Realizm strukturalny a problem reprezentacji w nauce w kontekście sporu o realizm naukowy

Janina Buczkowska

doi:10.21697/spch.2020.56.4.08

Published: 2020-12-31

Vol. 56 No. 4 (2020)

Structural realism and the problem of representation in science in the context of the dispute over scientific realism

Janina Buczkowska

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

Section: Papers

https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.4.08

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present structural realism as a realistic position in the discussion around scientific realism – its selected advantages and weaknesses. Structural realism is a response to the challenge that the historical facts theory change in science pose to scientific realism. It refers to the semantic approach to scientific theories and the conceptual apparatus developed in this approach. According to structural realism, what is preserved from mature theories when a theory is changed are their mathematical formulations, which are abstract models of the theory. They are approximately true because they represent the structures of reality in a way that is free from the ontological interpretation imposed by the language of the theory. Structural realism and the semi-realism related to objects, defend the theses of scientific realism in the matter of the approximate truth of scientific theories by realistically interpreting changes in scientific theories. However, they leave aside the problem of representing reality in scientific theories, which is essential for realism. Both of the above-mentioned positions, by referring to the model-theoretic approach to scientific theories assume that a representation is simply an isomorphism of the structure of the mathematical model of a theory and the structure of reality. Such understanding of a representation is too narrow: it does not take into account that the structure of phenomena is not clearly defined. In a theory, a real phenomenon is replaced by a data model, a mathematical structure that reflects the phenomena represented as relationships of the properties defined by the theory. A realistic interpretation of the data model is a necessary supplement to structural realism in order for it to satisfy the main thesis of realism that the reality which scientific theories describe is largely independent of theoretical commitments. This is the basis for defending the thesis about the approximate truth of the theory defended by structural realism. The aim of this paper is to motivate the need to extend structural realism and semi-realism with a richer and more adequate concept of representation. This article presents the basic elements of the contemporary discussion around scientific realism and the positions of structural realism and semi-realism as the reconciliation of scientific realism with the historical facts of theory change. Next, it highlights the consequences for structural realism resulting from the semantic (model theoretic) approach to scientific theories and the related notion of representation as an isomorphism of structures. The final section is devoted to arguing that in order to meet the postulates of scientific realism, structural realism and semi-realism should be supplemented with an explanation of the representation of reality in the data model in accordance with scientific realism.

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Received: 17/09/2020. Reviewed: 12/10/2020. Accepted: 09/11/2020

it, which extends the invariance of mature theories to the detection properties of physical

Keywords:

scientific realism, structural realism, semi-realism, representation in science, model of theory, data model, structure of scientific theory

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Buczkowska, J. (2020). Structural realism and the problem of representation in science in the context of the dispute over scientific realism. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 56(4), 153–178. https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.4.08

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