Realizm naukowy wobec zmiany teorii w nauce

Janina Buczkowska

doi:10.21697/spch.2020.56.3.01

Published: 2020-09-30

Vol. 56 No. 3 (2020)

Scientific realism and theory change in science

Janina Buczkowska

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

Section: Papers

https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.3.01

Abstract

An important part of the contemporary dispute between scientific realism and anti-realism is an attempt to give a realistic interpretation to the historical facts of the theory change in science. According to L. Laudan, this fact undermines not only the most important argument for scientific realism but also the most important theses of this position. The argument contested by Laudan is the H. Putnam’s claim that the huge success of science in predicting novel phenomena and developing new technologies proves at least the approximate truth of scientific theories. Laudan, however, shows facts from the history of science when successful theories have turned out to be false over time. A related argument against realism called Pessimistic Induction (PI). According to PI, since previous theories that had been successful turned out to be false from the perspective of newer ones, also current successful theories may turn out to be false in the future. This undermines the thesis that the predictive success of a theory is related to its approximate truthfulness. Therefore, an important challenge for scientific realism is to reconcile its theses with the facts of theory change in science. The most significant solutions to this problem are provided by structural realism proposed by J. Worrall and semirealism by A. Chakrawartty. Both positions adopt the same strategy of defending realism known as divide et impera, stating that not all theories, but only parts of them that are directly related to success, meet the theses of realism. Scientific realism in these formulations is largely limited and weakened. The aim of the article is to present these solutions and show, on the one hand, realistic answers to the PI argument provided by these positions, and on the other hand, the limitations that result from them for scientific realism. The weakened version of realism they propose is also not free from significant difficulties to which both structural realism and semirealism must respond. The identification of these difficulties may be helpful for the further development of the realistic position.

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Received: 05/02/2020. Reviewed: 11/03/2020. Accepted: 24/03/2020

Keywords:

scientific realism, convergent realism, structural realism, semirealism, approximate truth, divide et impera strategy

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Buczkowska, J. (2020). Scientific realism and theory change in science. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 56(3), 5–30. https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.3.01

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