Thomas M. Scanlon’s Critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility

Karol Wołk

doi:10.21697/spch.2025.61.A.18

Opublikowane: 2025-12-31

Tom 61 Nr 2 (2025)

Thomas M. Scanlon’s Critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility

Karol Wołk

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

Dział: Artykuły naukowe

https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2025.61.A.18

Abstrakt

This article examines Thomas M. Scanlon’s critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), focusing on its validity and implications for his contractualist framework. Scanlon challenges DDE by questioning the moral relevance of distinguishing between intended and merely foreseen consequences. While his critique raises important concerns, it may overlook DDE’s practical utility in specific moral dilemmas. However, this article argues that Scanlon’s broader contractualist framework – distinguishing the meaning, permissibility, and blame of an act – functions as a viable alternative to DDE. Crucially, this framework remains intact even if Scanlon’s critique of DDE is deemed invalid, as it does not depend on rejecting DDE to maintain its coherence or applicability. This analysis highlights the strength of Scanlon’s contractualism as a comprehensive moral theory, independent of DDE’s fate.

----------------------------------------

Zgłoszono: 23/05/2025. Zrecenzowano: 9/06/2025. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 25/08/2025.

Słowa kluczowe:

Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), contractualism, permissibility, intention

Podobne artykuły

<< < 1 2 3 > >>

Możesz również Rozpocznij zaawansowane wyszukiwanie podobieństw dla tego artykułu.

Pobierz pliki

PDF (English)

Zasady cytowania

Wołk, K. (2025). Thomas M. Scanlon’s Critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 61(2), 179–195. https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2025.61.A.18

Cited by / Share

Licencja

Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Bez utworów zależnych 4.0 Międzynarodowe.

Bibliografia

American Medical Association. (2018). Opinion 5.6: Sedation to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care. AMA Code of Medical Ethics.
Google Scholar

General Medical Council. (2010). Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life: Good Practice in Decision Making. GMC (London).
Google Scholar

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2010). Scanlon on the Doctrine of Double Effect. Social Theory and Practice, 36(4), 609-634. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201036430
Google Scholar

Moschella, M. (2023). Contextualizing, Clarifying, and Defending the Doctrine of Double Effect. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 26(2), 297-321. DOI: https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i2.2733
Google Scholar

Piłat, R. (2013). Aporie samowiedzy. Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN.
Google Scholar

Scanlon, T.M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Google Scholar

Scanlon, T.M. (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Harvard University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674043145
Google Scholar

Thomson, J. (1999). Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments. Ethics, 109(3), 497-518. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/233919
Google Scholar

United States Department of Defense. (2016). Department of Defense Law of War Manual. Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.).
Google Scholar

Wedgwood, R. (2011). Scanlon on Double Effect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(2), 409-419. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00517.x
Google Scholar