DESCRIPTION: Prof. Władysław Krajewski (1919-2006) was affiliated with the University of Warsaw. At the age of 11, he left for the Soviet Union with his mother. He completed his secondary education in Moscow, then during World War II he graduated from the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics at one of the local pedagogical institutes. After graduating, he worked as a high school maths and physics teacher for several years. In 1946, he returned to Poland. He was a member of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) and the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). Initially, he was a supporter of Marxist philosophy. He applied the method of dialectical materialism to the field of the philosophy of physics and other natural sciences. In the mid-1970s, he turned to scientism. The main areas of his research and philosophical interests are the development of science, the application of the method of idealization and factualization, and the principle of correspondence in the natural sciences. After 1989, he became a follower of critical rationalism, as developed by Karl Popper, and, in the philosophy of science, of hypotheticism and the idealizing conception of science. As he recalls in an interview from 2001, his spiritual masters were Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper. He defined his attitude towards Marxism in this interview as follows: “Today, I reject Marx's philosophy of history as unscientific and false, but, unlike some other Marxists, I do not condemn Marxist philosophy outright. I believe that dialectical materialism contains many valuable ideas that resonate with critical rationalism and the entire realist current of contemporary philosophy of science. He has published three articles in SPCh, which is also a testament to the journal's openness to different world views. He has repeatedly participated in conferences and discussions organized at the Institute of Philosophy at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. The aforementioned article deals with the nature and significance of scientific models. The author analyzes the types of scientific models and considers the question of their truthfulness. “Fundamental laws are generally false in the classical sense (‘they lie’) precisely because they are idealizing. However, they faithfully describe ideal M [models]. That is why I introduced the concept of model truth (Mtr) in my time (...). By this I mean conformity with the ideal model. It is therefore a version of the correspondence theory of truth, different from the classical version. There – correspondence with reality, here – with the ideal M. Of course, Mtr is relative to M (pp. 96-97).
SUMMARY: 1. Three types of models. 2. Mathematical model. 3. Theoretical model. 4. Ideal model. 5. Dual role of ideal objects as models. 6. On model truth.
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English
Język Polski