DESCRIPTION: Robert Piłat (born 1959) is a retired professor and populariser of philosophy, specialising in: philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics. His academic career has been mainly associated with the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) and Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (UKSW). He is the author of numerous books (including ‘The Mind as a Model of the World,’ ‘On Reason and Its Madness,’ ‘On the Essence of Concepts’). He also co-creates radio and television programmes on philosophical topics. The text in question concerns the basic thesis of Kantian ethics. According to Kant, the freedom of human will can only be guaranteed by submitting to the a priori command of reason. Any other motive of the will, Kant argues, introduces heteronomy into it and causes its actions to be devoid of freedom and morality. The author presents Kant's claims against the background of his theory of action. Due to the dualism of this theory (the radical separation of the phenomenal from the intelligible in the acting subject and in the action itself), Kant was forced to seek the basis of autonomy and freedom of human will exclusively in the intelligible world of rational rules and imperatives. The author then considers the accusation of formalism, which was often levelled against Kant. It seems that Kant equated the moral character of action with its conformity to an ideal, formal model. From this point of view, the sphere of interpersonal relations seems to be neglected. However, some of Kant's statements may lead to completely different conclusions. ‘It seems that for Kant, the morality of action is guaranteed by the purely formal relationship of action to the a priori categorical imperative. Action ’towards others‘ and ’on others", in other words, moral treatment of other people, is thus realised here, as it were, incidentally, i.e. in the course of fulfilling the law. The law itself, due to its a priori nature, does have an intersubjective value, but it consists only in the fact that each individual is subject to the same law and has nothing to do with intersubjectivity in the sense of a moral community. Is this the only possible interpretation of Kant's theory of moral action? To judge this, let us consider once again the wording of the categorical imperative: ‘Act in such a way that the maxim of your will could always be valid as a principle of universal legislation.’ Let us note that this postulate of universal legislation of maxims (and thus the entire formula of the imperative) is incomprehensible without realising that it refers to the basic condition of human existence, which is being among other people. In other words, moral law demands that we treat our actions as possible actions of other people and even as possible actions of all people. Of course, we cannot assume that any particular action could actually become the action of all people and that our maxim could become a positive universal law. However, it is necessary to present our actions in this way, because it is only through this paradoxical perspective that a special moral attitude towards other people arises, an attitude that cannot be reduced to an objective relationship but consists in referring directly to the subjectivity and personal value of another human being. In other words, in ‘Kaniowski’ moral action, we not only act among others, but we also relate personally to other people" (pp. 124-125).
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. 2. General characteristics of action. 3. Maxims of action. 4. Will. 5. Determinations and motives of the will. 6. Freedom of the will. 7. Internal legislation of the will. 8. The moral character of the categorical imperative. 9. Motivating the will through moral law. 10. The problem of Kaniowski's ethical formalism. 11. Conclusion.
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