In this paper the author analyzes Trinkaus Zagzebski’s theory of epistemic authority. This theory underlines the importance of trust in the process of justification of beliefs and it indicates the limitations of so called epistemic egoism. The ideal for epistemic egoism is self-reliance of a subject in justifying his or her beliefs. Trinkaus Zagzebski defends so called epistemic universalism, according to which, the mere fact that a person x claims that p is a prima facie reason in favor of p. In the text the author indicates the weak points of universalism and concludes that either one accepts this point of view with its consequence rejecting the thesis of equality of epistemic subjects or one adheres to the point of view of epistemic egoism. The author claims that Trinkaus Zagzebski gives a reader indications how to improve this standpoint so it does not result in counterintuitive claims.
Keywords:
epistemic authority, epistemic egoism, epistemic universalism, epistemic trust in others, epistemic foundationalism, theoretical and deliberative reasons, epistemic conscientiousness
Dobrzeniecki, M. (2018). Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski’s theory of epistemic authority: about the need for trust in others. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 52(2), 35–52. https://doi.org/10.21697/2016.52.2.02
https://doi.org/10.21697/2016.52.2.02
English
Język Polski