DESCRIPTION: Stanisław Kamiński (1919-1986) was associated with the Catholic University of Lublin. For many years, he headed the Department of Logic and Theory of Cognition, as well as the Theoretical Philosophy Section. He was associated with two schools of philosophy: scholasticism and the Lviv-Warsaw school. He dealt with logic and the history of logic, philosophy and the methodology of science, in particular the language and method of classical ontology. He cultivated the ideal of rational cognition, referring to the heritage of the past and the latest achievements in logic and the philosophy of science. He co-founded the so-called Lublin school of philosophy. The author of the article attempts to point the way to answering the question: are there truly necessary propositions and what do they look like? It is not only a question of the existence of necessary truths, but also of whether it is possible to state without doubt that a given proposition is true. The initial terminological explanations are followed by a historical overview of the problem. Next, the obstacles that tradition places in the way of a positive solution to the problem of the existence of necessary truths are identified. These are mainly: 1) too much autonomy granted to language, and also partly to cognition; 2) excessive isolation of different types of knowledge, especially sensory and intellectual (here, too, the classic controversy between empiricism and apriorism); and finally 3) a narrow or at least uncertain concept of experience. A positive solution to this problem seems possible, provided that it is possible to establish 1) the existence of necessary states of affairs, 2) the type of apodictic knowledge and, most importantly, the criteria for its recognition, 3) the means of constructing a national apparatus allowing for the expression, transmission, and control of the necessity of knowledge. All these operations interpenetrate and control each other, with language being the easiest means of recognition. "Thus, a materially true judgment occurs if and only if the intellect is moved by the necessary state of affairs (which is the subject of that judgment) and is irrevocably compelled to recognize the truth of that judgment on the basis of the cognitive content presented analytically in language. All this is decided simultaneously on three levels and in their mutual connection: linguistic (the analytical nature of the sentence), cognitive (the obviousness of the intuitive approach), and ontological (the necessity of the state of affairs). In practice, this is not just a spontaneous and “instantaneous” operation. For it to happen, it must be thoroughly prepared, repeated, and semiotically checked" (p. 71).
Table of contents: 1. Preliminary terminological explanations. 2. Terms synonymous with the name “necessary truth.” 3. History of the problem of necessary truth. 4. The need for a harmonious, multifaceted approach to the problem of necessary truths. 5. Obstacles hindering the proper approach to solving the problem of necessary truths. 6. An outline of the path to solving the problem of the existence of necessary truths.
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