This article concerns the problem of the normativity of action. In what sense can we say that actions are normative? Can we explain the normativity of action by reference to some established norms, by a relation to the language-user’s knowledge, or through regularities of social practice? Engaging with Robert Brandom, who distinguishes two ways of understanding the relation between rules and their application (regulism and regularism), the author claims that rules are a kind of actions that are normative per se. This view entails that those actions can establish norms and rules of action. Hence, it seems that Brandom’s distinction doesn’t exhaust the realm of all possible relations between actions and norms.
Keywords:
normativity, action, rule, neopragmatism, Brandom Robert, Sellars Wilfrid, Wittgenstein Ludwig
Piekarski, M. (2018). Can action be normative? Some preliminary remarks. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 52(3), 97–108. https://doi.org/10.21697/2016.52.3.05
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Wydział Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Wóycickiego 1/3, 01–938 Warszawa
Poland
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