CZYN POPEŁNIONY W „AFEKCIE” WEDŁUG KONCEPCJI ARYSTOTELESA

Przemysław Kubiak

doi:10.21697/zp.2022.22.2.06

Published: 2022-08-20

Vol. 22 No. 2 (2022)

Crimes of passion according to Aristotle

Przemysław Kubiak

Zeszyty Prawnicze

Section: Artykuły

https://doi.org/10.21697/zp.2022.22.2.06

Abstract

Ancient works on philosophy are an important source of information on the laws observed in Antiquity, and Aristotle’s Ethics is a special instance of this phenomenon. The abundance and maturity of his ideas on the law may inspire reﬂection on our current legal system. Aristotle devotes a considerable part of his Ethics to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts. He uses this discussion as a background to some important remarks on the moral assessment of acts committed under the inﬂuence of emotions which may relate to their legal evaluation. His reﬂections hark back to a wide range of the criminal law institutions of his times, such as the ancient concept of an oﬀence and issues related to this, the type and degree of the oﬀender’s guilt, his acting under duress or lack of awareness, as well as more sophisticated issues such as insanity, culpability prior to the commission of the oﬀence, and crimes of passion.

Keywords:

Roman criminal law; crimes of passion; criminal liability; guilt, voluntary/involuntary.

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Kubiak, P. (2022). Crimes of passion according to Aristotle. Zeszyty Prawnicze, 22(2), 89–120. https://doi.org/10.21697/zp.2022.22.2.06

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