https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2025.61.A.18
This article examines Thomas M. Scanlon’s critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), focusing on its validity and implications for his contractualist framework. Scanlon challenges DDE by questioning the moral relevance of distinguishing between intended and merely foreseen consequences. While his critique raises important concerns, it may overlook DDE’s practical utility in specific moral dilemmas. However, this article argues that Scanlon’s broader contractualist framework – distinguishing the meaning, permissibility, and blame of an act – functions as a viable alternative to DDE. Crucially, this framework remains intact even if Scanlon’s critique of DDE is deemed invalid, as it does not depend on rejecting DDE to maintain its coherence or applicability. This analysis highlights the strength of Scanlon’s contractualism as a comprehensive moral theory, independent of DDE’s fate.
----------------------------------------
Received: 23/05/2025. Reviewed: 9/06/2025. Accepted: 25/08/2025.
You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.
Download files
Citation rules
Cited by / Share
Licence
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
English
Język Polski