https://doi.org/10.21697/seb.5907
Environmental virtue ethics represents one of the major approaches within contemporary environmental philosophy, addressing the moral foundations of human relationships with the natural world. Charles Hayes recently presented a defence of environmental virtue ethics in response to criticisms of this stance from Holmes Rolston III. After an outline of Rolston’s criticisms, Hayes’ argument is depicted, including certain frameworks about motivation which he shows to be deficient, and which he also attributes to Rolston. I proceed to question Hayes’ implicit assumption that to act rightly is to do what the virtuous person would do, to contest his attribution of these deficient frameworks about motivation to Rolston, and to endorse Rolston’s account of what makes right actions right and meaningful lives meaningful. I also question the view that either virtuous lives or environment-oriented lives are self-justifying, since the actions performed by those who live such lives can (and often do) fail to be morally right.
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