Abstract

e concept of the subjectivity of a person presented in this article has shown
that man as a subject appears in constant references and relations in which his
existence is embedded. On the one hand, it escapes the determinism of nature,
on the other hand, it reveals a certain crack between its nature and action. is
leads to the conclusion that even if a person is characterised by individuality, it
is not a separate existence. It seems justified to return to the question of what
makes a person, in spite of both external and internal variability; they remain the
same or otherwise what builds and what destroys the subjectivity of the person?
e question thus posed reveals the first threat to human subjectivity which
is the fact of the existence of evil. For it is not only something external to man
but also something that makes man both the “place” of the appearance of evil and responsible for evilB8. While staying in Ricoeur’s philosophy characterised
by a dialectical movement one can already see in the language discussing evil
a threat to certain “deposits of hope” present in his thoughtB<. For the religious
language to which Ricoeur ultimately reduces the problem of evil is the language
of hope and eschatology. Freedom also takes on a new meaning in this context.
It is no longer just something that has been enslaved but above all something
that is a “desire for the possible.” A possible freedom is the Resurrection. In this
perspective, even evil and suffering can find their ultimate meaning, and the
subjective character of morality does not threaten to fall into subjectivism.
Moreover, it is in the name of such subjectivism that morality demands for the
subject this “otherness,” the hope that comes from the Resurrection.