From the series ‘60/60 the best of SPCh’ (36) [60 most interesting publications from 60 years of SPCh]
2025-10-13
Maria Szyszkowska: The consequences of Kant's separation of the spheres of theoretical reason and practical reason in the philosophy of law [Studia Philosophiae Christianae 8(1972)1, pp. 133–152].
DESCRIPTION: Maria Szyszkowska (born 1937) – professor of philosophy and social activist, senator of the fifth term. She studied philosophy at the Catholic Theology Academy as an auditor. She worked part-time as an assistant professor at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic Theological Academy. She is mainly associated with the University of Warsaw and the Polish Academy of Sciences. She mainly deals with the philosophy of law. In her views, she criticises neoliberalism and capitalism. She is sceptical about the cult of democracy, especially parliamentary democracy. According to her, direct democracy would be a better form of democracy. She declares her support for pacifism and a state that is neutral in terms of worldview. The article in question is one of three texts published by her in SPCh from the early period of her academic career. In it, the author presented the philosophy of law of the 19th and 20th centuries, which, in her opinion, was shaped to a much greater extent by Kant's theory of cognition than by his philosophy of law. The same also characterises the philosophy of law of neo-Kantianism. The article contains reflections on the influence of Kant's theory of cognition on various philosophical schools dealing with law. At the beginning, the author presented the theoretical and practical direction of the theory of pure reason in Kant's philosophy. The areas of theoretical and practical pure reason can be called the world of causality (the world of nature) and the world of freedom (the intelligible world). These two directions of reason take the form of being and duty in the philosophy of law. Under Kant's influence, the focus of philosophical considerations concerning law shifted towards what ought to be. Various interpretations of this division were presented using examples from the systems of several philosophers. The author emphasised that a sharp distinction between what is and what ought to be leads to a false representation of the relationship between man and the world. Through their actions, humans connect what is with what ought to be. Moreover, the category of being connects what is with what ought to be. "The dualism of being and duty, which is a certainty in post-Kantian philosophical and legal systems – the result of the master's teaching – does not seem to contradict Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology if being is understood in the sense of classical natural science. For it is impossible to arrive at statements about values by logical means, on the basis of findings about facts. Hence, the validity or binding force of evaluative statements (norms) can again be derived only from evaluative statements. However, the highest value judgement – the source of value – must be accepted as a fundamental value hypothesis beyond any possibility of verification” (p. 151).
CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. 2. Theoretical reason and practical reason in Kant's philosophy. 3. The separation of the domains of theoretical reason and practical reason in the form of the sphere of being and the sphere of duty. 4. An outline of the most important variations of this separation in the philosophy of law. 5. Conclusion.
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