The Issue Of Christian Anthropology*

(I). I: Why the Issue of Christian Anthropology?

1.1. Preliminary explanations

As far as can be gathered, the first textbook on dogmatic theology, in which a volume is devoted to the supernaturality of man was entitled *Anthropologia supernaturalis* by P. Parente, first published in 1943.

Karl Rahner dealt with the subject of Christian anthropology many times, treating it at first as the basis for a philosophy of religion, then as part of fundamental theology, and finally showing a tendency to identify the area of anthropology with dogmatic theology1.

Many authors raised the problem of Christian anthropology in relation to the modern approach to pastoral theology, noting rightly that the one presented by F.X. Arnold’s divine-human principle of pastoral theology and the entire pastoral ministry of the Church (understood as “self-realisation in the present”) implies anthropological structure as the basic structure2. In connection with the indicated interests of theologians, many different approaches to Christian anthropology or theological anthropology have been developed. Since we will not be classifying and typologising these positions herein, it is enough to say that they lie between two extremes: identification with dogmatic theology (Rahner) or recognition as a department of dogmatic theology (Parente) – treating Christian anthropology as a new department of theology in its structure and function, most often practical or pastoral. Therefore we

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1 STV 9(1971)2.


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state that Christian anthropology must be taught separately as a theological discipline especially necessary for pastoral studies.

The information given in a nutshell is enough for us to notice the existence of the issue of Christian anthropology in the contemporary theologian’s workshop. In Polish theological literature A. Nossol has recently addressed this issue in an interesting way in his article *Teologia człowieka w rozwoju*. This article will neither be a repetition of the work undertaken by Nossol, nor will it be a polemic with his approach. The author is interested in the whole anthropological issue, or at least theological anthropology as an issue to be developed in contemporary theology. I would like to draw attention to one aspect of this issue, which in my opinion is decisive: what is the “Christianity” of anthropology. I deliberately write “Christianity” and not of its theological character because as we will find out, this is where I see the essence of the matter.

1.2. What are we not dealing with in this problem?

The author of this article is of the opinion that the time has not yet come to decide what place Christian anthropology occupies or should occupy in the structure of the whole of theology. This structure is currently undergoing such a thorough overhaul that a discussion on these topics can only concern specific issues. As a consequence, the statements by K. Rahner are premature.

There is no doubt that the problem of human origin belongs to Christian anthropology. It has become customary to call this issue the problem of hominisation. This does not mean that this problem should cease to be a subject of interest of biblical theologians, dogmaticians or apologists. The problem of hominisation is simply a special point of view on Christian anthropology, which I would like to set out hereon. Therefore, I will not deal with the issue of hominisation.

I will also ignore the confrontation of the basic principles of Christian anthropology with the dogmatic analysis of God’s grace in the present reflections. This confrontation will undoubtedly have to be made, but it is precisely after the basic assumptions have been established, which is what this article is all about.

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3 This is the meaning of the article by K. Rahner, *Grundentwurf einer theologischen Anthropologie*, in: *Handbuch...*, op. cit., vol. 2.
5 Esp. in the fourth article from *LThK.*
According to K. Rahner’s suggestions, I will also omit the detailed confrontation of the foundations of Christian anthropology with trinitarian theology, with Christology, and with the carefully considered history of salvation⁶. All these matters will have to be tackled, but only in connection with the search for an answer to the fundamental question of this article, which, as I have already written, is: what is the “Christianity” of the anthropology that we are dealing with.

The problem, which will also not be addressed in detail, will be the analysis of the most anthropological document of the Second Vatican Council, the Pastoral Constitution, although we will make many allusions to its approaches.

1.3. What do we deal with in this article?

The basic answer is already known to us: the “Christianity” of our anthropology. However, a few clarifications are needed.

The first explanation must concern the belonging of Christian anthropology to the field of theology. There are long discussions about the existence and meaning of Christian philosophy. If we were to take the position of the existence of a Christian philosophy, not only because of the historical connection with the Christian environment, but also because of the specific internal structure of this philosophy, we could imagine the existence of a section of Christian philosophy that would be called Christian anthropology. The position represented in this article is to recognise Christian anthropology as a strictly theological field.

This does not mean, however, that theologically-understood Christian anthropology does not have numerous and important links with philosophy. On the contrary, it seems that from the very beginning of the Christian concept of man, i.e. from the time of writing the four Gospels and apostolic letters, especially St. Paul’s letters, there has been an ongoing dialogue with what could be called the philosophical views of the Jewish community and with Hellenistic philosophy in its various forms. I do not mention the future of this dialogue, it is too well known. For this reason, the second part of the article will be devoted entirely to the problem of the following relations: theology – philosophy in the formation of Christian anthropology.

The problem of dialogue between theology and philosophy will be the central and methodologically decisive element of the article. It ties the historical remarks of the first part with the last part.

The first part of the article is historical in the sense that it refers to personal experiences connected with writing a book about Christian anthropology,
a book that has not been completed yet, and to the many years of experience (strictly speaking: fifteen years!)⁶ of lectures on Christian anthropology. The description of these experiences will not only have the character of personal confessions, thus something significant for the very fate of Christian anthropology in contemporary reflections and in contemporary lectures. The writer managed, at least in part, to keep a diary of his own struggle with the subject in lectures and attempts to write a book. These materials will be used in the first part of the article. The point of adding of these remarks, as we have called them, will be the question of the balance between the theological and philosophical point of view, which will be a transition to the second part.

The last part of the article deals with the fundamental issue of the proper, in my opinion, approach to Christian anthropology, namely, the question of the transcendence of the person. This is an issue that is well known and widely discussed today. What I would like to contribute from myself to the discussion on this subject comes down to the problem of the end of the transcendence of the individual. The end of this is another person or, more generally, the interpersonal community. I consider the person and the community to be one and the same considered only from different points of view. In the conjugated view of persons and communities, I see the most contemporary and radical perspective of the human paradox and this is on the basis of Christian anthropology. Therefore, if this matter can be clarified as clearly as possible, then at the same time, in my opinion, the most basic assumption of contemporary Christian anthropology will be established, which is what this article is all about.

(II.) 2. From the Experience of a Writer of a Book on Christian Anthropology

2.1. Difficulty in raising the issue

In the notes from the initial stage of teaching Christian anthropology, already understood theologically, I find a proposal according to which I tried to include the issue: either in the model “nature-history” or “man in the history of salvation.” It soon appeared that both of these models, if they were to deal with theological issues, contain the same proposal, that is, a reference to the history of salvation. Christian anthropology, however, could not be transformed, as I have already written, into a lecture on the history of salvation.

⁶ Ibid.
It was necessary to maintain a reference to the history of salvation without a lecture on the history of salvation. This was achieved through suggestions made in *Gaudium et spes*. However I will write about this later. At the moment we are interested in the very way of presenting the lecture. It consisted in treating the problematic issues of man in the perspective of the final times, or rather the “middle of the times.” In this way the awareness of the entanglement of our knowledge of man and his structure in history is preserved without disturbing the systematic course of the lecture. This, of course, involves a far-reaching revision of the concept of human nature in terms of removing traces of the concept of “pure nature,” brought into Christian anthropology by certain forms of medieval Neoplatonism.

The most important difficulty in choosing the right point of view, which will be discussed further, which would enable a good attitude to the issue, was a good attitude of anthropology to Christology. It is known that Christ is a “new man”; at the same time it is known that he is the God-Man. The only way out of the difficulties could be entanglement in the Christological perspective again.

2.2. Difficulty in choosing the right point of view and material
As has already been written, the correct point of view in the lecture on Christian anthropology was to take into account the perspective of salvation history and the Christological perspective. Taking a proper point of view was therefore to treat the subject in such a way as to deal primarily and constantly with man in accordance with human experience, without losing sight of the fact that human experience and historical experience reveals its full meaning and is subject to a proper interpretation only when human history is treated as a history of salvation. The difficulty here is in the necessary methodological and stylistic mixture of the secular and religious points of view. Moreover, it was difficult to link the synchronous structure of the lecture with the diachronic

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8 It is a well-known approach to the theology of St. Luke by H. Conzelmann in his work *Die Mitte der Zeit...*, Tübingen, 1964; we wish to oppose the views that the history of salvation ended with the first coming of Christ.
9 We mean the idea of pure nature in *Metaphysics* by Avicenna.
10 Here we strictly distinguish between the secularisation of Christianity, which concerns cultural changes in the understanding of religiousness and does not have to be a religious negative phenomenon, and desacralisation, a tendency to remove everything that concerns the *sacrum* from culture and consciousness. The latter position is, of course, incompatible with Christianity.
structure of the understanding of the matter, i.e. to such a systematic contribution that would not stop treating the human being historically, and thus did not give the impression of a lecture on the eternal notions of a translating human being.

The Christological perspective once again demanded a constant dealing with Christ without talking about it all the time and without lecturing about the God-Man instead of man. As we can see, the problem of the lecture on Christian anthropology was connected in the consciousness of the lecturer who lectured constantly with the issue of the secularization of the Christian understanding of reality, which is typical of our times. The subject of the lecture was to be simply the man we know, seeking self-knowledge, self-determination, trying to understand and interpret one’s own aspirations: love and creativity. At the same time, it was to be a truly Christian lecture about man created and renewed in Christ in the image of God, a man whose history is the history of salvation leading up to the end of time.

The difficulty of choosing the right material was first of all related to the issues pointed out in one. We do not deal with them because after more mature consideration it was appropriate to remove them from a contemporary lecture on anthropology.

I tried to give the rules of proper selection and arrangement of the material in the article answering a questionnaire, written together with A. Zuberbier. According to the principles in this article I started writing a book devoted to Christian anthropology. Here I came across further difficulties. The principle was to present Christian anthropology in its theological as well as philosophical aspect. I will write about this issue quite extensively. However, the theological part of the lecture itself posed new problems. It was necessary to constantly refer to biblical sources, which in the absence of competence in biblical theology had to lead to the choice of a method of giving signals and operating on a very limited range of biblical references. It was also required by the already presented secular style of the book.

Another difficulty I encountered was when I started to develop the second chapter of the book devoted to the individual. There were no particular difficulties in aligning the individual and social elements when it came to the image of God in man and human individuality because we were supposed to begin to discuss human actions and aspirations. However, it was precisely in the individual’s problems that this difficulty appeared clearly. We will return to this issue in the last part of this article.

Finally, the very beginning of the lecture: the image of God in man. Should a Christian really begin his lecture on man “from Adam and Eve,” that
is, from creation, whereas it is known that theologically speaking, we begin to understand creation only in the light of salvation\textsuperscript{11}.

2.3. The question of the balance between the theological and philosophical point of view
K. Rahner teaches that Christian anthropology should be practised without philosophical prejudices, or at least without philosophical positions previously taken. On the other hand, the same author draws attention to the obvious fact that we cannot free ourselves from existing historical human experience, which is largely of a philosophical nature\textsuperscript{12}. How can these two tasks be reconciled in order to maintain a truly Christian and truly human character of anthropology?

First of all, you have to stick to the advice of an excellent theologian. Christ and the history of salvation is the first anthropological principle. I write this on purpose: the fact of Christ’s existence, for I want to remain as close as possible to reality, is historically unique. The interpretation of this fact, even an original one given in the theology of the synoptic gospels, is no longer free from philosophical interpretations. And the history of salvation? After all, the ways of presenting it always imply a specific historiosophical model, not free from philosophical ties, and are never a simple representation of the order of events. Nothing would have resulted from this, and if something had resulted from it, this would have been based on the principle of historiosophy entangled in the presentation of the order of facts.

What I have written is enough to realise that the pure fact of Christ existing and the pure, that is, history of salvation not entangled in any philosophy, is not given to us and is not available at all. There is also the history of human experience, understood as the history of philosophy. In turn is it completely free from religious and philosophical implications, even in the least religious forms of philosophising, which history registered? It would be easy to prove that it is not. So there is no problem of a “chemically pure” theology and equally a pure philosophy of man.

Therefore, the only thing that remains in our practice of Christian anthropology is to maintain a balance between its theological and philosophical elements. This means, above all, the primacy of fact and the primacy of the history


\textsuperscript{12} Art. cit. in LThK.
of salvation. There are methods developed by biblical theologians to maintain this primacy without losing the memory of an inevitable counterpoint of a theological and philosophical interpretation. With a theological interpretation, the matter is still quite simple, as long as it is only a reflection of fact and history, without resorting to any philosophical assumptions. However, is this phase of reflection at all experimentally tangible? Rather not. Philosophy enters “without asking, through the gate.” After all, it is the same as the human way of thinking shaped by history and current state of the community in which we live. After all, we must somehow understand the basic terms used in the transmission of the Gospel: man, life, light, freedom, love. This is a philosophy that is unknowing and immature. So let the inevitable at least be made aware.

So below is the result of the experience of the author of a book on Christian anthropology: philosophy cannot be avoided in the interpretation of the basic facts and the history of our salvation, so it is necessary to realise to oneself as precisely as possible when we refer to it. Conscious and critical reference to philosophy: this is the programme proposed here, and moreover critical study through the whole sequence of dealing with Christian anthropology, or by chance the concepts and philosophical theses, which we will make use of, do not falsify the biblical perspective and the fundamental line of the interpretation of the Bible in ecclesiastical teachings. This is how I understand the demand for balance. However, this is not enough. The question of a dialogue between theology and philosophy on the grounds of Christian anthropology will be discussed in more detail further in the article.

(III). 3. DOES A CHRISTIAN NEED A HUMAN PHILOSOPHY?

3.1. Extreme position: unnecessary

Unnecessary, because Christ and his work, and in it the doctrine, says everything that man should know about himself. It is not a new attitude. However, we are interested in the contemporary form of such a position, which is based on a misunderstanding. The Gospel itself, without any philosophy, is a programme that can be heard. This programme and attitude may be more primitive and non-reflective. Of course, we are interested in its more perfect and reflective form, which includes a philosophical programme, but is in a way minimalistic. Man against patterns, in search of the closest possible contact with the Gospel, learning about

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13 A. Grzegorczyk, Schematy i człowiek, Warsaw 1963, 17-141 passim.
himself, and what is necessary to act in accordance with the Gospel rather than reflecting on the question of who I am. If there is a philosophy, it is an analytical one, describing human actions in order to include as much as possible in the evangelical programme in a secular language or to show the relationship between the Gospel and mankind’s social aspirations for unity, justice and peace.

This last point of view questioning the need for philosophy for Christians seems to be the mildest because at least it implies a reflection on the main concerns of the human family of our time and initiates anthropological contemplation and thus, in a sense, theological contemplation. However, even in the mildest form, we are dealing with anthropological irrationalism in the name of a holistic, under a sign of unity and simplicity, dealing with man. Irrational contemplation or contemplation against rationalism? There seems to be a deep misunderstanding here. What is it all about?

3.2. Danger of “overphilosophing”

In the modern version, this danger is first felt as a threat to detach life from the Gospel through excessive and useless thinking. Then, as the use of thinking is too distinctive in man and it distinguishes between fields and elements, both in the individual man and in the human community, we do not need modern rational structures, but rather simple formulas to encourage unity among ourselves in the spirit of the Gospel.

Indeed, the philosophy of man practised by Christians can sometimes detach individuals from the concrete tasks of reforming themselves and their own community in the name of a subtle analysis of human structures. Does not modern theology give us examples? Some facts with salvific sarcasm were unmasked by Pascal in *Prowincjalki*. Others we can see looking back into the pre-conciliar era. Let us remain with the generalities – there is currently no historical study of the anthropological distortions of Christianity. Our perspective today does not allow us to separate human theory from practice: man checks himself and contemplates his riches in historical action.

However, it is necessary to note with particular attention the reluctance and fear of today’s people to apply distinctions in the analysis of human reality, which supposedly obscures the consciousness of one in its functional structure of the stream of life. Maritain’s “distinguer pour unir” programme is not popular today. This expresses, among other things, the distrust of the man of the technical era in the face of the dismemberment of our conscious reflection. The analysis of complex “underlying” structures is more likely to be left to the detailed sciences, especially the natural sciences, as well as to the social sciences.
3.3. Dialogue between theology and philosophy

Nevertheless, we are witnessing an increased dialogue between theology and philosophy in Christian anthropology.

The basis for dialogue is the search in the Bible for a full vision of man. Theological analysis of biblical data inevitably leads to a search for philosophical content entangled in biblical approaches. The question of biblical anthropology boils down to the question: what results from the relation between the Judaic mentality with various oriental philosophies, from the relation with Hellenistic philosophies, and finally what constitutes an indigenous biblical vision of a philosophical nature? The first issue to be mentioned is the issue of immortality. It is rather unquestionable that the formation of thoughts about the resurrection and immortality of man in later books of the Old Testament took place not without the influence of Hellenism.

Typically Hellenistic inspirations can be found in some biblical approaches concerning the problem of the soul and its relation to the body. As we know, the basic vision of man in the Bible is not dualistic. The terms “body” and “soul” are most commonly used in the Book interchangeably, from different points of view, but in their entirety. However, the further fate of the Christian concept of man has been different. Generally towards a sharp acceptance of the dualism of the soul and body, of course in favour of the soul. It is also known that this was mainly due to Platonic or Neoplatonic inspiration. St. Augustine was the crown witness of this process. There was an evolution in his views as he read the Bible. In the last version of the commentary to the book of Genesis, Augustine expresses a view of the positive value of the body created by God and constituting, together with the soul, a whole destined for resurrection.

It is commonly believed that St. Thomas Aquinas overcame duality in Christian anthropology. In his writings, the human soul is not opposed to the body as to something worse or hindering the soul in its free action. On the contrary, the action of the human soul in its highest forms requires the functional cooperation of bodily organs. It is certain that St. Thomas Aquinas himself did not overcome all the consequences of dualism, but we will leave this issue out of the reach of the present reflections. In any case, since the times of Thomas

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Aquinas, one can no longer treat a human being with impunity as a soul living in the flesh for punishment and to one's loss. Although for theologian, as Thomas Aquinas says, man is of an interest “from the side of the soul”\(^7\), however, the phrase itself is significant. It implies treating man as a whole composed in reality of the soul and body, but essentially indivisible.

Modern philosophy cannot claim the merit of overcoming all the consequences of a dualistic understanding of man. After all, along with Descartes, it returned to such extreme dualism as Christian thought had not known before. The merit of modern philosophy in terms of understanding the Gospel seems rather to overcome cosmo-centrism or treating man as one of many beings, one of many things in this world. Kant said the decisive word on this subject, although Descartes, and especially the English empiricists, already had elements preparing this point of view. By placing all emphasis on human consciousness as a constitutive of man in his uniqueness, subjective philosophy has overcome, if not *explicit*, then at least the *implicit* Aristotelian burden: treating man as a rational animal with the accent placed on the animal. Since then, man can no longer be analysed on the same plane as other living beings and the rest of the cosmos.

Contemporary Christian theological anthropology undoubtedly refers to the achievements of subjective and reflective philosophy\(^8\)\(^9\). We disregard the discussion on this subject with individual representatives of Christian anthropology practised today. We simply want to highlight what we personally consider to be a problem of Christian anthropology. In order not to confuse human cognition with human existence, while rightly considering human consciousness as constitutive of man in his uniqueness\(^0\). In the writer’s opinion, it is helpful to distinguish clearly between human existence and the act of human existence\(^2\). By existence I mean the historically-shaped structure of a concrete person that can be analysed through reflection, and by the act of existence, the basic element that makes man come true, which makes him a being. Through analysis and existential reflection, we never get directly to the act of existence. In this way we study the existing structure.

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\(^7\) ST. 1 q. 75, *proem*.


\(^9\) We are thinking primarily of the works of K. Rahner and his disciples.


\(^2\) The Polish language allows one to consistently maintain this distinction.
At least since the middle of the 19th century, the next form of the human paradox has been very clearly visible. If we managed to take a position on the opposition of the soul-body, man-cosmos, the opposition of the individual-society remains to be overcome. Marx and Engels’ *Communist Manifesto* is a groundbreaking document of human experience, requiring confrontation with the Gospel. The history of this confrontation from *Rerum novarum* to *Mater et magistra* and *Pacem in terris* is well known. In my opinion, a theological analysis is demanded above all by the principle of the common good, which has been referred to so many times and in various meanings in the teaching of the Church and in the work of theologians. A proper understanding and development of this principle allows us to overcome the opposition of the individual – society, or rather (we will stick to this terminology) – the person-community\(^{22}\,^{23}\). The last part of this article is devoted to this topic.

**IV. 4. TRANSCENDENCE OF A PERSON**

4.1. Contemporary wording of the human paradox

One of the sources of the contemporary formulation of the human paradox in relation to the issue of the person-community is research in the field of theology and the philosophy of human language and, more generally, human expression. It was possible to detect a mistake in the definition of the traditional matter of the dependence or independence of language and thinking. It appeared that we are dealing here with an apparent issue because human consciousness in its entirety is an interpersonal fact: not only do we speak, but we always think to someone, so human thinking and human expression are a conjugated reality.

Going further, it must be said that if we intend to consistently apply the achievements of subjective and reflective philosophy, the person and the community in general is a conjugated reality. We recognise ourselves as true and good, and consequently, as a unity, an integration and as an individual we recognise ourselves in interpersonal relationships. Firstly, I get to know another person and discover in him or her the common properties mentioned above as being, and only then, by analogy and reflection, do I learn about myself. Truth and human goodness, unity and human existence, are the basic common good understood in an analogous way, cognisable in interpersonal relationships. At


\(^{23}\) This concerns the specially constructed meaning of the word conjugation.
the same time it appears that by getting to know other people I get to know myself and vice versa, by deepening my own existential experience, I know increasingly more about all that is similar and analogically similar, one can say, common to me and other people.

4.2. Conjugation: person – community

In view of what has already been explained, I put forward the thesis that the individual and the community is a conjugated reality, that is, it is one and the same reality considered from a different point of view. Of course, I have no intention of proclaiming a thesis on the substance of the human community. I repeat, each human person remains an independent and unique reality. Rather, I would like to say that the human community, which, considered from the outside, is a relational entity in the sense of accidental relations, connecting people with each other on various grounds, exists in fact, personally and substantially in individuals as their common good by analogy. By the very fact that the role played in discovering oneself and in judging ourselves properly, other people live in us forever, they begin to be our truth, our goodness. They determine our unity or personal integration, by creating our existence and shaping our historical existence. By resorting to the traditional language of philosophy, they develop our existence as secondary causes.

The theme of the dialogue structure of the individual expressed in the me-you structure, the topic of living in each other’s people, is well known to contemporary theology and the philosophy of man. All this together amounts to a thesis about the transcendence of the individual in interpersonal relationships. The aim of this article is to dot the “i” in this regard. The proper place for the full existence of the human community is the individual and therefore we say that community and person is a conjugated reality, that is, one and the same reality. We wish to treat our thesis as theological, recalling the evangelical statements about Christ’s dwelling in us and us in him, about the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in us. In St. Paul’s letters there is no lack of words about how the addressees of the letters live in the heart of the Apostle, and they are not merely pictorial and metaphorical statements.

Recent remarks allow us to outline a proposal for a new interpretation of the theological human act of existence. The name of God in the Old Testament was “He who is.” In the New: “Our Lord’s Father and our Father” or simply “Love.” The creative act of existence given to man is therefore a creative act of love. In the sense in which man possesses him and is constituted by him, it is, of course, an act of created love, the full realisation of which, in a mysterious
way connected with the uncreated existence and love of the divine person, is the man Jesus Christ. God dwells in me because He loves me as my Creator and Father. People live in me because they love me and as secondary causes they work together with God to shape my existence and my being, that is, God’s love for me. I carry within me those who love me and those whom I love, and this is the most real communion with God and people, bearing fruit in many ways on a daily basis: “faith as a result of love.”

My existence is turned entirely to God; for this love created, which creates and makes me his son. It is also directed entirely to the people, those on whom the shaping of my historical existence depended to the highest degree. I do not hesitate to speak in this case, expanding somewhat the traditional meaning of this expression, about the transcendental relationships that bind me to God present in me through “the love poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us” and with people, the most important in my life. God and the people closest to me are my true home, a community that is internalised, and thus exists in me in the most real way because it identifies itself with my person.

This is a sketch. The proposal contains many uncertainties and understatements, but it seems that Christian anthropology should go in this direction.

4.3. Conclusion: theological suggestions of the Pastoral Constitution

The text of Gaudium et spe has not yet become the basis for a systematic analysis from the point of view of Christian anthropology. We shall not conduct a systematic analysis at the end of this article. We will only mention a few issues that are particularly important in our opinion. The first issue is the very arrangement of the first chapter of the Constitutions. It speaks firstly of the dignity of the individual, then of the human community, and only then does it move on to the discussion of human activity in the world and the tasks of the Church in the modern world. The anthropological concept of the text can be seen from the very layout of the chapters of the first part.

The idea is that the concept of the presence of the Church in the contemporary world, that is, the concept of the Church as a sign, that is, a modern concept of pastoral ministry with the whole Church as a subject, depends on the right attitude and resolution of the question of who I am and who I – man – become. This is the basic premise of an anthropological structure, expressed in questions about the dignity of the person and the human community.

24 A. Nossol does it to some extent, art. cit.
Are these two questions or one? In Article 25 of the CCC we read, in the editorial subtitle, about *interdependentia* – the interdependence of person and community. The Latin term expresses even more than the word Polish “interdependencja” (interdependence). It corresponds rather to a word that we have used several times, namely, the word *conjugation*, which we in turn interpreted simply as one.

The text of Article 25 itself proclaims: “*Ex sociali hominis Índole apparet humanas personae profectum et ipsius societatis incrementum ab invicem pendere.*” I pay attention to the expression “ab invicem pendere,” which is undoubtedly referred to, again, to what I call conjugation. It is simply an attempt to express this term in classical Latin.

In this article we encounter other formulations which seem to confirm our interpretation. Above all, it proclaims that the very nature of the individual results in the necessity of a social life for which the person is, as the text says, a *principium, subiectum et finis*. I pay attention to the expressions *subiectum* and *finis*. The first confirms all that I wrote about the one real way of existence of the community, which is its interiorisation in the person. The second expression *finis*, goal, insofar as it is significant here because it places the goal of the community in itself as existing in its subject of interiorisation, i.e. in the person. It has not yet been noticed that on this occasion of Church teaching and theological reflection an evolution of the concept of purpose has taken place. It is no longer just an external cause in relation to the reality to which it relates, but lies within it.

We have already omitted the interpretation of the last part of Article 25 of the CCC, although there are also interesting formulations about the non-marginal character of the community in relation to the person, in order to draw attention to the need for an in-depth interpretation of Article 26. This is where the idea of the common good develops. At first glance, it is in the sense of objectivity rather than in the sense of a community of persons. After all, a deeper reading indicates something else. We will not deal with this topic anymore. It is time for a conclusion of all our deliberations.

We understand the problem of Christian anthropology and have tried to show it as a problem of confronting the Gospel with human experience. If human experience shows us more and more deeply and clearly in its history the paradox of man, it is in the Gospel that we seek a solution to what seems unresolvable: the human paradox.