Ewolucyjny argument z rozumu przeciwko naturalizmowi a idea emergencji. Zarys problematyki

Piotr Bylica

doi:10.21697/spch.2024.60.A.17

Published: 2024-12-31

Vol. 60 No. 2 (2024)

The Evolutionary Argument from Reason Against Naturalism and the Idea of Emergence: An Outline of the Issues

Piotr Bylica

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

Section: Papers

https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2024.60.A.17

Abstract

The “evolutionary argument from reason against naturalism” refers to a line of reasoning developed by contemporary thinkers such as Clive Staples Lewis, Alvin Plantinga, and Victor Reppert. Its core thesis is that the reliability of human cognitive faculties cannot be reconciled with a naturalistic worldview. The problem is that the naturalistic account of the origin of our cognitive faculties explains their genesis ultimately by appealing to physical factors, particularly non-intentional ones, or characteristics that are inadequate to cognitive acts. This article illustrates Lewis’s, Plantinga’s and Reppert’s versions of this argument, focusing on their similarities and differences. Next, the argument will be evaluated in the context of the idea of emergence. A possible answer to the question of whether the idea of emergence undermines the evolutionary argument will then be outlined. A distinction will be made between the empirical idea of emergence and a broader account of emergence that includes a metaphysical aspect. The question of whether a version of the negative argument from reason against naturalism can also be considered a positive argument in favour of a particular metaphysical position will also be considered. Ultimately, this article argues that the idea of emergence in either of the two forms considered does not support a naturalistic view of reality. Furthermore, the extended naturalistic version of the argument is vulnerable to the evolutionary argument from reason against naturalism.

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Received: 30/06/2024. Reviewed: 7/09/2024. Accepted: 5/11/2024.

Keywords:

philosophical naturalism, argument from reason, evolutionary argument against naturalism, Clive S. Lewis, Alvin Plantinga, Victor Reppert, emergence

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Bylica, P. (2024). The Evolutionary Argument from Reason Against Naturalism and the Idea of Emergence: An Outline of the Issues. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 60(2), 173–198. https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2024.60.A.17

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