Published: 2020-12-31

Clive S. Lewis’s anti-naturalistic argument from desire

Piotr Bylica
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
Section: Papers
https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.4.09

Abstract

This article outlines a number of formulations of C.S. Lewis’s anti-naturalistic argument from desire. We tackle the problem of the logical validity of this argument and its weak points as characterized in the relevant literature, including objections concerning the deceptive character of irrational factors such as emotions and desires. It is shown that the formulations of Lewis’s argument in which the anti-naturalistic conclusion does not deductively follow from the premises can still be considered as adding to our knowledge, when viewed as instances of inductive reasoning. There are also formulations of this argument that can be shown invalid only at the great cost of accepting the premise of the Universe as absurd. Lastly, the objection that Lewis’s reference to irrational factors weakens his argument is also rejected.

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Received: 22/07/2020. Reviewed: 30/08/2020. Accepted: 19/09/2020

Keywords:

Clive S. Lewis, naturalism, theism, argument from desire

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Citation rules

Bylica, P. (2020). Clive S. Lewis’s anti-naturalistic argument from desire. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 56(4), 179–202. https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.4.09

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