JOHNA VERVAEKEGO TEORIA REALIZACJI ISTOTNOŚCI

MATEUSZ SABATOWSKI

doi:10.21697/spch.2026.62.A.06

Published: 2026-11-09

Vol. 62 No. 1 (2026)

JOHN VERVAEKE’S RELEVANCE REALIZATION THEORY

MATEUSZ SABATOWSKI

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

Section: Papers

https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2026.62.A.06

Abstract

This article carries out a critical reconstruction of John Vervaeke’s theory of relevance realization (RR), developed as a response to the explanatory gap in classical computational models of cognition. It traces the evolution of the theory from the 1990s onward, showing how the frame problem and the aporia of the representation–relevance relation have shaped its development within the naturalistic imperative in cognitive science. This paper offers a detailed account of the regulatory mechanisms of RR—cognitive scope, tempering, and prioritization—which, through opponent processing, are intended to enable systems to dynamically balance economic trade-offs. It also examines the theory’s interdisciplinary applications, ranging from predictive processing and general intelligence to personality theory and the concept of flow. In the critical section, a persistent tension is identified between Vervaeke’s rejection of computational and representational approaches and his appeal to anticipatory capacities (carrying representational connotations) as constitutive of relevance realization. The remaining difficulties in formulating a version of RR consistent with its own assumptions indicate the need to revise these assumptions and to reconsider the nature of relevance itself.

Keywords:

Vervaeke John, relevance realization, frame problem, representation–relevance problem, rationality; enactivism, predictive processing, teleology, computability, naturalism

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SABATOWSKI, M. (2026). JOHN VERVAEKE’S RELEVANCE REALIZATION THEORY. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 62(1), 137–176. https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2026.62.A.06

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