Emocje epistemiczne i normatywność albo o tym jak pokochać teorię znaczenia

Piotr Kozak

doi:10.21697/2018.54.1.15

Published: 2019-03-29

Vol. 54 No. 1 (2018)

Epistemic emotions and normativity, or how to learn to love the theory of meaning

Piotr Kozak

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

Section: Papers

https://doi.org/10.21697/2018.54.1.15

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss the content and cognitive function of epistemic
emotions such as feelings of correctness and incorrectness. I claim that a proper explanation of such feelings should take into consideration the non-metarepresentational, non-criterial, and non-discursive character of epistemic emotions. With reference to the issue of primitive normativity and rule-following, I argue that we can connect epistemic emotions with the problem of meaning and claim that a specific class of epistemic emotions, i.e. feelings of correctness and incorrectness, is a necessary condition of meaning.

Keywords:

epistemic emotions, primitive normativity, rule-following, content, meaning

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Kozak, P. (2019). Epistemic emotions and normativity, or how to learn to love the theory of meaning. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 54(1), 121–141. https://doi.org/10.21697/2018.54.1.15

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