The term “evolutionary argument from reason against naturalism” refers to the argument formulated in contemporary times primarily by Clive Staples Lewis, Alvin Plantinga, and Victor Reppert. Its core claim is that recognizing the reliability of human cognitive faculties is incompatible with a naturalistic view of the world. The problem is that the naturalistic conception of the origin of our cognitive faculties explains their genesis by ultimately referring to purely physical factors, in particular unintentional ones, i.e., characteristics that are inadequate in relation to cognitive acts. The article presents the formulations of this argument by the three authors mentioned above, pointing out the similarities and differences between the three versions. The argument is then evaluated in the context of the idea of emergence. A possible answer to the question of whether the idea of emergence refutes the argument is outlined. A distinction is made between the empirical idea of emergence and the idea of emergence extended by a metaphysical aspect. The question of whether the negative argument from reason against naturalism can also be considered a positive argument in favor of a specific metaphysical position is also considered, and if so, which one. Ultimately, it turned out that the idea of emergence in either of the two forms mentioned does not support the naturalistic view of reality, and in the case of the version extended by the assumption of naturalism, it is vulnerable to the evolutionary argument from reason against naturalism.
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English
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