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THE IDEA OF THE COMMON GOOD AND THE REASON OF STATE IN THE TEACHING OF PRIMATE WYSZYŃSKI

INTRODUCTION

The notions of common good and the reason of state were always present, usually in a joint way, in the teachings of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. They came to the foreground, especially in the periods of post-war crises in Poland, moments of growing social tension. Despite the fact that the primate did not want to be a politician, because the main sphere of his activity was concern for the souls of Poles¹, he became a statesman, for whom the welfare of Poland and Poles was the primary task. This was largely due to the primate's concern for the broadly understood common good – Poland as a subject of common concern for all members of society, regardless of their views. Most importantly, Cardinal Wyszyński was able to look at the political situation without ideological bias or obstinacy. If he believed that communists somehow work for the common good and care about the fate of society, he supported their activity.

¹ S. Wyszyński, *List pasterski na Ingres do Gniezna i Warszawy, 6 I 1949* (*Pastoral letter for Ingres to Gniezno and Warsaw, January 6, 1949*), in: Id., *Dzieła zebrane* (*Collected works*), vol.1, 1949-1953, Warsaw 1991, p. 14.

The most unequivocal example in this respect is the attitude of the primate to the beginning of Władysław Gomułka's rule. He supported him in 1956, not because he believed that „comrade Wiesław” was the optimal and most desirable choice for Poland and Poles, but because preventing Soviet intervention and broadening social subjectivity were more important to him than even far-reaching ideological differences. This type of approach will be repeated in subsequent years and under different circumstances, bringing the most spectacular and surprising dimension in the final period of Edward Gierek's rule, including the strikes of August 1980².

IN THE PERIOD OF THE COMMUNIST STATE OFFENSIVE

Bishop Stefan Wyszyński was nominated as Metropolitan of Warsaw and Gniezno in a particularly difficult moment. The turn of 1948 and 1949 was a period when the anti-Church offensive of the authorities had already taken on a very broad scale, the complete removal of the Church from the public sphere and the far-reaching limitation of its fields of activity began. For this reason, most of the time of the new primate was occupied by an attempt to develop an action strategy towards the authorities of the „people's” Poland. The Primate adopted a flexible method of responding to changing circumstances, combined with an attempt to develop a *modus vivendi* with the government of the People's Republic of Poland. Primate Wyszyński put the line of his proceedings against the authorities in words: “I fight only for that and I defend only that which is rightly due to the Church”. He believed that it was necessary to communicate with

² R. Łatka, „Bronić Solidarność przed wkraczaniem na tereny polityczne”. *Prymas Stefan Wyszyński wobec Solidarności* („To defend solidarity against entering political areas”. *Primate Stefan Wyszyński in the face of Solidarity*), in: *Stefan Wyszyński wobec opozycji i oporu społecznego 1945-1981 (Stefan Wyszyński in the face of opposition and social resistance 1945-1981)*, ed. E. Czaczkowska, Warsaw 2018, p. 77-104.

the communists with words, despite the extraordinary difficulty of this task³. And as he added in a pastoral letter addressed to the clergy of the Warsaw Archdiocese: “Do not fight with people, but with Satan! Create the kingdom of God’s love and peace. Surround your open or hidden enemies with special love. Remember that many hate today by order. They «must» be evil because the class struggle is praised, though so hostile to the social spirit. The new ethic, which is to replace Christianity, in essence glorifies hatred, returns to the Pharisee principle of loving only «one’s own»⁴.

The key element of the primate’s strategy was the commencement of talks on the conclusion of an agreement, which ended successfully in 1950. In the February agreement, the Church distanced itself from the armed struggle of the anti-communist underground and expressed support for the collectivisation of agriculture. It was the price for the declaration by the authorities of „People’s” Poland of respect for the communication between the Catholic Church and the Holy See⁵. The price was high, but in the opinion of the primate it was worth paying. The premises for concluding an agreement with the authorities were also the Primate’s delusions connected with the person of Bolesław Bierut⁶ and the conviction that the communist

³ P. Raina, *Kardynał Wyszyński (Cardinal Wyszyński)*, vol. 1, *Droga na Stolicę Prymasowską (The road to the Primate Capital)*, Warsaw 1993, p. 167.

⁴ S. Wyszyński, *Duchowieństwo polskie w obliczu potrzeb współczesnych. List pasterski do przewielebnego duchowieństwa Archidiecezji Gnieźnieńskiej i Warszawskiej, 19 IV 1949 (Polish clergy in the face of contemporary needs. Pastoral letter to the very reverend clergy of the Archdiocese of Gniezno and Warsaw, 19 April 1949)*, in: Id, *Dziela zebrane (Collected Works)*, vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁵ On the subject of the 1950 „Agreement” and its origins see more in detail: J. Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce 1944-1989 (History of the Catholic Church in Poland 1944-1989)*, Warsaw 2003, p. 94-110; A. Dudek, R. Gryz, *Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce 1945-1989 (Communists and the Church in Poland 1945-1989)*, Kraków 2006, p. 38-60, R. Łatka, J. Marecki, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce rządzonej przez komunistów (Catholic Church in the Poland ruled by communists)*, Warsaw 2017, p. 35-36.

⁶ S. Wyszyński, *Pro Memoria*, vol.1., *1948-1952*, ed. P. Skibiński, Warsaw 2017, record from 26 October 1952, p. 377.

system in Poland is possible without its anti-Catholic, and more broadly looking at the anti-religious component. In the opinion of the primate, a greater threat than the implementation of Marxist ideology was the question of social nihilism and the fall of moral values, as constitutive elements binding society.

It does not mean, however, that Archbishop Wyszyński did not have a clearly marked limit of compromises. It was undoubtedly the communion with the Holy See, and respect for the internal structure of the Polish Church. Both these conditions were denied by the communist authorities of the People's Republic of Poland when they introduced, in February 1953, a decree on the appointment of church staff, in which the communists guaranteed themselves the full right to control all appointments to the church. This meant a far-reaching step towards the nationalisation of the Polish Church. Despite such far-reaching interference in the subjectivity of the Church and the bishop's authorities, the Primate tried to enter into talks with the authorities in order to abolish the decree. When they turned out to be fruitless on May 8, 1953, the Episcopate addressed to the government the unambiguous words „non possumus”, containing a protest against the violation of the independence and ability of the Church to act⁷.

DURING THE REIGN OF WŁADYSŁAW GOMUŁKA

In 1956 the Primate showed a great political sense and that he did not look at the world with the help of ideological calques. He did not follow the anti-communism guidelines in his actions either, as he concluded an agreement with Władysław Gomułka, who was coming back to power, correctly understanding that his rule meant an extension of social subjectivity and greater independence of Poland from the Soviet patron. As it is worth mentioning,

⁷ Pismo Episkopatu Polski do Prezesa Rady Ministrów Bolesława Bieruta, 8 V 1953 (Letter of the Polish Episcopate to the Prime Minister Bolesław Bierut, May 8, 1953), Kraków, in: S. Wyszyński, *Dzieła zebrane (Collected works)*. vol.1, op. cit., p. 247-265.

Cardinal Wyszyński concluded an agreement on terms convenient for himself, obtaining concessions on issues of key importance for the Church's activity⁸. Avoiding bloodshed and the implementation of the „Hungarian scenario” was one of the main goals of Cardinal Wyszyński, as the primate himself explained, “if I knew that in order to save the nation I would have to go to the Central Committee on my knees, I would do it. For my person is not important, but the existence and survival of the nation [my emphasis – RL]”⁹.

At this point it should be mentioned that Cardinal Wyszyński was aware that the thaw in relations with the Church, initiated in 1956, is short-lived and tendencies in the anti-Church policy of the authorities are permanent. The Primate had no intention of passively watching the new version of the anti-Church campaign of party dignitaries. He wrote about it in an unambiguous way to Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz: “I reserve the right not to attribute the aspiration «that the Church should become a state, etc.». We know too well the boundaries of the Church's essential powers, we distinguish between Church and State powers, and we want to respect these boundaries. But this does not mean that we should not fail to uphold the Church's own rights and the rights of believing citizens. It seems to us that we are doing this within the limits of the applicable law and the Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland (Article 73)”¹⁰.

⁸ See more on this subject, Z. Zieliński, *Educatrix et Advocata. Wychowawca i obrońca. Miejsce Kościoła w dziejach Narodu (Educator and defender. Place of the Church in the History of the Nation)*, Lublin 2015, p. 230-236.

⁹ E. Czaczkowska, *Kardynał Wyszyński. Biografia (Cardinal Wyszyński. Biography)*, Krakow 2013, p. 312.

¹⁰ Pismo prymasa kard. Stefana Wyszyńskiego do premiera Józefa Cyrankiewicza, 17 VII 1958 (The letter of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński to Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz, July 17, 1958), in: P. Raina, *Kościół w PRL. Kościół katolicki a państwo w świetle dokumentów 1945–1989 (Catholic church in the People's Republic of Poland. The catholic church and the state in the light of documents 1945-1989)*, vol. 1, 1945-1969, Poznań 1994, p. 633–634.

The tightening of the authorities' policy towards the Church was closely connected with the authorities' awareness of the pastoral plans of Primate Wyszyński. The „Great Novena” and the subsequent celebration of the millennium of Poland's baptism became another reason for the communist authorities to attack the Catholic Church and Primate Wyszyński for the „clericalisation” of public life and an opportunity to organise celebrations competing with the church. This was due to the fact that, “in spite of the fury of the Gomułka's group, the Church appeared as a guardian of the Polish heritage, towards whom communism with its foreign ideology remained a temporary episode. The authorities have therefore decided to openly confront the Great Novena programme, with both repressive measures and propaganda counter-measures”¹¹. The aim of the „Great Novena” was not only to prepare for the millennium celebrations, but also to oppose the atheisation of society and to strengthen the Catholic national identity¹².

At the turn of 1967/1968, purges in the Polish United Workers' Party apparatus began, which were anti-Semitic in nature, but most of all aimed at taking over power in the party by the „Moczar” faction, which was supported by the party and military group led by Edward Gierek and Wojciech Jaruzelski. They coincided with the student protest against the film „Dziady” directed by Kazimierz Dejmek on the National Theatre stage. Polish bishops treated the criticism of Władysław Gomułka and his party team formulated in the intelligentsia communities as correct and proper, but at the same time they did not intend to interfere in factional fights in the communist party. The strategy of the Episcopate was based on the conviction of the primate that this is a game for the authorities in the Polish United Workers' Party, in which one should not be

¹¹ J. Żaryn, *Rok 1966 r. – Obchody milenijne w Kraju i na uchodźstwie (Year 1966 – Millennium celebrations in the country and in exile)*, typescript in the author's collection, p. 2.

¹² AAW, SPP 04/13, Central Commission of the Polish Episcopate 1958, c. 26, Protocol of the Central Commission of the Episcopate, November 7, 1958.

involved, and particular caution should be exercised: “We must have a lot of peace in order to stay in balance. We cannot act under the influence of hectic suggestions, we cannot advocate one faction or another. Hurry up with some sign of trust towards unknown would be a risky thing. The Episcopate must be free to make decisions from the subjectivity and passion of the counsellors”¹³. Cardinal Wyszyński also pointed out and regretted that the anti-Semitic propaganda campaign unleashed by the authorities would contribute to the deterioration of the image of the People’s Republic of Poland and Poles in the West¹⁴. This was due to his realistic attitude that it is necessary to take care of the state as it is and to prevent it from being received unfavourably abroad. As we can clearly see, it was the Primate who, with his wise behaviour, took care of Polish interests, in contrast to the communist dignitaries¹⁵.

The Church’s reaction to the workers’ revolt, which effectively ended Gomułka’s party career, was also quite subdued. The reason for the Episcopal temperance, however, was completely different and was based on the conviction of the primate that it is necessary to prevent further bloodshed and the possibility of the Soviets entering. For the latter reason, Cardinal Wyszyński decided, among other things,

¹³ Quote for: R. Łatka, *Prymas Wyszyński wobec rzeczywistości politycznej doby Władysława Gomułki (Primate Wyszyński towards the political reality of the days of Władysław Gomułka)*, in: *Dzieje Kościoła katolickiego na Pomorzu Zachodnim (History of the Catholic Church in Western Pomerania)*, vol. 2., 1956-1972, ed. M. Siedziako, Z. Stanuch, G. Wejman, Szczecin 2018, p. 59. See also, R. Łatka, *Biskupi w obronie studentów (Bishops in defense of students)*, „W Sieci” 2018 no. 10, p. 56-58.

¹⁴ P. Raina, *Kościół a państwo w świetle akt Wydziałów Do Spraw Wyznań 1967-1968. Próby kontroli Kościoła, wydarzenia marcowe, interwencja sierpniowa w Czechosłowacji (The Church and the State in the light of the files of the Faculties for Religious Affairs 1967-1968. Attempts to control the Church, March events, August intervention in Czechoslovakia)*, Warsaw 1994.

¹⁵ R. Łatka, *Czy prymasa Wyszyńskiego można określać mianem realisty politycznego? (Can Primate Wyszyński be described as a political realist?)* in: *Realizm polityczny (Political realism)*, ed. R. Łatka, „Polteja” 2013 no. 25, p. 201-212.

to withdraw the pastoral letter of the bishops, maintained in a tone very critical towards the authorities¹⁶.

IN THE REALITIES OF EDWARD GIEREK'S EPOCH

Primate Wyszyński saw the fundamental mission of the Church in relation to his homeland in the seventies in defending the Polish reason of state, he spoke about it clearly during a sermon given in Kraków on 11 May 1975: “The Church, the children of God, in our homeland follows the example of its supreme shepherds in defending man against abuses of power. That is why in Poland, too, the Church stands up for – in a manner of speaking – the national reason of state, which means something more than the political reason of state, because the political reason of state changes its dimensions, while the nation lasts, has its religious and national culture, its national customs and guards those values which do not arise at once, but also cannot be destroyed at once”¹⁷.

The Primate also postulated a concrete vision of the Church's actions in the decade of the seventies, emphasizing during the meeting of the General Council of the Episcopal Council of the January 26, 1971: “As Bishops, we must save the freedom of the Nation and the Church on the basis of pastoral means available to us. Much will depend on the way we do our work. Society is distrustful and cautious about changes. We, bishops, cannot give in to emotions. We must think soberly and look at things from the experience of the Church. [...] We are children of this nation and care for the nation, its security and integrity is not a stranger to us. Now, albeit limited, but we have some sovereignty and we must defend it”¹⁸.

¹⁶ J. Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła (History of the Church)*, op. cit., p. 290-291; R. Łatka, *Czy prymasa*, op. cit., p. 206.

¹⁷ Cit. for J. Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła (History of the Church)*, op. cit., p. 378.

¹⁸ AAW, SPP 04/26 General Council of the Polish Episcopate 1971, c. 11 Protocol of the General Council of the Polish Episcopate of January 26, 1971.

Cardinal Wyszyński kept his distance from political events, directing his attention to the concern for the common good in its broadest sense¹⁹. The rise of the organised opposition in 1976 did not change this position. The Primate spoke about it in April of that year: “Our action must be thoughtful, mature and calm. We cannot put ourselves on an equal footing with one secular institution or political centre. It can be done differently by the laity and by the bishops. We must not succumb to the pressure of people who are arguing and seeking to prove their right”²⁰.

The line of the Church’s conduct towards opposition organisations in the years 1976-1980 was best summarised by the words of the meeting of the GC of February 26, 1980, when Cardinal Wyszyński stressed that “they should be given some kind of care without getting involved in their contestations”²¹. The Primate also spoke about this at the GC meeting of March 7, 1978, as its minutes show, during the meeting: “It was found that there are strong pressures on the church from different sides and an attempt to drag it into their gameplay. There is a high activation of some groups of lay Catholics who are not affiliated. Similarly, the Polish Independence Agreement deals with the Church. We cannot allow ourselves to be involved in their political activation, but on the other hand we cannot combat them – they do not harm the Church and the People, as long as they act in moderation, so that they do not exceed the security limit. [...] We must defend the Church,

¹⁹ R. Łatka, *Kościół wobec „Solidarności”, czyli wsparcie idei niezależnych związków zawodowych (The Church in the face of „Solidarity”, i.e. support for the idea of independent trade unions)*, in: *Kościół i inne związki wyznaniowe w służbie dobru wspólnemu (Churches and other religious associations in the service of the common good)*, ed. W. Uruszczak, K. Krzysztofek, M. Mięka, Kraków 2014, p. 345- 355.

²⁰ AAW, SPP 04/31 General Council of the Polish Episcopate 1976, k. 43, Protokół Rady Głównej Episkopatu Polski z 26 IV 1976 r (Protocol of the General Council of the Polish Episcopate of 26 April 1976). See more details, R. Łatka, *Rada Główna Episkopatu Polski wobec przedsierpniowej opozycji (1976-1981) (The General Council of the Polish Episcopate against the pre-August opposition (1976-1981))*, „Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2017 no. 1, p. 110-136.

²¹ J. Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła (History of the Church)*, op. cit., p. 398.

but we must also defend ourselves so that the nation does not end up in a difficult situation. What will we gain if Gierek goes away? We are constantly confronted with so many unknowns”²².

Since 1979 Cardinal Wyszyński has been aware of Poland’s economic crisis and on several occasions pointed out to the authorities that a bad social situation may lead to the outbreak of social discontent on a large scale. This type of warning was formulated, among others, during his meeting with Edward Gierek in 1979²³.

THE „SOLIDARITY” REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS

The Primate responded to the events of August 1980 by recommending moderation and reason to the strikers, but at the same time supporting their main postulate, i.e. the establishment of independent trade unions²⁴. Undoubtedly, the famous sermon from the 26th of August was of key importance in determining the attitude of the primate to the protests of workers and the later attitude to Solidarity. The sermon expressed disappointment with the strikers, who expected Cardinal Wyszyński’s unambiguous support for their demands. They received a clear call to consider the situation calmly and to take responsibility for the fate of their Homeland²⁵. Although the authorities manipulated the sermon in television and radio

²² AAW, SPP 04/33 General Council of the Polish Episcopate 1978, k. 110 Protocol of the General Council of the Polish Episcopate of March 7, 1978.

²³ See more, R. Łatka, *Rada Główna Episcopatu Polski a pierwszej pielgrzymka Jana Pawła II do Ojczyzny w 1979 r. (The General Council of the Episcopate of Poland and the first pilgrimage of John Paul II to his homeland in 1979)*, „Dzieje Najnowsze” 2018 no. 1, p. 229-262.

²⁴ AAG, Stefan Wyszyński, Pro Memoria 1980-1981, record from 19 August 1980. Zob. również, P. Raina, *Kardynał Wyszyński i Solidarność (Cardinal Wyszyński and Solidarity)*, *op. cit.*, p. 31-32; R. Łatka, *Plaszczyzny wpływu Kościoła na Solidarność (1980-1981) (The planes of the Church’s influence on Solidarity (1980-1981))*, „Komunizm: system-ludzie-dokumentacja” 2016 no. 5, p. 129-147.

²⁵ J. Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła (History of the Church)*, *op. cit.*, p. 424-426.

broadcasting, these interventions did not change its basic message. The leader of the Polish Church saw the socio-political situation within the framework of specific geopolitical conditions, and from the point of view of the common good of the whole Nation. It stated that the fulfilment of the demands should be divided into instalments, and in this respect should be guided by national and civic maturity²⁶. The Primate explained the reasons for this position at the General Council meeting on 7 September, when he emphasised: “We need to understand reality well. We are teachers of the Nation. On August 26, 1980, I spoke to the Nation, not to the party. Some people thought that not enough to the party – I didn’t talk to the shipyard workers either – others said that not enough to the shipyard workers. I spoke to the Nation and that is why I confined myself to these basic elements, trying to dose them in such a way that I would not be a demagogue, especially in a situation in which it is not known what it could still lead to. What was triggered by the shipyard workers is beginning to provoke social movements among youth, the high school youth”²⁷. In the message of the General Council issued a day later, the bishops emphasised that the sermon of the Primate was manipulated. Its content also included support for the main postulate of the strikers, i.e. the establishment of independent trade unions²⁸.

At the same time, however, the Primate was of the opinion that the emerging unions should not deal with political issues. He wrote about it directly in his *Pro Memoria* diary in February 1981: “Solidarity should be defended against the extension of socio-economic tasks

²⁶ A. Friszke, *Rewolucja Solidarności 1980-1981 (The Solidarity Revolution 1980-1981)*, Kraków 2014, p. 46.

²⁷ AAW, SPP 04/35 General Council of the Polish Episcopate 1980, c. 193 -194 Protocol of the General Council of the Polish Episcopate of 9 September 1980. Cf. AAG, Stefan Wyszyński, *Pro Memoria 1980-1981*, record from 27 August 1980.

²⁸ The message of the General Council of the Polish Episcopate on the rights of the Polish nation, in: P. Raina, *Kościół w PRL (Church in the People’s Republic of Poland)*, vol.3, 1975-1989, Pelpin 1996, p. 164-165; A. Micewski, *Kościół wobec „Solidarności” i stanu wojennego (The Church in the face of „Solidarity” and martial law)*, Paris 1987, p. 23.

to the political areas”²⁹. For this reason, he was sceptical about the activities of the Workers’ Defence Committee environment within the framework of the independent social movement, believing that it was too radical and irresponsible³⁰.

Since the conclusion of the “August Agreements”, the Church has tried to influence the direction and mode of action of the emerging social movement. Like the leaders of the emerging Solidarity, they sought the support of the Church in the struggle for their own demands and the implementation of the “August Agreements”³¹. Cardinal Wyszyński wanted to be an advisor to the association, suggesting the direction in which the newly formed social movement should go. In principle, the Church, in defining its own social role, considered that it could not support specific political groups in its words and actions. The support given by the Church to Solidarity should be treated as an expression of concern for the common good³².

The role of the Church was also crucial in the creation of Solidarity for individual farmers. Particularly important in this respect was the strong position of Primate Wyszyński, who did a lot to ensure that the authorities gave their consent to establish a trade union in the countryside. The Church gave farmers strong support, as it is impossible to read the words of Primate Wyszyński from February 2, 1981 in a different way: “If industrial workers have acquired the right of association, this right must also be granted to agricultural workers [...]. One does not need to “grant” this right, it simply exists and nobody can deny it to us. There is one natural right, the same for every human being, regardless of what he does, works in the factory, in the mine or on the land, everyone has the same natural right, to join forces and efforts to carry out together the tasks

²⁹ AAG, Stefan Wyszyński, Pro Memoria 1980-1981, record from 19 August 1980.

³⁰ Ibidem, record from 9 September 1980.

³¹ AAN, KC PZPR LI/74 Administrative Department, Religious policy 1977-1981, c. 6, Relations between the State and the Church, 1 June 1981.

³² R. Łatka, *Kościół wobec Solidarności (Church in the face of Solidarity)*, op. cit., p. 349.

that man has to perform”³³. The Primate stressed that there can be no discrimination against the agricultural union and that it should be placed on an equal footing with the workers’ movement, as they have equal rights of association³⁴.

Summary

For Cardinal Wyszyński, the welfare of the Polish society, the Polish Nation, was of key importance during the entire period of the Primate’s service. Throughout the 33-year period of his leadership over the Polish Church, his concern for the common good and the Polish reason of state was often quite surprising: from the conclusion of the „Agreement of 1950”, through support for W. Gomułka and an open call to vote in the „elections” of 1957, to the subduing of social moods and calls for prudence during the August 1980 Revolution. Each of these actions encountered a misunderstanding of circles independent of the „people’s” Polish authorities, and was even treated as a kind of „collaboration” with the communist regime (the primate was most widely accused of this by the Parisian „Kultura”). After some time, however, it turned out that Cardinal Wyszyński was usually right, because he did not look at reality in the dichotomous simplified „communism/anti-communism” model, but understood it on the basis of a broader analysis of the socio-political situation and often putting the common good of the whole nation before the narrow interest of the Polish Church. This does not mean, of course, that Cardinal Wyszyński was not mistaken in his actions and views, because this also happened to him more than once, but that in the foreground of his teaching and action was Poland and concern for the Polish state reason (apart from the obvious concern for the whole Church).

³³ A. Micewski, *Kardynał Wyszyński (Cardinal Wyszyński)*, op. cit., p. 427; *Stefan Kardynał Wyszyński, Prymas Tysiąclecia do rolników (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of the Millennium to farmers)*, ed. E. Marciniak, Włocławek 1996.

³⁴ S. Wyszyński, *Zło dobrem zwyciężaj (Evil with good conquer)*. Do „Solidarności” z Gdyni (To „Solidarity” from Gdynia). Warsaw 22.02.1981, in: *Stefan Kardynał Wyszyński. Do „Solidarności” rady i wskazania (Stefan Kardynał Wyszyński. To “Solidarity” advice and guidance)*, Warsaw 1996, p. 67-68.

Dwa razy Summary?!

Summary

The notions of common good and the reason of state were always present, usually in a joint way, in the teachings of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. They came to the foreground, especially in the periods of post-war crises in Poland, moments of growing social tension. Despite the fact that the primate did not want to be a politician, because the main sphere of his activity was concern for the souls of Poles, he became a statesman, for whom the welfare of Poland and Poles was the primary task. This was largely due to the primate's concern for the broadly understood common good – Poland as a subject of common concern for all members of society, regardless of their views. Most importantly, Cardinal Wyszyński was able to look at the political situation without ideological bias or obstinacy. If he believed that communists somehow work for the common good and care about the fate of society, he supported their activity (an example of this could be the fight against social pathologies – especially alcoholism).

Keywords: Primate Stefan Wyszyński, reason of state, common good, homeland, nation, political realism

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