https://doi.org/10.26142/stgd-2025-014
This article examines the limits of tolerance through the lens of Hans Jonas’s ethics of responsibility. Classical liberal theories – those of Voltaire, Mill, and Popper – conceive tolerance as a virtue of coexistence within a stable moral and political order. However, they presuppose a world in which human action is limited in scope, harms are reversible, and responsibility concerns only existing individuals. Jonas challenges these assumptions by arguing that modern technological power has transformed the nature of human action and extended the moral horizon toward future generations. His ontology of responsibility shows that tolerance cannot be justified when it endangers the long-term conditions of human life. In this framework, tolerance becomes a derivative virtue subordinated to the imperative of safeguarding the fragile future of humanity. The article argues that Jonas provides a deeper, ontologically grounded criterion for determining what must not be tolerated in the technological age.
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Język Polski
English