although in a landscape we can go from one place to another, the place in which we are is never in a visible and defined (überschaubar) relation to the world as a whole. Objective cognition can only be achieved by placing its objects in an environment of geographical space and objective time. Perception searches unity, it is fact-oriented. It is never a set of, or a reproduction of impressions appearing in the sphere of sensation, it is not simply a result of comparing them and discriminating between them. To be able to compare and discriminate, we have to go beyond the horizon of sensation and find ourselves in the geographical space and in the objective time.

What are the consequences of the findings of these analyses for our deliberations? Straus emphasises the mutual relation between the subject and the world, the "total" relationship between them of mutual becoming. He also discusses how the world becomes more diverse for the self and stresses that the world has always been, from its beginning, diversified; moreover, as it has already been mentioned, sensation (and therefore, even more so, perception which is based on it) is, according to Straus, a "total" relationship between the subject and the world. What organisation of a sensing living organism should be assumed to allow the possibility of the existence of such a relationship?

To explain this situation one should, in the author's opinion, first of all, clearly distinguish between the world understood as what is real and one's own model of the world. This distinction is an assumption, as it seems, in Straus' description of sensation; and contemporary psychology, ethology, and *cognitive science* widely justify the existence – the necessity of existence – of a functioning model of the world of each living organism: there has to exist a structure enabling the behaviour of

these organisms in accordance with their instinct to survive or preserve the species. In animals, this model of the world simply functions and is not consciously construed by them. Man, on the other hand, constructs and consciously transforms his conceptual model of the world.

The difference between the sensual, functioning and conceptual, consciously shaped model of the world strictly corresponds to Straus' distinction between "sensing" on the one hand, and perception and cognition on the other. This last, specifically human behaviour, is intermediated by language. Henri Ey expressed it in his concise definition: "to be conscious means to have at one's disposal a personal model of the world"<sup>4</sup>.

It is obvious that our model of the world, even in its human, conceptual layer or variety, is not *given* to a subject in the same way in which we are given trees or persons in perception. An enormous part of it is not given to us at all; however, it has to function, as if anonymously, if we are to be aware of anything. No object given to us in the traditional meaning of the word would be given without the functioning of this model in the background of our conscious lives, and we must be constantly referring to this model to recognize objects with which we deal, otherwise we would not be able to distinguish two elements or moments within our field of consciousness; this field would remain empty.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS: TRADITIONAL AND MODERN CONCEPT OF THE SENSES

Let us try to juxtapose these reflections with the traditional conception of senses by Thomas Aquinas as formulated by Etienne Gilson. He states that Aquinas' theory underlines that:

(1) The unity of the human *continuum* and the fact that it is that that recognises – and not just the senses or intellect alone; "animal sensibility (*la sensibilité*) is already much more than a passive recording of sense impressions. The behaviour of animals proves that they are capable of acquiring a purely sensible experience, ... their

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4 H. Ey, *La conscience*, PUF, Paris 1968<sup>2</sup>, 36.



reactions frequently imitate the action of reasoning"<sup>5</sup>. This ability was called in the middle ages *vis aestimativa*. Man, to the extent to which he is a living organism (*animal*), also has this ability. However, in man, it was called *vis cogitativa*, or even *ratio particularis* because, although not being the function of reason, it functions in man as sensual experience of a reasonable being. This type of experience has *aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quendam refluentiam*<sup>6</sup>. The mind and the senses of the human subject closely penetrate each other. "Man recognizes what he senses, and he senses what he recognises"<sup>7</sup>.

(2) Everything, including the first principles, originates, according to Aquinas, in the senses. *Omnis nostra cognitio originaliter constitit in notitia primorum principiorum indemonstrabilium. Horum autem cognitio in nobis a sensu oritur*<sup>8</sup>. However, Gilson stresses that using this phrase is not equivalent to its understanding. Almost all contemporary readers who are strongly influenced by idealism, "will conclude from these words that if a man did not perceive any sensual object, the intellect would be unable to formulate the first principle, however, he has this principle in him and has the right to attribute it to things. In fact, the man shapes it in his own light, but he borrows its content from sensual data"<sup>9</sup>.

Therefore, we have access to a special sphere of sensual communion with what surrounds us. Although it is essentially the domain of the senses, it cannot be cut off the domain of the intellect, it constitutes an organic unity with it. It is due to this unity, and only within it, that the human intellect can function at all, as it provides all content for it, and shows it all its objects. Although even animals are equipped with it, in man this domain is different, as it is the domain of sensual experience of a reasonable being – as Gilson puts it – of "sensual empiricism of

5 E. Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance*, J. Vrin, Paris 1947, 206. (Text by Thomas Aquinas: *Summa Theologica* I, q. 78, art. 4 ad 5-m).

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*, 205.

8 *Ibid.*, 200f. (Text by Thomas Aquinas: *De Veritate*, q. X, art. 6 *Praeterea*).

9 *Ibid.*

man” which depends on operations which much more resemble the operations of the mind than the respective operations in animals<sup>10</sup>.

Difficulties appear – says Gilson – when we treat the sensual as the conceptual. We then require from the order of concrete empirical facts to correspond to the logic of abstract notions, and we turn to idealists. The sphere of sensual intuition – seamlessly passing into the sphere of intellectual perspective – requires, therefore, to be treated separately, within it one cannot mistake the sensory for the conceptual, one has to be able to distinguish one from the other.

After quoting the above sentence of Aquinas about the affinity of sensual experience and reason in man, Gilson notes that: “These notions are intentionally indefinite, it would be the task of psychology today to bestow precise content on them”<sup>11</sup>.

There is another point in Gilson’s deliberations that should be clearly emphasised. The field of sensual intuition is the domain in which the existence of the real object presents to us; as emphatically formulated by Gilson: “a being’s act of existence, not its essence, is the ultimate foundation of what we know to be true”<sup>12</sup>. When catching the real world, things and living organisms in it, as if “red-handed” in their existence, and this is what happens in sensual communion, we at the same time catch it *in actu* – in a scholastic sense. So it will probably not be a far fetched use of the terms here if we say: in dynamic contact between us – the human *compositum* and the reality surrounding it.

It turns out that the intellectualist construction of the domain of experience put forth by Descartes and Hume was a gross falsification in which pre-predicative, and in some sense pre-cognitive primary data were presented as an element of conceptual cognition, which obviously must have led to their deformation. If we, therefore, agree that one of the main tasks of modern philosophy is to deepen the foundations of empiricism by the analysis of experience, at the same time it has to be said that the road to realising this task was, perhaps not completely

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10 *Ibid.*, 207.

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Ibid.*

obstructed (because despite the false interpretation of what it describes, this philosophy has made enormous and fertile efforts in this direction), but it was presented in a false light and made much more difficult for nearly two centuries by inextricably linking this analysis with a search for what may be formulated clearly and distinctly in pure intellectual intuition, and what should be absolutely certain.

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## THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF INTENTIONALITY\*

**Abstract.** The issue of intentionality was posed anew in philosophy by Franz Brentano. However, it was Brentano himself who indicated that the source of intentionality-related problems dates back to Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The search for the original traces of this issue in the history of philosophy has led me to conclude that intentionality as an inalienable characteristic of consciousness is characterized by three-dimensionality, which is expressed in *theoria*, *praxis* and *poiesis*. Contemporary research focuses primarily on cognitive intentionality, examining in particular either the very subject-object relation or the immanent (intentional) object, in-existing in psychical experience (in the acts of consciousness). And yet, intentionality is a basic feature of the whole consciousness-anchored (mental) life of a human being. It determines the whole consciousness-based activity of the subject in abstract theorizing, practice and production. Therefore, it manifests itself as a mode of being of a conscious (mental) entity, i.e. an entity partially constituted by intentional content, relationality, reference, directionality, openness and conscious awareness, as well as determining the meaning and the creation of purely intentional beings. Intentionality is revealed as a primary factor in the awakening of consciousness, through the building (constituting) of conscious experiences that are poietic, practical and theoretical. Each of these three ways of categorizing the nature of experience, however, indicates only the predominant aspect of a given experience, for strictly speaking experiences are determined by all three aspects. Intentionality and – consequently – all conscious experience, are thus characterized by three-dimensions: cognitive, activist and productive. Any act of consciousness is always a form of activity that is informed by its cognitive aspect and produces something transcendent with regard to itself. The recognition of the three-dimensional nature of intentionality allows us to understand the human being and the dilemmas concerning his actions, knowledge and creativity.

**Keywords:** intentionality; mind; consciousness; action; creativity; cognition

1. Introduction. 2. Comments about Brentano's position on intentionality. 3. Intention as a way to realization of the mind. 4. Signs of intention. 5. The three dimensions of intention. 6. Conclusions.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The analysis of intentionality as a characteristic of the mind and mental life reveals its three-dimensional nature, and thus the three dimensions of intentionality (or intention), i.e. its productive, activist and cognitive character<sup>1</sup>. To justify this thesis, I will first refer to the description of the awakening of the mind, i.e. the realization of its potentiality, which is achieved through its intention (intentionality) characterized by openness and creativity. Subsequently, I will discuss the different ways in which it manifests itself, the in which its openness and creativity is manifested to varying degrees. In the next part, I will demonstrate the three dimensions of intention (intentionality) in the three basic activities of mental being, which are action itself, cognition and production. However, I will open with a few comments about Franz Brentano's position on intentionality.

## 2. COMMENTS ABOUT BRENTANO'S POSITION ON INTENTIONALITY

It is quite commonly believed that the issue of intentionality of contemporary philosophy was introduced again into debate by Brentano. The quintessence of his approach to intentionality is reflected in the following passage from the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, namely: "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity"<sup>2</sup>.

This sentence was the starting point for later research on intentionality – sometimes only heuristic, inspiring, sometimes critical or criticized for its inadequacy, and sometimes normative, setting the

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1 My book *Odstłanianie intencjonalności*, Liberi Libri, Warszawa 2013, is dedicated to this problem. This article includes modified and somewhat clarified research results presented therein, being a kind of errata to the aforementioned monograph.

2 F. Brentano, *Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia*, transl. W. Galewicz, PWN, Warszawa 1990, 126.

framework for the understanding of intentionality, with these three ways of using the Brentano approach to intentionality were and still are not clearly distinguished but rather intertwined.

The quoted passage draws attention to the duality of intentionality and identifies the direction of the mental (conscious) entity to a certain object with the interaction of the subject matter content in the mental (conscious) experience. As far as I know, this ambiguity of the above thesis was never explained by Brentano. However – and this should be noted and emphasized – intentionality was not a primary subject of consideration for him. He did not put forward a relatively concise and complete concept of intentionality. It would be more accurate to say that he merely pointed to it as a moment to distinguish between mental and physical phenomena and to separate the former from the universe of possible subjects of cognition as the proper subject of psychological research, which in his time became more and more significant, the shape of which was then being discussed and which was to emancipate it from philosophy, then again – to become a kind of primary philosophy<sup>3</sup>. Brentano himself, who together with William James contributed to the crystallization of the concept of psychology as an independent scientific discipline, believed that psychology is rooted, if not in all philosophy, at least in its important disciplines, and in science<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, Brentano's views on intentionality should be construed in the context of the search for the *differentia specifica* of the subject of psychological research, which are psychological phenomena<sup>5</sup>.

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3 Cf. J. Pieter, *Historia psychologii*, PWN, Warszawa 1974<sup>2</sup>, 133–166; R. Stachowski, *Historia psychologii: od Wundta do czasów najnowszych*, in: *Psychologia. Podręcznik akademicki. Podstawy psychologii*, ed. J. Strelau, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, Sopot 1999, 25–66; Idem, *Historia współczesnej myśli psychologicznej – od Wundta do czasów najnowszych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2004.

4 F. Brentano, *Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia*, op. cit., 30–40; cf. A. Chrudzimski, *Psychologia jako podstawa filozofii. Szaleństwo czy metoda?*, ([http://www.academia.edu/10101311/Psychologia\\_jako\\_podstawa\\_filozofii.\\_Szalestwo%20czy%20metoda\\_Psychology\\_as\\_a\\_basis\\_for\\_philosophy.\\_Method\\_-\\_or\\_madness](http://www.academia.edu/10101311/Psychologia_jako_podstawa_filozofii._Szalestwo%20czy%20metoda_Psychology_as_a_basis_for_philosophy._Method_-_or_madness)), [accessed on: 08/2015].

5 By applying the term “phenomenon” Brentano pushed aside the metaphysical deci-

Although Brentano limited his own concept of intentionality, also in his later statements, to the two manifestations mentioned above: including in itself a specific object and directing to a specific object, he broadened it by indicating the scholastic (including Aquinas) origin of the term and the presence of the problem of intentionality in the philosophy of Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria or Saint Augustine<sup>6</sup>. Expanding the indicated scope of research to the whole history of philosophy and looking for traces of intentionality not only in scholastic but also Greek philosophy, and then in modern and contemporary philosophy, intention or intentionality is revealed as an essential characteristic of the mind or consciousness (I apply these terms interchangeably here), and even of the mind as their property, without which the mind, consciousness or mind would not be what they are. If we consider consciousness to be a way of being a mental entity (not just human beings, although we focus our attention on them), then at the same time the way of being a mental entity is intention or intentionality. Thus, the mental entity exists as an actualizing self in intention-based experiences and by being a real being, thanks to them, it constitutes itself as an intentional being.

At this point, an important distinction must be made in line with Roman Ingarden's views, already mentioned by me, which is in fact also known to Polish researchers. Namely, he proposed to call intention-based what contains intention (an act of consciousness), and intentional what is indicated or produced by such acts (the object of the act)<sup>7</sup>. With this distinction in mind, intentionality would therefore be a way of existence, state, property or quality of an object that we can say is "intentional" because it is in relation to the intention of a certain act of consciousness or conscious experience. Intention, on the other hand, would be the way of existence and the property of conscious experience, and in particular of an act, and this experience

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sions concerning the spiritual substance (soul), whose incidence is psychological experience, while maintaining the experimental starting point of psychology.

6 Cf. F. Brentano, *Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia*, op. cit., 126–127.

7 Cf. R. Ingarden, *Spór o istnienie świata*, vol. 2, *Ontologia formalna*, part 1: *Forma i istota*, PWN, Warszawa 1987<sup>3</sup>, 180.



or act – as it will be discussed – as built in and through consciousness, being intention-based would be at the same time intentional.

With this in mind, I believe that intention is not only a distinguishing feature of some conscious experiences, namely acts, but it is a property of all experiences, including actless ones, although one should distinguish between an indistinct intention that is unclear, typical of states of consciousness and actless experiences, and an explicit intention that is typical of acts. Intention in this sense would therefore also be a property of the mind and the way it functions, and further on, it would be a property of the mental being, i.e. also man, and the property of his functioning, thus both the mind and the mental being too, being a real being, becomes somehow also an intentional being.

### 3. INTENTION AS A WAY TO REALIZATION OF THE MIND

Without entering into the debate on problems broadly discussed nowadays concerning the mind, including its nature, regardless of naturalistic or anti-naturalistic solutions, in my<sup>8</sup> analyses, I understand the mind as a basis for specific events or behaviours, which we call conscious or mental experiences. Its property, without which it would not be itself, i.e. the mind, and further, the property of a being endowed with it, is the intention which is inseparable from consciousness as an intention-based or intentional way of being a mental being or mental and corporeal being.

Treating the above statements only as an introduction, it should be noted that the mind, as a kind of potentiality, actualizes itself, i.e. it realizes itself as intention-based and intentional. This realization of the potentiality of the mind is what I call an awakening, because the mind, being the mind, is revealed first of all to itself “waking up” from the unconscious as its actually unintentional state.

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8 Cf. J. Bremer, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii umysłu*, WAM, Kraków 2010; *Analityczna metafizyka umysłu. Najnowsze kontrowersje*, eds. M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2008; U. Żegleń, *Filozofia umysłu. Dyskusja z naturalistycznymi koncepcjami umysłu*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2003.

The awakening of the mind makes it conscious of itself as much as it is actualized in the Aristotelian sense, as much as it is realized in its experiences<sup>9</sup>. The mind, striving for its perfection by its nature, that is, becoming more and more conscious, awakens, manifesting itself as intention-based and intentional<sup>10</sup>. The awakening of the mind is its, i.e. characteristic to it, action, which consists in opening up to itself while getting to know itself. Only my mind is present at the awakening, without the horizon of previous experiences, internalized knowledge or previously acquired information.

The mind, waking up, thanks to its intention, shapes itself, in a way creates itself and at the same time gets to know itself, becoming its own intentional creation. More be more precise, it creates and learns its own acts in the Aristotelian sense, its own realizations, that is – its own experiences. The awakening of the mind is becoming more and more conscious of oneself: realizing one's own experiences, and this realization brings one's own experiences out of the dark or sheds more and more light on them. This is possible thanks to the openness of the conscious mind, first to itself, which involves an intention that has not yet developed a clear thematic intent, but – one could say – is characterized by a fuzzy intent. Then the mind, as the subject of its own experiences, begins to orient itself in their stream, in the stream of related experiences, still undefined and difficult to define unambiguously. One could say that at this level of life, whether intention-based or intentional, or pragmatic, the mind as the subject of the conscious self is aware of its own flow of conscious experiences and – also non-thematically – of its own existence as their subject. Both the stream of conscious experiences

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9 Given the peripatetic combination of potentiality and actuality (*potentia et actus*), or as Stefan Swieżawski proposed – of potential and realization, these experiences can be called acts, which should not be confused with his phenomenological understanding of this term.

10 The constitution of consciousness, described by Edmund Husserl, is in fact an awakening of consciousness – cf. E. Husserl, *Medytacje kartezjańskie, z dodaniem uwag krytycznych Romana Ingardena*, transl. A. Wajs, PWN, Warszawa 1982; Idem, *Wykłady z fenomenologii wewnętrznej świadomości czasu*, transl. J. Sidorek, PWN, Warszawa 1989.

as a specific whole, as well as each of its individual phases, each conscious experience, appearing in the stream, is the very flow, the happening of something that, as an experience, appears in the crevice of the present and leaves it immediately, keeping its place in the stream of experiences forever, even though it continues to move away from “now”. Our consciousness, flowing through the present, constantly leaves the present and falls into the past, and at the same time is constantly and unceasingly open to what is just appearing (the retention and potential structure), to new experiences. The consciousness cannot stop time, nor can it close itself off from the future. By realizing the flow of consciousness, the mental entity of this flow becomes aware of its sense: the sense of individual, passing through experiences, and the sense of content, carried by these experiences.

It should be noted here that the awakening consciousness is initially experienced impersonally, and the subject as the fulfilment of the experience is revealed only in the actual consciousness. The consciousness does not bring the subject into being, it is the subject that is the existential basis of consciousness<sup>11</sup>. It goes beyond actual experiences and lasts despite them. Nevertheless, the subject, as the existential basis of both the whole stream and individual experiences, reveals itself in these experiences precisely as their existential basis, and the more so, the clearer the moment of intent in them. Each experience, and in particular each actual experience, fulfilled by the subject, leaves a double trace in it and thus shapes it, building in it an internal horizon of meaning, setting out successive intentional references, and giving the subject competencies (virtues) in the constitution of new actual experiences<sup>12</sup>.

Then, although not necessarily in the sense of time, the mental entity of conscious experiences (conscious entity) realizes its own openness to the outside world, the transcendent one, in which it happens

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11 Speaking in the language of Ingarden, every conscious experience is existentially dependent on the stream of consciousness as a whole and on the presence of other experiences and on the subject who fulfils these experiences.

12 Here I would like to draw attention to the classical virtue theory and the distinction between dianoetic and moral (character) virtues.

to be and in which it begins to orient itself. Thanks to the openness of the subject, this world, in a way that is mysterious for the subject at this stage, enters its consciousness, fills it with its meaning, its content, and at the same time constantly manifests its transcendence. At this level, intention reveals itself as a purely passive reception of the content that finds the conscious entity, in a way finds it and enters the pure immanent world of its experiences, and sometimes even brutally invades it, despite the opposition of the said entity. And when something in the horizon of consciousness is particularly pronounced, whether in the external world or in the consciousness itself, it causes a clear, actual direction to this something as an object of special interest. Whether this directing will take place and what it will be directed at, and how it will be directed, depends on the conscious entity, who has to “prepare” for a specific reference to the object, for some reason interesting. The subject must therefore establish a corresponding act of consciousness that will determine not only the object of the intention-based reference, but also the manner (quality) of that reference. The subject, by constituting an act of consciousness of a certain kind, determines whether it will focus exclusively on the quality of its action, whether it will aim at a cognitive approach to its object, or to produce a transcendent object in relation to itself. Whether one wants to explore, act or produce and how one wants to explore, act or produce depends on the way one relates to the object and the result achieved. The intention of consciousness is therefore responsible not only for the directedness towards this and not another object, but also for the way in which this object is referred to, that is to say, for the constitution of an act of consciousness that is appropriate to the intended purpose, which for this reason is itself intentional, and (to varying degrees) for the result of the act being fulfilled, that is, for the intentional production of this act.

#### 4. SIGNS OF INTENTION

The analysis of the awakening of the mind to consciousness reveals two sides of intention: openness and production, which are a mani-

festation of the passive-active character of intention, with openness conditioning to some extent the production.

At the lowest level of mental activity, i.e. its realization, the intention manifests itself as an openness of the mind to itself, i.e. as self-consciousness, with neither a clear view of the conscious entity nor a doubling of the subject and object. At the same time, it is easy for one to realize oneself and what one is realizing. This realization differs in the degree of saturation with consciousness: from the dark, barely noticeable, to the fully enlightened, which Ingarden called “the intuition of existence”<sup>13</sup>.

This simple awareness of these edifying experiences gives rise to yet another manifestation of intention: a leaning towards something yet unknown. One can speak here of an empty consciousness of the object, being – at a higher level – a manifestation of the openness of intention. It enables an act of directing towards an intention-based, selected object, which for this reason is intentional, although in a different sense of this term: whether as actually (really or ideally) existing (e.g. in case of learning something), or only as possible (in case of searching for something or producing it). Intention as directedness towards something is also defined as aiming at something. Directing or aiming is a moment that activates the mind or consciousness, whether potentially as an opportunity to direct towards the object, or as an actual directing towards or aiming at it. Thus, the constitutive power of intention, manifesting itself in constituting acts of consciousness as intention-based, becomes apparent.

In contrast to an act of directing towards or aiming at an object, which may be empty, an intent reference – another manifestation of intention – demands the existence of a reference object. This does not mean, however, that the object has to be real. In the act of referencing, the absence of a real or ideal reference end is replaced by a purely intentional one, so that what the act presumes and the alleged object overlap.

Next – referring to something creates a relation of the subject to a transcendent object or to a purely intentional object, including

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13 Cf. R. Ingarden, *U podstaw teorii poznania*, PWN, Warszawa 1971, 368–380.

the immanent content of the object. Intentional relationships built by intention are not real in line with classical understanding. They do not happen outside the thought or without the participation of thought (consciousness) or the thinking entity. The thinking entity is necessary for the existence of an intentional relationship, which does not mean that it is revealed directly in each such relationship. However, there does not have to be a transcendent object that one thinks about, but even then, there is a content of thinking that one does think about. A particular intentional relationship is the relationship of identity when the subject and object of the relationship overlap, when a thought, when thinking, thinks of itself.

Intention also manifests itself in the use of specific subject matter content. Thus, mental or conscious experiences are not contentless, but always contain specific content: they are experiences full of meaning. An extreme case of the in-existing content is the experience itself – when the content of the experience is identical to the experience, as is the case with the experience of kindness, the content of which is simply kindness, not having a clear reference to anything, with the experience of aversion, the content of which is a reluctance not directed to any object, the experience of opening without opening to something specific, etc.

On the other hand, the peak of intention-based activity of the mental entity is the production of purely intentional objects, which, speaking in the language of Ingarden, are produced by acts of consciousness<sup>14</sup>. They are immanent to these acts, although sometimes – as in the case of works of art, designs of buildings or various devices, as well as moral acts – they are incarnated in various ways, gaining a stronger existential basis in a given material. A variant of this manifestation of intention is to influence something that consists in such an act of a subject that in an already existing object causes some change, and so somewhat produces it.

The manifestations of intention presented here have been arranged from the barely discernible to the most expressive and build

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14 R. Ingarden, *O dziele literackim. Badania z pogranicza ontologii, teorii języka i filozofii kultury*, transl. M. Turowicz, PWN, Warszawa 1988, 179–247.

on each other, resulting in intentional products – from experiences themselves to purely intentional objects.

## 5. THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF INTENTION

Bearing in mind what has already been said, the specific experience reveals that intention is always three-dimensional. Aristotle distinguished three types of activity of the soul as a mental entity: theoretical cognition, action and production, and with their purpose in mind, he clearly separated them. The purpose of theoretical knowledge (*theorein*) is to gain knowledge about a subject. The aim of action (*praxis*) is action itself. The purpose of production (*poiesis*) is to produce a transcendental work. In cognition, the subject takes the form of the object being learned, while in the case of action, the subject gives shape to the action itself (i.e. its form, which derives from the thought). Similarly, in the case of producing, the product takes the form<sup>15</sup> in and from the soul of its producer because – according to Aristotle – art is the giving of forms<sup>16</sup>. Meanwhile, it appears that all activity of the mind is an activity in which cognition and production are inscribed, and intention as a property of the mind always reveals its three-dimensionality as action, cognition and production, with one of the moments mentioned here stands out, allowing to distinguish – as Aristotle did – production (*poiesis*), action (*praxis*) and cognition (*theory*). Let us therefore look at how the three-dimensionality of intention mentioned here is revealed in the acts of production, action and cognition.

Experiencing oneself as a subject of creative or productive activity, one experiences first of all that one creates or produces something. In the case of production, the product one intends to produce, is producing or has produced, obscures one's own activity and focuses one's attention on oneself. This is understandable because the purpose of a productive activity is the goodness and perfection of the product, not the perfection

15 Arystoteles, *Metafizyka*, 1032b, in: Idem, *Dzieła wszystkie*, vol. 2, transl. K. Leśniak, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2003.

16 Ibid, 1034a, 1996, 1110a 15n, 112a–b.

of the productive activity, and even more so, that of the actor. However, the existence of a product and its perfection depends on the perfection of the act of production and a reliable knowledge of what is to be produced as realizable and of one's own production capabilities. The essence of the productive activity is to "bring in" (a kind of embodiment) of an idea or concept, created in the mind of the creator or producer, into a specific material and thus perpetuating this idea in it. The production of an object starts with the creation of an idea or concept of a specific artefact and ends with the production of an artefact according to the conceived idea. The artefact produced in this way is a purely intentional object, although it is often incorporated into a stronger basis of being. In this sense, the creative activity of the mental entity is also the product of conscious experiences themselves, including – in particular – conscious acts, through which the mental entity shapes itself, language as a specific system of conventional signs, as well as the social structures or the laws that shape these structures. One could therefore say that the whole human world is an intentional world: either produced by intentionality, or modified by it, or adapted by it, which is nowadays expressed in the conviction that there are no more areas on the earth that would not be directly or indirectly touched by the human hand.

The intentional product is also one's action, one's act as an *actus humanus*<sup>17</sup>, because the fact that one acts and how one acts depends on one's consciousness, and the shape of what it does depends on how the action is shaped. When talking about practical action, we have in mind the action itself, whose perfection is its primary goal. It can be said that an action first of all produces itself according to an idea that is subject to cognition, and the achievement of its intended goal depends on how it is shaped. This applies to both spontaneous and planned actions, with the intended objective not necessarily coinciding with the objective actually achieved. The act, being a product of consciousness, often has its stronger existential foundation in specific corporeal behaviours, which find their extension in various types of tools, which are artefacts.

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17 Cf. J. Krokos, *Sumienie jako poznanie. Fenomenologiczne dopełnienie Tomaszowej nauki o sumieniu*, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2004, 132–134.



Cognition, on the other hand, is a special kind of activity that aims at gaining knowledge of a certain subject, knowledge being a specific, intentional product of cognition. The specificity of cognition lies in the fact that – as Aristotle said – the subject, in its own way, wants to accept the object being cognized, which indicates an intention to open the mind to the found object. Cognition produces knowledge, but not an object of cognition that stands as somehow existing, which is revealed by the fact that it is the object itself that stimulates the cognizing entity to draw attention to itself. The intention of openness of the cognizing entity to an object is a condition of its cognition. It belongs to a mental entity and therefore it cannot be deprived of it. The cognitive result, however, depends on the types of cognitive acts that the mental entity represents and the reliability of their realization.

Thus, any activity of the mental entity which is always permeated by intention, is a unity of action, production and cognition. This is because the production of some material or mental object requires undertaking actions, which will allow this object to be produced, and this in turn requires learning about this object as possible to produce, as well as actions, which will allow to achieve this result. In turn, the constitution of the act demands to know its purpose and the means to achieve it, and the product of the act is the act itself and its result. Cognition, on the other hand, is itself a kind of act, which aims at knowledge as its product, and the condition for its achievement is its reliable fulfilment. This makes all productive, practical and cognitive intentions converge, revealing the richness of the intention and intentionality of life of the mental entity, which has three dimensions, with one of them often dominating others in a particular act, which makes it possible to distinguish between action, production and cognition, without denying their three-dimensionality.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

The three-dimensional nature of intention shown here has its translation into the practical life of the mental beings that we all are. Man has always lived an intention-based life, acting, producing and cognizing,

and sometimes he has constituted his actions in a particular way, emphasizing one of the above three moments of intention. Morality, scientific cognition, production and art are the areas of human existence that grew out of the intention-based human life. As intention-based entities who realize themselves in and through their intention- and intentionality-based experiences, and who are always three-dimensional, we also live in the present real world, which in its essence remains invariable as a transcendence insensitive to our acts of intention. On the other hand, our intentional world is changing, nowadays – mainly through the unification of our intentional material products (the same devices we can meet and buy all over the world, in the same arranged markets) and through the unification of our intentional spiritual products (ideas, theories, interpretations). And because we feel better in the world of our intentional creations than in the world of nature, because the latter, the world of nature, which is actually the primary world, is still mysterious to us, and getting to know it requires effort and competence, while the former, actually secondary, precisely because it is a purely intentional world, is fully understandable to us, we close ourselves in it<sup>18</sup>. We are open to it, it is of interest to us, and we relate to it, and it is the world that shapes us more than the autonomous reality that is the real world. This makes us live in a largely ideologized world today. Therefore, one has to constantly reflect on one's own conscious life, which is always three-dimensional, and which determines and defines action, cognition and production, so as not to be deceived by the intentional world, which, being the creation of man, sometimes imitates and obscures the world of nature.

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 1972, 25–39.

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## SOME REMARKS CONCERNING THE REFERENCE OF MENTAL AND LANGUAGE REPRESENTATIONS\*

**Abstract.** This paper is an attempt to answer the question, what is exactly represented by our thoughts or language expressions. At the beginning, the article presents the main philosophical problems regarding the understanding of the nature of the object of reference of such representations as names or descriptions. Is the name directly referred to the real object or rather to the content of thought? What about cases when the name cannot be referred to the real object? What is the relation between the intentional subject connected with every name (or description) and the external object to which only some names can be referred to, and which one is prior to the constitution of representation? The idea to understand the subject of mental or language representations as a complex structure which has a relational nature is the solution proposed in this paper. This structure is constituted by cognition and ties internal elements of a given representation such as the content with the elements which are external with regard to this given representation. This structure reflects such elements as the content of representation, the way in which this content is given, the correlate of the content and its mode of existence as well as additional systemic information coordinated with given representation. Some consequences of this proposal are discussed at the end of the article. It is explained how the differentiation of the elements of this structure can lead to different types of reference. The basis to understand the issue in question is the relation between internal and external object of reference. It can be interpreted (as is suggested in the paper) as a connection between internal elements of the described structure.

**Keywords:** representation; Peirce; language

1. Introduction. 2. The dualism of the object of representation. 3. Object and content of the representation. 4. Structure of the object of representation. 5. Conclusions.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The question about the object of thoughts and language expressions raises many well-known difficulties. The distinction between an external, real, thought-independent object and intentional, internal object of mental acts and linguistic expressions leaves an open issue of their mutual relation. All the problems related to this issue are well known, so I will not quote them, although the following analyses will be conducted in their context.

Acts of perception, conceptual thinking, verbal communication, etc., that is, mental acts and acts of linguistic communication, are today interpreted by many philosophers as processes of representation. The concept of representation is nowadays used quite commonly to describe and explain the nature and cognitive functions of both consciousness and language<sup>1</sup>, although each author has a slightly different understanding of representation itself. If elements of consciousness, such as sensory impressions, imagining, concepts or signs of language are representations according to this approach, then the question of what do they represent is legitimate. The analysis of the function of representation will reveal the nature and role of the object of representation and the ways it is presented.

The analysis of the general, internal structure of the relation of representation, understood as a sign relation, was presented in detail by C. S. Peirce<sup>2</sup>, who made the concept of representation the key to understanding thought and language. The relation of representation includes, in addition to the means of representation, what is represented and an element of interpretation. Peirce stresses that the very function of representation implies its relational nature, consisting in the relationship between what is represented, what is used for performing representation and what it evokes in the consciousness as its interpretation.

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1 For example: F. Dretske, J. Fodor.

2 Cf. C. S. Peirce, *Wybór pism semiotycznych*, transl. R. Mirek, A. J. Nowak, Warszawa 1977.

Nowadays, the name “representation” is often used in a narrower sense only with regard to the very element by which the whole process of representation is carried out and which Peirce called a representamen and which, in his opinion, is only one of the elements of a richer relationship. In contemporary representationalism, there is even more a need to define what different types of mental or linguistic representations represent. The basis on which the representation is made and what is the object of it. The following is a proposal to ask a question about the object of representation, primarily the object of linguistic expressions, but also of other cognitive acts, in the context of their function of representation.

Including under the general name of the object of representation what is perceived and to what mental concepts and linguistic expressions relate, it should be taken into account that the object which representation directly presents is constituted in relation to what is represented and the way of presenting it in a specific representation. There is a need to distinguish between the external object and the internal (intentional) object of representation. So let us assume that the object of representation has a complex structure and we will search for its elements in this article. This structure should at least partly explain some of the difficulties concerning the nature of the object of mental and linguistic representations, such as the difference between an intentional object and the real thing, or the possibility of representing non-existent objects. This structure will be used to characterize the object of representation for various types of representation and to define the relation between the intentional object of representation and the external object which is represented.

Most of the considerations will be carried out using the example of linguistic representation, but both the analyses themselves and their results will be generic and will also apply to other types of representation. Type of representation different than the linguistic one will be clearly indicated.

The name “object of representation” will be used most generally to describe what is represented in a given act of representation and remains outside it, it may be an object, a concept, an impression,

a fictional object, etc., it is external to the act of representation. “Real object” is an object external to consciousness. “Internal object”, on the other hand, is an object which is given in representation and limited only to the represented aspect. These distinctions may be useful for further consideration. If there is no clear indication in the text of what is referred to as “external” or “internal” for example, it should be understood in the sense given above.

## 2. THE DUAL ASPECT OF THE OBJECT OF REPRESENTATION

When looking for an answer to the question of what language expressions such as names represent, one always encounters an irremovable duality of what can be regarded as the object being represented. If it was assumed, for example, that the expression “Morning Star”<sup>3</sup> represents an object external to the language, namely the planet Venus, it was at the same time indicated that it only captures some aspect of this object, namely that it is visible in the morning sky. The expression does not reveal the real object in all its content, but only a certain aspect of it, presented cognitively and linguistically. This reveals the fundamental property of representation, which is that the object being represented is not fully present in it, but is given only in some way. It is this aspect that constitutes the internal object of representation in terms of content, and only the internal object is directly given in representation.

Peirce distinguishes between a dynamic object, i.e. an external object that exists independently of representation, and an immediate object, i.e. an aspect of a dynamic object, for the purposes of a given representation. According to Peirce, „it necessary to distinguish between the immediate object – the object as it is represented by the sign – from the real object (but not since this object may be completely fictitious, I must therefore find another term), let’s say, rather, from the dynamic object, whose sign is by its very nature un-

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3 I am referring to G. Frege’s theory of sense and denotation. Cf. G. Frege, *Sens i Znaczenie*, in: *Idem, Pisma semantyczne*, transl. B. Wolniewicz, Warszawa 1977.



able to express, leaving the interpreter the task of further cognition in a complementary experience”<sup>4</sup>.

The idea that only fragmentary content, a certain isolated aspect of the external<sup>5</sup> object of representation is given in a representation, is also included in the concept of intentional object as opposed to the external object, as well as manifests itself in the distinction between denotation and meaning, introduced by G. Frege. Many language names, such as “Odysseus”, do not have, according to Frege, an external object, but only a sense that exists for each type of linguistic representation<sup>6</sup>. The object, i.e. the meaning of a language sign, according to Frege, exists only in some cases. In Peirce’s view, on the other hand, a dynamic object of representation always exists, as does an immediate object, although not necessarily in the way real objects exist. A real object is one type of dynamic object, while an immediate object is always an intentional, internal object.

The function of representing something consists in, according to Peirce<sup>7</sup>, the the occurrence or use of something (a sign that is called a representamen) instead of something else (an external object) in a certain aspect (an internal object), that is the replacement of something by something, but only in some aspect in a situation where what is represented does not occur. A representing element or representation in the narrow sense (representamen in Peirce’s terminology) does not present itself as an autonomous object, but only as a specific, aspectual substitute for what it represents. However, it does not fully replace what it represents, but only occurs instead, and this “instead” is clearly stated and known in the case of representation. The representamen, according to Peirce, is a sign of what its represents.

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4 C. S. Peirce, *Wybór pism semiotycznych*, op. cit., 116

5 External to a single act of mental or linguistic representation and not to language or thought in general. Thus, an external object of a given representation may be the content of consciousness as represented, e.g. a concept, a word or its meaning as what is represented. The internal one will be what exactly the representation from a given concept or general meaning of a word represents.

6 Cf. G. Frege, *Sens i Znaczenie*, op. cit., 61.

7 Cf. Peirce, *Wybór pism semiotycznych*, op. cit., 131.

Mental or linguistic representations can have both real things and mental constructions as their object. A thought or language may represent, besides real things, also other thoughts, abstract or fictional content, impressions, words, etc. A thought may juxtapose a representation of a real and an imagined situation side by side and retain the distinction between their respective status. We can all imagine, for example, a situation more convenient than the one we are in, and we are aware of the reality of one and the fictionality of the other. This knowledge is external to the representation itself, it is not derived from its content. However, this knowledge cannot be omitted as it affects the constitution of the object of representation

Let us stop at the case of representing external things by language expressions. We will say that what this expression represents is precisely it. For example, the expression "Morning Star" represents the relevant astronomical object – the planet Venus. It is an object external to thought and language. However, the planet Venus is not given in all its content in the representation. The expression directly represents a conceived object, cognitively captured exactly by the content it represents. The name "Morning Star" has the planet Venus as its external object, while the internal object only covers the aspect of the planet Venus that reveals the content of the name, that is, its visibility in the morning sky. What is the relation of these objects to each other? Neither epistemologically (constituted by other cognitive content) nor ontologically (one is a real object and the other a mental one) are they the same, although on the other hand, it is difficult to deny them a certain identity. The content of the internal object is part of the content assigned to the external object, and the content of the internal object, although intended or given linguistically, refers after all to the object in the sky and not in the mind. However, only the aspect of the external object revealed in the representation is the one that reveals the internal object.

Therefore, is this internal object an appropriate object of representation? The answer to this question is not obvious. The basic function of language is the possibility of using it for speaking about the extra-linguistic world, real things and our thoughts.

When we apply language expressions to a real object, we are clearly dealing with two closely related concepts of the object of representation. With the concept of an external object or, according to Peirce, a dynamic one, and the concept of an immediate object, an internal object of representation. Internal and external objects fulfil different cognitive roles. The act of representation captures something else, something that is given, but is not included in it. It may be constituted in another act of representation, or it may exist outside the realm of thought, but it cannot be an internal element of a given act of representation.

It can therefore be concluded that the object of representation, that is, what is represented, is constituted both by what Peirce describes as a dynamic object and an immediate object. Both these aspects are equally important and irreducible in a full description of what is represented. This duality is non-removable because it is related to the function of representation and indicates the relational nature of the object of linguistic representation (and any other). It should therefore be reflected in the structure of the object of representation.

### 3. OBJECT AND CONTENT OF REPRESENTATION

Distinguishing between the object and content of mental representations and of linguistic expressions often leads to understanding them as if they were almost independent elements. But ignoring their close relationship gives an incomplete picture of the representation process. For different types of representations, the distinctiveness of the internal and external object seems more or less clear. For example, if it is the name (descriptive) of a real existing object, e.g., the “current Prime Minister of the Polish Government”, then it is easy to grasp the difference between the content of a representation, i.e. that aspect of the object that is given in the representation, which is the internal object of the representation, and that which is its external object. This is easily noticeable when, based on other cognitive acts, we know additional aspects of the represented object.

In many cognitive or communicative acts, however, we know the object content only from a given representation and we only know the internal, intentional object of the representation. This is the case, for example, in sensual cognition, where the only available way to capture an object is to represent it by means of impressions. External things that we get to know, e.g. by means of sight, are given to us only as visual images, i.e. aspects of things represented in the process of seeing. Only these visual contents are the immediate, internal object of visual representation, which is carried out by appropriate neural structures. However, despite the direct accessibility only to the content of the internal object, we consider our visual impressions to be a representation of the external object, which can also be captured by other senses. We say then that this representation has a real external object that determines the internal object.

In the process of sensory cognition, a spontaneous distinction is made between the internal object, i.e. the inner content of the impression itself, and the external thing, and the reference of one to another. The internal object is intentional and never replaces the whole thing, only some aspect of it. What is seen can also often be heard and touched. This creates a richer representation of the external object, but it is still incomplete and cognitively open to further content enrichment.

In the case of sensory cognition, we usually deal with some kind of projection of real external things into the space of possible sensory experience. Experiencing something that is only a construct of consciousness is not a basic type of sensory experience, although such accidents also occur, e.g. when we are hallucinating. Thus, despite the distinction between the external thing and the internal object of sensory representation there is also a certain unity between them<sup>8</sup>. Although the thing is given in sensory cognition only as the content of perception, it is this thing and not the content of perception itself that is known. External object is considered a cause and a determinant of qualitative content.

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8 The dispute over the relation between real and intentional objects is described by, among others: M. Maciejczak, *Świadomość i sens*, Warszawa 2007, 154-162.

A dynamic object, an external object is present in sensual cognition next to the intentional, internal object and remains inextricably linked to it. This close link between these two aspects of the object of representation has been stressed many times in philosophy, for example in Thomistic philosophy or phenomenology. Related problems appear also in contemporary representationalism<sup>9</sup>. This duality of the real thing and its cognitive content, more generally, content that is represented, should be reflected in the structure of the object of representation.

Such an approach indicates, on the one hand, that the object of representation, if a real thing is represented, is the relationship established by that thing and its cognitive content. This makes it easy to explain the fact that the same thing can be represented in different aspects. The thing that serves as the basis for the content represented plays the role of uniting all the aspects into one concept of an object, which makes that all the content is predicated on one object. The difference in the content related to the various aspects of the subject differentiates its various representations, however, there remains a common link in the form of one basis of these representations which is the real thing.

Pierce assumes that an object in a cognitive relationship cannot be given fully as something homogeneous, but is a two-argument relationship in which, as a single component, there is an independent thing, a certain monolith, a “thing in itself”, the “First” as the author describes it, and as a second component of the relationship there is a cognitively dependent aspect of that thing<sup>10</sup>. The object is the second. It is what it is because of something else, in opposition to what it occurs. The basis of this relationship is the causal relationship between the thing and its cognitive perception. Such a relational approach to the object of representation (cognition, language, thought) seems very promising to explain the aforementioned of dual aspect of represented object. However, it seems that this relationship should be enriched with additional elements.

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9 Cf. F. Dretske, *Naturalizowanie umysłu*, transl. B. Świątczak, Warszawa 2004, 39-43.

10 Cf. C. S. Peirce, *Wybór pism semiotycznych*, op. cit., 119, 222-228, 259.

There is a clear difference between the mental representation of reality in the form of sensory cognition and the conceptual or linguistic representation of that reality. If we consider linguistic representation, it can be seen that, unlike sensory perception, what is represented is not in some basic way a reflection of reality. We can think or describe imagined situations or objects, even non-existent ones. What does the name "Pegasus" represent? It represents an imaginary object. In cognition, there are mechanisms for distinguishing between what is given externally and what is constructed by the mind. Experiencing or imagining some kind of object content, we are aware of which process of representation occurs.

If we consider human linguistic activity, it turns out that the function of language concerning the construction of such imaginary situations or objects is as important as the function of reflecting reality. Thought also has similar properties. Representing and reflecting reality are two different functions. These functions are in many cases combine, since representation can be a certain reflection of reality (things, their properties and arrangements). However, the space of representation is also used to obtain images of non-existent situations, possible worlds, to perform any operations on the elements represented or reflected and to create new representations. Language can represent imaginary objects, which the senses do not often do. We can think of the blue sun, although we will not get a sensual image of this object. Words and sentences can represent our ideas, not just real things.

On the other hand, language is also used to talk about things. In linguistic cognition, or many acts of communication, language words refer to external things. This makes the relationship between the internal and external object more diverse in linguistic representation than in sensory cognition. An internal object of thought or language does not have to be a real object given in some aspects but it could be given as the content correlate that has no equivalent in real world.

This property of representation plays an important cognitive role. We can perform certain operations on elements of representation. The function of cognition is a certain representation of the world.

But cognition is subordinated to purposeful action in the world. The possibility of creating imagined “possible worlds”, and the choice of the most appropriate of imagined situations as a goal of activity is strongly connected with the cognition of reality and adapting it to expectations. Understanding the cognitive function only as a reflecting function is too narrow. Cognition, especially scientific, often operates with representations of abstract, theoretical, etc. objects. What are these objects? Do they come down to the content of the representation?

Although pragmatism in the philosophy of language has initiated and developed the view that language also has other important functions besides the function of reality representation, its creative role as a creator of representation of imaginary situations is still underestimated. Over the last century, the function of the reflection of thoughts and language, their relationship with reality have been emphasised, omitting the second aspect, the creative aspect. It seems that a more complete, though perhaps still not exhaustive, description of the object of representation may be given only if both aspects are taken into account.

When presenting an object as a two-element relation, as suggested by Peirce, and assuming that its components are the object – as something represented – and its content characteristics, it should be taken into account that among the linguistically represented objects some have only a content representation, as well as those that have very poor content, such as the expression “this”, “what I’m talking about”, etc., which is a reference to something beyond the expression itself.

Frege indicated these two components as two aspects of the use of the name. The name fulfills its representational function based on their mutual relationship. On the one hand, a name such as “Morning Star” refers to the planet Venus, on the other hand, it cognitively captures only a certain aspect of the planet and links a certain content to it. For Frege, the sense, that is, the internal content of a representation, is what is necessarily associated with the expression. Frege that links the cognitive function of expression with the sense in a significant

way<sup>11</sup>. However, having a denotation, that is, an external object, distinguishes some names, giving them a function of reflecting reality. Only sentences in which all names have reference can be true or false because only such expressions can be referred to the real world. The lack of denotation, that is, an external reference object which, according to Frege, may belong to a domain of things, physical events, or a domain of logical and mathematical objects, deprives the expression of the function of mapping the reality, but does not deprive it of the function of representation as such.

The sense of an expression is directly and necessarily connected with the expression and presents its purely intentional content. The knowledge of denotation requires additional knowledge of the world, which is not contained in the sense of expression. This knowledge requires additional representation. For example, besides the linguistic knowledge of the meaning of the expression "Morning Star", we also have a sensory experience of an astronomical object, e.g. we can see in the sky this bright and appropriately located object, which we call the Morning Star, we associate the appropriate content with this name as its sense. Thus, a certain inseparable relationship arises between reference and content, denotation and sense, the external and the internal object of representation. The two elements of this relationship are complementary to each other. Only their combination gives full understanding of the name. Neither the sense nor the denotation itself constitutes complete linguistic knowledge of the name. However, it is not possible to a certain inseparable relationship arises between reference and content, denotation and sense, the external and the internal object of representation. these elements in isolation. They are always correlated. The object of cognition, as the classical philosophy put it, has always had the aspect of content and the aspect of existence recognised in different kinds of judgements<sup>12</sup>.

What we learn or represent is always seen as something with certain qualities. What we know or represent is always given as some-

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11 Cf. G. Frege, *Sens i Znaczenie*, op. cit., 61.

12 Cf. M. A. Krąpiec, *Język i świat realny*, Lublin 1985, 91.



thing having certain features. Something in sense of entity given only as a centre combining the assigned features in unity into the concept of a given object and a set of features anchored in this focus. Without the properties given as sense, (a pure object in opposition to the content) is unrecognized, unrepresented. It becomes a component of a relationship if we attribute at least one feature to it, such as being what you say or think about. This something, as a basis for the content, is present as a real or assumed holder of the properties assigned to it. Russell views the object in this sense, as an argument fulfilling a function defined by the sense of a description or a sentence<sup>13</sup>. The sense fulfills the function of a predicate which is assigned to the object. However, it is the object that determines the features included in the description, and not the description that determines the object.

Apart from the qualitative characteristics, we also have an element that determines the way the the argument of description i. e. the correlate of content exists. The sentence "The current king of France is bald" makes the argument that he is currently the king of France, that he is bald and that he exists in reality. However, none of the existing real arguments meets such a description, so the name of the current king of France is empty and the sentence is false. Knowing the name, besides knowing its sense, is linked to an object of reference i.e. the correlate of content. This reference is always associated with some description of the object of reference, even such as: "is a completely unspecified thing to which the name refers", or at least an indication of a given thing providing its sensory characteristics, which replaces a linguistic expression of indication.

Based on the above, we can assume that when the represented is a real-existing thing, object of representation is a certain relationship with a certain structure. Within this structure, it is possible to distinguish, on the one hand, a certain content, given as a sense of expression and on the other hand, the referent of this content, which is its cause and determinant.

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13 Cf. B. Russell, *Denotowanie*, transl. J. Pelc, in: *Logika i język: studia z semiotyki logicznej*, ed. J. Pelc, Warszawa 1967.

What do general names, such as “a man” or “an animal”, represent? As language expressions, they have the content assigned to them in that language. This content is not related to just one, specific, individual thing, but can be assigned to many things. However, it is not these individual things that are the source of unity of content. This source is a correlate of content having the character of a general, intentional object, which has the character of a variable that can be truly replaced by the elements of a specific set. Content of predicative notions of “animal” can be fulfilled by many arguments.

The general name can function as a description, i.e. as the content given in a general concept, e.g. the name “a human”. What is the object of this name? The name a “human” does not represent all people, although it can be used to refer them, that is to say, one can truly attribute the content that is contained in the concept of human to every human being. This name represents a schematic, albeit dynamic, general object. General names represent a general object, abstract, thought or language construct.

One may ask if it is justified to introduce general subjects as correlates of the content of concepts that exist only as components of thought, next to concepts. If we understand the concept as here, as a mental content, then this content is the content of some object. Frege proposed to understand the concept as a complex unity of content, as a function, as a predicate, which can only be satisfied by objects, represented by unit names. This is what happens when we say, for example, that NN is a good person. But when we say that a human has changed his silhouette over the centuries, we do not mean all people, nor do we mean a particular human, because no individual has changed his silhouette over the centuries, nor the concept of the human, because it is not the concept of man that has changed his silhouette over the centuries, but people. We mean that there is a difference between any human being belonging to different ages of species development. Here we have an internal object of representation, defined by a certain content and its correlate, which exists as abstract in a way of a generalised scheme based on the characteristics of individual things. So if we want to answer the

question of what a general name refers to, e.g. the name of a human being, we have to consider whether we mean a specific utterance, an act of linguistic representation, or a name belonging to a universal language (dictionary). A specific utterance, a specific linguistic representation may refer to an individual real object falling under the concept of human being or to a general abstract object, conceived, corresponding to the content of the concept of human being. The dictionary name represents only a general object with the content of the term human being.

The question about the object of representation remains the most pressing when it comes to names that are not matched by any existing object, such as "Golden Mountain" or "Pegasus". Kazimierz Twardowski distinguished the content and object of a name even in the case of names that do not correspond to anything, such as the name "diagonal square". The content of a name always exists, but the object is declared non-existent. It appears as a correlate of content, as a link between the features attributed to the name, but it not exist in any other way than an internal relation to the content. What object, then, are we talking about that does not exist: is it internal object, intentional, conceived or external one to the representation? What role does the content correlate, often simply called an object, play in the representation that it has to be distinguished from the content? It is a kind of a focal point around which the features attributed to it are concentrated, creating a single concept, a concept of this very object. It is not only a link between the content, but it is its foundation and the source of its unity as attributed to the same thing. Only in such an approach, as a characteristic of something that is both diagonal and square, is the content of the expression "diagonal square" contradictory. A real thing can be diagonal or rectangular. But an object cannot be both at the same time.

The content correlate is also what is given in the various acts of representation in different ways and what forms the basis for the unity of all these cases. Correlate of content is the cause that, when we say Alexander the Great's teacher and Plato's greatest student, we are talking about the same man. The content itself does not constitute

an object, but only partially characterises it. The object remains open to the content, its enrichment and changes. It is about the object, and not about the content, that we declare existence or identity with another. (Frege “Morning Star” and “Evening Star” have a different content, but have the same content correlate, i.e. a narrowly understood object). It is similar for non-existent objects. For example, we can decide on the identity of Oedipus’ mother and Oedipus’ lover, although the content of the expressions and the internal object of expressions are different in both cases. Identity refers to the content correlate. The correlate is what unites different contents into a concept. The object of the name, e.g. the mythical Zeus, is what unites various information about it, also that it is a product of imagination. The content of the name “Zeus” also includes the fact that it is a mythical character, but the correlate of content has a different function. The name refers to correlate of content and not to the content. An object as a content correlate is represented by different approaches to the content assigned to it. It is not the name (as a representamen) that unites the content itself, but the referent of name, in this case the correlate of content. In this sense, one can even talk about something that is only conceived and that elements of content are even contradictory, such as a “diagonal square”.

A correlate is a condition that the content is assigned to something. “Red” as a feature of observation can only be the content of something perceived, not an object. Something that is red is just a red object. The content and the correlate belong to the constitutive elements of the object. Something completely devoid of content is not an object, as it is not known in any way. Similarly, the characteristics themselves as the content of a representation, without reference to a common basis, to a single focal point, are not an object. The content correlate is, therefore, what constitutes the content as a content of something. It only plays a focal, source or causal role in relation to the content, although it does not identify with it.

Correlate and content play a different role even when talking about unrealistic things or situations. Content is a way of representing what is represented. The object as a correlate of content is

a condition of representation itself. What is represented exists in some specific way or is a logical contradiction. But it always transcends beyond the content, only beyond the content do we find its existence or not find its existence. There is a known difficulty that arises in the case of a content correlate that has no equivalent in any logically possible or real object.

#### 4. STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECT OF REPRESENTATION

What characterises the object of representation alongside the content and its correlate is the way of existence of content correlate. This way of existence is always given additionally, although not by the content of representation itself. We have additional knowledge about the fictionality of literary objects, or about the reality of sensually experienced real things, about the contradiction of content and the non-existence of diagonal squares. This knowledge concerns the ontic status of what the representation refers to, whether it is a concept or a mental image or an external thing. Without this additional but important knowledge, it is impossible to determine what specific representations refer to. Thus, next to the object or content correlate, one should distinguish the way of its existence. We can think about our thoughts or we can think about things. Language expressions can represent things, but also mind constructions or other language expressions. The object represented may be different, the phrase; "Yesterday I was thinking about holidays" may have as its object the thought with holidays as content and holidays as a real object that I mentioned yesterday. In both cases, the object of representation will be different in terms of the way of its existence.

What is presented by means of the content can exist as sensually presented, conceptually conceived, verbally spoken, sensory experienced, non-existent, etc. This way of existence of the content correlate is the way the object of representation exists. This is crucial as it reveals this property of representation that we can represent thoughts or images as well as states of affairs, and we distinguish between one type of representation and another. The basis of the distinction is not

so much qualitative content but rather different type of internal information of the cognitive system concerning whether the content relates to a real object or to the thought construct. We can dream about red tomato, experience it or imagine it. The qualitative content can be the same in any of these cases. However, cognition provides us with additional knowledge about whether the object is dreamed, imagined or experienced in real life.

Apart from the content, its correlate, i.e. factor uniting its various components, and the way of existence of a correlate of content, the way of giving the content itself should also be distinguished. If a correlate of content is a real, existing thing, e.g. a horse, then a way of giving content might be a perception, an image, a conceptual or linguistic representation. Then, one would call it a perceived horse, an imaginary horse, conceptually represented or named horse. Although the external content correlate of a horse remains the same, one can spot different direct, internal object. However, in the case of the same content correlate, one can speak of a certain objective, though perhaps not representational (the same horse as an object of different representations) identity. It differentiates such situations as when one talks about a horse that one thinks of, imaginary horse or perceived horse, as well as a horse that one thinks of today, but saw yesterday. It also allows distinguishing between a horse that is being recalled and a horse only imagined. The way of giving content, as well as the way of the existence of content correlate, is not included in the content of the given representation itself, but rather given as additional, systematic knowledge. For example, one distinguishes between a situation when one sees a yellow ball and a situation when one sees or hears the name "yellow ball" without any additional information contained in the expression "yellow ball" itself. One also distinguishes such situations when one sees a real horse, thinks of a real horse, imagines a real horse that description one reads, and when one recalls the horse one saw. In all these cases, the content correlate is real. However, the way in which content is given in the act of representation differentiates what corresponds to the internal object of representation and how the object of representation is

given in the representation itself. Therefore, depending on the content and its presentation, one may finish with different internal object of representation created on basis of this correlate. In the first case, one have the object of observation, i.e. the real thing perceived sensually, in the second case, one have the notion of the real thing, in the third case the image of the real thing, and so on.

The object represented in a given act of representation is shaped in the context of additional complementary information, which is not included directly in the expression, but in the structure of meaning of the language itself or in the system of knowledge in general. In addition to the content revealed directly by the representation, additional knowledge is required to relate it to the content correlate, to recognize the identity of the content correlate in other acts of representation, or to assign additional content to the same correlate. This knowledge is obtained by other acts of representation and creates a system in which representing an object is possible. This allows one to assign different contents to the same correlate, which is one of the most vital cognitive processes. For example, the content of the expression "Morning Star", namely the content stating that this is a star visible in the morning sky is complemented by information that e.g. it is the same celestial body as the Evening Star or that this is the planet Venus.

This complementary content may, for example, relate to the complexity of representations, e.g. the fact that in the expression "a horse is herbivorous" there is a representation of representation, a general object, a schematic, abstract construct of the mind, which includes the content attributed to each real object defined as a horse and which is given in a concept or category of a horse, is represented<sup>14</sup>. It is the knowledge of the structure of the whole representation and its internal dependencies and its external references. The correlate of this content is the same as the content represented directly. This allows developing the knowledge about the cognitively represented subject.

In the above discussion, components describing the internal structure of the object have been distinguished, the differentiation

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. F. Dretske, *Naturalizowanie umysłu*, op. cit., 57.

of which reflects different types of objects of representation. These are the aforementioned: (1) content represented directly; (2) the correlate of content; (3) the way of giving the content of representation; (4) the way of existence of the correlate of content; (5) the complementary content – systematic representation.

An object of representation, an object that is being represented, is given as the structure described above. However, the axis of this structure is the correlate of content, which can be called the represented object. But, as an object of representation, and not an element not included in the relation of representation, it must manifest the whole structure. Thus, the objects of representation (in the sense of their full structure) may differ in content, the way they are given and complementary knowledge, the correlate of content and its way of existence. The identity of an object of representation, despite the difference in content or the way it is given, determines the correlation between the content and the way it exists. The content assigned to an object determines exactly the aspect of the object reveals a given representation. A correlate of content can exist as, e.g. a real thing, an abstract, fictional object, etc.

Within such a defined structure of an object of representation, one can distinguish what can be called an intentional or internal object of representation. A relation of content with the way it is given and the correlate of content without specifying its way of existence is corresponding to the aforementioned notion. This object is, on the one hand, an internal object of representation defined by the content and the way it is given, and on the other hand, it transcends the correlate, it goes beyond the content itself and refers to the other elements of the structure. The relation between content, a way it is given and its correlate need to be complemented with the way of existence of the object that is represented, defining to which field of reality the correlate belongs to, e.g. real things, abstracts, fictitious, contradicting in terms of the content attributed to them, and so on. Taking into account the complex structure of the subject of representation makes it possible to remove the difficulties that arise in the case of non-existing referents. A fictitious object is an



imaginary equivalent of logically possible or contradictory content and it exists as an element of thought, not as a real thing. Both the objects of thought and the real objects can be represented. They exist for representations in different ways, being the correlate of the content of representations. Pegasus does not exist as a horse with wings, it exists as a thought of "horse with wings". The thought with such content can be represented and in this sense, it is the object of representation, reflecting its entire structure together with how the content correlates and other components exist. In the case of a real thing, the correlate of content is that thing, however, cognitively expressed in terms of content and the way it is given, which determines the internal object of representation of that thing.

When we talk about the object of representation, we mean what the content directly refers to, what it indicates, what is its source and correlate, and what is given in representation in the form of the structure described. For example, in a sentence: "the neighbour's horse is old", a correlate of the name "neighbour's horse" is a specific external thing that exists in real life, while in a sentence: "the horse is a herbivorous animal" a correlate of the content of the name "horse" is not a single real horse, but an abstract general object, existing as a construct of thought, a correlate of the content of the concept of a horse, one schematic, cognitive approach to many real things. On the other hand, our image, e.g. of a flying horse, has a purely intentional content correlate and we can say that it exists e.g. in the field of fantasy creations conceived or described, similarly to a Pegasus, but it does not exist in reality, although similar to an diagonal square, it has an element uniting a given content. Only a representation for which a correlate of content exists, in reality, has a real thing as a denotation. It is then said that representation: a linguistic expression or a thought, has a real external object.

The way of presenting content differentiates the subject of the representation with the same content correlate. For example, a neighbour's horse, imagined, seen directly, seen in a reminder, described in words, may have the same content, the same correlate of content and the way it exists. However, there will be one subject of a presenta-

tion, another one of imagination or description. However, they will all relate to the same thing represented in different ways.

The object of representation is a relational structure, constituted by consciousness, which can combine both mental and real elements and is based on information processes.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

The article attempts to present the internal structure of the object of representation. For this purpose, some well-known analyses of the object and content of mental representations and of the distinction between the external object and the intentional object of thought and language have been cited. Individual components of the structure of the object of representation were distinguished and described against the background of these analyses. The presented structure makes it possible to reconstruct the diversity of what we call the object of representation and to show the structural dependence of the internal, intentional and external object of representation. An internal object is defined by its content, its way of presentation and its correlate. While an object external to thought and language (real) is defined by the full structure described in the article.

The thoughts that gave the basis for distinguishing the described structure of the object were as follows:

(1) The function of representation in relation to thought or language is much richer than the function of reality reflection, so it is necessary to take into account situations of representing only imaginary objects.

(2) There is given, associated with the representation, additional knowledge, not contained in the content of the representation itself, on how the correlate of content exists or about the source of the content represented, and this knowledge affects the constitution of the object of representation and should therefore be reflected in its structure.

(3) The object of representation is constituted in the relationship of cognitive or linguistic representation of reality or thought, and, therefore, there must be room in its structure for the relationship of external and internal elements to the individual process/act of representation itself.

(4) The representation does not include its content, but always something else in opposition to it, even if different content is constituted in another act of representation, which justifies the adaptation of a distinction between the object and content of the representation in each situation.

It may be problematic to attribute the status of a general object to what is represented by the content of the concept. This is reflected by the fact that the use of the term is the use of representation. This is because the concept represents a category, a pattern that captures the characteristics of individually existing things, or a pattern that captures only the intended content. In both cases, it is a pattern conceived and general. There are no real-life general objects, but if a generalised model of individual things is represented, it is called a general object, as opposed to the content itself, which is the way it is represented, and not the individual real things that this model fulfils.

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## LINGUISTIC MEANING AS A PART OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE WORLD\*

**Abstract.** The paper deals with the concept of the model of the world. It concerns a pre-linguistic stage of language acquisition, descriptive content of proper names and interpretation by means of a conceptual system. The model of the world comprises all aspects of being conscious. It is a system, a unity, a background of our conscious life; perception, language, notions, concepts, are its aspects. The more we know about cognitive processes, functions and structure of the mind, the better we understand the nature of language; the more we know about language, the better we understand the nature of the mind. Linguistic meaning as it was shown by the studies of language and categories acquisition, has its origin in the aforementioned model. That is why linguistic meanings are not ready-made contents, ideas, semantic entities, etc. but rather systems of procedures that constitute sense of speech acts. The approach to linguistic meaning as a part of an individual conceptual system, a system of information that mirrors cognitive, linguistic and non-verbal experience of an individual, is much of help in understanding efficacy of language, forming of beliefs, convictions, and also introducing new meanings.

**Keywords:** model of the world; language; mind

1. Introduction. 2. The pre-language stage of language learning. 3. The descriptive content of proper names and occasional expressions. 4. Sense as interpretation by means of a conceptual system. 5. Examples of the role of context in interpretation of semantic anomalies. 6. Conclusions.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The term “model of the world” was introduced by an outstanding psychiatrist and French philosopher Henri Ey in his work *La conscience*. “A model of the world” encompasses a number of aspects that make up the phenomenon of being conscious and constitutes a systemic,

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hierarchical unity<sup>1</sup>. Language is one of such aspects. Language participates in perception and cognition as an objectifying medium in which the results of cognition are formulated and an individual model of the world is created: “No object, given to us in the traditional sense of the word, could be presented without this model in the course of our conscious life, and we must constantly refer to it to recognise the objects we are dealing with; otherwise we would not be able to distinguish any elements or moments of our area of consciousness, and this area would remain completely empty”<sup>2</sup>. In the hierarchical structure of the model of the world, sensory experiences serve as the basis for orientation of the subject in the world and the formation of concepts and meanings assigned by humans to the objects of experience, including the “true or false” qualification<sup>3</sup>. The unity labelled “the model of the world” should be referred to in order to understand how experience and knowledge are created, the presentation of what we directly experience and the semantic (conceptual) representation of experience. Moreover, it also explains how a specific autonomy of conscious being and its personal character is created in the course of personal experience and, especially constitutive for the issue of meaning, in the social context of communication. The concept of a model of the world can help to overcome a certain one-sidedness of naturalistic and computational theories of the mind, shed light on the issues of the relationship between perception and language, the meaning of linguistic expressions, the conceptual scheme, mental representation, intentionality and rationality. It is both an opportunity and an actual need.

The study of cognitive processes, functions and structure of the mind enables better understanding of language. On the other hand, the more we know about language, the better we understand the nature of the mind. The importance of language, as the studies of language acquisition in children and the genesis of language cate-

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1 H. Ey, *La conscience*, Paris 1956, 1968<sup>2</sup>.

2 A. Póltawski, *Problematyka doświadczenia „zewnętrznego” w filozofii Romana Ingardena*, Część II, *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 24(1996)4, 110.

3 M. Maciejczak, *Brentano i Husserl. Pytanie epistemologiczne*, Warszawa 2001.

gories have shown, refers to a broader, dynamic model of the mind, to which the system of concepts belongs as its element. In its light, the linguistic meaning is not a ready-made content, ideas, semantic components, etc., but a system of procedures, operations to determine the sense of an utterance. Having such a system leads to the development of a targeted reference of the human being to the world, the participants of communication and oneself, as criteria of the subjective importance of cognition. The assertion that the meaning given to signs (content) is determined by the content of the conceptual system in which the interpretation is made, on the one hand, questions the Cartesian image of the mind as a place of “ready” meanings, ideas that are the basis for the creation of our knowledge of the world, and on the other hand, the notion of meaning as an independent individual, semantic existence, and objective thought. To indicate the broader context of the process of language acquisition and its meanings – to include linguistic meaning as part of an individual conceptual system, a system of information that reflects the individual’s cognitive, verbal and non-verbal experience, will help to better understand the effectiveness of language, the formation of beliefs and the introduction of new meanings.

## 2. PRE-LANGUAGE STAGE OF LANGUAGE LEARNING

Psycholinguistic research provides arguments for the existence of a pre-linguistic fragmentation of the world of experience. The pre-language background is the perceptual, performative and cognitive knowledge of a situation. It precedes and, at the same time, makes it possible to introduce and establish distinctions of a purely linguistic nature<sup>4</sup>.

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4 The results of these studies and research can be found in: E. Holenstein, *Von der Hintergebarkeit der Sprache. Kognitive Unterlagen der Sprache. Anhang: Zwei Vorträge von Roman Jakobson*, Frankfurt 1980; *Badania nad rozwojem języka dziecka*, eds. G. Shugar, M. Smoczyńska, Warszawa 1980; J. Piaget, *Psychologia i epistemologia*, transl. Z. Zakrzewska, Warszawa 1977; *Akwizycja języka w świetle językoznawstwa kognitywnego*, eds. E. Dąbrowska, W. Kubiński, Kraków 2003.

Jean Piaget, for example, noticed that with the knowledge of perception, the perception of a sensory characteristic, is usually associated with a functional moment. A child, for example, recognises that a ball is something that can roll, and so it is something with some kind of role in relation to the child's movements. The ball is distinctive in the field of vision because it can be rolled. The child repeats the action of rolling immediately and many times when the ball is in its field of vision – rolling activates and satisfies its ability to move. At the same time, the child perceives the perceptual characteristics of the ball as a more or less round object. Seeing a round ball satisfies the sense of sight, and its subsequent recognition can be explained as identification of the object of the activity with its performance.

The arguments for embedding language in perception and cognitive structures are also provided by the analysis of the early stage of language acquisition – moving from gestures to words. In this stage of development, the child combines linguistic expressions and certain formulation of ideas with specific experiences. It has been observed that in children the connection of motor and linguistic meaning, gesture and word, is preceded by the connection of hand indication with the direction of gaze, thus with two signs already acquired<sup>5</sup>. The progress from gaze and gesture of pointing to verbal indicating (*Deixis*) is accompanied by a change in the structure of the area of perception, and the progress from objects in the immediate vicinity catching the eye, through increasingly more distant ones, to objects outside the field of vision. It concerns moving from the present things to the absent ones, from signs for the present things to signs for the absent ones<sup>6</sup>.

The property of the described situation is that the object is considered as *certain this* and *certain that*, i.e. as an individual object of some kind. This “dual” character of the perceived objects is the basis for the semiotic distinction of the *token* and *type*. An object is not

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5 E. Clark, *From Gesture to Word. Human Growth and Development*, Wolson College Lectures, Oxford 1976, 94, 85–120.

6 According to Elmar Holenstein, showing what is absent becomes possible by moving from signs indicating or showing things to signs representing things. E. Holenstein, *Von der Hintergebarkeit der Sprache*, op. cit., 25.



only a ball but also a certain primitive type of sign: a (representative) example of BALLS. To be a ball, an object needs to be round, flexible, and rollable. The aforementioned properties (roundness, flexibility, rollability) allow to identify the given object as a ball.

In the pre-language stage of language acquisition, we find the basis for concepts derived from perception. The process of perception is abstract, it ignores insignificant properties of the object and introduces the perspective of the subject. That is to say, which properties will be chosen and how something is included – as an aspect, a clue or a token – depends on the structure of the perceiving subject. For example, I can see a house from the roof side, or as a token of a house existence when I see only the roof; the same form (shape) that makes an object a knife is also a token that the object can be used as a knife. The sign is based on a specific form usually lines, bars, arrows, longitudinal objects that attract attention. They also point to similar and contrasting things: a white dress can resemble a snowy summit, the person who wore it, but also a black dress. The change of the subjective attitude allows moving from associative to semiotic referencing (*Verweisung*). We associate the objects thus distinguished with tokens, meanings and see them as token of objects we experience and other tokens. Holenstein convincingly demonstrates how language competence as a distinguishing ability is embedded in the perceptual and motor competence, and how the ability to use symbolic signs (*Symbolische Zeichenvermögen*) is embedded in the pre-linguistic ability to indicate things (*Indexikalischen Zeichenvermögen*)<sup>7</sup>. The ability to use symbolic signs such as demonstrative pronouns: *This – That* – presupposes the understanding of pointing gestures, usually made by the hand (arm) and finger, most often accompanied by direction of the gaze. The experience that something in the field of vision is distinctive and attracts one's own attention and that of one's companion, and is usually accompanied by turning the body in that direction. This behaviour, becoming a token of what is distinctive in the field of vision, thus gains a demonstrative

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<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, 23.

function. It appears that we are genetically wired to harness signs – indicating. Already in the fifth minute of life, the child is looking for eye contact with the mother, and the seven-week olds are looking adults in the eye rather than in the face to know where their attention is supposed to go<sup>8</sup>. Understanding linguistic distinctions (phonemes) also presupposes first of all the perception of linguistic signs, i.e. the ability to distinguish sensory signs that function as linguistics signs. The thesis that perceptual concepts are the result of procedures of generalisation and classification of objects, learnt perceptually and functionally, is confirmed by the research on the initial stage of language acquisition, i.e. the stage of encoding concepts<sup>9</sup>. It assumes distinguishing both linguistic expressions (perceiving linguistic signs and awareness of their specificity) and the context of their use. The sign is based on a specific form usually lines, bars, arrows, longitudinal objects that attract attention. Linguistic signs are seen as signs of something and as signs of other signs. Both are interpreted in the same conceptual system. What is coded by a word refers to a specific structure of concepts, related in turn to other such structures. From the point of view of generating or constructing concepts, we can talk about their hierarchy. The same linguistic sign can be used to encode different concepts and, through other concepts, be associated with the whole conceptual system. In this way, the conceptual system participates in the interpretation of the sign, in other words, it expresses its meaning. The conceptual system also stores and interprets, through its structures, the linguistic and situational context of the use of an expression and provides access to any area of the system containing relevant information for interpretation.

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8 E. Oksaar, *Spracherwerb und Kindersprache in evolutiver Sicht*; in *Der Mensch und seine Sprache*, eds. A. Peisl, A. Mohler, Frankfurt 1979, 149.

9 R. I. Pavilionis, *Język, znaczenie, rozumienie i relatywizm*, in: *Język, znaczenie, rozumienie i relatywizm*, Warszawa 1991, 131–169, 135. In the next part, I will refer to Pavilonis' article a number of times.

### 3. THE DESCRIPTIVE CONTENT OF PROPER NAMES AND OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS

How does the conceptual system interpret the meaning of an occasional expression such as *me*, *you*, *him*, *here*? It has two aspects: (1) conventional (a concept or meaning of the first person speaking); (2) pragmatic (concepts we have about a specific or possible object, the object of reference of the expression). Such an object can be the reference object for many other expressions that are related to a specific information, i.e. concepts that someone has about the given object.

The fact that a name is given is the reason for talking about a “so-called object” in discourse, directing attention at or thinking about it. Similarly, occasional expressions: “*I*”, “*you*”, “*he*”, “*here*”, “*now*”, can be considered as the names of the first, second, third person, etc., respectively. They have “fixed” meanings of corresponding expressions. The proper use of occasional expressions presupposes seeing the context of the reference, distinguishing the relevant objects, and constructing a specific concept of a given object in a conceptual system. Therefore, in addition to its conceptual meaning, Pavilonis speaks of a descriptive meaning of proper names or an occasional expression. It is an “image” in some conceptual system that can be established verbally by various descriptors: the object reference then becomes the result of a combination of “established” and “descriptive” meanings<sup>10</sup>. Descriptive meanings are the means of expression and thus the means of representation and presentation of the corresponding objects.

There is no need for the language user to be able to express a “descriptive” meaning. An occasional expression, e.g. “*I*”, cannot be reduced to any descriptor representing my idea of myself. Its inexpressibility is the property of the conceptual system and no verbal expression will exhaust the content associated with it. The “descriptive” meaning as an “image” changes depending on the object itself and our perspective on it. The name retains this object at its every change (e.g. in the fictional

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 136.

world), is an inflexible designator, relativized to the conceptual system. It is therefore not it in the sense of objective identity.

When a child knows the structure of a declarative sentence, its utterance is freed from the situation in which the act of speech took place, from the characteristics that once determined the reference – the relationship between objects and events and the ways of presenting them is severed. In this situation, a tool is needed that can link the situation to the event expressed in the sentence and the objects included in it. It concerns the identity of time, space and sometimes also people: fulfilling the act of speech and taking part in the described event. This tool are relation-referring demonstratives *shifters*. They restore the reference to the current situation in a sentence. *Shifters* demonstrate by means of relation expressions. Reversible relation expressions free us, among other things, from the egocentricity of early childhood perspective. The reference to the situation of the declarative sentence by means of demonstratives (*shifters*) is chosen at will. As long as the interchangeability of such linguistic indicators (*I-you, here-there, left-right*) is not established, and shown by being properly used in a dialogue, there is no fixed criterion that they have been used to describe a relation and not as qualifying expressions (thus far). When used as a qualifying expression, they are more related to the specific attitude, as relation descriptors, they testify to the choice of possible positions, possible actions, i.e. a category-related attitude.

*Shifters* can be compared with relation names, e.g. brother, neighbour, etc.; their use at an early stage of language acquisition is often neither relational nor reflexive but qualifying: “Brother equals a boy”<sup>11</sup>. Likewise, the use of the pronoun *I* does not mean gaining self-awareness, certainty of one’s own existence, but the discovery of one’s own relativity, the interchangeability of roles in social communication – overcoming the childish egocentrism. In this context, Jakobson indicated two freeing stages of the child’s linguistic development<sup>12</sup>. By

11 D. Elkind, *Children’s Conceptions of Brother and Sister: Piaget Replication Study V*, *The Journal of Genetic Psychology* 100(1962), 129–136.

12 E. Holenstein, *Von der Hintergebarkeit*, op. cit., 186.

grasping the interchangeability and reflexivity of linguistic indicators, the child is capable of a proper dialogue – the interchangeability of specific linguistic social roles. A partner in a real conversation is not only the sender and recipient of signals but also of symbolic information and confirmations. There is a known example of a child who, before mastering the predictive use of language, could neither initiate a dialogue nor answer purely informative questions with a *Yes* or *No*<sup>13</sup>.

In this context, we can see the reason why proper names and occasional expressions are ideal means of communication. It is so, because they are neutral towards the various concepts associated with them, so there is no need to agree on the associated descriptive terms. Moreover, they allow not only to link different concepts to the same object by one and the same user, but to link different cognitive experiences, to link different thoughts of different language users as presumably referring to the same objects. Therefore, names have a “causal” role: they “evoke”, “activate” specific concepts in specific conceptual systems, link together those that presumably choose the same objects in the corresponding object universe, thus enabling communication. Pavilonis stated: “The moral of this is simple: linguistic expressions, and especially proper names and occasional expressions, cannot be considered as directly object-referenced expressions”<sup>14</sup>. For we always deal with an interpretation in a certain conceptual system.

The acquisition of language means not only mastering the means of coding concepts of a conceptual system, but also mastering the means of social communication, and conventional orientation of such systems. In other words, language not only serves to verbalise the pre-linguistic and linguistic “image” of the world but also to bring individual “images” closer to the “images” of a given language community. It is a medium leading to the establishment of inter-subjective distinctions, articulating the world by means of a common code. Learning the correct use of linguistic expressions means acquiring appropriate distinctions, classifications concerning the

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 35.

<sup>14</sup> R. I. Pavilonis, *Język, znaczenie, rozumienie i relatywizm*, op. cit., 138.

common world in which communicating subjects live. This is the second, besides the coding of concepts, necessary condition for the social communication of individual language users. By manipulating concepts, we can build new conceptual structures, create new “images” of the world, but this logical possibility of creating new concepts is determined by the conceptual system itself. Although they may be far from “images” reflecting the real world, they do not break continuity with concepts reflecting the real experience of the individual. Conceptual structures created by means of language refer to the possible experience of an individual, to possible states of things, unreal, imagined objects – to possible worlds. Once a child is able to build declarative sentences on the basis of what is real, the child can talk about both possible and unreal things.

Thus, mastering a language gives access to “possible worlds”. All possible real and unreal, concrete or abstract “images” as conceptual structures are part of a single conceptual system in which they are linked in a continuous manner: “The possibility of crossing the borders of real experience includes the cognitive meaning of symbolism as well as language in general”<sup>15</sup>. Continuity, on the other hand, explains the presence of traces of everyday language in abstract languages.

#### 4. SENSE AS INTERPRETATION BY MEANS OF A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM

The transfer of information from one user to another consists of encoding concepts belonging to a particular conceptual system in some text and then decoding the same text in another system. This process of interpretation is the understanding of a linguistic text as a set of signs.

An expression makes sense if we can find its interpretation in a particular system, covering all possible types of interpretations. The meaning content of a word changes with its verbal environment, not unlike the content (qualitative endowment) of an object depending on the situational context. The means of distinction are hierarchically ordered according to structural relationships of suitability

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 140.

and cognateness. Sense is the constructability of a specific “image” by means of the meanings contained in the system. The source of meaning and understanding is linking concepts into a certain unity, to give form, to fill gaps between concepts, to cross differences, distances, contrasts, any kind of incomparability.

This is convincingly demonstrated by the notions of connection, approximation and achievement contained in the etymologies of linguistic expressions that make up the semantic field of the words “to mean” and “to understand”. Latin *comprehendere*, English *to catch*, *to size*, *to follow*, French *saisir*, *comprendre*, German *fassen*, *ergreifen*, *begreifen*, Polish *pojmwąć*, *ujmwąć*, *chwycić*, etc. The distance between the subject and the object of understanding can be found in the German *verstehen*, English *understanding*. Lithuanian *presme* (meaning) and *suprasti* (understand) is the expanding, approximation, acquisition of an object by the subject. Pavilionis, while discussing these examples, believed that in the semantic field of these expressions, the idea of directness, intentionality of the very touchstone of meaning is visible<sup>16</sup>. Let us add that this also concerns the perceptual and functional context (Piaget) of these concepts, which we were discussed earlier.

An example of this is the issue of categorisation in language. The disarticulation of the world is largely done pre-linguistically. There are similarities and differences between individual phenomena, affinities, and internal preferences that guarantee the existence of perceptible distinctions. We therefore rely on them not because they are confirmed by appropriate language expressions but because they are captured by differentiated behaviour. Linguistic distinctions make it possible to correct and clarify distinctions already obtained in perception and action. The fact that we can rely on them is a result of common control and common use of language. Only in this context should we talk about language standardisation. Referring to the research into the function of guidance, introduction, selection and justification by linguistic differentiation of the scope and extent of behaviour, Kuno

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 143.

Lorenz argued that we are learning certain behaviours and through these differentiation without being linguistically aware of them<sup>17</sup>.

Sense is therefore a question of interpretation in a specific conceptual system. An expression may be nonsensical in a different system or in a different structure of the same system. The same expression can be interpreted in light of different concepts, which are related to each other in different ways. A system, on the other hand, gives an interpretation when there is an appropriate context that defines the part of the system necessary for interpretation. The context that defines such a fragment of the system are concepts or structures of concepts that are linked due to the relationship of interpretation to concepts directly associated with an object, situation, text, etc. Such a fragment is a block (module) of essential information covering constitutive concepts with different degrees of abstraction and content. The conceptual system, determining what and how we can interpret, also determines our personal view of the world. Its user can not only create meaningful images, but above all, choose those he/she considers true, those he/she accepts – thus not only those which have sense (thus are possible) but also meaningful to him/her. The set of beliefs so distinguished, the individual system of beliefs, is expressed by the so-called *propositional attitudes*: “I am convinced that...”, “I think that...”, etc. The individual system of knowledge includes information about everyday experience (including the pre-verbal period of constructing a conceptual system), personal history and systematic knowledge, coded in scientific texts. This objective knowledge includes conventional concepts – an agreed knowledge of the world, the basis for communication between carriers of different conceptual systems. Conventional elements, reflecting the social, cognitive experience of an individual, are intersubjective senses and logical judgments. When considered in isolation from the individual conceptual system, they are transformed into the so-called objective knowledge. Objective knowledge is therefore an abstraction of individual systems of knowledge. On the other hand, it exists

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17 K. Lorenz, *Elemente der Sprachkritik*, Frankfurt 1970, 174.



symbolically in the body of scientific texts, constituting historically and socially determined “scientific images of the world”<sup>18</sup>.

## 5. EXAMPLES OF THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN INTERPRETATION OF SEMANTIC ANOMALIES

The linguistic meaning defined in the concepts of a conceptual system is not a “finished product”. It is not always possible to understand a sign by grasping what it means, what it denotes, using only the rules set out by the code. The fact that it is not the sequence of signs constituting the utterance itself that determines its comprehensibility and sense is confirmed by the analysis of the so-called semantic anomalies – a prohibited combination of meanings. For example, the words “to sleep” and “chops”, “paint” and “mute” must not be combined – one cannot say chops are sleeping, or the paint is mute, because that would result in a nonsensical statement. Chomsky’s famous sentence: “Colourless green ideas sleep furiously” is an example of such a prohibited combination. The collocational restriction is part of the word sense and also determines its use. But is it absolute? Is it not necessary to take into account the context, i.e. the place of a defective sentence in the whole utterance?

Hans Hormann told the following stories:

“Yesterday, behind a freshly painted wall, the police discovered the body of a strangled woman. So far, the police have not managed to find any fingerprints or other clues to help establish the identity of the victim or the murderer – the paint is mute”.

“Once, when Chomsky was sixteen and still a secondary-school student, his mother entered his room late at night. Chomsky was already asleep, but he turned anxiously from side to side, gnashing his teeth. Seeing this, Mrs Chomska said: ‘Oh! The colourless green ideas sleep furiously’”<sup>19</sup>.

18 R. I. Pavilionis, *Język, znaczenie, rozumienie i relatywizm*, op. cit., 146.

19 H. Hörmann, *Z zagadnienia procesu rozumienia*, in: *Prawda i znaczenie. Rozprawy semiotyczne*, ed. J. Pelc, Warszawa 1994, 94.

An incomprehensible sentence starts making sense, after being placed in context – the sense does not automatically result from the systematic translation of characters according to the rules of the code, it was the decision of the listener to interpret this sentence not as incorrect, but as a metaphor. Understanding the sense of expressions is not only the result of grasping what a sign means, but above all of grasping the intentions of the speaker of what he/she means. The listener, attempting to understand what the speaker has in mind, is guided by the principle that the utterance makes sense. That is why he/she analyses signs and word combinations in order to achieve the goal of the above – grasp the sense of the utterance. He/she changes the codes as needed, omits what he/she heard, sometimes ignores the rules of grammar, invents new senses of the word. There is no fixed process, different processes are selected – sense – or lack thereof – is not the property of the sequence of signs or of the utterance itself. It is more accurately described as what the listener achieves.

The concept of sense of linguistic expressions will also remain ambiguous for these reasons. This statement does not discredit its validity. In its light, Quine's scepticism that since it is impossible to define meaning in behavioural concepts, it does not make sense at all to attempt to establish semantics, in the light of selected concepts does not appear appropriate. It is not necessary to justify semantics in this way. Meaning can be discussed in relation to the cognitive and communicative goals set by the speaker and listener, as emphasised by Strawson, Grice, Austin, and Searle, for example. The theory of linguistic meaning should take into account what the user does with it, that is, what he/she could, should, etc., have in mind, using a given expression in a given situation.

The listener is directed towards sense – in the traditional philosophical meaning of the term “to be directed towards [something]”, corresponding to the Latin term *intendere* – because making the world understandable, and hence making utterances in this world understandable, is one of the most important anthropological needs of man, even something necessary for him<sup>20</sup>. The listener, deciding whether he/

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20 Ibid, 98-99.

she is dealing with a semantic anomaly or a metaphor, idiomatic expression or not, actively brings out the sense of the utterance. To this end, he/she must have unclear knowledge of what the speaker may mean in this situation, in this context. Understanding is the concretisation of this knowledge: "In our minds we have, as if, some knowledge of the situation and the actions that people in this situation could take if they decided to act at all. We expect them to act in an understandable way, following to a large extent the same rules, motives, conventions and grammar that we ourselves follow in this situation"<sup>21</sup>.

This would mean the existence of different levels of understanding, which are determined by the attitude, the interests of the listener. The speaker's utterances refer to something the listener already knows, the latter links the new components to the earlier ones, temporary pre-conceptions are rejected until the listener considers that he/she has reached the final level of understanding at that moment. In order to achieve the goal – a certain sense, what the speaker has in mind – the listener modifies the existing perception and conceptual patterns. Understanding is not, as we can see, passing on ready-made information, the utterance is rather an instruction for the listener: think this way, perceive these and those relationships. "In this process of creating information, the listener is guided by what he knows about the world, by what the speaker means and says, and by his dominant tendency to perceive events in the world as having sense. ... When understanding from the superficial levels penetrates into the deeper, sounds, words and utterances become as if transparent, and in the listener's consciousness appears what the speaker has in mind"<sup>22</sup>.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

The above comments lead to the conclusion that the meaning of the expression refers to a broader dynamic model of a conceptual system whose contents are not made of atoms of meaning. The

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 99.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 100-101.

meaning cannot be autonomous, it must be considered in relation to the conceptual system, and by extension also to the world. From this point of view, the concepts of referential meanings proposed by Davidson, Kripke, Montague, and Hintikka, for instance, are closer to explaining the concept of meaning. On the other hand, non-referential concepts, for instance Husserl's presented in *Logische Untersuchungen* (*The Logical Investigations*), where the meaning is defined as existing independently of the acts, as something outside the world, identical and unchangeable, should rather be rejected<sup>23</sup>. Likewise, the positions of Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein, where thoughts are communicable, common to all, objective and exist independently of our grasp and expression<sup>24</sup>. Another example is Chomsky's theory, in which the meaning of utterances is a certain combination of language-independent, innate semantic atoms. Knowing them and the semantic resultant relationships based on them would be the knowledge that the ideal language user has about language as a system (a collection of meanings and semantic relationships). There is no need to refer to the knowledge of the world. There is only one semantics as a competence theory for all language users.

In the light of the above, we should not discuss a system of ready-made concepts, ideas, semantic components, etc., but the structure of procedures, operations, achieving results – determining the meaning, determining the sense of utterances, etc. A natural language, in the light of the above considerations, serves to build and symbolically represent the content of the multiplicity of conceptual systems as systems of belief and knowledge. These include different ideas – everyday, scientific and other – about the real and possible world. Language is the means to build these systems. Therefore, language users may have different conceptual ideas about the world. Since linguistic expressions are interpreted within conceptual systems, linguistic meanings should not be detached from these systems and

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23 E. Husserl, *Badania logiczne*, transl. J. Sidorek, Warszawa 2000, 119–124.

24 See: G. Frege, *Pisma semantyczne*, transl. B. Wolniewicz, Warszawa 1977, 108.

should be absolutized. When we do this, then language appears as opposed to reality, detached from the processes of acquiring it. The meaning of a sign should be related to its interpretation. The use of signs that require understanding involves the recognition of reality as getting closer to the truth<sup>25</sup>. Pelc, using Twardowski's distinction between acts, activities, actions and processes and their products, claimed that in his description of the activities of transmitting, receiving and processing signs (semiosis), the subject of these activities should be taken into account, similarly, in the analysis of cognition and not of the product – the state of knowledge as all sentences considered true, as well as in the activities of interpretation. “There are no signs outside their use, there is no use of the sign without interpreting it, there is no interpretation of the sign without the cognising subject”<sup>26</sup>. The starting point provided by conceptual systems allows us to question the absolutisation of meaning which is common in natural language philosophy. The theories of Frege, Husserl, Russell, early Wittgenstein, and Chomsky, abstracted from the functions that language performs in cognition and understanding, close the subject within language, which does not allow to explain the references of linguistic expressions, their relation to the objects of the world they signify. From the point of view of the conceptual model of the world, one can think that the reference concepts (Davidson, Kripke, Montague, and Hintikka) are closer to explaining the issue of meaning.

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## THE ISSUE OF INTELLECTUAL INTUITION IN METAPHYSICS\*

**Abstract.** The article presents problems of intellectual intuition in metaphysics from a semiotic point of view. There are various types of intuition in philosophy: rational intuition, irrational intuition, and sensual intuition. All of them are immediate ways of cognition. Classical metaphysics uses intellectual intuition as its main method to find out and justify its statements. The main problem of intellectual intuition is an intersubjective approach to the object of metaphysics. The main aim of this paper is the objectivization and rationalization of intellectual intuition in language. The semantic notion of meaning and the pragmatic notion of understanding are the fundamental tools which are used to translate the issue of intuition from the subject-matter level into the language level. This operation allows to look at intuition in a non-psychological manner. It enables the objectivization of the method of intellectual intuition in the light of the understanding of meanings.

**Keywords:** intuition; meaning; understanding; separation

1. Introduction. 2. Intuition as intellectual experience. 3. Intuition as an act of understanding the object of cognition. 4. Intuition and induction. 5. Act of intuition in classical existential metaphysics. 6. Intellectual intuition as intuition of meaning. 7. Conclusions.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Intellectual intuition is one of the types of intuition. Other types of intuition are sensual intuition and irrational intuition (e.g. mystical intuition)<sup>1</sup>. The issue of intellectual intuition is one of the most important philosophical issues of the metaphysics of Thomistic existentialism. It has its roots as early as in Plato and Aristotle. It is particularly in Aristotle that intuition is a way to learn the

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1 M. Bunge, *Intuition and Science*, Englewood Cliffs, New York 1962, ix.

principles which are non-demonstrable. The Stagirite points out an issue which, in my opinion, casts a shadow on the recognition of the importance of intuition for science and philosophy to the present day. According to him, intellectual intuition as a method is situated outside the system of knowledge, and this is because it is only through intuition that we are able to learn principles; scientific knowledge can be demonstrated, and principles are indemonstrable. Hence the conclusion that intuition which is indemonstrable cannot be a method of scientific knowledge. At the same time, Aristotle admits that the principles of evidence are better known than the conclusions drawn from them, and no type of thought is more precise and certain than intellectual intuition<sup>2</sup> which is the first cognitive operation.

In the later history of philosophy, intuition was understood in a variety of ways. Descartes understood it differently – as a purely rational operation due to which truths appeared to him in a direct and comprehensive manner. The relationships between, for example, such propositions of mathematics as “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ”, “ $3 + 1 = 4$ ” and their consequence “ $2 + 2 = 3 + 1$ ” must have been understood intuitively. The relationship between two first propositions and the third one is given intuitively, directly and without analysis. Spinoza’s concept of intuition as having mathematical nature was the first concept to continue this rationalistic approach.

If three integers are given and 1 is in the same relationship to 2 as 3 to a certain number  $x$ , finding  $x$ , whose value should be in the same relationship to the third number as the second number to the first one, is done so quickly that it manifests itself as a flash of intuition. There is no need to find the value of  $x$  by converting the expression  $1:2 :: 3:x$  to the expression  $x = (3 \times 2) : 1$ , from which we obtain the value of  $x$ . Therefore, according to Spinoza, intuition would be instantaneous inference. Intuition for Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza was a way of learning about primary theorems – the first true propositions. These types of intuition are classified in the literature

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2 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 100b.



as rational intuition, as opposed to irrational types, such as Kant's pure intuition which is the source of synthetic *a-priori* statements, or Bergson's intuition of experiencing<sup>3</sup>.

Intersubjectivity is a weak assumption of the rationality of cognition. Intuition in the works of Aristotle, Descartes or Spinoza can be called rational intuition, as opposed to Kant's or Bergson's intuition because the results of the first type can be verified with the use of other methods, and the second type does not meet the condition of intersubjectivity as to the possibility of controlling its results. This control can be carried out with the use of a variety of methods, depending on the object of cognition. Aristotle, for example, attempts to provide an elenctic argument for the principle of non-contradiction. His intention is to demonstrate the absurd consequences of rejecting this principle<sup>4</sup>. According to Descartes, the provided examples of relations between propositions can be verified by deduction, just like it was proposed by Spinoza. Let us, therefore, assume, at least as a research hypothesis, that a feature of rational intuition will be the verifiability of its results with the use of some method.

## 2. INTUITION AS INTELLECTUAL EXPERIENCE

Intuition, on the one hand, in Thomist metaphysics plays the role of the essential method of reaching of fundamental propositions, on the other hand, it is used in metaphysics as a method of verification, and thus it makes it possible to confirm the obtained results – which is a justificatory function. The way in which propositions are verified is understood differently than in the distinguished types of Aristotelian or Cartesian intuition. Intuition is treated as a kind of experience – intellectual experience. It exceeds purely sensory experience but, just as sensory experience in exact sciences is the essential method of reaching statements and their verification, intuition is a method allowing

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3 M. Bunge, *Intuition and Science*, op. cit., 5-7, 12.

4 Many scholars accuse him of committing the fallacy of *petitio principii* in his attempts to justify the principle of non-contradiction.

to reach metaphysical statements, and then verify them by immediate, intuitive contact with their object. Recognizing intuition as a rational or irrational way of cognition is a decisive factor for the existence of metaphysics, just as recognizing empirical experience as a valuable way of cognition is a decisive factor for the existence of empirical exact sciences.

It is believed that metaphysics has no possibilities to verify its statements based on sensory experience or *a-priori* cognition<sup>5</sup>, i.e. in a way different than intuitive. The question which should be asked in this context is: in what does the intuitive way of cognition consist and can this method be considered as a rational method? The first part of the question pertains to repetitive operations which in the case of the same object of cognition and with the use of certain rules of procedure will lead researchers to the same cognitive results. The question about rationality, on the other hand, is in the first place a question about the intersubjective verifiability of its results.

Statements that constitute primary premises in metaphysics are the result of intellectual intuition. The same is true for the construction of sciences. Propositions directly based on experience which constitute the primary theorems of empirical theories are obtained using sensory intuition. According to Morawiec, in metaphysics, as opposed to sciences, one can have doubts as to which propositions can be considered as primary premises. At the starting point of the practice of metaphysics, existential and predicative statements are formulated. These statements can be called completely original material of metaphysics which is based on sensory experience (the experience of the content of being) and intuitive cognition (the cognition of existence). According to Morawiec, due to their individual character,

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5 This does not mean that there are not trends in neo-Thomism that reject *a-priori* or empirical verification. Analytical Thomism, in Poland initiated by the "Cracow Circle", would be the first trend; the second was the philosophy of nature, for example in the approach adopted by Klósak who constructed a method for testing philosophical facts with the use of empirical facts (i.e. empirical facts interpreted from the philosophical perspective).

they are not statements belonging to the domain of metaphysics, and therefore they cannot perform the role of the first true propositions of metaphysics in a strict sense<sup>6</sup>. Metaphysical statements are general. Morawiec does not use the term “primary premise”, but he refers to the primacy of propositions in metaphysics, or to first propositions within a metaphysical system. It seems, however, that nothing should prevent us from recognizing existential and predicative propositions as the primary premises of metaphysical theory. The same is true for the empirical sciences. General universal propositions, which are the purpose of science, are reached based on specific statements. Such statements are not considered as scientific theorems<sup>7</sup>, but as the primary theorems of scientific theories. Of course, individual objects (e.g. the Sun, the Milky Way, etc.) can also be the subject of scientific inquiry but then they are investigated from the perspective of universal laws of nature. The purpose of sciences, in a very broad sense, consists in seeking to capture the most general regularities in nature and describing them with the use of natural laws. However, to attain this purpose, the sciences must ultimately be based on experience. Since it is always individual objects that are the object of sensory experience, the propositions which are primary premises for inductive inference are not general, but individual propositions. Assuming a static understanding of metaphysics, one can speak of it in the first place as a set of general statements resulting from its characteristic cognitive procedures. Such an approach is associated with the purpose of metaphysics, which means that only theorems which realize the purposes set in its domain are accepted in it. Secondly, it is possible to extend the set of statements which belong to the metaphysical theory by adding all statements which are not general but constitute the foundation for their formulation – as it would be impossible to construct metaphysics without them.

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6 E. Morawiec, *Podstawowe zagadnienia metafizyki klasycznej*, Warszawa 1998, 147–148.

7 K. Ajdukiewicz, *Subiektywność i niepowtarzalność metody bezpośredniego doświadczenia*, in: *Idem, Język i poznanie*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1985, 372.

If we assume that existential and predicative propositions are the primary premises of existential metaphysics – which is a position that I advocate – metaphysics will be a type of knowledge immediately based on experience, in which experience will be of an intuitive empirical (the experience of the content of being), and intuitive non-empirical nature (the experience of the existence of being). Such a claim is the result of the belief that existence is something different from the content of being and is not experienced by the senses<sup>8</sup>. However, since the selected aspect in which the objects of immediate experience are investigated is the existential aspect, the notion of being as being is expressed in the process of separation. Its definition is finally obtained through intellectual intuition. An act of intuition is preceded by intellectual operations which formally follow deductive and inductive rules<sup>9</sup>. Intellectual intuition will be different from the intuition of existence in that it will be an act of understanding, while the intuition of existence will be an act of immediate experience.

In metaphysics, we would be dealing with three types of immediate statements. The first type of statements in the theory of being would be statements expressing given experiences, the second type – the definition of being (formulated through intellectual intuition) as a necessary condition of formulating metaphysical principles; and metaphysical principles would be the third type. According to Morawiec, if existential statements are nonetheless rejected at the point of departure as statements not belonging to theory, then – leaving aside the concept of being as being – the principles of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, sufficient reason and

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8 Another position in this respect is presented by Gogacz who claims that the content of being is available for immediate cognition, and the affirmation of existence is a consequence of reasoning. "Thus, first in the order of an intellectual encounter with being is the experience of its essence ... the act of existence is specifically concluded by reasoning as the first act of an individual being, the first principle constituting, along with essence, the inner fabric of being" (M. Gogacz, *Elementarz metafizyki*, Warszawa 1987, 16, 21).

9 D. Piętka, *Status metodologiczny tezy tomistycznej teorii bytu*, in: *Nauka i metafizyka*, ed. A. Motycka, Warszawa 2010, 61-67.

finality will be the primary theorems of metaphysics<sup>10</sup>. However, regardless of which statements play the role of primary theorems in metaphysics, general metaphysical statements are a result of intellectual intuition.

### 3. INTUITION AS AN ACT OF UNDERSTANDING THE OBJECT OF COGNITION

In metaphysics it is assumed that intellectual intuition is an act of understanding the object of cognition to develop general concepts and principles of metaphysics. It is preceded by a set of intellectual operations, such as the comparison and combination of data, analysis and inference<sup>11</sup>. It is said that all these operations are so simple that they are immediately obvious. It also applies to deductive and inductive inference that is part of the process leading to an act of intuition. When talking about intellectual operations, I will not mean mental activities, as is often the case, but operations on propositions. This is because what is compared and combined are the contents of concepts (the meanings of names) and statements. Statements are the result of these comparisons. With the use of very simple inference, one can proceed from one statements to another. Operations leading to an act of intuition, although they are very simple and immediately obvious, and in the psychological sense they seem to constitute immediate cognition are, in fact, a kind of reasoning and, objectively speaking, must be classified as a type of indirect cognition<sup>12</sup>. What is immediate is the act of intuition. In the literature, it is said that intuition can be understood both in a broader and a narrower sense. In the broader, operative sense, intuition is a set of activities preparing the act of understanding being as being in its structural, genetic and functional sense. In the narrower sense, intuition is the very act of

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10 E. Morawiec, *Podstawowe zagadnienia metafizyki klasycznej*, op. cit., 148; T. Rutowski, *Czy tzw. pierwsze zasady tomistycznej filozofii bytu są naprawdę pierwszymi*, *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 3(1967)2, 223-227.

11 E. Morawiec, *Podstawowe zagadnienia metafizyki klasycznej*, op. cit., 94.

12 I pointed it out in an analysis of the method of separation in the article *Status metodologiczny tez tomistycznej teorii bytu*, op. cit.

approaching being as being, the result of which is a statements answering questions asked in metaphysics<sup>13</sup>. In this article, I will use a clear distinction between these two aspects, and by intellectual intuition, I will mean the act of understanding being. The primary intention is to clearly discriminate between interpretation procedures and the very act of intuitive cognition<sup>14</sup>. Obviously, interpretation procedures have a fundamental role and essentially affect the result of intellectual intuition.

What is characteristic of intuitive cognition is the fact that it is immediate and obvious<sup>15</sup>. However, unlike the empirical obviousness given in sensory experience, the act of intellectual intuition is accompanied by peremptory obviousness characteristic of necessary theorems<sup>16</sup>. What does this assertion mean? Here we compare the obviousness of the act of cognition and the obviousness of the results of cognitive acts in the form of peremptory statements. Authoritative statements are statements which describe necessary states of affairs and do not allow for any doubt. Non-necessary statements and statements concerning some types of sensory experience can also be peremptory, for example, "I have a toothache". Their feature is doubtlessness. The peremptoriness of an act of cognition would consist, above all, in an experience that excludes doubt. Peremptory obviousness can also be attributed to experience and statements resulting from this experience, although their object may not be necessary, or its occurrence obvious. And here is the fundamental difficulty of the value of intellectual intuition. The subject of cognition may have an experience that will have a feature of obviousness, which will also result in an obvious statements, but this statements may be false. The act of intuition itself does not necessarily lead to the truth. If we apply the framework proposed by Morris to the discussed issue, namely that the process of semiosis consists of three types of relationships – pragmatic, semantic and syntactic relation-

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13 E. Morawiec, *Podstawowe zagadnienia metafizyki klasycznej*, op. cit.

14 J. J. Jadacki, *Metafizyka i semiotyka*, Warszawa 1996, 148.

15 B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London 1912, 174-185.

16 T. Czeżowski, *Filozofia na rozdrożu*, Warszawa 1965, 73.

ships, then the obviousness of a statements will be in the domain of pragmatic relationships, and the truth of a statement within the domain of semantic relationships.

According to the theorists of metaphysics, the theorems of this discipline of philosophy are of an exigence nature because they are based on pointing to the only reason for something. Intellectual intuition is a method that justifies this type of cognition, as its obviousness “not only gives a sense of certainty but also excludes fallacy”<sup>17</sup>. A true and obvious statement is when we have to intellectually recognize a necessary state of affairs given to cognition due to this cognitive content, analytical nature of the proposition expressing it, and obviousness. This operation is not one-off, but it has to be repeated, which allows the control of cognitive results<sup>18</sup>. However, the problem is that depending on the subject of cognition, different conclusions can be reached while adopting the same initial assumptions. It is therefore not necessary to point to one and only cause. An example is the dispute over the existence of substance. In the world, changes can be observed. The data of common cognition and data of scientific cognition lead to the conclusion that there are two different types of changes. On the one hand, these are insignificant changes, such as changes in the position of an atom, change in the colour of one’s skin, etc., and on the other hand, significant ones, such as, for example, atomic disintegration or death of a man etc. Thus, two types of changes occur – changes preserving the continuity of an object, and changes which cause an object to cease to exist or come into being. The ascertainment of two types of changes leads to the conclusion that in an object changing inessentially there is the subject of properties called substance, and if object changes inessentially inessential properties called accidents<sup>19</sup>.

Łukasiewicz, for example, reaches different conclusions based on the same assumptions. Namely, he states that objects have proper-

17 S. Kamiński, *Możliwość prawd koniecznych*, in: Idem, *Jak filozofować*, Lublin 1989, 122.

18 Ibid, 123.

19 A. B. Stępień, *Wprowadzenie do metafizyki*, Kraków 1964, 101.

ties that change and properties that are unchangeable. And what is non-contradictory is the object. Therefore, Łukasiewicz does not differentiate between changeable features and unchangeable subject, but he differentiates between changeable and unchangeable properties, where a change of the latter causes the annihilation of the whole object. Łukasiewicz states explicitly that to justify the existence of an object which is changeable, but nonetheless has a relation of identity with itself, one does not need to refer to the metaphysical assumptions about unchangeable substance and changeable properties since it is sufficient to assume that changing objects comprise groups of changeable and permanent properties<sup>20</sup>.

#### 4. INTUITION AND INDUCTION

Since intellectual intuition is a type of immediate cognition, experienced in a given moment by a particular person, a problem arises concerning its intersubjective nature. In a sense, this is analogical to the non-intersubjective character of empirical experience<sup>21</sup>. However, the difference is that, in most cases, phenomena of a certain type which are the object of sensual cognition, can be learned repeatedly by a number of people. What raises an objection here is the reference to the type of object, which assumes that a particular experience of a researcher will never be repeated as the same experience. Moreover, intellectual intuition does not have a character that can be proven by the senses, which is why the belief in its justifying character is very weak. However, the issue of intersubjectivity can be approached in a slightly different way. The object of intellectual

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20 J. Łukasiewicz, *Analiza i konstrukcja pojęcia przyczyny*, *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 9(1906)2-3, 146.

21 Ajdukiewicz wrote about the subjective character of direct empirical methods. He claimed that a proposition obtained based on the method of direct experience can be recognized only once by a small group of researchers. Therefore, it is not a method that allows everyone to verify many times the truth of a proposition obtained with its use. This is therefore not an intersubjective and repetitive method. K. Ajdukiewicz, *Subiektywność i niepowtarzalność metody bezpośredniego doświadczenia*, in: *Język i poznanie*, op. cit., 371.



intuition cannot be a domain of objects belonging to the real world, or the domain of language (meanings of language expressions).

I assume, like Ajdukiewicz does, that each person can understand a certain expression in the first place as to its object of reference, secondly – as to the way of reference, thirdly – as to emotional undertone, and fourthly – as to attitude<sup>22</sup>. We are interested only in the first two ways of understanding expressions. According to Ajdukiewicz, person  $V$  understands expression  $A$  when  $V$  upon hearing or seeing expression  $A$  directs their thought to object  $x$  different from that expression<sup>23</sup>. Apart from the fact that a language user refers by means of expression  $A$  to object  $x$ , they always do so in a certain way. One person asked whether a given object is a square, will answer in the affirmative because the geometric shape to which they refer is a rectangle with four equal sides. Another person will give the name of a “square” to a shape because it has two equal diagonals, intersecting each other at a right angle exactly in the middle of their lengths. Each of these people understands the name “square”, but each of them differently. The way of reference in this example will be the properties of the square. Even if one user of language understands “square” exclusively in the first way, and in no other way, and the second user understands it in another way, each of them can, based on their mathematical knowledge, deduct from the properties of a square known to them, the properties used to identify the shape as a square by the other user. Then both of them will understand the name “square” in the same way not only due to the object, but also due to the way in which it is referred to.

Individual people, when learning a (common or scientific) language, learn the ways of referring to objects. By analyzing the way in which users of a language come to capturing the meaning of a particular object we can come closer to the way of capturing with the use of thought what real objects are. This will not be about the psychological aspect of the process, but rather about indicating certain formal conditions

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22 K. Ajdukiewicz, *Logika pragmatyczna*, Warszawa 1975, 23.

23 *Ibid.*, 19.

that are necessary to understand a previously unintelligible expression. It will be limited to the concept of understanding as the knowledge of meaning proposed by Ajdukiewicz (understanding of an expression as to the way in which an object is referred to) or the knowledge of reference (understanding of the expression as to its object).

For example, to understand the name “table”, what seems important is the genesis of capturing the properties which allow identifying some objects as tables. Let us assume that person *V* is in a room in which there is a table. In the same room, there is also person *W*, who, pointing to the object with a table-top standing on four legs, asks person *V* – “is it a table?”. If person *V* answers that the object indicated by *W* is not a table, then we may suppose that *V* does not understand the meaning of the word “table” in English. If we ask person *V* to indicate a table among the objects in the room and that person would be unable to do so, this would be definite evidence that *V* does not understand the meaning of the word “table” as to the object. In other words, *V* cannot indicate an object to which the name “table” refers. Since the asked person is unable to answer the question asked by *W*, therefore he or she does not understand the word “table” as to the object. If, however, *V* does not speak any other language than English, then the answer provided by *V* will mean, in the first place, that *V* does not understand the word “table” assigned to it in the English language and, secondly, that he or she does not know what is the object referred to by the name “table”.

Understanding what is an object belonging to the physically existing world is usually reached by way of induction. The same is true when we learn meanings assigned to expressions in a language. This inductive way ultimately leads to an act of intuition consisting of a one-time and holistic understanding of what an object is or understanding the meaning of some name. Let us assume that a small child learning a language, pointing to an object with four legs and a table-top on which there are different objects, asks “what is it?”. A person to whom this question is addressed, answers “this is a table”. Thus, the name “table” is assigned to a specific object. The same child, in a other room, pointing to a table-top placed on one

central leg, asks “what is it?”. The answer provided is “this is a table”. The same name is assigned to another object than previously. The same answer will be provided when the child asks about an object consisting of a round table top with three legs, a rectangular table top with a dozen legs, and so on. Each time, the name “table” is assigned to another object, which nonetheless has a shared function and properties. At some point, the child will understand what it means to be a table, and thus understand the meaning of the name “table”. On the one hand, one includes in a single act what an object is and the meaning of the name used to refer to it. If someone pointing to a table top with some objects lying on it, suspended rigidly on mounting arms fastened to the ceiling asks the child – “is this a table?”, and the child answers “yes, it is”, although he or she has never seen such an example of a table before, this would mean that he or she understands the meaning of the term “table” assigned to it in the English language. This is because he or she assigns the name “table” to an object that meets the conditions of being a table.

##### 5. ACT OF INTUITION IN CLASSICAL EXISTENTIAL METAPHYSICS

Let us assume, as Ajdukiewicz did, that any name  $n$  means object  $x$  if and only if the name  $n$  can be truthfully predicated about each  $x$ <sup>24</sup>. On these grounds, we can define the notion of understanding as to the object. If person  $V$  understands the meaning of the name “table” as to the object, at least in one language, this means that  $V$  can truthfully predicate the name “table” about such objects  $x$  which are tables; and vice versa, if  $V$  can truthfully predicate the name “table” about such objects which are tables, then they can understand the meaning of the name “table” which is used to refer to this object in at least one language. Therefore, extending our deliberations to any names, we can say that person  $V$  understands the meaning of the name  $n$  as to the object in at least one language if and only if  $V$  can truthfully predicate the name  $n$  about such objects  $x$  which are  $n$ .

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 40.

Using this definition, for example, to the notion of being as being, it can be concluded that a person who understands the name “being as being” in the *J* language (e.g. the language of metaphysics) as to the object, can predicate the name “being” about each object *x* which is a being. The presented notion of understanding as to the object is a notion which is the most fundamental to it.

In order to predicate the name “table” about a certain object truthfully and in accordance with understanding, a user of a language has to have a method that allows him or her to decide whether he or she can assign the name “table” to this object. The method consists in assigning the name “table” to every object consisting of a table top at a certain distance from the ground whose function is to enable the convenient use of objects without the need of bending or lifting these objects. Ajdukiewicz gives an example of a mathematical object – hexagon. The method, in this case, would consist in giving the name “hexagon” unconditionally to every geometrical shape based on the information that this shape has 9 diagonals<sup>25</sup>. In these examples, it turns out that a language user can assign certain names to objects unconditionally, while other names cannot be assigned unconditionally. The unconditionality of assignment here is related to the sharpness of the scope of this name. It is known that in maths, notions are well-defined. It is not the case of real-world objects. Here, the meanings of expressions can be vague, they can change depending on changes in objects themselves, in particular in their functions – this applies primarily to intentional objects. Objects belonging to the world of nature and their (usually) qualitative qualifications are also re-definable. Such a notion as good, beautiful or fair have partially changed their meaning in the course of history. In this context, we can say that the meaning of the name hexagon would be unchangeable in language *J* in the course of history. This is because today the explanation of what properties are characteristic of a geometric shape called “hexagon” would probably be the same as it was in the times of Euclid. The notion of hexagon

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 21.

did not change significantly during this time. Perhaps the only exception is that one should mention that hexagon retains the said properties in the Euclidean space.

It seems to be different for the second type of objects. Probably we would provide a different explanation of what beauty is than the one that would have been provided by Plato; our understanding of freedom or equality between people would also differ. But we also have a different understanding of what are such objects as the Earth, Sun, Moon, etc. This is related to having a method allowing us to ascertain what are the abovementioned objects and what features they have. In the antiquity, the Earth was a disc surrounded with the waters of the river Oceanos which at night transported the Sun from the west to the east so that it could start its journey through the sky in the morning.

An analogical situation is with the notion of being as being. The act of understanding what a particular being is, and the act of understanding the meaning of the name “being” significantly depend on our method of the cognition of the world. In the Aristotelian or Thomist current of the classical metaphysics, there are several methods of arriving at the notion of being as being. The most important of them are abstraction and separation. These methods are operations preparing the act of intellectual intuition whose object is being as such. As a result of these operations, different concepts of being are obtained, but the principles and most theorems concerning the structure of being remain the same, or at least distantly similar. Individual steps of separation, in simple terms, can be presented as follows<sup>26</sup>. Existential statements are made as a result of collecting experience data:

$$(i) \text{ } ex(A_1), ex(A_2), ex(A_3), \dots, ex(A_n).$$

The abbreviation “ex” is a predicate of “exists”, while  $A$  is any individual name.

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<sup>26</sup> What I am interested in are only the relations between propositions and I do not consider mental activities of the subject of cognition.

As a result of the analysis, one comes to the conclusion that individual beings have certain content, i.e. Jan Kowalski is a shoemaker, Anna Nowak is an accountant, Burek is a dog, and so on. By marking different properties with the constants  $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_n$  can be written down as follows:

$$(ii) A_1 \varepsilon a_1, A_2 \varepsilon a_2, A_3 \varepsilon a_3, \dots, A_n \varepsilon a_n.$$

From (i) and (ii), we receive

$$(iii) ex(A_1), ex(A_2), ex(A_3), \dots, ex(A_n) \wedge A_1 \varepsilon a_1, A_2 \varepsilon a_2, A_3 \varepsilon a_3, \dots, A_n \varepsilon a_n.$$

On this basis, it is claimed that if some individual  $A_1$  is a being as being  $B$ , then it is something that exists and has some specific content:

$$(iv) A_1 \varepsilon B, A_2 \varepsilon B, A_3 \varepsilon B, \dots, A_n \varepsilon B \rightarrow ex(A_1), ex(A_2), ex(A_3), \dots, ex(A_n) \wedge A_1 \varepsilon a_1, A_2 \varepsilon a_2, A_3 \varepsilon a_3, \dots, A_n \varepsilon a_n.$$

Formula (iv) can be considered a deductive conclusion from (iii) and the right of simplification. However, metaphysics claims that the process of specifying being as being by means of cognition, the purpose of which is to form an atheoretical notion of being as being, that is, a notion of being that is not implicated in any theory<sup>27</sup>. However, I think that in conducting analyses, a metaphysicist uses some rules that organize their thinking. Even if the metaphysicist did not use them consciously, it is possible to extract these rules and check the accuracy of passing from one sentence to another. Still, from (iv), one receives a general conclusion concerning what a being is:

$$(v) \forall A [A \varepsilon B \rightarrow ex(A) \wedge A \varepsilon a].$$

<sup>27</sup> E. Morawiec, *Podstawowe zagadnienia metafizyki klasycznej*, op. cit., 90.

The symbol “*a*” represents any content. It is claimed here that every being is any existing content. This is an inductive generalization of what is given in an experience, the subject of which are individuals, and what is expressed in the sentence (iv). The final stage is intellectual intuition, which would consist in understanding that if something exists and has some content, it is a being. Hence, the definition of being as being is the result of an act of intellectual intuition and could be written down in this way:

$$(vi) \forall A [A \varepsilon B \leftrightarrow ex(A) \wedge A \varepsilon a].$$

Intuition is a one-off understanding and is preceded by deductive and inductive inferences. According to Stępień, as a result of constant contact with individual beings, a metaphysicist understands what a being is, i.e., they see that for something to be a being, it must exist as a specific content<sup>28</sup>. This constant contact could be understood as a constant confirmation of what has been understood.

The above analysis shows that the act of intuition in classical existential metaphysics is prepared by means of reasoning which, due to its rules, does not ensure the reliability of the final conclusion. On the one hand, these operations are very simple; on the other hand, the result of the whole procedure has no counter-example in the world, so the conclusion is obviously apodictic, consisting in the conviction of its unquestionability. However, the only statement that is reached here is that it is one thing to be and another thing to be something. It seems that at this stage of development of metaphysics, one cannot speak of existence as an act of being. The above analysis made it possible to precisely identify the statement resulting from an act of intellectual intuition, without burdening the statement with a subsequent interpretation<sup>29</sup>.

28 A. B. Stępień, *Wprowadzenie do metafizyki*, op. cit., 54.

29 The separation itself and its result can be understood in various ways.

## 6. INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AS INTUITION OF MEANING

If person  $V$ , pointing to a dog, would ask man  $W$  in English: “is it a being?”, pointing to any existing object, and man  $W$  would give a positive answer because he has a method that allows him to decide whether a given object is a real being or not, it means he knows the meaning of the name “being” (we exclude blind guessing here, of course). However, it is not known whether he would understand the name “being” in the same way as person  $V$ . In classical essential metaphysics, as for example in traditional Thomism, the function of existence in the structure of being is understood differently, and thus the meaning of the word “being” is different than in existential metaphysics. Thus, as was the case with the name “hexagon”, two people can understand the name “being” in the same way as to the object and differently as to the reference.

Person  $V$  understands the meaning of the name  $n$  in language  $J$  if and only if, truthfully and based on the understanding of the manner of reference,  $V$  can indicate the name  $n$  of the object  $x$ . If one has a method by which he can assign a name to an object, then he knows what that object is. Hence, person  $V$  knows what  $x$  is if and only if  $V$  understands, in at least one language, the meaning of the word  $n$ . Therefore, the knowledge of what an item is consists in knowing the meaning of the name of the item in the language used by its user. Our analyses also show that both the knowledge of the meaning of a name and the knowledge of what is the object of cognition do not come from nowhere, but remain closely related to the knowledge of certain characteristics or some qualifications that it has. In other words, there would be no meaning of the word “table” if we did not ultimately know what a table is. However, such knowledge always has a sign character. Thus, anyone who understands the word “table” in English knows what a table is. In both cases – in case of the word “table” and in case of a material table – the object of understanding is different. In both acts of intuition – understanding, the object is indicated through the same features. If someone wants to explain the meaning of the name “table” using a definition, he will use names of features co-denoted by this name. If someone wants to explain what a table is using a definition, he



will point to the features of this object. Both are about indicating the features or certain qualifications through which we relate to the things of this world. In the context of this definition, a well-known epistemological problem arises, whether human thinking is always linguistic or not. The problem of the relationship between thought and language, and in particular the question whether thinking is always linguistic, is left unanswered, as it lies beyond the capabilities of the method applied here. However, our analyses only concern the field in which we can say that thinking of the linguistic nature.

Between these two fields of cognition – real and linguistic, there are relationships that make it possible, when talking about things, to draw conclusions about the meanings of linguistic expressions or, when talking about meanings, to draw conclusions about things. Thanks to the ability to objectify intellectual intuition by transferring it to the language level, it is possible to show its intersubjective character and explain in a simple way, accessible to everyone, what intuitive cognition, which seems extremely mysterious and irrational for many people, consists in. Language not only allows us to check whether we understand certain meaningful terms in the same way, but it also allows us to check the truthfulness of the first metaphysical premises obtained through direct intuitive experience. They can be derived in a deductive way from general statements of metaphysics, treating them as consequences of metaphysical hypotheses.

The objection that can be made to the considerations presented in the article is as follows: in the intuition of meaning, we use features, just as in the understanding of genres, types, etc. Classical metaphysics, on the other hand, uses an analogous language, whose expressions have meanings that are not limited by a certain features or set of features, but express beings in their similarities and differences from other beings. However, I think that the issue of intuition raised by me in this way can be defended even in relation to analogous language, assuming that we will not take the view of elusiveness of the meanings of analogous terms, but rather try to make them as precise as possible, as the philosophers of the Cracow Circle used to do in the past.

Another accusation that can be made is that of moving away from metaphysical realism, because how can one speak of a world external to

language and independent of language on the basis of the knowledge of meanings? I would like to point out here that I accept that the meanings of expressions referring to non-linguistic objects have their own objective origins and are the result of certain generalizations. When confronted with the sphere of reference, the meanings and thus the understanding of reality itself are often modified. However, it is possible to speak about things on the basis of the knowledge of meanings. For example, let us use the expression “capital of Poland”. If I know the meaning of this phrase, I will be able to easily assign to the object denoted by this phrase certain features co-denoted by the name “capital of Poland” based on certain knowledge. Similarly, if I know the meaning of the word “being”, I know what being is, etc. Therefore, it is not a matter of believing that meanings determine the statements.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

The above-mentioned proposal to treat intellectual intuition as intuition of meaning is a certain proposal for discussion, aimed at objectifying it with linguistic tools and, consequently, showing its intersubjective character, which is often denied or even rejected completely<sup>30</sup>. On the other hand, there seems to be a serious rationale to consider intuition primarily as cognitive acts in the context of discovery. Operations preparing an act of intuition are not reliable. Results of intuitive acts can be false. An example could be the understanding of existence – in existential metaphysics it is an act of being, and in essential metaphysics it is the property of being. Of course, in both cases, different procedures are used to prepare the act of intuitive cognition but the goal is determined by the same question – what it means to be a being as such (being as a being). A different starting point is taken and different analyses are performed.

When it comes to intellectual intuition in metaphysics, it is not only about the act of intuition, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, about objectifying the methods allowing to understand

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30 J. J. Jadacki, *Metafizyka i semiotyka*, op. cit., 152.

transcendental concepts and the first principles of being. In the definition that is results of act of intuition, which results in a definition, that the metaphysicist articulates the concept of being as being. The problem of the intersubjective nature of intuition in metaphysics arises mainly when we try to understand transcendental concepts, the scope of which is a collection of all existing objects.

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## TOUCHINESS AND CRITICISM. ON THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM IN CULTURE AND EDUCATION\*

**Abstract.** In this article, I am discussing the social phenomenon of touchiness (excessive sensitivity to differences of opinion and lifestyle) as a result of the polarization of discourse in contemporary Western culture. This polarization and the resulting touchiness are partly an effect of media, but the later also reflects structural problems of cultures and social practices. The problems arise from the dense network of potentially conflicting values. I am discussing some diagnoses of this phenomenon and some purported philosophical remedies including departure from the language of values and abandoning the idea of a strong subject of action and beliefs. I am criticizing these solutions and I am proposing the idea of radical criticism instead. I am presenting the idea about established theories of philosophical criticism, including those by Horkheimer, Spaemann, Habermas. I am also presenting a practical application of the idea of radical criticism in education: promoting philosophical inquiry in the classroom.

**Keywords:** criticism; values; modern subject; irony; touchiness; education

1. Introduction. 2. Touchiness and discourse of values. 3. Vision of the weak subject. 4. Radical criticism. 5. Conclusions: Criticism in schools.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In diverse societies, where the rights of individuals are not respected, all speech is subject to violence. In diverse societies that respect the rights of individuals and minorities, although there is freedom of expression, it does not necessarily increase acceptance of diversity of opinion. The

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old censorship is being replaced by touchiness. Tolerance, which is protected by law, does not prevent irritation and aversion. The problem is political and legal in nature, as the various subjects – individuals and groups – are increasingly demanding the presence of their values and beliefs in the public space, encountering quiet and dispersed but nevertheless strong resistance. This also applies to the school. It has to face the clash of the traditional mission of the school as an intergenerational transfer of knowledge and culture with the avalanche of sensitive topics related to differences in world views and morals when the very discussion is annoying for the participants. At present, it is not only religion, ethics or sex education that contain such topics. They also appear in history and biology, and the list will probably continue to grow.

Sensitive content makes communication impossible, because the very fact of communicating one's own beliefs or values evokes negative feelings in others, from irritation and resentment to actively manifested disgust or hostility. In these deliberations, I will refer to the recent diagnosis of the problem presented by Eberhard Straub<sup>1</sup> who claims that the difficulties of modern social communication are the result of a discourse of values which, unfortunately, has replaced the former reference to dignity. According to Straub, values are something that is not only appreciated but also possessed, shared, defended, undermined, violated, etc. Seemingly, the same applies to dignity, however, Straub considered dignity to be as inherent as one's own body – the ultimate strengthening of dignity leads to the person and his or her characteristics and actions. Meanwhile, there is something external to our relationship to values – they are acquired by an act similar to appropriation or by establishing a claim. The conflicts that arise here resemble other conflicts caused by ownership relations. As in the realm of ownership, it is difficult to appeal to one's values without affecting the values of others. Thus, the fear, lack of trust and touchiness that characterise modern social communication cannot be avoided.

Another way to reduce touchiness is to weaken the power of beliefs and build the identity of the subjects without resorting to

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1 E. Straub, *Von Tyranney der Werte*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2010.

strong beliefs and axiological attitudes. At the same time, this demand leads to a reduction in the rational assumptions of discourse. However, this solution is too costly in normative terms. Without the concept of a strong subject, it is very difficult to defend the concept of responsibility and thus to justify any norms.

I will critically evaluate both of these proposals later in the article. I intend to defend another solution, the core of which is not to weaken subjectivity and rationality but, on the contrary, to deepen and strengthen them. A radical critical attitude seems to increase touchiness in the short term, however, it weakens it and improves communication in the long term. I will try to justify my arguments in a philosophical way, and to support it with my experience of conducting philosophy classes in school, at an early stage of education. If the touchiness related to the world-view and axiological issues cannot be resolved, consequences will have to be borne in the form of disappearance from education, and perhaps from the public sphere in general, of the matters that are important to man. This would not only be a loss to education and culture but would also lead to socially dangerous phenomena – the creation of substitute fields of conflict and aggression.

## 2. TOUCHINESS AND DISCOURSE OF VALUES

When Deborah Tannen published her book *The Argument Culture*<sup>2</sup> years ago, she was worried about the antagonisation of public discourse fuelled by the media – dramatising, maximising differences, polarisation. According to this author, organising public discussions involving stark opponents has become a constant media custom, imitated increasingly more often in everyday customs. In her opinion, this has a destructive impact on the quality of dialogue and perception of reality. The real structure of the world does not support the polarised discourse in the least. The latter is part of the social game of power and influence. In this game, logic is used seemingly

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2 D. Tannen, *Cywilizacja kłótni. Jak powstrzymać amerykańską wojnę na słowa*, transl. P. Budkiewicz, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2003.

and vaguely – the logical principles called for organising one's own beliefs using correct reasoning become a tool for mechanical production and equally mechanical attribution of beliefs. People act as if beliefs can be created from other beliefs (in the role of arguments or counter-arguments) and principles of logic. However, beliefs are not created in this way. They are based on a multi-level cognitive and emotional structure that has to be involved in every serious discussion. The inclination to debate flattens these levels and the associated communication styles. On the one hand, these practices are a symptom of a crisis of speech, experience and communication, but on the other hand, they deepen this crisis.

Polarisation gives rise to aggression, which is clearly noticeable. Increasing touchiness is a less frequently observed disorder of discourse. As the subtle, content-rich base of our beliefs is increasingly obscured by polarising practices, we do not know how deep the differences between us and other people reach. When this ignorance is combined with a low level of trust, it creates the suspicion that the differences go very deep, to the point that conversation or cooperation becomes completely impossible. This is an *a priori* suspicion – it cannot be empirically substantiated or rejected. Suspicion, and subsequent touchiness, are not founded on facts but despite the facts. Touchiness occurs at the very beginning of communication and has an avalanche effect: (1) the differences between its participants are automatically maximised; (2) the views are identified with the disposition to act and begin to give rise to fear; (3) logical differences take on existential features; (4) discussions begin to include slippery slope arguments; (5) finally, the innocence of speech itself is questioned, because the difference between speech and action dissolves – speech is treated as an act that is not in the interest of speech itself (communication, expression, truth) but always in the interest of the speaker.

Obviously, we know that these dependencies often occur. For example, contemporary analyses of the speech act, showing the implicatures contained in utterances, instruct us about the rich structure of action hidden in speech. However, the effect of touchiness consists in the appearance of all these dependencies in a reflection-proof



entanglement. Reducing speech to action and the interest of the speaker is not a scientific statement based on empirical or analytical evidence but a certain attitude – a culture of suspicion and guilt.

In the aforementioned book, which style and message lie halfway between philosophical analysis and committed journalism, Eberhard Straub argues that this profound pathology of communication is due to a discourse of values that, in modern times, gradually replaced the former reference to dignity. According to Straub, it is impossible to invoke one's values and not to infringe on the values of others, whereas such correlation does not occur in the case of dignity. Thus, the fear, lack of trust and touchiness that characterise modern social communication cannot be avoided in a discourse of values. Although Straub does not write about touchiness separately, his criticism applies to the subject under discussion herein: Utterances cause irritation just by the very fact that they express the values recognised by the speaker. Recognition of value implies the possibility of judgement, just as possession of a weapon implies the possibility of its use. This is also how value-oriented speakers treat their statements. It is difficult to indicate the value you accept without also indicating the value you do not accept. However, there are always some supporters of the latter. There is again an analogy with ownership: in a highly organised civilisation, it is difficult to find an object or a piece of space that belongs to nobody – almost everyone can be assigned a certain line leading to ownership or claim.

Another negative consequence is the sheer density of the field of value. The value determines the class of objects falling under this value. There cannot exist an object that, by definition, alone has a certain value. It may happen, for example, that there is only one honest man left in the world. That does not mean, however, that the class of honest people consists of one person for it also includes given, future and possible honest persons. Objects belonging to a class determined by value shall also have properties that include them in other axiological classes. When the axiological structure is rich, axiological contradictions are more likely to arise – the subject is assessed favourably in one reference system and unfavourably in another, and these systems are not mutually exclusive.

It is impossible to narrow down the affirmation of values to yourself. If I recognise a value, I always do so with a claim about other people: I assume that they share this value with me. However, if that is the case, the person who does not affirm the same value makes opposite claims. Namely, that I should not recognise the value that I recognise. The disparity automatically becomes an antagonism. The only solution would be to recognise that everyone has their own values, but then the reasons for recognising, defending, arguing in their favour would be invalidated. To live in society, we need to have a community of values and, at the same time, we need relativisation that allows for the divergence of personal values. No rational procedure seems to exist to maintain this kind of balance. It would require a kind of restrictive hermeneutics, which seems difficult to achieve, as shown by the modern history of the principle of tolerance. After centuries of discussion, it is still unclear what specific actions or attitudes are the best way to implement this principle: patience, ignorance, recognition, respect, acceptance, affirmation? Tolerance is gradually becoming a principle full of contradictions and, despite its noble origins, it is not very helpful in establishing the aforementioned balance today.

Values have an impact on preferences that is not subject to reasonable control. The correlation is seemingly very simple: I prefer A to B, because the value of A is higher in my hierarchy of values (I value A more than B). However, numerous experimental studies show that our preference systems are very susceptible to disorders. We often change our preferences before we act and we do so as a result of insignificant impulses. In one of the experiments,<sup>3</sup> the subjects were to decide how much they would have to be paid to agree to listen to a very unpleasant sound prepared by the experimenter for some time. But first, a sample valuation of 300 seconds of listening to this sound was prepared. This was done in a completely arbitrary manner, the price was set separately for each subject with

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3 D. Ariely, G. Loewenstein, D. Prelec, *Tom Sawyer and the Construction of Value*, in: *The Construction of Preference*, eds. P. Slovic, S. Liechtenstein, Cambridge University Press, New York 2006, 261.

the use of their identity card number. This arbitrariness was known to the subjects. Each person was then asked to provide the amount for which he or she would agree to listen to this sound for a given time. It turns out that the subjects with lower numbers generated from their document numbers decided to listen to the same portion of sound for lower pay. This experiment exhibits a phenomenon that can also be observed “with the naked eye”: the appearance of a new value, even if only hypothetical (without strong reasons for affirmation), is sufficient to change the force of upholding other values.

To sum up: According to Straub, the language of values has emerged with capitalism. *Being* someone (related to dignity) has been replaced by having value. Conflicts inevitably arise when beliefs are expressed in the language of values. According to Straub, the language of dignity does not have this flaw. Dignity is equally divided among people. Personal dignity is not the subject of a universal claim (it cannot be satisfied at someone else’s expense) and therefore does not cause conflict. Instead of debating the superiority of some values over others, dignity discourse leads to the imperative of self-perfection.

While agreeing with Straub on the negative features of axiological discourse, I do not believe that the alternative of dignity is a remedy. Firstly, it is irrational. Dignity is so heterogeneous that you cannot count on it as a predictor of behaviour. In other words, when it comes to the generation of preferences, dignity is even less credible than values. There is no telling what a person guided by a sense of dignity will choose in a given situation. Secondly, dignity needs to be justified and then the reference to values reappears.

### 3. VISION OF THE WEAK SUBJECT

Another strategy for reducing touchiness is to weaken the concept of the subject. It is no longer a question of *what* is the cause of irritation and lack of trust, but of *who* is experiencing these feelings. When an individual has a weak self-concept (of being an “incomplete” belief holder, performer, etc.) the clash of subjective claims does not occur. These clashes are an expression of the impasse, of

the lack of manoeuvre in the social game; the point is, therefore, for the participants in the discourse to always have a possibility to make a move. The way to implement this strategy is through a specifically understood sceptical attitude. It has been thoroughly described in Szymon Wróbel's latest book *Retroactive Readings*. The author begins with a philosophical criticism of attitudes oriented towards subject identity and universal principles. He summarises these critical results as follows: "I think that the freedom of the thinker, i.e. the suspensory sceptic, is, above all, the freedom resulting from liberating oneself from the obsession of ultimate legitimacy. The mission of such legitimation was taken on by philosophy and then sociology for fear of scepticism, which it considered intellectually and morally unacceptable. For a sceptic, to think means to use the resources of the concepts of philosophy itself, psychoanalysis, art and colloquial thinking, with the freedom liberated by the recognition of various already known ways of thinking. To think means to avoid the blind alleys of discourses 'closed' to their own notions, that is to say dogmatic and alluring with absolutism of their constructional claims. For the sceptic, philosophy and history, psychoanalysis and art do not seek knowledge, they are merely the practice of intelligent, thinking life, and thus an activity of life itself, not its transcendent product"<sup>4</sup>.

The attitude described by the Author consists of: scepticism understood as an aversion to dogmatism, resignation from the strong conditions of identity with which the traditional concept of the subject was associated, freedom to use reason, i.e. the ability to change rules and the conceptual apparatus, sensitivity to context, resignation from a certain part of the traditional normative discourse in favour of psychoanalytic discourse, irony and discursive displacement that allows to avoid blind alleys of cognition and communication and to satisfy the awareness of one's own limitations, and finally empathy which is a better guide in solving problems than rules. This is a rad-

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4 S. Wróbel, *Lektury retroaktywne. Rodowody współczesnej myśli filozoficznej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu, Kraków 2014, 34.

ical and comprehensive programme. In a way, Szymon Wróbel dots the i's by clearly and practically formulating the consequences of over a hundred years old odyssey of a critical mind. However, some of the components of his diagnosis and formulas are questionable:

- (1) While the efforts of a sceptic may be motivated by an aversion to dogmatism, this aversion is not the essence of a sceptical attitude. Scepticism stems rather from accepting the otherwise unwanted uncertainty of cognition. The sceptic is not trying to convince us that the quest for knowledge is wrong but to show that it is ineffective. Scepticism is based on a certain accidental truth, not an essential one. Considering any accidental truth as the norm is perilous. A sceptic would be a bad advisor (harmful hardliner) in a world where human cognitive abilities would dramatically improve.
- (2) The weakening of the principle of the subject's identity leaves other people's claims unanswered, suspended in a kind of moral vacuum without responsibility; this is a world in which all the participants in the communication are inflicting blows, but no one is suffering because of them. In practical terms, it is an effective but morally empty solution.
- (3) Any attempt to replace normative language with descriptive language is based on strong assumptions, mostly scientifically based, although there was no shortage of spiritualistic versions of this reduction, for example in the doctrine of predestination or some currents of gnosticism. These assumptions themselves contain strong normative assumptions which remain undisclosed and thus incomprehensible. It is no different with psychoanalysis. Norms are indeed difficult to understand and justify, but their non-normative interpretations do not represent any progress – they only seemingly increase the ability to understand and guide oneself.
- (4) The demand for freedom to use reason aptly indicates the danger that the subject of cognition is somehow held hostage to their knowledge; they are not able to take effectively into account what they do not know or are not sure. This leads to

the following paradox: (a) you should rely solely on what you know, consciously ignoring the limitations of your knowledge; (b) when you ignore the limitations of knowledge, you do not know what is known and what is unknown. Acceptance of paradox leads to irrationality.

- (5) The irony is an extremely important tool of the human mind, however, it contributes to the better constitution of the subject only when it takes the form of self-irony. The latter presupposes sophisticated self-knowledge and cannot be reduced to some form of discourse or a decision to adopt a certain attitude. Despite the similarity of the name, irony and self-irony are distant human faculties. The former often occurs without the latter.
- (6) Discursive displacements are a function of freedom and irony. However, it is important to point out that make them out of necessity – to escape from aporia. This compulsion should not be elevated to the status of a rule. The problem of contemporary criticism of subjectivity is that they expect us to choose, in an unforced way, what for centuries has only been chosen out of unfortunate necessity, as a forced deviation from an ideal. Such a defensive strategy of the mind should not be elevated to the status of a positive rule, even if there is no prospect of removing the conditions that enforce this defensive strategy. Conditions under which human communication takes place require many “survival strategies”, but to consider them as a normal human condition would mean radically forgetting their fundamental inadequacy.

This review of doubts about the spirit of contemporary criticism of strong, rational subjectivity is cursory out of necessity, and may itself raise doubts. However, these considerations do not concern the whole extent of the dispute, but merely one problem: touchiness. I am searching for cultural, discursive and, in the long term, pedagogical measures that would allow this property or attitude to be kept within an acceptable framework. From this point of view, both the postulate to radically reduce value-based discourse and strategies to weaken claims related to rational subjectivity are not convincing. The valid critical core they contain serves other purpos-

es well, by being an important contribution to in the philosophical discussion, but the threat that speech poses to itself – so evident in the phenomenon of touchiness – remains unchanged.

#### 4. RADICAL CRITICISM

It is impossible to remove touchiness by criticising normative concepts and by relaxing the requirements of rationality. My proposal is exactly the opposite: the criteria of rationality must be strengthened with the use of rigorous criticism. Only a radical critical attitude can preserve the normative sense of culture and, at the same time, get us out of the trap of increasing touchiness. This is because the criticism advocated here is positive and aims to reveal the foundations of the beliefs and attitudes of all the participants in the communication, and thus promotes the formation of a critical community. This criticism is not aimed at establishing and maximising the dissent. On the other hand, it has certain normative effects, does not reduce requirements but raises them with regard to the participants in the communication.

Philosophy has a special role in the formation of criticism understood in this way, as the essence of philosophy is a critical mission. Philosophical criticism is directed at many of the properties of society and culture and the practices that result from them, but always with a critical reference to itself – to the foundations of its own criticism. Due to this characteristic, it cannot be reduced to other critical acts and attitudes: political, civil, artistic, religious. Only philosophy is a critique of its own critique – when other disciplines do it, they become a philosophy<sup>5</sup>.

Today, after a wave of critical philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century and in the first decades after the Second World War, philosophy is experiencing an unprecedented crisis in this most important mission. Complicated and subtle as never before, philosophy

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5 The following comments on the critical mission of philosophy are a concise summary of the reasoning presented in: R. Piłat, *Filozofia jako radykalna krytyka*, in: *Filozofia 2.0*, ed. M. Soin, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2015.

seems to provide ever weaker critical impulses and little nourishment for intelligent self-management. The mental achievements of philosophy do not increase the critical potential of culture, remaining within what Gaston Bachelard called the philosophy of philosophers<sup>6</sup>. Under these circumstances, it is worth rethinking those philosophical concepts that were particularly explicit in formulating the call for criticism. Below are three critical ideas in the most synthetic formulations, with reservations as to their legitimacy and effectiveness.

*Max Horkheimer's position:* As is known, the critique was the central idea of the Frankfurt School. According to Horkheimer, "the real social function of philosophy lies in its criticism of what is prevalent .... The chief aim of such criticism is to prevent mankind from losing itself in those ideas and activities which the existing organization of society instils into its members. ... In the past century of European history, it has been shown conclusively that, despite a semblance of security, man has not been able to arrange his life in accordance with his conceptions of humanity. There is a gulf between the ideas by which men judge themselves and the world on the one hand, and the social reality which they reproduce through their actions on the other hand"<sup>7</sup>.

However, despite Horkheimer's clear reservations that distance his approach from sociology, the latter is clearly marked in his concept and restricts it. It does not allow the metaphorical statement "making the world rational" to be developed and filled with content. In Marxism, which Horkheimer draws from, the autonomy of reason and the fact that it can be brought into the world are limited by a basic dogmatic assumption: The path to the broadest possible basis for our views must not go beyond the class interest but, on the contrary, is closely linked to the class interest of the proletariat.

*Robert Spaemann's position:* This philosopher insists that criticism must have a basis and that it is not self-evident even when it opposes

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6 G. Bachelard, *Filozofia, która mówi nie. Esej o filozofii nowego ducha w nauce*, transl. J. Budzyk, Wydawnictwo Słowo/obraz/terytoria, Gdańsk 2000, 14.

7 M. Horkheimer, *Spółeczna funkcja filozofii*, in: Idem, *Spółeczna funkcja filozofii. Wybór pism*, ed. R. Rudziński, PIW, Warszawa 1987, 235, 239.



obvious evil. When proposing changes in any field: science, art, institutions one must be ready to demonstrate the normative basis of the proposal. If I understand Spaemann correctly, these normative grounds for criticism itself come down to the question about the subject: Who will a person subjected to these changes become? It is not the characteristics of events and objects that are the basis for norms, but the subject's place in the world – a successful struggle against the contradictions that this place produces and reveals.

However, this position raises doubts. Spaemann argues as follows: First, there must be a justified desire for rational thinking and similarly the desire for fairness, followed by critical social discourse. This desire for rationality is a reminder of Horkheimer's intention to make the world rational. In both cases, there is a metaphorical reference to an enigmatic subject that occupies a privileged, eccentric position in reality and has access to as if from outside. However, the actions of this subject, and even the very expression of desires, including the desire to live rationally, are carried out within social practices. A rational entity is therefore doomed to pretend its own transcendence or, to put it more sharply, to unacceptable hypocrisy.

*Jürgen Habermas' position:* The German philosopher is aware of the paradox that good, legitimate critique must make many factual assumptions to which it devotes much (and sometimes all) of its criticism. Not only philosophy, but the whole culture suffers from a disease of uncritical criticism. Paradoxically, today the criticism comes mainly from dogmatists, or even fundamentalists, as they have the easiest way of formulating allegations – they use the universal language of accusation. A philosophical critic is in a different position. He is radical not in the sharpness of his judgments, as a fundamentalist, but in the depth of criticism itself. This depth comes from the effort to reverse the line of criticism, to relate the criticism to the critical subject itself. The critical attitude is constantly reviewed here, through assessing the contribution of the critical act to the disclosure of the ultimate normative basis of human subjectivity. Habermas formulates a concept that meets the need to fund such a critical and self-critical subject. His view is based on

*communication*. Whatever we have to say about ourselves, the world, and even the communication itself, must first be established as communicative action. Our opinions have binding content if they are addressed to and understood by other reasonable actors and become a premise for their own utterances. From this perspective, Habermas formulates some concrete and important criticisms: (1) lifeworld has been colonised by economics and bureaucracy; (2) the meaning expressed in language is increasingly being instrumentalised – it is more linked to the social functions of speech than to what it refers to; (3) “distorted communication takes the form of a detachment of meaning from legitimacy, speaking from the action, meaning from intention”<sup>8</sup>. Habermas’ positive idea is to rationalise the lifeworld instead of colonising it<sup>9</sup>. The basic instrument of this rationalisation is to take care of the quality of communication – correcting its distortions. The critical effort of philosophy is, therefore, to be directed towards communication<sup>10</sup>, and through it, towards other areas of life: moral attitudes, political choices, institutional solutions.

However, the Habermas proposal has serious limitations: (1) Axel Honneth claimed that by focusing on communication, or speech, Habermas remains blind to the suffering and injustices that are not expressed in speech<sup>11</sup>; (2) Habermas’ rationalistic assumptions are strong, which means that the poetic language remains beyond the reach of analysis, contrary to the obvious intuition that it was often the carrier of the deepest criticism; (3) the Habermas’ method requires appealing to an ideal model of communication – it is not only unrealistic by definition, but leads to aporia since it must be an object of desire (only then can it be the basis for criticism), and this desire would have to be tantamount to a desire for a specific end of the story;

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8 A. Dupeyrix, *Zrozumieć Habermasa*, transl. M. N. Wróblewska, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2013, 198.

9 Ibid, 197.

10 See: J. Habermas, *Zur Architektonik der Discursdifferenzierung*, in: *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion. Philosophische Aufsätze*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2005, 89.

11 I quote this objection after Dupeyrix, *Zrozumieć Habermasa*, op. cit., 132-138.

(4) Habermas' critical strategy reveals, according to Judith Butler<sup>12</sup>, hidden authoritarianism, because the critic is completely outside of the criticised relations and phenomena – uncritical about himself.

I have presented three selected views on the critical function of philosophy. Their common flaw is that they confuse critical thought itself with its applications. It can be agreed that criticism is to bring order and improve ideas (Horkheimer), but that does not mean that criticism is an analysis of ideas. It can be agreed that critique aims to strengthen sagaciousness and fairness and that it must be justified itself (Spaemann), but that does not mean that criticism is an improvement on justification. Finally, one can agree that improving communication is the key to many positive social and moral changes (Habermas), but this does not mean that criticism comes down to improving communication. In my opinion, the critical attitude relates primarily to the relationship with oneself and not to the world in which negative phenomena are perceived. Criticism cannot be confused with protesting against evil to resist injustice, irrationality, hypocrisy and so on. It is not necessary to be critical in the radical sense presented here; it is enough to be intelligent and sensitive. A critic in the colloquial sense is very often extremely uncritical, which is easy to see nowadays, after a century filled with doctrines that are right in their opposition, but at the same time are ideological and extremely unreasonable. Contemporary protest and emancipation movements, from transhumanism to religious fundamentalism, are also often directed towards the right external goals – they recognise the negative phenomena correctly, but remain completely uncritical themselves. They can justify their positions by referring to the evil in the world, but they do not see that their statements are rooted in a normative background that needs to be revealed and rethought. It is most often the case that the critic and the one being criticised share most of the assumptions about a just world, yet a disagreement arises whose source remains unknown and is most often replaced by a mythological image of the opponent.

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12 See: J. Butler, *What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault's Virtue*, *Transversal* 5(2001), (<http://eipcp.net/transversal/0806/butler/en/>), [accessed on: 09/2016].

The real criticism is to reveal the source of one's own attitude in radical reflection. A critical person aims to reveal that part of their own image of the world which is the deepest source of commitment they can understand. However, it is not enough to reveal the source – one still has to ask whether the implementation of this commitment makes this person better. Naturally, talking about self-improvement also involves normative assumptions and there is always the danger that the same system of ideas that defines what we aspire to will also define the aspiring one – we then become indistinguishable from our beliefs and values, falling into all the aporias mentioned earlier. Criticism is precisely a defence against this kind of aporia. It accomplishes that through understanding and revealing the gap between the perfectionist ideal of oneself and the means at one's disposal to realise that ideal. We do not become better at pursuing our desires and beliefs, but at criticising them. Detecting and understanding this difference is what I call radical criticism. I will stress once again how different this concept is from the colloquial concept of criticism: it is not about disagreeing with something by virtue of one's beliefs, values or interests, but about putting those beliefs, values and interests – the basis of the expressed discord – to the test. In this sense, the subject of criticism is not the beliefs with which we disagree or the values that we do not recognise, but precisely, or perhaps above all, those beliefs and values that we hold and recognise. From the point of view of radical criticism, the difference between consent and disagreement, leaning towards something and resistance, is of little importance.

Radical criticism is not about being right. It is closer to the ideal of self-management. The latter is not about ordering and disciplining one's own actions, but about guiding one's own perfectionist dynamics through the thoughtful use of one's own resources. This sense of criticism was expressed in Kant's idea of enlightenment. It means achieving the ability to guide oneself, which was what Kant called maturity.

According to Kant, the reason must stand before its own tribunal in order to justify its claims. However, this raises the question: what is a tribunal? It cannot be described as a mere rejection of what is not accepted. After rejection, there is always some positive content

emerging which must be understood; moreover, rejection itself is an act with some positive content. Both of these contents are easily overlooked by the critical mind. It is presented in an interesting manner in Philip Quadrio's study on Rousseau's and Kant's idea of. As is known, Jacques Rousseau criticised the scientific mind, accusing the sciences and arts of merely obscuring human enslavement without freeing from it<sup>13</sup>. But his idea of emancipation includes a distinction between natural freedom and the freedom that must be achieved<sup>14</sup>. Although man has become homeless, banished out of nature by rationalism, only the reason can help him to return to his place<sup>15</sup>. Kant put it more bluntly. For him, critique other than the strictly rational one would be an attempt at emancipation without a sense of equity.

However, this raises the following question: Does radical criticism alone – this tribunal of reason – have its own basis? It seems that Kant saw this basis in a transcendental analysis – in revealing what he called a transcendental illusion<sup>16</sup>. The latter consists of not recognising that questions are asked that cannot be answered. For Kant, emancipation (newly gained freedom) means not to succumb to an illusion that leaves a man stranded by suggesting unrealistic goals. However, many contemporary philosophers would not accept this version of critical reason. According to Michel Foucault, there are two versions of Kant's critique: the first is included in his book *Critique of Pure Reason* and the second in the essay *What is Enlightenment*. In the former, Kant seeks a transcendental basis for criticism, while in the latter, he relies rather on a certain ethos, namely the effort of emancipation. Although Quadrio doubts whether this is a good interpretation since Kant's project of transcendental basis and emancipatory project are closely linked, this is where we can leave the historical dispute aside. It is important to consider how strong the conditions must be for

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13 P. A. Quadrio, *Rousseau, Kant and Philosophical Auto-Criticism: The Practical ends of Critical Thinking*, in: K. de Boer, R. Sinderegger, *Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy*, Macmillian, Palgrave 2012, 51.

14 *Ibid.*, 54.

15 *Ibid.*, 58.

16 *Ibid.*, 62.

this emancipation ethos to be an emancipation rather than an illusion. This is where I see the benefit of my thesis of radical criticism: emancipation is justified by referring to the improvement of man by the power of radical reflection, not vice versa. Improvement does not happen when emancipation occurs, but vice versa: emancipation occurs only when it meets the condition of improvement.

The idea of radical criticism presented above seems to me to be a sufficient response to the problem of touchiness. The aporia of touchiness means that the greater subtlety (specific density) of culture and the greater extent of personal rights lead to touchiness that is destructive to communication – systems of beliefs and values are interconnected and these relationships are known to their holders. They know that the differences of opinions reach deep, to the very basis of identity, and suspect that they go too deep to find a discursive solution for them. Radical criticism casts doubt on this suspicious depth. At the same time, it reveals a much greater degree of agreement between the opposing beliefs and values than sensitive participants in the communication can admit. This does not mean that we are in the possession of a set of critical philosophical tools waiting to be used. As I have already mentioned, philosophical criticism, in its desire for primariness and radicalism, must first and foremost criticise itself. Many contemporary philosophers call themselves critical, but this self-classification must be verified each time. Criticism is not yet a philosophical criticism, and many contemporary views are only critical in the colloquial sense, not in the philosophical sense of the word.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS: CRITICISM IN SCHOOLS

Having outlined a vision of radical criticism as a remedy for communication permeated by lack of trust and touchiness, I want to reflect on the practical consequences of this idea in the field of education. If radical criticism is not to remain merely a theoretical possibility, the scope and tools of its application must be indicated. This scope is education, and the proposed tool is philosophical inquiry understood as an integral part of the educational process. Nowa-

days, the idea of philosophical inquiries at school is fairly known. It had more than one source, however, at this point, I want to refer to the specific programme presented almost half a century ago by the American philosopher Matthew Lipman, who died in 2010. The idea emerged under the name *Philosophy for Children*, but developing it in the Polish environment gave it a more flexible framework and a separate methodology. The essence remains the same: to trigger a process of critical thinking that also makes a cooperative sense. That does not lead to antagonisation, but to the disclosure of the cognitive resources of the participants in the dialogue, which in turn strengthens the means of solving problems and, consequently, the sense of community. The author of the programme used the term “community of inquiry” in this context. Many years of experience in implementing the programme in Poland lead to the conclusion that a community of this kind is achievable, and criticism is its most important component. Lipman’s original method of conducting classes is quite restrictive: it consists of collecting questions and conducting discussions using statements starting with “I agree because ...”, “I disagree because ...”. Its advantage is that arguments also need to be made in the case of consent, not just disagreement; exactly as I have advocated by formulating the philosophical ideal of radical criticism above.

Developing criticism is an extensive task, as can be seen in the following list of standards that have emerged from school practice and indicate the specific skills needed to create a critical attitude. The guiding principle of a critical discussion is that the degree of recognition of a belief must not be higher than the degree of its justification. To be able to observe this principle, the following skills have to be mastered<sup>17</sup>:

- (1) Ability to assess your own degree of conviction. This implies, among other things: (a) the ability to imagine what actions is our conviction obliging us to take and whether we can take

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17 Summarised follow: *Model Minimum Kompetencji Myślowych*, collective publication prepared by the team: Stowarzyszenia Edukacji Filozoficznej PHRONESIS, in the frame of the project: PO KL 09.02-30-365/10 *Pozwolić uczniom myśleć* [Let students think], co-financed by the European Union under the European Social Fund.

- these actions; (b) the ability to imagine what other (alternative) beliefs one could have in a given situation; (c) the ability to assess how many other beliefs are logically connected to a given belief.
- (2) Understanding the non-absoluteness and volatility of your own beliefs.
  - (3) Not to associate one's own dignity with the veracity of one's beliefs; to accept imperfection and openness to new beliefs. The attachment to one's own views is understandable as they are often an important part of one's identity. However, the best way to maintain this relationship is to improve one's own beliefs, not to cling to them.
  - (4) Ability to devise alternatives to your own views. The willingness to adopt different beliefs and to test them is a fundamental instrument for developing knowledge.
  - (5) Ability to identify irrational, superstitious, prejudice-based beliefs and resist irrational impulses.
  - (6) Ability to combine logical-semantic competence with communication skills.
  - (7) To recognise that opposing views, troublesome counter-arguments or inquisitive, critical questions ultimately benefit each person involved in communication.
  - (8) Awareness of one's own ignorance. The general awareness that *human* knowledge is imperfect is not enough – almost everyone admits this. What is needed is to see one's *σown* ignorance here and now, to point out exactly the area that it concerns and to creatively look for ways to remove it.

In the school environment, criticism raises concerns, because the word “criticism” is generally understood in a colloquial sense of disagreement, objection, dispute. The concept of criticism that I defended in this article has a positive sense. Moreover, it is useful both in situations of consent and disagreement. In essence, it comes down to certain positive and valuable mental and communication skills and the will to apply them. Such criticism comes quite naturally with the acquisition of language and communication skills, therefore there are



practically no age limits when it comes to its improvement. Critical inquiries can be carried out with primary school children as well as with high school students. The dominance of encyclopaedic knowledge in school causes critical skills to be perceived as an obstacle, as they are associated with mental chaos and wasting efforts invested in acquiring knowledge. Meanwhile, critical thinking is not about undermining cognitive efforts and creating chaos, but about revealing the rational basis of our beliefs, values and attitudes. At the same time, experience has shown that criticism understood in this way has a real civilising effect, curbs touchiness and opens the way for the school to treat sensitive world-view subjects seriously and without fear. In the absence of criticism, a vicious circle is created: touchiness leads to avoidance of some types of discussion, and avoidance leads to ignorance and suspicion, which further increases touchiness.

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